The operation’s name, “Am Kelavi,” is not random. It embodies strength drawn from Jewish culture and identity. This name signifies a worldview that provides meaning and responsibility to everyone involved, including civilians on the home front, operational military units, and decision-makers in the Kirya and Jerusalem.

“Behold, the people shall rise up like a lion”: When the Lion Awakens

The lion (“lavi”) appears repeatedly in the Hebrew Bible as a symbol of calm confidence and genuine power. Jacob blesses Judah, referring to him as a “lion’s cub” who crouches confidently, challenging anyone to provoke him. Similarly, Isaiah uses the metaphor of a roaring lion to describe strength and decisiveness.

However, the verse inspiring the current operation against Iran is unique, as it originates from an external source rather than from within the Jewish nation. The words, “Behold, the people shall rise up like a lion and lift themselves like a lion,” were spoken by Balaam, the prophet originally hired to curse Israel but who ultimately blessed them. What special characteristic did Balaam recognize in the Jewish people? He identified the ability to awaken and rise powerfully precisely when needed.

A lion embodies tranquility when resting, yet does not hesitate to act decisively when challenged. Balaam’s message is clear: never underestimate this nation. Even in apparent rest, it possesses immense underlying strength. When necessary, it will rise and persist until victory is achieved and the mission is fully accomplished.

Today, too, we sometimes fail to recognize our internal strength. Internal disagreements can obscure our true nature, occasionally requiring external reminders like Balaam’s prophecy to reawaken our awareness. October 7 served precisely as such a wake-up call. Initially, we believed we lacked the strength to rise and prevail. Yet unfolding events clearly demonstrate our profound capability, rewriting the Middle East’s history. We truly embody the lion’s nature.

Depending Only on Ourselves

Another crucial aspect is emphasized by Rabbi Meir Simcha HaCohen of Dvinsk, known as the Meshech Chochmah, one of Eastern Europe’s greatest rabbis prior to the Holocaust. He highlights an additional attribute of the lion: independence.

He writes: “For behold, the people rise up like a lion… they receive no aid from other kingdoms, only from themselves, just as the lion never seeks external help.” In other words, just as the lion independently defends its pride, Israel must also independently secure itself without relying on foreign powers. This aligns closely with one of the fundamental principles of the Habithonistim (IDSF) movement: Israel’s security depends solely on itself.

Drawing Strength from Jewish Heritage

“Am Kelavi” (“Like a Lion”) compels us not merely to defend ourselves but to take initiative, assume clear responsibility, make decisive choices, and achieve victory. This responsibility extends beyond ourselves to future generations and the heritage from which we draw our strength. It signifies the courage required to face immense challenges, unwavering determination to accomplish our goals, and mental resilience under fire. This spirit guides us in battle and everyday life.

Selecting a biblical name for the operation provides a clear reminder: our strength is not merely in weaponry, intelligence, or technology. It also, and perhaps predominantly, resides in our human spirit. In this ongoing conflict and in every struggle against adversaries, the Israeli people remain committed to self-defense, firmly rooted in their heritage and just cause.

הפוסט Like a Lion: Not Just an Operation Name, but a Worldview הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Striking Alone, Three Times Over

In 1981, Israel made a fateful decision. Flying deep into hostile Iraqi airspace, it destroyed Saddam Hussein’s Osirak nuclear reactor, halting a looming atomic threat before it could explode. The world condemned the strike—but Israel had no choice. Again in 2007, Israel wiped out Syria’s secret nuclear site at al-Kibar, acting alone to prevent another catastrophe. Now, in 2025, Israel has struck deep inside Iran to dismantle the most advanced and dangerous nuclear program on Earth. Three times in half a century, Israel has taken on a task no one else would. It isn’t just the world’s nuclear janitor. It is the last line of defense against the unimaginable.

Warnings and Paralysis: The World Watched

For years, Israel was warned: a strike on Iran would ignite the region, crash economies, and unleash Hezbollah. Media outlets and foreign leaders forecast apocalyptic consequences. International conferences set ever-moving diplomatic conditions. The message was clear: Israel was too small, too isolated, and too late to act. Meanwhile, Iran pressed forward—enriching uranium, digging fortified bunkers, exporting missiles, and arming proxies from Gaza to Yemen. It moved with alarming efficiency toward nuclear breakout whilst the world, paralyzed by fear or apathy, did nothing. Only one nation prepared to act decisively.

Drawing the Red Line

The U.S. issued warnings of “serious consequences.” The IAEA published reports. The EU expressed “concern.” But no one enforced a red line. Israel did. Through intelligence, cyber sabotage, electronic warfare, and precise airstrikes, Israel hit Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—not out of bravado but necessity. Iran’s response was bluster, drones, and proxy skirmishes. The regional apocalypse never came. The strike proved what few dared to believe: bold action could deter chaos rather than cause it.

A Moral Reckoning

The uncomfortable truth? No one else was willing to stop Iran. Not the UN, not Europe, not Washington. Israel’s action wasn’t just strategic—it was moral. It exposed the impotence of international institutions that profess human rights while tolerating tyranny. It revealed a strategic decay in a world where fear of instability outweighs the will to confront evil. Israel acted while others debated. And as always, the cycle repeats: Israel strikes, the world criticizes, then quietly exhales in relief.

Behind the Scenes: The Myth of Isolation

Despite public silence, Israel was not truly alone. Gulf states offered quiet support. European capitals, though critical, now sleep more easily. In Washington, officials voice concern but admit privately: Israel did what others wouldn’t. It took the shot. The others blinked. Even in Germany, some voices spoke out. CDU leader Friedrich Merz said what many only think: Israel acted where others wouldn’t—and the world should be grateful. It’s a rare, public acknowledgment of the hard truth—that Israel did the dirty work others feared. That kind of clarity deserves recognition, not cynicism. This is the myth of Israeli isolation. True isolation is inaction—waiting for green lights that never come. Israel understands sovereign responsibility. When your nation stands between civilization and catastrophe, you don’t outsource defense. You act—decisively and unapologetically.

The Cost—and the Shift

There will be fallout. Iran will retaliate through proxies and cyberwarfare. The UN will condemn. Some allies will call for “restraint.” But a deeper shift has begun. Young Iranians will notice cracks in the regime’s armor. Sunni states will recalibrate. And Western leaders—despite their public handwringing—know this strike may have averted devastation. Israel once again did what no one else dared. It may be criticized now, but history will judge differently. The world will remember the airstrike, but quietly forget the courage and clarity it took to carry it out.

Redefining Deterrence

From Osirak to al-Kibar to Tehran, Israel has reshaped the balance of power through preemptive action. These strikes weren’t just military operations—they were strategic inflection points. While others hesitated, Israel acted. The global order is fracturing. Institutions fumble, alliances waver, and threats multiply. In this dangerous vacuum, Israel has redrawn the boundaries of deterrence: no nuclear program is beyond reach, no threat untouchable when a democracy is willing to stand alone. The world must decide: catch up—or continue to flinch in the face of danger. Because while Israel acts, the rest of the world waits. And waits. And waits.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Alone but Resolute: Why Israel Still Guards the Nuclear Threshold הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel’s economy stands predominantly on the country’s prolific high-tech industry.

Some 14% of the country’s economy is made up of the high-tech sector, which is one of the economy’s main engines of growth, and responsible for a major share of government revenues. However, the war in Gaza saw vast numbers of that sector’s employees serve in reserves duty, meaning they were absent from their jobs for prolonged periods of time.

A country’s economy is one of the main pillars of its national security, and thus Israel’s economy is an inalienable link in the very existence of the State of Israel. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement set out to gain better understanding of the implications of the ongoing war on the economy of Israel.

For this end we interviewed senior member of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement – former Director General of the Ministry of Communications and IDF Chief Communications Officer, Brigadier General (res.) Nati Cohen on his views on this matter.

Although Israel is entrenched in a long-term multi-arena war, “we are viewing the return of investor confidence in the Israeli economy, especially because the country is at war”, asserts Cohen.

The economy plays a crucial role in creating optimal conditions for funding the costs of the war as well as in the continued existence of the State of Israel. The necessity to allocate financial support to the reservists and their families, both who bear the main brunt of the fighting, alongside the costs of rehabilitation of the individual in Israeli society are done through the reallocation of budgets from their usual purpose in times of peace, to the emergency channels that have been imposed upon Israel.

It is important to stress that it is only natural for a country dealing with a prolonged acute state of emergency, to experience economic trials. The effect of the economy on a country’s national security and vice versa is not mutually exclusive as the state of a country’s national security and its economy are tied in an interlinked cycle.  One manifestation of this correlation is the steep costs of manufacturing of armaments, which meet higher demand in times of war.

As Israel’s high-tech industry draws heavily on foreign investors, its economy leans on high-tech, and its national security is dependent on the state of its economy – it follows that foreign investment plays a crucial role in Israel’s national security.

The reality at the moment is that by natural cause and effect, Israel’s economy sustained a hit from the war with large budgets allocated to war-related causes such as military activity, financial remunerations for fighters and their families in lieu of lost salaries, and medical and emotional support for the war’s victims. Yet on the other hand, data from the past year show that there is also potential for leveraging the war to sustain economic balance.

Does the war have any positive effect at all on Israel’s economy?

In sharp contrast to all of the negative economic outlooks and the credit downgrade Israel had sustained, it was actually the year of the war that saw a rise of 77% in foreign investments. “This stems from the understanding among investors that every war has a day after the war”, says Cohen. “On the one hand, Israel is in a state of war, but on the other – war is also an opportunity for creativity, innovation, thinking out of the box. Start-ups are born from unanswered needs, and the war in Israel had bred such needs, offering numerous opportunities to entrepreneurs”.

It is important to mention that the above said does not in any manner suggest that war is positive and desired, nor is it a choice made to create opportunities; however, one must not ignore the larger picture that includes a silver lining that should be considered.

Events the likes of war serve as an important test for a country’s capabilities, one which if Israel learns the right lessons could serve to boost its economy, no matter how chaotic and difficult the current situation is.

One engine for such an opportunity for growth is Israel’s world-renowned technology industry.

When and how had Israel become a high-tech superpower?

“The foundation for Israel as a platform for becoming a startup nation , starting 25 years ago, had been laid when Bill Gates visited the country. At the time I was serving in the IDF as a young officer (Major) and was selected to give Gates a tour of the IDF’s school of computer science”.

What was Bill Gates’ impression of the IDF’s technology unites?

Cohen remembers Bill Gate’s impression of the visit as a definitive moment in Israel’s high-tech industry: “The day I visited the IDF I understood why Israel is a start-up nation. When I see these young 18-year-olds learning in about a half a year what takes us four years to learn in university, and then serve another three to four years as they sign on to serve longer, they gain considerable experience which they then bring to the civilian market”.

What is the role of the IDF in Israel’s economy?

“The IDF is a factory of sorts that is like an assembly line for its people. The army provides these people with the knowledge and ability to become future entrepreneurs, found start-up companies and acquire technological prowess while developing creativity, initiative and the ability to think out-of-the-box. This is in fact Israel’s atomic mass and relative advantage”, explains Cohen.

What do foreign investors see as unique to the Israeli market?

“Israel holds favorable objective conditions specifically in terms of start-up entrepreneurship and investments. It is a greenhouse for innovation and academia that nurtures the conditions for the growth and thriving of start-up companies”.

What are the main magnets for investors in Israel?

“Trust and the demonstration of ability”.

What does that mean?

In terms of trust, Cohen says that “since the Second Lebanon War, where the decision was made to develop the Iron Dome air-defense system – four years were needed to create an adequate response. Since the present war is a prolonged campaign, there is the need for quick solutions which are developed on the fly. This is the advantage of the trust in Israel’s military high-tech industry in that context”.

On the one hand, it would appear that a prolonged war taxes Israel’s stability and economy over time. On the other – it produces a slew of opportunities, and hence these fields of development enjoy investor confidence. One example are the reservists, who after months on the battlefield, come back to their technological greenhouses full of creative ideas, and present them in their respective companies. This process elicits the confidence of investors, who understand the unique opportunities that lie in this cycle.

In regards to the demonstration of ability, Cohen cites several cases in point: “Wiz, for example, is an engine of imitation. Investors copy the Wiz investment model in their own investments. Wiz investors had not started to invest in the company a month or two ago, but four or five years ago. A potential investor of Israeli high-tech sees profits only within three to five years and investors understand that cycle all too well”.

Do you have data that supports that claim?

“In 2020 Israel had about 3,000 startups. By 2021 that number grew exponentially to some 6,500. If you compare the size of Israel to Germany and England, although Israel is only about one quarter the size of Germany – that means that withing a year, investments have quadrupled themselves!”

Which companies express the greatest confidence in Israeli high-tech?

“Facebook, Google and Intel have considerable investments in the Israeli market. They establish greenhouses in Israel and invest large amounts of money in the development of R&D centers in the country, which are responsible for the impressive growth over the past years”.

Where there years in which investments ebbed?

“We witnessed a sharp drop in foreign investments, VC funds, banking and other foreign activity in Israel’s financial market during the years of the social protest against the judicial reform that raged up to the war; however, we are currently witnessing an impressive return of confidence during the year and a half of the war”.

How do you explain this?

“The fact that Israeli society as a whole is mobilized to the war effort, and that investors see that at the end of the day, there is a strong sense of solidarity and mutual aid in Israeli society, boosts confidence in Israel’s high-tech industry as a result. It was when investors thought that the country is on route to becoming a non-democratic society according to western standards that they drew their activity from the Israeli market”.

What is important for investors in 2025?

“Regardless of being Jewish or non-Jewish, investors look for a stable government. The protests around the judicial reform [up to the outbreak of the Gaza War] led eventually to the destabilization of Israel’s high-tech ecosystem and in turn – of Israel’s economic stability. This manifested in the choices the investors themselves made. In other words, when we look at the war, it seems that it is actually the years of security instability in Israel that bring in the highest rate of investments in Israeli high-tech. In years of apparent instability of the democracy – investor confidence wavers because at the end of the day, they want to invest in a stable, democratic environment. That is why investments ebbed during the social protest and rose during the war”.

What is the reputation of the IDF among other militaries in terms of technology?

“Case in point: military systems that in the past, in times of relative quiet, have been updated once a year, have been updated no less than 60 times within four months during the war due to demands arising in the ongoing fighting. This is a definitive occurrence as far as the trust on part of foreign militaries towards the IDF. If the Polish army for example, wants to purchase a command and control system, or a drone system, and it has the choice of Israel’s military industry as oppose to other military industries – it would choose a system that had been updated some 40 times, and is at peak performance, even if it is more expensive, as compared with a cheaper system, which can only perform on the bases of preset models, experiments and trials, as oppose to real time data input”.

How do you explain the marked positive change on part of investors’ attitude toward Israel’s defense industry?

“This occurred in light of Israel’s force buildup during the war as well as the fact that Israel had proven its mettle on the battlefield. Israel’s military industry is highly creative and rolls solutions for the battlefield off its production line in real time – this serves as a relative advantage over other military industries. The UCAV and drone attacks, for example, caused considerable damage to Israel, `which was caught without an adequate response in the start of the war. But thanks to the industry’s prowess, it is now only a matter of months until military giants RAFAEL and Elbit will provide laser systems that can terminate that threat”.

The “proof of ability” that Cohen talks about is a very lucrative growth engine for Israel’s economy

Since the start of the war, Israel’s defense industry recorded a steep growth rate, with 2024 marking a record year, with peak revenues amounting to a staggering 70 billion dollars.

The unprecedented arms race forced upon Europe is eying Israel’s battlefield tested and proven military industry.

Many countries in Europe had already acquired Israeli missile systems worth hundreds of millions of dollars and it seems like this is only the beginning for Israel’s economy.

Hence, on the one hand, the war poses difficult challenges for the Israeli economy but on the other – it presents very lucrative opportunities that Israel would be wise to capitalize upon, through which it could expedite its recovery.

But an economy stands not only on its investors, but also on the human capital of its society. In Israel, the majority of society enlisted in the security forces over the past year and a half to protect the country.

How does a large-scale enlistment of reservists affect high-tech?

“The larger companies accept the situation and support those of their employees who serve in reserves’ duty. I myself had to let employees go to serve in combat units as part of their reserves’ duty”.

Who paid the price?

“The small startup companies were the ones who bore the heaviest brunt of their employees’ reserves’ duties– some of them serving as much as four tours. It did not hurt the critical mass, as most employees returned to their jobs sharper and more creative. Since Israeli high-tech has a mixture of populations, it is pretty balanced socially, which compensated for the absence of the reservists”.

In conclusion, Israel has what it takes to manage the required balances to maintain economic growth in order to minimize and recover from the damage sustained by small businesses and the country’s civilians who were hurt financially, emotionally and medically as a result of the war.

This balance can be achieved through the contribution of Israel’s high-tech and military industries, which are yielding very high profits despite the war. Captains of the industry’s large-cap companies have a crucial role in the rehabilitation of the State of Israel through its economy, support and contribution to the general good.

הפוסט The Effects of the Gaza War on Israel’s Economy – Snapshot הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

1. For decades, writing about the political activities of the entrenched elites in Israel has been a no-go zone. Drawing attention to the agenda of this group has been out of bounds. But gradually and unavoidably, it has become an accepted subject of public attention as a well-organized vocal minority has been systematically targeting the unity of Israeli society to destabilize and overthrow the legally elected government. This political and social assault has effectively become the eighth front in Israel’s existential war. We can no longer ignore the danger posed by this group. We must understand the strategy of the other side and defeat it. The approach of strategic defeatism dates back to World War I when the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin (1870-1924), accepted the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took the Russian Empire out of the war in March 1918. The terms were draconian, with Russia losing several major territories, including Ukraine and Finland, but accepting defeat made it possible to save the Russian Revolution. According to British historian John W. Wheeler-Bennett, “The battleground was that of social struggle, and therein frontiers mattered little in comparison with the fight of the proletarian versus the capitalist …. ‘He is no Socialist,’ wrote Lenin in an open letter to American workers, ‘who does not understand that the victory over the bourgeoisie may require losses of territory and defeats. He is no Socialist who will not sacrifice his fatherland for the triumph of the social revolution.’” In August 1915, Lenin wrote that those who want revolution must work for the defeat of their own country.  When he wrote, he hoped that the first uprising of the workers would break out in Imperial Germany, but it did not happen.  Nevertheless, the idea is clear: …. A “revolutionary struggle against the war” is an empty and meaningless exclamation… unless it means revolutionary action against one’s own government even in time of war.  One has only to think a little to understand this.  And revolutionary action in wartime against one’s own government undoubtedly and incontrovertibly means not only desiring its defeat, but really facilitating such defeat….1

   In early March 1918, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, the British consul in Moscow, first met with Lenin and recorded his personal impression:

   “…. In his creed of world-revolution Lenin was as unscrupulous and as uncompromising as a Jesuit, and in his code of political ethics the end to be obtained justified the employment of any weapon.  He gave me, — correctly as events proved—all the information for which I asked….

   Lockhart asked Lenin about the possible outcome of the Great War, because, at that moment, it appeared that the Imperial German Army had the advantage.  He then described Lenin’s reply:

   “Lenin smiled.  Like all your countrymen you are thinking in concrete military terms.  You ignore the psychological factor.  This war will be settled in the rear and not in the trenches.” 2

   Later, on October 10, 1918, Lenin wrote that it was necessary to “disorganize” the army: “Not a single great revolution has ever refrained from ‘disorganizing’ the army and cannot refrain from doing so …. The first commandment of every victorious revolution, as Marx and Engels repeatedly emphasized, was: Smash the old army, dissolve it and replace it by a new one.””3

   From Lenin’s reply to Bruce Lockhart, it is clear that in real time he understood the kind of war he was fighting and that it would be “settled in the rear [the home front] and not in the trenches.” Any reader of Carl von Clausewitz, On War, will remember that “this is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

   Beyond the longer-term strategy of defeatism and seeing the battle-ground as one of social struggle, Lenin advocated the tactic of taking advantage of existing sources of discontent.  He wrote: “Our task is to utilize every manifestation of discontent, and to gather and turn to the best account every protest, however small.”  While the redemption of the hostages, kidnapped on October 7, has great merit inherently, the enemies of the lawfully elected government have used this method as a political weapon.

2. On Thursday, April 10, 2025, a group of nearly one thousand reserve pilots and air force staff published a petition calling for the immediate release of the Israeli hostages seized and held by Hamas, even at the price of ending the current war. This really means accepting national defeat. It was reported that sixty of the signatories were in active reserves, but most of the 1,000 were veterans, no longer in service; a small number were unidentified. The headline of this petition read: “A Call for the Return of all the Kidnapped Hostages, even at the at the Price of Ending the Hostilities!” …. “We, the team of fighters of the Air Force, in the reserves and retired, demand the return of the kidnapped [hostages] without delay …. End the fighting and return all the kidnapped [persons] – Now! Every day that goes by endangers their lives. Every extra moment of hesitation is a disgrace.” Illustration of the Reservists’ Petition [At the end of this article]: Before the publication of this petition, on Tuesday, April 8, the Jerusalem Post quoted the KAN news service, as follows: “Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar was most troubled by one paragraph in particular: ‘At this time the war serves mainly political interests and not security interests.  Continuing the war does not contribute to any of Israel’s stated war goals and will lead to the deaths of the hostages, IDF soldiers and innocent civilians.’” It was reported that Commander Tomer Bar objected to this defeatist message which accused the government of duplicity and bad faith.  Its subversive language dates back to the propaganda of the First World War, namely, that government policy makers are acting under false pretenses. The Times of Israel gave the background to the petition and the official response as follows: “After its publication, Commander Tomer Bar, along with IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, moved to dismiss the active reservists who signed the letter, with the IDF saying that it has no issue with reservists protesting any matter in their civilian lives, as [long as] they do it without using the name of the military or their role.”  Specifically, they objected to the use of the ‘Air Force Brand’ for political protest. On the same subject, Channel 12 independently reported that the reservists intended to publish their letter on Tuesday morning, April 8, before the hearing of the High Court of Justice on the efforts to fire [Ronen] Bar, head of Israel’s Secret Service [Shin Bet]. We must ask who really orchestrated this political initiative as well as others. Who drafted this letter?  And who paid for it? Despite the fact that the signatories of this letter claim to be retired Israel Air Force staff and reservists, its real purpose was to promote defeatism by undermining public trust in the government in time of war.  Furthermore, the petition of April 10 was not an isolated event. On April 14, the Jerusalem Post reported that 1790 graduates of the elite Talpiot intelligence program published a letter in support of the IAF reservists’ petition, and separately, 250 doctors in the reserves joined them. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s initial public reaction was to declare that the letter came from a noisy fringe group whose only aim is to topple the government. Nobel Laureate Professor Israel Aumann stated that this act will increase the price that Israel will have to pay for the hostages and Dr. Mordechai Kedar opined that this declaration of weakness is a gift to Israel’s enemies in the Arab world. The purpose of the Prime Minister’s pre-recorded address to the nation on Saturday night April 19 was to counter the effects of the reservists’ petition and to reiterate the government’s determination to achieve their strategic goals.
3. If we look back half a century, we may learn from the strategy and tactics which the North Vietnamese used in order to manipulate American public opinion and disrupt the American home front and the orderly conduct of foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor, wrote an autobiographical account of this era, The Washington Years (Boston, 1979), in which he documented how an aggressive and forceful domestic campaign against the war destabilized the administration and undermined its ability to govern. Kissinger’s observations show that there are real parallels between the domestic disorder which was fomented during the Vietnam War and the turmoil on the home front in Israel. The following are several of Kissinger’s observations which may apply to our present situation: “My theme was constant, that the war had to be ended as an act of policy, not in response to demonstrations”“Our opposition came from those who wanted more rapid withdrawal, if not defeat, and this destroyed our bargaining position.  Our enemies would only benefit from our domestic collapse.” “We [American policy makers] acted as if the process of negotiations operated on its own inherent logic independent of the military balance –, indeed, that military pressures might jeopardize the negotiations by antagonizing our adversary or demonstrating bad faith. Nor surprisingly, a stalemate of nearly two years’ duration followed, during which our casualties equaled those we had endured when hostilities were unconstrained. Treating force and diplomacy as discrete phenomena caused our power to lack purpose and our negotiations to lack force.” On the evening of April 15, 1972, Anatoly Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union, made a discrete visit to Kissinger’s home in order to discuss lending Soviet diplomatic support to American efforts to end the war.  Requesting Russian help, Kissinger said: “Anatol, for us it isn’t just an international problem; it has now become a major domestic problem.  We cannot permit our domestic structure to be constantly tormented by this country ten thousand miles away.  The war must now be brought to a conclusion, and we will do it either together with the other great powers or alone.” This conversation shows that Kissinger understood the cumulative effect of a systematic campaign of domestic defeatism.  It was demoralizing and dangerous. The similarities between the strategy of the North Vietnamese and that of Hamas should help us better understand the kind of war we are fighting. However, if policy makers in Israel ignore the reality of the Eighth Front, the outcome of the present war could be even more precarious.

   One of obstacles that Henry Kissinger had to overcome was that Hanoi even refused to discuss American proposals and it became necessary to get the negotiations moving. In the event, massive B-52 attacks on Hanoi, in April 1972, proved to be an effective catalyst.

   After devoting attention to Henry Kissinger’s lessons with regard to negotiating in general, one may reconstruct his views with regard to the petition of the reservists and the claim that accepting defeat would facilitate the immediate release of the Israeli hostages.  According to Kissinger, negotiations must be supported by vigorous military force.  In view of his reasoning and the lessons of his experience, it is unlikely that defeat and humiliation can bring about the return of all of our hostages.

4. Based on the open sources, we can make a reasonable guess as to the motives and the methods driving today’s political warfare in Israel. It cannot be ruled out that the real goals of the so-called “Resistance” are civil war, national defeat, and revolution. Although the Soviet Union has passed into history, certain political agitators in Israel, while claiming moral superiority in the name of “democracy,” –as they understand it, — have adopted Lenin’s legacy of political warfare.

Copy of IAF Reservists’ Petition Below:

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

This article was originally published in Jewish News Syndicate (jns).

הפוסט Israel’s Eighth Front: The Challenge of Domestic Defeatism הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Recent statements by retired Major General Yair Golan, head of the Democratic Party, have sparked significant controversy. In an interview with Israeli radio station Kan Bet, Golan accused Israel of “killing children as a hobby,” conducting “warfare against civilians,” and seeking the “uprooting of populations.” These remarks, seen as severe accusations against the State of Israel and the IDF, have resonated widely, particularly in Arab media and among Palestinian groups and anti-Israel propagandists.

Arab Media: “Internal Testimony of Crimes”

Outlets such as Al-Quds Al-Arabi prominently highlighted Golan’s remarks, referring to him as the “former deputy chief of staff of the occupation army,” emphasizing his senior military background and familiarity with Israeli operations. His comments were presented as internal admissions by a high-ranking Israeli official about crimes committed by Israel in Gaza. Arab commentators have described these statements as “incriminating evidence” and called for prosecuting senior Israeli political and military officials for “genocide and crimes against humanity.”

“In any case, Israelis (not just their government and army) ignore the suffering of the Palestinian people, particularly in Gaza, except for a few isolated voices,” one article stated. Additionally, the prominent Arab newspaper recalled Golan’s previous controversial statements: “It is worth mentioning that before retiring from the army ten years ago, Golan compared the occupation’s crimes in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 to events in the 1930s, openly alluding to Nazism.”

The Palestinian terrorist organization Mujahideen Movement stated that Golan’s comments constituted “incriminating evidence” that justifies severe international sanctions against Israel. “Golan’s statements once again confirm that the enemy government is responsible for continuing the brutal war in Gaza and for disrupting all mediation efforts. The reactions from various Zionist parties reveal the collective criminal and fascist mentality dominating the occupying entity, which rejects any criticism of its brutal crimes,” they said.

The Palestinian news agency “Quds,” affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, reported, “Yair Golan, the leader of the Democratic Party in the occupying state, sparked widespread anger among both the government and opposition.” They added that “his remarks follow a series of criticisms by former senior military officials regarding the army’s conduct in Gaza. Analysts interpret these critiques as part of an internal effort to rehabilitate the army’s image amid mounting international pressure and potential prosecution of Israel for war crimes.”

Al-Jazeera highlighted Golan’s statements, noting, “These declarations directly attribute responsibility to Netanyahu, placing him at the heart of accusations regarding committed atrocities.”

“The significance of these statements lies not only in their content but also in their appeal to international accountability, presenting a notable paradox,” Al-Jazeera commented. Ahmad Jabarin, described by Al-Jazeera as an “Israel expert,” added, “It is the Israeli government that calls for displacement and starvation. Whenever accused, it immediately labels such accusations antisemitic, despite these claims being based on actions it openly carries out and publicly acknowledges.”

Jabarin also suggested that such statements gain further significance due to the positions of countries like France, Britain, and Canada, along with recent U.S. actions, concluding, “All this points toward one reality: Israel must wash its hands of Palestinian blood.”

The governmental media office in Gaza responded by referencing “bloody massacres committed by the Israeli occupation army against defenseless civilians in Gaza,” linking these acts to Golan’s statements:

“These massacres align with unprecedented statements by a senior Israeli official, Yair Golan, former deputy chief of staff of the Israeli army, who explicitly admitted Israel ‘wages war against civilians,’ ‘kills children as a hobby,’ and aims for ‘population displacement.’ This represents a clear admission by the Israeli military establishment of ongoing genocide against our Palestinian people. We affirm that this criminal behavior, supported by incitement and hateful rhetoric, exposes the true nature of the occupation as a racist colonial regime openly engaged in organized terror.”

Consequences and Implications

The battle for public perception and Israel’s legitimacy remains a critical front in the Gaza conflict. Arab media reactions demonstrate how Golan’s statements provided fertile ground for constructing a misleading narrative about massacres and genocide. It is no coincidence that Hamas, hostile media, and anti-Israel rights organizations eagerly embraced these statements.

While Israel exerts considerable effort internationally to clarify that its military operations target terrorists rather than civilians, statements like Golan’s suggest systematic policies aimed at civilian deaths. Such claims are not only false but extremely harmful to Israel’s international reputation, potentially affecting political, diplomatic, and legal decisions on the global stage.

Comments of this nature severely undermine Israel’s public diplomacy efforts and reinforce Palestinian propaganda, which often contains antisemitic elements. Statements like Golan’s reinforce a victimhood narrative carefully cultivated by Palestinian propagandists. They see such remarks not merely as internal political critiques but as insider testimony that Israel systematically commits crimes against civilians.

Such statements further facilitate attempts to diplomatically isolate Israel, encourage boycotts, and amplify international pressure. Moreover, they can create divides between Israel and its global supporters, undermining Israel’s narrative and contradicting established facts: that the IDF targets terrorists, not civilians. Additionally, the IDF consistently undertakes extensive precautions, including issuing pre-attack warnings and investing considerable resources to minimize civilian casualties.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Reactions in Arab Media to Yair Golan’s Statements הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Amid one of the most dramatic years for Israel’s security and future since its founding, the country’s third Security Conference convened under the banner “The Year of Opportunity.” The main message was clear: this is no time for hesitation – but a time for action.

The conference, organized annually by the IDSF movement, featured prominent figures from Israel’s political and defense leadership. Among the speakers were Minister of Economy and Industry Nir Barkat, Minister of Education Yoav Kisch, Gilad Erdan (Israel’s former Ambassador to the UN and the US), and David Friedman (former US Ambassador to Israel). President Isaac Herzog, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar, and Defense Minister Israel Katz addressed the conference via recorded messages.

True to the broad approach that characterizes the IDSF movement’s work since its establishment, the conference focused on Israel’s national security in the broadest sense. A significant portion of the event was devoted to ways to bolster national resilience, social cohesion, and education toward Zionist values, recognizing these as the foundation on which the nation’s military and diplomatic strength is built.

In addition to lectures and interviews, the conference offered three panel discussions addressing the main opportunities facing Israel at present:

• A diplomatic opportunity panel on “the day after Gaza,” alongside considerations regarding Judea and Samaria.

• A regional opportunity panel dealing with the Trump administration’s policies, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East.

• A social opportunity panel asking how best to seize the potential for victory through settlement efforts and by revitalizing the Gaza border region and Israel’s north.

Participants on these panels included former senior security officials who are also members of IDSF, leading academic researchers and think-tank directors, high-ranking government and local authority officials, social entrepreneurs, and civic activists.

President Herzog: “We Must Emerge from the War Stronger”

President Isaac “Buzi” Herzog welcomed conference attendees, stating:

“We are in a critical period that calls for in-depth rethinking of the security frameworks we have relied upon and the security paradigms that we urgently need to adopt. As part of that, we must also delve into the current state of our society and nation and figure out how to emerge from this war stronger – not only in terms of security and diplomacy, but above all as a stronger Israeli society.”

Herzog also stressed the importance of turning the war imposed on Israel into an “opportunity not only to decisively repel threats posed by Iran and its proxies, but also to develop alliances and agreements across the region – particularly moving toward normalization with Saudi Arabia and extending relationships as far as India – thus reshaping realities for generations to come, integrating us further into the region. Not naively or blindly, but as a cornerstone of fortifying our security.”

He then praised IDSF’s contribution to public dialogue: “We do need not agree on everything – and indeed, I do not always agree with all positions – but I believe it is crucial to have a voice that acknowledges and speaks to Israel’s diversity. And unlike many in the TV studios, that voice is presented with statesmanship and respect, seeking to speak, to engage in discussion, to unite rather than to polarize.”

Defense Minister: “We Will Keep Striking Hard Anyone Who Threatens Us”

Defense Minister Israel Katz summed up a year and a half of sustained fighting on multiple fronts: “There is no doubt our adversaries now receive a loud and clear message: whoever raises a hand against Israel will have that hand cut off.”

Katz reiterated that the IDF and the Israeli defense establishment have inflicted substantial damage on Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian “axis of evil,” thereby undermining Assad’s regime in Syria. He added that they would also deal a decisive blow to the Houthi terror organization in Yemen, “just as we have done in Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and other arenas.”

Katz informed the audience that the defense establishment is currently creating a directorate responsible for facilitating voluntary emigration for Gaza residents who wish to leave, in line with the vision of President Trump. Katz concluded his remarks by expressing appreciation for the IDSF movement.

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, Chair of the IDSF movement, began his talk with a forceful statement: “We are living in a historic, almost biblical era of immense opportunities. Let’s start talking about a vision for the day after the war, and make the most of these wartime opportunities to create a better future for Israel.”

He argued that in the coming months, Israel has an opportunity to secure a clear victory on all fronts – bringing down Hamas’ regime in Gaza, recovering the hostages, and striking a decisive blow (in tandem with the United States) against Iran’s nuclear program.

Avivi also warned about the growth of a radical Sunni axis – Turkey, Qatar, and ISIS – amid Iran’s potential weakening. He believes the solution lies in forming an American–Israeli–Sunni front that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, and other countries. “We want to see Russia and China drawn closer to the West and to us – not to Iran’s side.”

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila: From Collapse to Growth

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila, CEO of IDSF, opened his remarks by quoting from “In the City of Slaughter,” a poem by Haim Nahman Bialik depicting the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, and drawing parallels to the massacre on October 7.

He noted the crucial difference between the two tragedies was our collective reaction:

“We are no longer the same Jews, no longer a persecuted people hiding behind barrels of oil. We are a people who enlist in an army, who band together, who overcome adversity and gather the strength to fight for our land. We are a people who go to battle to bring back our hostages, and we are also sovereign in our land – free to decide to pay a price for their liberation. Yes, friends, we face problems – but these are the problems of a nation within its homeland. They are the trials and hardships of a growing, developing people – one that argues, but ultimately prevails.”

Or Yissachar: “Israelis no longer chase illusions of a quick fix – they demand action”

Or Yissachar, Deputy Director for Research and Content at IDSF, presented the “IDSF Index” for the first quarter of 2025. The survey explored what the public sees as the top priorities for the nation, comparing the results to a similar poll carried out by the movement’s research department in 2022.

The findings reveal that 51% of Israelis view the Iranian threat as the most urgent challenge today – a sharp increase from 35% in 2022. Only 10% of Jewish Israelis consider peace with the Palestinians feasible, with 80% of Israel’s Jewish population and 68% of the general public opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital. On the other hand, a significant majority – 78% – favor expanding the Abraham Accords and bolstering ties between Israel and other moderate states in the region.

“These numbers,” Yissachar concluded, “reflect not just a shift in public opinion but also a deeper change in mindset: Israelis are no longer chasing illusions of easy solutions – they want action, stability, strength, and security.”

Merav Leshem Gonen: “National resilience is built when it is allowed to hear other opinions”

The conference included panel discussions, lectures, and one-on-one interviews covering a range of topics, with emphasis on the security, diplomatic, and social opportunities that Israel can pursue in the wake of the devastating events of October 7.

Particularly emotional moments came when Merav Leshem Gonen, mother of Romi Gonen – released after 471 days in Hamas captivity – took the stage, alongside entrepreneur and media professional Orit Mark Ettinger, who lost many family members to terror attacks and in the current war over the years, yet in her grief never abandoned hope and faith.

The participants’ personal accounts and expert commentary merged into an overarching vision resting on one core insight: this is the historic moment in which Israel can solidify its position as a regional and global power, deepen its national resilience, and carve from the shock and turmoil of war not only new strength – but genuine hope.

A “Year of Opportunity”: “The nation of Israel needs a rebirth narrative”

Israel’s Third Security Conference differed from its predecessors. The first conference, held several months before October 7, spotlighted IDSF’s clear warning that multiple fronts – stretching from Gaza to Iran – were coalescing against Israel. The second conference took place under the shadow of the war that followed, triggered in part by ignoring IDSF’s alerts about the approaching conflict. The current conference has begun to glimpse rays of light and hope at the end of war.

“It’s no coincidence that we titled this conference ‘The Year of Opportunity.’ Yes, we took severe hits on October 7, and the war continues more than a year and a half later. But we can also see achievements,” noted Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi at the conference’s conclusion. “I keep saying we stand at a historic juncture – ranging from fully dismantling the Iranian threat, through broad regional peace agreements, to the prosperity that lies ahead once Israel takes firm hold of itself. The scale of these opportunities is still hard for us to fathom.”

The conference closed with the singing of Hatikvah – “The Hope”, Israel’s anthem – which perfectly captured the spirit of the event: a profound belief that soon we will see the hostages return home, and that Israeli society will reunite around a shared vision that will propel it into a new and brighter future.

Photo credits: Omri Abuhatzira, Channel 14

הפוסט From Crisis to Opportunity: Israel’s Third Security Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

If tension surrounding the word “Zionism” in the past mainly pertained to disputes among the various streams, over the years increasingly more complexities have been piled upon this word. Nowadays, countries and organizations hostile to Israel speak of the “Zionist enemy”. Various bodies in Israel and around the world, mainly from the radical left, have also adopted “anti-Zionist” attitudes that attempt to portray Zionism as racist, and even call for the delegitimization of the State of Israel.

Sometimes it seems that the word “Zionism” has always existed – but it was coined, according to most assessments, only on April 1, 1890. The person who coined it was Jewish thinker Dr. Nathan Birnbaum. Almost symbolically, Birnbaum himself underwent an internal process surrounding the word and its meaning, turning from an ardent supporter of Herzl into one of his greatest opponents.

How do you say Zionism in German?

Nathan Birnbaum was born in Vienna to an observant Jewish family, but over the years he distanced himself from religion. The connection to Judaism as a nation, on the other hand, became a strong ideological component for him. In 1881, when he was only 17 years old, he joined the Hovevei Zion movement, and a year later he was one of the founders of the Kadimah Student Association – the first Jewish student association in Austria. Later, he was active in disseminating ideas of national revival and edited the first national Jewish newspaper in Germany, “Der Colonist”, which dealt with the possibility of settlement in Palestine. In 1885, Birnbaum published a journal dedicated to the idea of love of Zion called “Selbst-Emanzipation” (in English, “Self-Emancipation”).

On April 1, 1890, Birnbaum published the article “For the Honor and Peace of Our People”, in his journal, in which he first used the word “Zionistisch” – Zionist, intended to describe the members of the Hovevei Zion movement. About two years later, he published another article in the same journal called “Principles of Zionism”, in which he used the word “Zionismus” (“Zionism”). Thereafter, Birnbaum often used these words and their derivatives, describing Zionism as a solution to anti-Semitism. According to him, the word “Zionism” expressed the connection between the Jews and Zion, and emphasized that the Land of Zion was the only land where the Jewish people could ingather. In 1897, Birnbaum participated in the First Zionist Congress as the first secretary of the small Zionist Executive Committee. Herzl, who knew Birnbaum and was exposed to the term he coined, decided to adopt it as the name of the Zionist movement.

Birnbaum’s ideological transformation

At the beginning of the Zionist movement, Nathan Birnbaum and Binyamin Ze’ev Herzl shared similar views, but over the years, these views diverged. These differences of opinion mainly revolved around the question of the goal of Zionism – according to Herzl, the goal was national realization, and according to Birnbaum, the goal was to highlight the importance of national culture in the Zionist movement.

In 1898, Birnbaum left the Zionist movement and became one of the spokesmen for “Diaspora Nationalism”. In line with this approach, he preferred to work toward achieving national-cultural autonomy for Jews in the Diaspora over realizing the political Zionist plan.

During World War I, another significant change occurred in Birnbaum’s life. He became religious, joined Agudat Israel – an ultra-Orthodox party that sought to unite the Jewish people in the Land of Israel under the rule of the Torah – and even became the movement’s secretary. Over the years, he became even more extreme, and became one of the leaders of the ultra-Orthodox community. Accordingly, he also became a major opponent of the Zionist movement as led by Herzl.

There is no consensus

Alongside the numerous claims and testimonies linking Nathan Birnbaum to the term “Zionism”, there are also claims that he was not the first to coin the term. Researcher G. Kressel, for example, claimed in an article he published in 1956 that historian and writer Saul Pinchas Rabbinowicz had used this term as early as 1886, in a letter he sent to Yehudah Leib Levin.

Alex Bain, the historian and Herzl’s biographer, also questioned the connection between Birnbaum and the term Zionism. According to him, Ahad Ha’am claimed in 1902 that Hovevei Zion used to call themselves “Zionists” long before Herzl, and emphasized that Birnbaum did not coin the term but merely renewed it.

The disputes surrounding the origin of the term will probably never be resolved, but perhaps one cannot expect a consensus when dealing with a word like “Zionism”, which has become such a significant reality.

הפוסט 135 years ago today: The term “Zionism” was first coined הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Very few, if any, elite counter-terrorism units worldwide can compete with it. Its professional skill, operational prowess, experience, volume of activity, and achievements have made it a legend. Its fighters are the first to hunt down terrorists en route to carry out a terrorist attack or who have fled the scene. It conducts hundreds of operations every year, the vast majority of which are classified. But even the handful of operations that have been publicized is enough to establish its undisputed status as the spearhead of the Israeli security forces.

And it doesn’t even belong to the IDF.

Come discover seven fascinating facts you didn’t know about Yamam – Israel’s national counter-terrorism unit.

1. It is one of the top SWAT units in the world.

Yamam is considered one of the best units in the world for combating terrorism, rescuing hostages, and foiling terror attacks. A delegation from the unit won the “Urban Shields” competition for elite police units two years in a row (in 2010 and 2011), defeating a large number of SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) units from across the US and elite international counter-terrorism teams (from Bahrain and Jordan). The delegation even achieved the highest score ever achieved by a participant in this competition.

2. It’s not military – it’s police.

Although the Yamam fighters closely resemble soldiers from elite military units, Yamam is not subordinate to the IDF but to the central command of the Border Guard. And this means? More freedom of operation within Israel’s borders, policing authority, and the ability to maneuver in a way that the army cannot. The reason for its establishment was one of the most tragic events in the country’s history – the Ma’alot massacre in 1974, in which Israeli pupils were murdered due to a failed handling of a hostage incident. This was the moment when decision-makers realized that Israel needed a designated force to combat terrorism within a friendly and built-up territory, that is, inside the actual country.

3. It has one of the toughest training courses there is.

Did you think that courses in the IDF were difficult? The training course for the Yamam fighters is one of the most demanding in the world: urban warfare, sniping, breaching, hand-to-hand combat, and dealing with extreme scenarios. Only the strongest manage to pass. These are not just physical fitness tests – candidates are also tested for composure, intuition, and the ability to make and execute critical decisions in a split second.

4. It is an entire commando “army” in one unit.

When the Yamam fighters go on a mission, they don’t wait for anyone – they are a completely independent force. The unit has its own breaching teams, snipers, commandos, paratroopers, undercover officers, “monkeys” (combatants who specialize in climbing, surfing, and rescue), technological teams – and even a K-9 team. One of the unit’s most famous dogs is Rambo, a Malinois attack dog that has been specially trained to locate terrorists and assist in taking control of terrorist scenes. Yes, even the dogs in Yamam are trained at the level of a commando combat soldier.

5. It has the most advanced technologies – far ahead of everyone else.

The unit develops and orders special equipment that cannot be found anywhere else. Customized weapons, next-generation night vision devices, shoulder-launched rocket launchers, “rhinos” (drones armed with grenade launchers), and robots used to breach buildings and dispose of explosives – everything that makes operations more precise, more deadly, and safer for the fighters.

6. “Arnon” – the operation that restored our hope.

Yamam has conducted thousands of daring heroic operations over the years, but one of the most dramatic occurred only recently – Operation Arnon. On June 8, 2024, in a joint operation with the Israel Security Agency and additional forces, Yamam broke into the Nuseirat refugee camp in Gaza and, under heavy fire, rescued and freed four Israelis who had been kidnapped during the Nova Music Festival massacre on October 7: Noa Argamani, Andrei Kozlov, Shlomi Ziv, and Almog Meir Jan. During the exchange of fire, Yamam squadron commander and combat soldier Commander Arnon Zmora was fatally wounded. After succumbing to his wounds in the hospital, Arnon was promoted to the rank of superintendent and the operation (originally called “Operation Summer Seeds”) was named after him.

7. You don’t retire from it so quickly.

While in other elite units in Israel and around the world combatants tend to retire around the age of 40, Yamam continues to utilize its fighters until the age of 57 – enabling them to gain unparalleled operational experience. This is a huge advantage, because there is no substitute for years of dealing with extreme situations and countless covert operations.

The legacy continues

On October 7, Yamam lost nine fighters who were the first to reach the main intersections in an attempt to stop the murderous Hamas attack. Two more combatants died in the “Swords of Iron” war. In their memory, a special stamp was issued commemorating the Yamam heroes.

For the courage of its fighters, Yamam was awarded the IDF Chief of the General Staff’s Citation, and the Israel Police Commissioner’s Citation at least five times. Among the numerous unit fighters who received medals and decorations are the recipients of the Medal of Courage, Major General Assaf Hefetz, Major General David Tzur, and Major General Boaz Goldberg; the recipient of the Medal of Excellence, Major General Nachshon Nagler; and the recipient of the Commander-in-Chief’s Citation, Major General Noam Raz.

The Yamam continues to fight, strengthen its capabilities and, most importantly, protect us, whether we are aware of it or not. So the next time you hear about a foiled terrorist attack, a spectacular rescue, or a hunt for terrorists that ended in their elimination, know that behind the scenes stands a unit of people who know no fear – only a sense of mission.

הפוסט Seven Facts you Didn’t Know about Yamam (Israel’s National Counter-Terrorism Unit) הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“The movement currently has over 40,000 members, including women and men in their teens to age 80 and older, and this diversity cannot be ignored. That’s why the connection with the movement’s members is, for me, one of the most important tools of Israel’s Defense and Security Forum (IDSF)”, says Itzik Lev, VP of Development at IDSF, who is in charge of the movement’s community relations.

What do you do to connect with your base?

“Many mistakenly think that IDSF includes only military personnel and senior officers, but in fact it is open to anyone with our worldview and anyone who shares our values. We grew by more than 70 percent this year, and the goal is to continue growing at the same rate next year. We offer members of the movement a wide range of unique activities, such as lectures given by senior security officials, and tours given by IDSF experts that take place throughout the country – in the north, in the Gaza Envelope, in Judea and Samaria, and in Jerusalem. The movement has silent WhatsApp groups for receiving updates from the field, each of which has over 1,000 members. Until now, mainly news stories have been posted in these groups, but following surveys we conducted, we realized that the public wanted more than that, and we began disseminating dynamic webinars, event tickets, tours, and unique business benefits in these groups. We treat these groups like a members club”.

A community that is attentive to the public

Lev, who came to IDSF from the field of project management in the municipal context, set a goal for himself to not only increase the number of members in the movement, but also to create a community that would be attentive to its members’ opinions, even those who are not senior military people. Subsequently, he initiated the establishment of the Arena of Insights, a digital system that enables the movement’s members to exchange opinions and raise ideas on current affairs. This is a special system that is also used by local authorities and the military, capable of analyzing large amounts of information.

When did you launch the new public participation system?

“In the second half of 2024. Before that, we used to post open questions on social media, and since there was a very good response from the movement’s members, we started working with the new Arena of Insights system. Every month we pose a different current affairs question. For example, recently: ‘Should we establish a state commission of inquiry or a national commission of inquiry?’ So far, over 1,000 people have responded to each of the questions we asked”.

“A question that was recently posed among the movement’s members through the new system, regarding an investigative committee into the events of October 7, received a large number of responses whose analysis results surprised the movement’s leaders”.

What was the rationale behind the Arena of Insights?

“The idea was to develop the system as a tool through which opinions and ideas could be shared from the bottom up – meaning not only from the senior military officials at the head of the movement to the non-expert public, but also in the opposite direction”. The system analyzes the responses and derives some basic insights from them, which we incorporate in our documents. The goal is to incorporate the movement members’ feelings into the movement’s research and position papers that are conveyed to decision-makers. “The movement sees great importance in public participation and in connecting the grassroots with the professional knowledge of military personnel”.

The wisdom of crowds

A question that was recently circulated among the movement’s members regarding a commission of inquiry into the events of October 7 received a large number of responses – over 700 responses in the actual system and another 326 responses on Facebook. When the content of the responses was analyzed, the movement leaders were surprised to discover that most of them did not lean in one direction but rather toward a compromise between the two poles. “The discussion was very lively, and not unequivocal”, says Lev. “It turns out that aside from the extremists, who express extreme positions, the majority wants a merger between a state committee and a national committee. In other words, most of the public thinks that the commission of inquiry should be state-run with aspects of a national commission of inquiry, in terms of its management and authorities”.

When it comes to a large amount of responses that are so complex and ambiguous, doesn’t that make it very difficult to process the information?

“We know that the more Israelis there are, the more opinions there are. The very connection between the two options we proposed was an innovation that came from the public – it did not emerge as a main option before we circulated the question. This opened another window for us: We realized that there is a majority in the public that is looking for the middle ground. Now the IDSF’s research department will have to process these insights and look for the right integrated model that we will offer to decision-makers”.

How is the information processed?

“First of all, the actual system analyzes the information using AI and extracts insights from it, and then we review its conclusions and test them. After our analysis, a summary of the discussion is published for all movement members who participated in the discussion – for each member regarding what they wrote. Then we send the results to the research department, which processes the information and incorporates it into its reports”.

Does this mean that you learn from the public?

“We are attentive to the movement’s members and want them to be part of our thought process”. Although issues related to Israel’s security still remain the domain of professionals, on other issues we want to hear what the movement’s members feel, and we want to incorporate them in the position papers that our professionals in the research department write. This enables us to combine professional knowledge with the “wisdom of crowds”.

Is there another example of public reactions that caused the movement to change its positions?

“It definitely happened. For example, in response to a question about recruiting Haredi soldiers, we received answers that were more complex than we expected, and they influenced and touched us. When we submitted the ‘8000 Plan’ to the government that dealt with this, there were several points that changed thanks to ideas from the public – for example, the understanding that the frameworks would have to be unique, that the uniqueness of Haredi society must be recognized, that there is importance in outreach within Haredi society and in cooperation with Haredi leaders, and that there is a need for benefits and incentives and a need to change the perception of military service – from a burden to a privilege and an opportunity to contribute to the country”.

In your opinion, does the system actually strengthen the democracy in the movement?

“During the discussion of the open question, all participants see the comments that are written, so you can also see the response to the comment. A kind of round table was created between people, one who could be in Kiryat Shmona, one in Jerusalem, and one in the Gaza Envelope. I think this has a lot of power. The system not only strengthens the senior officials’ familiarity with the voices on the ground, but also strengthens the sense of partnership and diversity among the movement’s members”.

Promoting women to the forefront of the movement

Lev did not complete his military service as a senior officer, but after his discharge from the Border Guard, he continued to work in the security field and acquired in-depth knowledge of domestic security issues. Over the years, he has gained significant experience in managing complex systems and leading operations, mainly in the municipal arena, where he specialized in a variety of fields, including education, security, and project management. He previously served as CEO of the “Merkazei HaTzeirim BeIsrael” [Youth Centers in Israel] network and currently serves as a volunteer member of the Harish City Council.

He also brings the same public spirit – of partnership, transparency, and commitment – to IDSF, where he works to promote a broad and in-depth security discourse. “It’s important to me that people get to know the movement’s diverse activities”, he says. “Alongside security, I also promote housing benefits for reservists, the business community, the senior officers community, managing and increasing the movement’s membership, and the IDSF women’s forum, with the goal of placing women more at the forefront.”

How can non-professional voices in the public contribute to the security discourse in the movement?

“Even in the security discourse, there are many elements that are not necessarily military. Amir Avivi often says that it is impossible to compromise on security – but there are dozens of diplomatic ways that may offer solutions that address the issue of security: in education, the economy, settlement, etc. Security is not just about tanks and planes, but also benefits for reservists, agriculture, community, and history. The movement is not only concerned with war and the army, but also with the question of how to remain strong and with an independent National Security Doctrine without compromising our Zionism. In these areas, I believe that ideas from the public can and should be used, and I hope that this trend continues”.

הפוסט “The IDSF also wants to listen to ideas that come from below” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

What comes to mind when you hear the words “lone farm” or “a farm in Judea and Samaria”? It may elicit an image of a subversive complex with a not-so-normative family. But that’s not the case.

Contrary to popular belief, not only are the farms not subversive, but they are part of a vital security, social, and educational enterprise of the State of Israel, as part of a proper strategy. This project thwarts the Palestinian Authority’s scheme to unilaterally establish a state in Area C, all while educating young people to be Zionists, work the land, and love their country. To get to know the project better, let’s go back to its origins.

The farms paved the way for the establishment of the state.

As early as 1908, the Palestine Office (the executive arm of the Zionist Organization in Israel), headed by Arthur Ruppin, decided to establish agricultural farms throughout the country that would train laborers to settle the land. Among other places, farms were established in Sejera, Um Juni, Hulda, Kfar Uriya, Be’er Tuvia, Beit Arif (Ben Shemen), and Hittin, and agronomists and agricultural experts helped them to grow and develop.

The role that the farms played in realizing the Zionist vision and establishing the state far exceeded their official mission. The Hebrew Defense Force (in its first incarnation, as the “Bar Giora” defense organization), the first agricultural collective in the country, and the Labor Legion were established on the Sejera farm, whose most famous laborer was David Ben-Gurion. The first kibbutzim and moshavim grew from the Kinneret Farm, and the foundations for the future state were laid in the form of institutions such as the Haganah organization, Solel Boneh, Tnuva, and the Mashbir.

Agricultural farms: An appropriate Zionist response to the Fayyad Plan

After the establishment of the state, many additional farms were established on vast, uncultivated territories suitable for Jewish settlement. After the Six-Day War, cattle farms were also established in the Golan. In the Negev, over ten lone farms (a farm established and run by a single person, family, or small group) have also been established since the 1990s. However, the most important development in recent decades with regard to the agricultural farms and their contribution to Zionism was in Judea and Samaria.

In 2009, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad published a plan to take over Israeli-controlled Area C and unilaterally establish a de facto Palestinian state by 2011. This plan, known as the Fayyad Plan, posed a significant threat to the Jewish communities across Judea and Samaria and to their security and strategic interests. The appropriate Zionist response to this was the agricultural farm movement.

Maximum territory using minimum resources

What makes farms a particularly effective way to occupy land?

The farms are small and therefore require little investment from the state in terms of resources and infrastructure.

Despite the small area of the actual farm, it grants control over much larger areas, since not only do farmers work the land adjacent to the farm, but the farm’s activities also involve the daily use of extensive grazing areas. In this way, the farm’s ongoing activities thwart attempts by hostile elements to take over the land, and assist in countering agricultural crime and smuggling. The constant presence on site strengthens the rule of law and the state’s sovereignty in the frontier areas, since it facilitates alerting of any illegal construction or suspicious changes in the area. Furthermore, the constant presence of the farmers in the fields and pastures prevents the creation of no man’s land, which may become security-related points of friction.

Another advantage lies in the fact that the farm requires almost no built-up area, and therefore it blends in well, and does not jeopardize military firing ranges or green spaces whose continuity is important from an ecological perspective.

By comparison, establishing a town or city requires a complex planning, legal, and administrative process, which can take years, to approve the plan and precise location in accordance with the Planning and Building Law and the National Outline Plan. This is followed by a construction process and the creation of water, electricity, and drainage infrastructures, as well as other municipal services. This means that a large investment over many years is required by the state for residents to be able to inhabit a relatively small area.

On farms, however, a minimal investment in resources and infrastructure is enough for a small number of conscientious and determined farmers to be able to hold extremely large areas for the state, work the land or graze herds on it, and protect the borders.

In this respect, the farms proved to be an ideal, effective, and economical way for the state to spread over vast areas and create territorial continuity that is strategically vital to its ability to maintain the security of its citizens within defensible borders – all with minimal investment on its part.

A strategic and security Israeli enterprise

The achievements speak for themselves.

There are currently over a hundred agricultural farms, which are protecting over six hundred thousand dunams of state land in Judea and Samaria. The farm enterprise spans vast areas and holds more than twice as much land as all the towns and cities in Judea and Samaria combined, including Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim, Beitar Illit, and Modi’in Illit. The construction boom is continuing, and already since the Swords of Iron War broke out, at least 15 new farms have been established in the area.

A decade and a half after their establishment gained momentum, it can already be stated that the agricultural farms play a crucial role in protecting Israel from the threat posed by the Fayyad Plan, in maintaining security in the region, and in creating a defensible Israeli demographic continuity in Area C.

In November 2021, the government determined that any of its ministries, not just the Ministry of Agriculture, can support voluntary agricultural activity in areas of national priority. In December 2024, we learned that Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter had instructed his ministry to begin granting farms the pasture grants that farmers in every other region of the country have been receiving for years. Dichter defined the move as “tremendous news for farms in Judea and Samaria,” and said that “after decades of being discriminated against, farmers in Judea and Samaria have begun to receive the pasture grants they deserve”.

Unity is Strength

The large number of farms in Judea and Samaria, and the fact that they span vast areas, posed security, economic, logistic, and bureaucratic challenges to their owners that needed to be handled in an organized and coordinated manner. In 2024, farm owners in Judea and Samaria established the Farm Association, whose role is to represent them vis-a-vis the authorities, assist in the requisite coordination vis-a-vis the defense establishment and government agencies, and assist in raising resources and obtaining grants that will support the farms financially.

The establishment of the Farm Association constitutes an important development of the agricultural farm enterprise. The association enables the numerous farms in Judea and Samaria to operate in a more efficient and organized manner, and significantly strengthens the entire movement. The Farm Association currently works to support the farmers and expand the farm enterprise in Judea and Samaria, out of a commitment to the vision behind it – preserving the nation’s lands and ensuring continuous Israeli control over the region.

The association intends, among other things, to provide financial incentives to farms that generate additional sources of income, such as tourism and vineyards, which will boost their stability and economic success, as well as to set up new farms, which requires the construction of infrastructures, security, and a preliminary herd that involve high initial costs. Concurrently, the association plans to operate an educational program for youth and volunteers at the farms, which will include practical training in carpentry, welding, and riding. The plow line is the border line for Israel’s other borders as well

The struggle to thwart the Fayyad Plan to take over Judea and Samaria is still in full swing. Only the establishment of dozens of additional farms will ensure that the Palestinian Authority does not take over Area C and fatally harm Jewish settlement in areas that are essential to maintaining national security and that constitute the cradle of our identity.

However, the momentum of fulfilling the settlement vision through agricultural farms must not stop in Judea and Samaria. In recent years, the number of Jews in the Galilee has been in continuous decline, and as of 2023, it was less than 15% of all residents (compared to about 25% in the past). Meanwhile, in the Negev, the illegal expansion of the unrecognized Bedouin villages and the increased rise of Palestinian nationalism and even involvement in terrorism within it are turning it into a “state within a state” that threatens the southern towns.

In our time, the long-standing Zionist settlement system of agricultural farms, which enables a small population to own large territory in a manner that requires relatively few infrastructures and resources, has become not only more relevant than ever but also a prerequisite for Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state.

As the HaShomer HaChadash (The New Watchman) organization rightly claims, the agricultural farm is the settlement model of the 21st century. Only extensive investment by the State of Israel in establishing dozens of farms in the coming years, not only in Judea and Samaria but also in the Negev and Galilee, as a project of national priority, will allow us to protect all parts of the Land of Israel, and not lose the south and the north again.

More than a century ago, Joseph Trumpeldor said: “Wherever the Jewish plow plows its last furrow, that is where the border will run”. This insight is more relevant than ever. This makes the agricultural farm enterprise the most important security and strategic mission of our time.

To participate in the Farm Association project

הפוסט The Farms: Zionism of the Future הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Nowadays, one would be hard pressed to come up with slurs that have not been hurled already at Generation Tik Tok. It is said that that it is shallow, selfish and mentally feeble; That it lacks true connection to nation and country; that it wants for ethics and morals, and has no purpose and aspirations.

Then came October 7, and shattered that impression of Israeli youth.

“Suddenly, it became evident that Israeli youth is not the problem, but rather the solution”, says Major Matuko Alamu, head of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program. “Our youth isn’t vapid and morally weak. On the contrary – it seeks meaning, purpose and the realization of its potential. In one moment, it understood that Israel is back in 1948 and we are once again facing a war of independence that calls on all of us to step up to the flag, and protect the very existence of the Jewish national home. It was able to put aside differences of opinions, and it united to carry on its shoulders the protection of national security. The current [security] system suffers from issues that had cultivated a general misconception regarding the superiority of Israel’s military and intelligence and the deterred state of Hamas. The ideological youth, which exhibited a strong sense of purpose and mission that arose in the wake of October 7, is the key to change”.

From under the veneer of materialism and “Me–ism”, explains Alamu, rose a generation that responded to the call to the flag and shined in the most brilliant light it could – committed and willing to sacrifice itself for the protection of Israel, united above any sectoral or political divide and with a strong and deep sense of belonging to the Jewish nation and country.

“In one of the most difficult times in the history of the State of Israel, we have been discovering what a fabulous future the Zionist cause can have, if only we enable it and help it grow. This is exactly the reasoning behind the Tkuma preparatory program”.

Cultivating the next generation – aimed at the defense of state, united, committed

The Tkuma pre-military preparatory program named after Sergent Major Omer Smadga May his Memory be Blessed, is one of the flagship initiatives of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement and was created with the aim of cultivating the IDF’s future generation of commanders – proactive, determined, ready to be on the offense, ideological and committed to Zionist security values, to ensure that the worst failure in the history of the State of Israel will never happen again. The choice of the location – the Tkuma moshav – is far from coincidental, as it is one of the communities that was attacked by the Hamas terrorists on October 7 and its members consequently evacuated.

“It was very important for us to educate and encourage the young generation to come live in the Gaza envelope communities”, says Alamu, “to boost agriculture in the moshav and the area and play a role in the rebuilding of Israel’s border communities”.

The directorship of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is just one in a long track-record of positions Alamu (40) has filled in non-formal education. Alamu had immigrated to Israel by walking from Ethiopia to Israel by way of Sudan, in an arduous journey that began when he was just three years old and ended when he was seven. In Israel, he grew up in the town of Ofakim and went to the religious school – yeshiva – in Hebron.

In the army Alamu served as a fighter and commander in the Paratroopers Brigade, now a Major in reserves in the airborne evacuation unit, also serving as a counselor and evaluator in special forces tests. He has a BA in management and public policy and has over ten years’ experience in non-formal education, as a counselor and coordinator in the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement and director of a number of pre-military preparatory and leadership programs. He lives in Ofakim with his wife Anat and their five children.

Against this background, Alamu’s appointment as the Director of the Tkuma program was almost inevitable. Not only has he dedicated his life to security and education – the interconnectivity of which the program focuses on – but he also personifies the three unique aspects of the program: a clear security perception, the interconnection of all parts of Israeli society, and deep commitment and dedication to the Israeli people and country.

The First IDSF Habithonistim Preparatory Program in Israel

The Tkuma program is the only one of its kind that offers the involvement of senior officers from the security establishment. The members of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, which served in the high ranks of the security apparatus, in commanding, combat and management capacities, will be part of a unique mentorship track. They will cultivate the deep comprehension of the military occupation and the Zionist aspect of Israel’s security doctrine, preparing the cadets to meaningful service in the IDF’s spearhead units and positions.

What is special about this mentorship?

“The IDSF HaBithonistim mentors will provide each cadet with an envelope of mentoring and guidance that will be personally tailored, not only during the term of the program but also later, during her or his military service. They will be there to guide, advise and help achieve the goals each cadet sets for themselves, while assisting to fulfill military duties in the optimal manner, including courses, selection of the desired officers’ training, and more. The cadets will be able to continue benefitting from the mentoring and guidance of the movement throughout their lives – even years after they end their military career.”

What kind of focus will the issue of security get in the program?

“Our curriculum includes an in-depth introduction to the national security doctrine of the State of Israel, the defense establishment and the defense industries, and will also place special emphasis on physical fitness and physical and mental preparation for assuming leadership roles and achieving meaningful military service. Whether they join elite forces, in combat roles in the infantry or in the 8200-intelligence service, the goal for them will always be to make the most of their abilities and contribute as much as possible to people, society and the country“.

How actually was the initiative born to found a preparatory program that would focus equally on education and security?

“Education is the central pillar of our existence as a nation, and in turn – of Israel’s security. Therefore, since the establishment of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement five years ago, it has been investing a considerable portion of its enterprise in education, among others in participating in various pre-military preparatory programs, and conducting pre-military talks in high-schools across Israel, in collaboration with the Education Ministry and the government. The establishment of the Tkuma preparatory program is the natural evolution of this involvement. October 7 made it clear that time is of essence in putting this into action”.

Part of the program’s stated vision is teaching security in the broadest sense. What does that mean?

“The military aspect is only one pillar of strong and lasting security. Our security is also based on an independent economy, diplomacy, the settlement of population in strategic areas of the country, social cohesion and education for Zionism. The preparatory program aspires to provide the students with the deep understanding of the interdependence between all these areas and their vitality for the future of the country.”

Reuniting Israeli society

An additional aspect of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is its rich and divers human tapestry, which makes it a microcosmos of Israeli society.

“Many such programs do much good”, says Alamu. “But unintentionally they produce a cookie-cutter type of graduates. Our program, on the other hand, will truly encompass all walks of Israeli society – men and women, religious and non-religious, residents of affluent central Israel and from its geoeconomic periphery. This is one of the most important lessons from the state of affairs in our society on October 6 – that a way must be found to reunite Israel’s fragmented society, finding that which unites us in order to strengthen our social cohesion and eliminate the polarization and social discord. It’s clear to me that our rebirth as a strong united nation will grow from the cultivation of values and unity, which are inalienable elements of our national security, as is the connection to the land and working the land – and this is the path of the Tkuma program. For me this is a great honor to be part of the effort to shape the collective national perception among the young generation and to instill in them the belief in our right to live in this land”.

The Tkuma preparatory program: Omer’s legacy

The ideological vision of the Tkuma program reflects the jolting crucial wakeup call that Israeli society received on October 7.

“We witnessed a sudden mass mobilization of the entire nation. People who’ve found a way to shirk their reserves service for years had suddenly showed up to volunteer for duty, and the rate of enlistment was so high that the base supply stores couldn’t keep up with demand for gear and uniforms. We suddenly remembered that we’re part of a nation, of a society, of a bigger story, and not just a random group of individuals, but a collective, and that true self realization demands the contribution to the collective to which we belong”.

The Tkuma program is named after Lt. Col. (res.) Omer Smadja, the son of the famous judoka Oren Smadja, who was killed in battle in the Gaza Strip in June 2024. How did his character and the legacy he left behind reflect these values?

“One of the amazing and inspiring things about Omer’s story is that despite his difficult struggle with attention and concentration deficits, as a result of which he studied in special education, not only did he not give up on realizing his aspirations – but he also chose to do everything in his power to contribute to others – country and society. Not only did he overcome his difficulties, but he also chose to volunteer at the Magen David Adom emergency medical services, to be a cadet in a pre-military preparatory program, to volunteer to service in the IDF, to donate bone marrow, and all the time to give, in more and more ways. In other words, he was always a champion.”

Is that really your slogan – “Program for Champions”? What does that mean?

“Omer, may he be in blessed memory, was an example that in order to be a champion, you don’t need the rank, but rather the strength and perseverance to set goals and objectives every day and strive to meet them, no matter what age and stage of life we are at. It was enough to hear his father, Oren Smadja, eulogize him at the funeral and call on IDF soldiers to continue moving forward and stick to the goal, in order to understand what kind of upbringing Omer had. At the same time, it must be remembered that these goals must be realized within the community, society, and country. A champion is someone who not only excels in everything he or she does, but also someone who chooses to take on leadership positions and contribute to the common good. In the communal living at the Tkuma program, in which the students are together 24 hours a day, this can also materialize in the smallest everyday actions – taking care of your friends, taking responsibility without being asked and stepping up to take on tasks, for example – washing dishes for everyone – rather than trying to shirk responsibility”.

And this is only the beginning

The Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is far from the end of the line of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s initiatives. The movement’s educational vision stretches far beyond this single enterprise: “We want the program to have an influence on our graduates for the rest of their lives. It is imperative that they continue playing an active role in the settlement of Israel, by founding more communities and boosting existing ones across Israel. Wherever the need arises for helping hands for security or settlement – we’ll be there”.

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim’s Tkuma Pre-Military Program – Cultivating the Future Generation of IDF Leadership הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Swords of Iron War is not Israel’s first prolonged war. The War of Independence, which broke out before the official declaration of the state’s founding was made, lasted around a year and eight months – from November 1947 until the armistice agreements were signed in July 1949.

The operational portion of the war was concluded with Operation Uvda, when Israel established its sovereignty in the southern Negev and southern Arava Valley. Despite the operation’s strategic and political importance, it is currently remembered mainly because of the makeshift Israeli flag that was raised. This flag, which was raised on March 10, 1949, 9th of Adar 5709, was later nicknamed the “Ink Flag”, and became a central symbol of the War of Independence. Documenting the hanging of the flag was also given distinguished status, and to date is considered one of the most iconic photographs in the history of the IDF.

Facts on the Ground: The Backstory for the Operation

Operation Uvda was conducted at the beginning of March 1949. At the time, the armistice agreements between Israel and its neighboring enemy countries began to be signed in an attempt to end the War of Independence. On January 1, 1949, the first agreement was signed with Egypt, and on March 4, talks with Jordan commenced. Already at the start of negotiations it became apparent that Jordan was demanding ownership over the southern Negev, including the city of Eilat. Jordan’s demand won the support of the British, who were very involved in the Kingdom of Jordan, and who strove to create territorial continuity between Transjordan and the Suez Canal, which was to be under their influence.

On the other hand, the State of Israel had strong political and military claims that it needed to control the Negev, and did not intend on relinquishing this control. In order to establish de facto Israeli sovereignty over the Negev, a decision was made to embark on a campaign to take control of the territory on March 6, which was called Operation Uvda.

South of Eilat: How the Operation Unfolded

The goal of Operation Uvda was to reach Umm Rashrash – a small Bedouin village on the coast of the Gulf of Eilat, while taking control of the entire Negev and Arava territories within the Land of Israel. Three brigades participated in the Operation – Negev, Golani, and Alexandroni. The Negev and Golani brigades were meant to reach Umm Rashrash, each moving along a different route. The Alexandroni brigade, however, functioned as a side stabilization campaign operating in the northeast Negev. The air force also participated in the operation, and mainly assisted with aerial reconnaissance and transporting forces and supplies.

The infantry forces began moving southward in the early afternoon hours of March 6. The vanguard forces of the Negev brigade were the first to arrive at the Sde Avraham area, and later in the day they were joined by additional forces from the brigade, along with ground reinforcements of the air force, which helped to prepare the field. Concurrently, the Golani brigade forces advanced in the eastern Negev, and by evening they established themselves the Ein Hatzeva area.

Over the next two days, the Negev and Golani forces continued to advance along their prescribed routes, conquering destinations along the way, including Ein Yahav, Ein Ghamr, and Ein Radyan (now Yotvata). At the same time, the Alexandroni brigade completed the stabilization operation and managed to capture Ein Gedi and Masada without a battle.

The Final Stretch: The End of the Operation and Raising the Flag

On the morning of March 10, military communications discovered that the Arab Legion instructed all of its forces to withdraw east of the international border. Air force patrol revealed that the Jordanian military outpost adjacent to the Egyptian Ras al-Naqb police station had been abandoned.

In light of this information, the commander of the Negev brigade, Nahum Sarig, realized that the forces were close to achieving their goal – capturing Umm Rashrash, however he then noticed that they did not have an Israeli flag to plant there to display their conquest. Sarig instructed his soldiers to create a makeshift flag, which they did. The flag was prepared by the company secretary, Pua Erel. According to her, she used a white sheet that she found and drew a Star of David and two stripes on it with ink.

The makeshift flag was handed to one of the company commanders in the Negev Brigade, Avraham Adan. Complying with Sarig’s instruction, Adan advanced with his forces on foot to Umm Rashrash. Sarig himself advanced to the area in a roundabout way with two jeeps. That same afternoon, a vanguard force of the Negev brigade comprised of 13 officers and soldiers, arrived at Umm Rashrash. They brought with them the makeshift flag the secretary made.

The vanguard force first cleared the buildings in the area, particularly the British police station in the village. Once it was confirmed that the station had indeed been abandoned, the force as able to conduct the flag raising ceremony. Avraham Adan climbed the flagpole that was there and hung the handmade ink-drawn flag. Micha Perry, Deputy Commander of the 9th Battalion of the Negev brigade, who was also a photographer, documented this moment. After the flag was raised, the soldiers there sang Hatikvah.

Despite the successful improvisation, the Ink Flag did not wave from the flagpole for very long. Around two hours after the flag-raising ceremony, Golani forces arrived and brought a proper Israeli flag with them, which replaced the one the Negev brigade made.

The Greatest Event: The Outcomes of the Operation and Commemorating the Ink Flag Ethos

Once Umm Rashrash was captured, Nahum Sarig, commander of the Negev brigade, and Nahum Golan, commander of the Golani Brigade, sent a telegram that said: “On Haganah day, the 11th of Adar, the Palmach Negev brigade and the Golani brigade present the Gulf of Eilat to the State of Israel”.

The next day, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: “This was the greatest event in recent months, if not during the entire war of liberation and conquest”.

Operation Uvda was indeed one of the most important campaigns in the War of Independence, and it greatly shaped the southern border we now know well. Despite Jordan’s initial demands, the armistice agreement Israel signed with Jordan on April 3, 1949 stated that the locations the IDF forces captured during Operation Uvda – including the city of Eilat – will be included in the sovereign territory of the State of Israel.

With regards to the Ink Flag – despite its symbolic and historical significance, it seems to have disappeared during the operation. In fact, for five years no one was even aware of the fact that this was the first flag that flew above the abandoned British police station in Umm Rashrash. Only on March 10, 1954, in an edition of the weekly newspaper Davar LaYeladim that was dedicated to commemorating five years since Eilat’s capture, the photo taken by Micha Perry was published for the first time. This photo was immediately etched into the national memory and became a symbol of the end of the War of Independence.

In 1996, a metal statue created by artist Daniel Kafri was inaugurated at the site of the old police station of Umm Rashrash in Eilat . The statue, which was inspired by Micha’s photograph, depicts Adan hanging the Ink Flag on the flagpole. The Hebrew date on which the flag was raised, the 9th of Adar, was chosen as the official date to celebrate Eilat Day, and this is how the flag

הפוסט 76 Years Ago Today: Operation Uvda Ended and the Ink Flag was Raised in Umm Rashrash הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The “hostage deals,” which are taking place as part of the ceasefire agreement with the terrorist organization Hamas, could have been conducted in a modest and discreet manner that would honor the released living and dead hostages, and their families. And perhaps, if you can even say such a thing, it would also cast Hamas in a slightly more “humane” light, at least to the blind eyes of target audiences in the Arab and international arenas, to whom Hamas directs its cynical and despicable propaganda displays. But when it comes to Hamas, even the hostage handover proceedings, which unfortunately also included a process of handing over the bodies of dead hostages last week, take place as a cynical and horrifying media “carnival” according to carefully planned and detailed rules of ceremony, reflecting the terrorist movement’s murderous ideology that boasts of its “achievements” and that seeks to glorify and praise the distorted values of what it calls “resistance.”

A media analysis of the living and dead hostage handover ceremonies in the Hamas-affiliated media outlets actually makes it possible to quite easily outline the guidelines of the ceremony’s set of rules as determined by Hamas’s “Ceremonies Committee” and according to which Hamas’s meticulous “handover ceremonies” are conducted – ceremonies that, despite ourselves, we have become addicted to and that flood us each time with mixed feelings of joy, immense pain, and copious rage and disgust.

The media “carnival” of the living and dead hostage handovers always begins with introductory coverage of the preliminary preparations for the handover ceremony to emphasize its importance and meticulous management. This is the point where Hamas’s film and documentation crew makes sure that no detail is overlooked – the location, the ceremony stage with the displays on it, including the ceremony’s key messages that appear in three languages: Arabic, English, and Hebrew (rife with spelling and wording errors). The messages and slogans Hamas uses are taken from the terrorist movement’s key messages of the “victory” narrative. The central horrifying message, which appeared on a giant poster on the ceremony stage, above the coffins of the late Shiri Bibas and her young children, Kfir and Ariel, and of Oded Lifshitz, was: “Murdered by the war criminal Netanyahu with fighter jet missiles.” A message in this spirit in Hebrew was also included in the announcement that was attached to each of the victims’ coffins along with their photo, the date of their abduction, and the date of their “murder” by the “occupation.” We all already know the horrifying truth: Shiri and her young children were brutally murdered in captivity, shortly after they were abducted. The vile murderers were not satisfied with cold-blooded murder; they also mutilated their bodies to match the bodies’ condition to the cause of death that would be presented almost a year later, during the dead hostage handover procession: “murdered by the occupation”.

Hamas also carefully selects the location of the “handover ceremonies.” They were intended to demonstrate both full control of strategic points in the Strip and to pay tribute to the legacy of the movement’s symbols, led by the architect of the murderous terrorist attack, Yahya Sinwar, whose compound near his home also served as a hostage handover location. An integral part of the ceremony is dedicated to exhibiting the presence of an armed parade, which includes dozens of masked terrorists, in full military attire. The militants scattered around the ceremony complex are documented taking pictures with the audience that comes to watch the ceremony, especially with the children and toddlers of Gaza, who are never absent from the ceremonies. They are documented and photographed next to their admired militants, wearing the military wing’s headband.

The presence of the numerous armed men at the ceremony serves Hamas for two ideological goals: First, to convey a clear and resounding message that Israel’s claims about the destruction of Hamas and disbanding its combat battalions are false, and that Hamas, with its military wing, is fully functional from a military aspect and is exercising complete sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. From Hamas’s perspective, this is “giving the finger” to anyone who thought that the long intensive war had defeated it militarily. Furthermore, Hamas is also ensuring that commanders in the military wing, who Israel announced had been eliminated, attend the ceremonies, to prove that this was a case of mistaken identity on Israel’s part. For example, at Keith Siegel’s release ceremony on February 1, 2025, Haitham Khawajari, commander of the Shati Battalion, was seen and documented walking among the militants present at the ceremony. The second goal, no less important from Hamas’s perspective, is to link its presence on the ground to its popularity and support among the Gazan people in order to gain additional legitimacy “points” in domestic and even Arab public opinion. But the militants have another significant role in the ceremony, and it is aimed at Israeli public opinion: Hamas wants to humiliate Israel and tarnish the IDF’s image as an invincible army. This is why the elaborate ceremony features armed men carrying IDF weapons, such as the Tavor, which was documented by one of the military wing members at the dead hostages handover ceremony last Thursday (and at Agam Berger’s handover ceremony to the Red Cross, a weapon was displayed that Hamas claims was taken from an IDF combat soldier). Gunmen from the “Shadow Unit,” which is responsible for transporting and securing the hostages, were also filmed making their rounds at the ceremony complex in Khan Younis, riding in a RAM truck that Hamas claims was taken from the “occupation” in a raid on the day of the October 7 murderous terrorist attack.

Hamas also made sure to document the presence of Gazan prisoners who were released in previous rounds and who were brought to the podium of honor at the dead hostages handover ceremony. Hamas considers the prisoners’ presence to be of great importance, since one of its key messages in the victory narrative is that the release of the prisoners was only possible thanks to the October 7 attack, Hamas’s steadfastness and refusal to yield to pressure in negotiations with Israel. This message also helps Hamas silence the voices of its domestic critics who believe that Hamas inflicted a catastrophe on the Gaza Strip.

Ironically and cynically, and most outrageously, Hamas’s show is primarily directed at the released hostages and, unfortunately, even at the dead ones. The production team ensures that each ceremony begins by documenting the transport of the hostages accompanied by armed men, wearing “hostage badges” and being brought to the ceremony stage where they are given signed release certificates in a folder with a photo, as well as “souvenirs and mementos” in a special package stamped with the symbol of Hamas’s military wing. Hamas’s ceremony guidelines also include strict requirements regarding the hostages’ appearance and clothing, ensuring that soldiers appear on the ceremony stage in military uniform. Even a bracelet in the colors of the Palestinian flag is worn by some of the hostages for photo purposes, as seen on Agam Berger’s wrist as she waved to the crowd. The strict staging instructions for the hostages continue on the ceremony stage as well. Before they leave the “stage of honor” and are handed over to the Red Cross representatives, the hostages are required to smile and wave to the camera and the Gazan audience, display their release certificates, and in some ceremonies, the hostages are instructed to deliver speeches that include messages of gratitude and appreciation to their captors for the “kind and compassionate treatment” and, of course, a message to the Israeli government that the only way to release the hostages is through Hamas’s cynical staged ceremonies. The handover of the hostages to the Red Cross effectively concludes the  painstaking ceremony, but this is also the preferred time for Hamas media to post summary videos on its multiple channels of the “impressive” handover ceremony, while concurrently, horrifyingly cynical videos are posted with a montage of “magical moments” of the hostages during their captivity, such as the video of Sasha Troufanov spending quality time with a fishing rod in the sea, and a video of Keith Siegel delivering a message and blessing to his captors, against the backdrop of the pastoral landscape of the Gaza beach.

We all saw the bitter truth about what the hostages are enduring in captivity, during the shocking ceremony in which Eli Sharabi, Ohad Ben Ami, and Or Levi were handed over. It was impossible to ignore their sunken eyes, pallor, and emaciated appearance as they made their way to the ceremony stage like walking skeletons, not before they had also “played their part,” as the lead actors in the worst play in town.

Hamas never stops claiming that it is interested in a comprehensive “all-for-all” hostage-prisoner exchange, but the compensation Hamas demands not only includes the release of prisoners, but “the whole nine yards” and implementation of the second phase of the agreement that is supposed to enable its survival. This is why Hamas consistently works to make the handover ceremonies unbearable for Israel, and it will probably not stop doing so without an Israeli move that forces it to. At first glance, it seems to us that the set, the extras, the stage, and the slogans are the same in every handover ceremony. But in every ceremony, Hamas reveals a new “surprise,” which constitutes a new level of evil cynicism and cruelty. This is exactly what we saw during the release of the hostages last Saturday, when, to our astonishment, the main photographer of the Al-Qassam Brigades approached Omer Shem-Tov and instructed him to kiss the heads of the armed terrorists who were standing next to him on the ceremony stage in order to immortalize the embarrassing and humiliating moment – one that would be leveraged shortly thereafter on all of Hamas and Co.’s media channels. Omer’s forced kiss is a “frog” that many Israelis may be willing to swallow. This is undoubtedly a moment that elicits revulsion, but in these moments our thoughts are more focused on the expectation that the hostages will be handed over to our forces and begin the journey home to Israeli territory. But anyone who thought the ceremony was over after the hostages were handed over to the Red Cross “puppets” was wrong. Hamas prepared another “surprise” that surpassed all its predecessors on the scale of evil and cruelty. A video documenting the hostages Guy Gilboa and Evyatar David, sitting in a vehicle that took them near the ceremony stage to watch, with teary eyes, their friends being released. The car door opened in front of the ceremony stage and Guy and Evyatar were asked in Hebrew by one of the car’s occupants: “How are you feeling now?” This signals to them to convey a message to the government and beg for their release and an end to the terrible suffering they are enduring in captivity. At the end of the poignant message, the camera captures the car door closing.

Hamas is undoubtedly very well aware of what the Israeli public’s weak points are, and it will continue to target its soft underbelly using the strong card it holds: the living and dead hostages. The question that arises and becomes more acute in the wake of these vile ceremonies is why is it even important to focus on Hamas’s release performances, watch, and even analyze them? Should this surprise any of us? Of course not. Will “Hamas Productions Ltd.” continue to stage these performances in Gaza and “perfect” them with displays of evil and cruelty? As long as they have live and dead hostages in their possesion, of course they will. It seems that the immense importance of this is to sear it into our consciousness. But not with the narratives that Hamas wants to impress upon us, but rather with what we knew and suppressed, or perhaps even refused to brand onto our consciousness as a leadership and as a nation, in the many years leading up to the murderous attack. If these horrific ceremonies are burned into our consciousness and shake our fading memory, whenever we tend to forget who the enemy we face is and how we should treat him if we want to live, it may be possible to say that Hamas’s production and directing crews and the handover ceremonies they produced with advance planning and premeditation did indeed contribute to shaping our consciousness and to the long process of our national correction. Let us hope.

By: Avishai Karo

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט “Hamas Productions Ltd.” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The current political echelon in Israel is perceived as trying to shirk its responsibility for the events of October 7th. There is a lot of truth in this. The “congratulations” that government officials bestowed upon the resigning IDF Chief of the General Staff, along the lines of “well done, we salute him”, without mentioning in the same breath the great shame and humility that should encompass their every move during this period – are shameful. But the discussion around this issue is not on point.

There is a tendency to divide responsibility for the events of October 7, and also for what happened afterwards – the successes and failures – into military and political domains. But the truth is that the mutual influence the two ecehlons have on each other is too great to separate. The dichotomous separation is the real shirking of responsibility.

Who is responsible for the misconception?

There are too many causes to count for what led to the October 7th misconception. The intelligence responsibility of the Military Intelligence Directorate and the other intelligence agencies is clear and undisputed. But what caused this intelligence failure is the lack of a true critical culture. The responsibility of the IDF, and of the intelligence community in general, is to examine the veracity of their perceptions, which ultimately lead to the intelligence assessments that reach the political echelon. It’s enough to listen to Brigadier General (res.) Itay Baron, who was previously Head of the Research and Analysis Division at the Military Intelligence Directorate and who returned to the position after October 7, to understand that this is not the situation within the army: “If we have such information, and the information is of high quality, then it has greatly strengthened this culture of ‘we know because it’s impossible that we don’t'”^[1]. The professional assumption that it is possible to know and understand reality accurately, is what lies at the heart of the failure.

After the Yom Kippur War, the Audits Department, also known as Ipcha Mistabra (Aramaic for “The Devil’s Advocate”) was established at the Military Intelligence Directorate. This department’s role is to challenge the Military Intelligence Directorate and its concepts before they even reach the political echelon. But even this tool, and other tools such as red teams (teams whose job is to think through the enemy’s eyes), have proven ineffective in the face of a culture of arrogance, as evidenced by the IDF’s decision to expand the Audits Department and its authorities after the events of October 7 in light of its failure.

But intelligence responsibility does not stop with the IDF or other intelligence agencies. The political echelon has the responsibility to cast professional doubt on intelligence assessments. The political echelon has the authority and responsibility to demand additional expert opinions, and to place common sense into the mix of considerations. The professional echelons, on the other hand, have the responsibility to provide politicians with any information that may be relevant in order to enable them to make the right decisions, and they should present this information when it is processed from a professional aspect only and not from an ideological aspect.

Who is responsible for meeting the goals?

The political echelon must not only cast doubt on intelligence assessments, but also on everything that comes out of the military: strategic goals and plans of action to achieve these goals must also be put to the test. Statements made during this period by government ministers, accusing the army of trying to evade meeting clear goals, are nothing short of negligence. The political echelon has the duty to define clear goals according to which the military can plan its programs and mode of operation.

Let’s take, for example, the second goal of the Swords of Iron War, as defined by the political echelon: eliminating Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. It’s enough to read a little news to understand that this is not the situation in the Gaza Strip, even at a stage when a hostage deal is already taking place. The claim made by government members is that the military echelon fears control over the civilian population and is trying to avoid it, and as a result, Hamas is still the most powerful entity in Gaza. The failure of the uncontrolled humanitarian aid entering Gaza, and not taking the appropriate political steps to verify who is distributing the food in Gaza, are being blamed by the political echelon on the fact that “the army chiefs are not aggressive enough”, and are therefore demanding their resignation, hence their congratulations to the outgoing IDF Chief of the General Staff.

Who benefits from the current situation?

The truth is that it is the responsibility of the political echelon to audit the progress in achieving the goals it has set. And it has a host of other options to promote this, if the army does not succeed. So where is the gap?

1. In the current system structure, the political echelon does not have the professional tools to question what the military says. There is no civil body capable of giving the government alternative plans or additional intelligence assessments. Choosing from among different alternatives is a basic principle in proper decision-making processes, and it cannot exist in such a reality.
2. The definition of the term “national security” varies in its scope and content. Some include social domains due to the fact that they also indirectly affect national security, and some narrow the definition to purely security domains. But there is no denying that national security includes more than dealing with military threats. It is standard to view national security as also encompassing diplomatic, political, and economic issues, which have a direct and clear impact on national security. However, despite the complexity of the issue, the person considered to be the “national evaluator” is the Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, even though his considerations are limited to military ones. The monopoly of knowledge that exists in professional bodies pertaining to intelligence, planning, and more is not all that prevents the political echelon from casting doubt and choosing between alternatives, but also minimizes the engagement in national security to the military stratum alone. Even if political steps are taken, they are done so in isolation from military ones, and this is clearly evident in the current situation in the Gaza Strip, where the military actions have not provided leverage for significant political steps that would replace Hamas’ rule.
3. There is not enough synchronization between the various security and intelligence agencies. The structure of the Israeli defense establishment is complicated and dispersed. There are intelligence agencies in the IDF, the Israel Security Agency, and the Mossad. There are planning bodies in the Ministry of Defense and the IDF. There are research bodies in the IDF, the Foreign Ministry, and more. However, there is no effective body in Israel that will synchronize these bodies, and more importantly, there is no synchronization between the professional echelon and the political echelon that is responsible for making decisions. The person entrusted with this synchronization is the National Security Council, which has suffered from a lack of efficiency and real authority since its establishment. The separation in the day-to-day work between the profession and the decision-making has been the basis, for many years, for the deficiencies in the defense establishment’s work. Any cooperation is coincidental, circumstantial, and not the result of a well-oiled, efficient system.
4. There is an entire stratum, the one between the major goals set by the government (if any) and the military operational plans, which remains a void. The goals of the war, as they were defined, are somewhat amorphous. Cuasing the collapse of Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities is a major goal, the military aspect of which is only one step in achieving it. Although a decisive military victory is indeed a prerequisite for replacing the civil rule, history shows that even after a military defeat, a rapid move must be made to capture the sphere of civilian life without leaving a vacuum. This issue was not properly defined, and this vacuum left Hamas as the most powerful ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

   It is easy to attribute this failure to the raid method adopted by the IDF since March 2024, but this method stems from the lack of clarity of the war’s goals, of a lack of control over these goals, and of course of the absence of the political component of these goals. Without the political component, the military step can never achieve the ultimate goal.

5. Convenience. The disconnect between the echelons is convenient for everyone. It’s convenient for the government to have someone to blame, and it’s convenient for the army to set facts on the ground. The government can pride itself on setting goals for the war, even though they are partial, vague, and not enough efforts are made to achieve them. On the other hand, the army can take pride in military achievements, even if these correspond to its goals and not the goals set by the political echelon.

Convenience, in these situations, is the opposite of responsibility. The relationship between the military and political echelons has been structured in a crooked manner since the days of David Ben Gurion. The structure of the security system is inefficient, does not facilitate synchronization between bodies, grants a monopoly of knowledge and opinion to the professional ranks over policymakers, and above all, creates a culture of shirking responsibility. The IDF Chief of the General Staff and the Head of Southern Command did well to fulfill their responsibility, and the government would do well if at some point it also assumed its responsibility. However, responsibility is not a personal matter. Resignation is not the solution to the real problem, just as one or another appointment is not the solution. The real responsibility lies in leaving the defense establishment’s comfort zone, which is to dismantle the structure of the system and reassemble it.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

^[1] From an article in N12 – https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm “Former senior officialhttps://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm warns: “October 7 may happen to us again“

הפוסט So, who is responsible for national security? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the last three months, the center of gravity of the Swords of Iron war has shifted northward, but according to journalist Yair Kraus, the story of the northern sector began unfolding as early as October 7, 2023. As someone who lives in Acre and covers the northern region for Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, he discerned from the beginning that his region was an integral part of the war.

“When we saw the terrible attack on the southern communities, we realized that such an attack could have happened here too, and in much more monstrous proportions,” he relates. “This completely changed our perception of security as residents of the north. It created a deep crisis in our trust for the state and the IDF. Today, when we hear statements like ‘Hezbollah is deterred,’ for us it’s a warning that the situation on the ground is probably the opposite.”

The days of a “sense of security” are over

Yair Kraus lives in Acre, so he and his family were not evacuated. But they certainly felt the echoes of the war. His eldest daughter, for example, had to leave home for an entire month to go to school in the center of the country, and his three younger children had no educational framework for about three months. Kraus also personally knows many families who were displaced from their homes, and has seen firsthand the difficulties they faced and are still facing. He is aware of many residents – mainly elderly – who are waiting for the moment when they can return home. Moreover, there are quite a few others who are not at all sure they wish to return, and some have already decided to leave the north for good. The trend toward relocating permanently is especially noticeable among young families whose children have already settled into new frameworks in central Israel. Those families do not want to uproot them again.

However, even if we focus on residents who are waiting to return – and even on exceptional individuals who decide to move to the north of the country now of all times – there is still a serious problem in that most of them are not yet able to do so.

According to Kraus, who has been covering the northern region since the Second Lebanon War, several conditions must be met before the north can be repopulated. The first involves security and survival. “The residents in the north, especially the evacuees, will carefully examine what conditions the state and the army want to return them to,” he says. “I hear from many friends that they will not return to a situation where they will see Hezbollah terrorists and their families settling again in the villages where attacks were launched, or go back to being on the front line with the army behind them.”

The residents of the north have had enough of promises, Kraus adds, and they will now demand to see changes on the ground. “The security establishment’s usual boasting and lying will no longer work, and there’s no use for more of their statements that have repeatedly turned out to be unfounded,” he concludes. “The days of ‘a sense of security’ are also over. The issue here is no longer what people feel. It’s what people see with their own eyes – and when you see the villages where attacks were launched being rebuilt, and when there’s no buffer zone, it doesn’t look like security. Remember, we didn’t defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. And Hezbollah’s stated goal is still to conquer the northern settlements. It’s time for us to start believing Hezbollah and stop underestimating its buildup. We also need to wean ourselves from the addiction to respite – and from methods of action such as the kind we used in the so-called war between the wars. There is a major lesson here for the leadership, the army officers, and the northern residents, and it is that the peace and quiet we long for can be bought only with determination and the force of arms.”

So what will security on the northern border look like?

“We constantly hear about weapons being seized and terrorist infrastructure being destroyed, even now during the ceasefire, but what will change the reality the day after the war is not how many weapons we removed, but whether the weapons will return to those places. As long as the army and government show no willingness to hold on to the areas where Hezbollah operated, we should be worried. It’s clear to me and many other residents that for security in the north, we must create a buffer zone like the ones at the Gaza border and the Syrian border. Besides keeping security threats away from the communities at the fence, a buffer zone would also deliver humiliation. The Lebanese will see abandoned villages standing as monuments that proclaim what happens to those who try to harm us.”

Don’t say “rehabilitation,” say “development”

Besides restoring security, another condition that must be met in order to return the residents of the north to their homes is the restoration of the damaged infrastructure, including the ruined drainage systems, the destroyed roads, the wrecked buildings, and the many homes that suffer from abandonment. Of course, we also need repairs at public institutions such as health funds and schools, and at businesses, because they are all integral to a reasonable lifestyle.

However, alongside physical restoration, there is another aspect, less talked about, which is the development aspect. “We hear all the time about ‘rehabilitating the north,’ but in my opinion, rehabilitation is the wrong concept because it implies restoring the conditions of October 6,” says Yair Kraus. The situation in the north has been shaky for many years, and it is impossible to prop something back up that has long been falling apart. There is an issue of attitude here, and it is time for us to replace the term ‘rehabilitation’ with the terms ‘momentum’ and ‘development.'”

Kraus expresses a feeling that many northern residents share – especially now, after they have glimpsed the lifestyle of the center’s residents. “Exposure to life in the center of the country made the residents of the north realize how far behind they were. The rift strongly affected their perception,” he explains. “After a few months of living in the center, residents of the north began to get used to conditions that residents of the center have long taken for granted, such as accessible public transportation, advanced health services, well-paying jobs, and a variety of leisure activities. It’s enough to notice how many movie theaters an average city has in central Israel and then look at the Upper Galilee. There isn’t a single movie theater in that entire region. But the problem is much deeper than that, of course. Such gaps exist in every field and influence every aspect of the residents’ daily lives. So if the state wants those residents to return to the north, it cannot be satisfied with merely restoring what they had before. It must assure them that they will receive the same conditions that exist in the center. People say that you don’t cry out for what you don’t notice the lack of – but now the residents of the north know what they lack and they will cry out.”

What should the development plan for the north include?

“We need to start improving public transportation and expanding railroad lines, build advanced medical centers, and place an emphasis on employment, education, and leisure. Beyond that, we need to work on reducing land prices in the decaying rural communities at the heart of the Galilee – because currently the prices are exorbitant, to the point where they harm the entire Jewish settlement enterprise in the Galilee. But above all, a new point of view is needed. Currently the state treats the north as an unwelcome assignment and not as an asset. For that reason, it develops the north according to economic and administrative considerations, and not considerations of Zionism and societal values.”

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north.

The people of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem aren’t wiser than we are

It is impossible discuss the rehabilitation and development of the north without addressing the question of responsibility. Currently there are various bodies trying to drive the process, and they are roughly divided into two groups – outsiders and insiders. The first group includes mainly government bodies and regulatory officials. The second group includes local leaders, residents, and private associations. Synchronization among the various bodies is not always successful, and sometimes it does not exist at all. Currently the reins are held by those external offices.

According to Yair Kraus, this trend is not new. “For years, the people in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem decided what was right for us, and how we should live, and even now there is a feeling that do-gooders are coming from outside again to save and heal us,” he says. “This criminal policy may derive from good intentions, but in practice it weakens the local leadership and the community’s resilience. It sends the message that the residents can’t take care of themselves.”

Kraus compares the situation in the north to national disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes. In such disasters too, we see delegations from elsewhere arriving to save the locals. The missions operate out of good will, and their assistance is indeed needed, but when they operate without the cooperation of the local population, their benefit is only partial.

“All the studies in the world prove that sustainable reconstruction after a national disaster is possible only when the community is part of the reconstruction and part of the action,” he explains. “We need to create a situation where we exert ourselves not merely for the community but together with it. Not only do the locals know best what they need. In addition, by taking responsibility for themselves they can achieve a sense of triumph and restore their own resilience, which is no less important than physical rehabilitation.”

Why, in your opinion, are the people of the north excluded from the reconstruction and development processes?

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north. Billions have been invested in the region over the years and have given back almost no profit. In my opinion, a solution needs to be found that will provide for supervision but also give the north a certain freedom of action. I don’t know what the solution is, but I know we must try to find it.”

No “state,” no “army,” only people

One of the clearest conclusions that Yair Kraus draws from the last year of the war is that we need to discard amorphous terms like “state” and “army,” and instead start talking about the people who make up these bodies.

He harks back to the period when he covered Operation Guardian of the Walls and many media outlets reported on various decisions made by the court. He, as a journalist, opposed that unspecific term and made sure to mention the name of the judge who made each decision. In today’s context, Kraus emphasizes that there is no army, but rather a Chief of Staff, a head of the Northern Command, a divisional commander, and so on. Similarly, there is no state. There are ministers, there are members of Knesset, there are advisors. “This precision is important because when you attribute the responsibility to the body, then no one is responsible,” he explains. “In contrast, when you say who has the authority, by name and position, and indicate what decision or what action that person took – then immediately an individual is responsible.”

His hope is that those in authority, from the most senior to the most junior, will take responsibility and truly fulfill their roles. Only in this way, he believes, will it be possible to influence the future of the country and its development.

Another conclusion that Kraus has retained is that we must no longer be captivated by promises. “In the last year and a quarter, we have received a very big lesson in realism, and I can no longer look at the future through a prism,” he says. “In my lifetime, I’ve heard enough exciting announcements that ultimately led to nothing. I hope that now, with the reality of the north finally on the public agenda, we will see real change. It’s a very harsh thing to say, but this terrible war could be a blessing for the north. If it weren’t for a game-changing event of this magnitude, I doubt we would be talking about the importance of the north and recognizing how acute the need is to take care of this region of the country and improve its conditions. In my view, we must leverage this event into development, so that out of the fearsome comes forth sweetness.”

הפוסט The North Needs a New Story: An Interview with Journalist Yair Kraus הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Major (res.) Yossi Levi testifies that he has been an Israeli for 15 years. As far as he is concerned, this count of “national years” began the day he enlisted in the IDF. “Before I joined the army, I identified exclusively as ultra-Orthodox,” he says. “To me, concepts such as ‘Israeli’ or ‘Zionist’ belonged purely to the secular world and were strictly off-limits. There was nothing to talk about serving in the IDF at all – it was completely not in my plans. But today I can say with all my heart that the decision to enlist was the best step I took in my life.”

First of all, a security imperative: the importance of enlisting ultra-Orthodox in the IDF

Yossi practically stumbled on his enlistment. Exactly at a time when he was beginning to feel that studying in yeshivot (religious colleges) did not allow him to reach his full potential, he met a recruit from the Netzah Yehuda battalion, and was persuaded to give the military option a chance. Once in the army, he began climbing the ranks, reaching command and officer positions. Today, he is an infantry officer in active reserve duty. Levi is about to complete the battalion commander program, after which he is expected to attain the rank of lieutenant colonel and be given the command over a combat reserve battalion. At the same time, he serves as the Director General of Netzah Yehuda, an NGO that is dedicated to the support of ultra-Orthodox soldiers serving in the IDF, and helps ultra-Orthodox who have completed their service integrate into civil society.

As one who has served in the IDF for many years, and is even authoring a doctorate on ultra-Orthodox conscription, he can attest to the fact that the army provides young ultra-Orthodox with important tools for life – from instilling values such as work ethics and personal responsibility, to professional knowledge and practical experience. It is equally clear to him that the army has also benefited greatly from the integration of ultra-Orthodox into its ranks, especially in the current period in which the shortage of combat personnel has become a major security issue.

“The integration of the ultra-Orthodox into the IDF has two chief aspects: social and security,” he explains. “In recent years, the IDF has been mustering out many units, scaling down its manpower, and it has become very difficult to advocate security demands. There was a sense that there is really no operational justification for the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox, and the demand thereof stems mainly from the desire to establish a more egalitarian society. All of this was true until the Gaza War. Today, every member of the ultra-Orthodox community understands all too well that there is a significant need to boost the IDF’s rank and file, and that this is a national imperative of the highest order. This doesn’t mean there can be an en mass enlistment of the ultra-Orthodox, but they do understand that this is a real security demand, which is something that couldn’t really be argued before the war.”

Kashrut is just an excuse: the barriers that turn the ultra-Orthodox against conscription

Maj. (res.) Yossi Levi’s claims indicate that, for the most part, the ultra-Orthodox community understands the importance of the military service, but nevertheless, there are various obstacles to the expansion of conscription to this sector.

According to Levi, one of the main obstacles is related to the manner in which the discourse on ultra-Orthodox conscription is conducted. “The current public discourse on the subject is such that does not understand the intricacies of ultra-Orthodox society,” Levi states. “This is especially evident when we talk about equality. Israelis think that this is a universal value, but this value is simply irrelevant in ultra-Orthodox society. This is a society that is not governed by the value of equality – not between men and women, or between rabbi and student – so it was never a notion that we had to uphold. Therefore, when you mention to the ultra-Orthodox the need of ‘sharing the burden,’ it only deters them. Similarly, it is also incorrect to talk to them about the importance of protecting the State of Israel, because they do not see themselves as part of the State to begin with. On the other hand, if we talk to them about the importance of protecting the people of Israel – this is something they can get behind.”

Another major obstacle, according to Levi, is the fear of losing the ultra-Orthodox identity. “The biggest fear is that young people will adopt secular or Western values, and replace their ultra-Orthodox identity with an Israeli identity,” he explains. “You have to understand that the ultra-Orthodox see themselves as the keepers of the flame. As far as they are concerned, the overall purpose of the Jewish people is to preserve tradition down the generation line, and this is done with the help of those who dedicate their lives to the study of Torah. In the ultra-Orthodox view, in order to keep the flame burning, we must first keep the young people within the sector, and that is why we are so afraid of dropping out of religion. When we see the various sectors, such as the national religious or the national ultra-Orthodox, which are more involved in general society, we see that dropout rates among the ultra-Orthodox are indeed the lowest. The conclusion that many draw from this is that in order to preserve tradition, one must distance oneself from any external influence, and this is one of the reasons for the strong objection to enlistment in the IDF.”

Another barrier concerns the negative attitude that has become entrenched in ultra-Orthodox society toward enlistment in the IDF, so much so that oftentimes even when a young ultra-Orthodox man does wish to enlist, he will not do so simply because he fears repercussions – excommunication for one – from the Ultra-Orthodox society and even his family. “When you grow up in ultra-Orthodox society, you are instilled with one central value: the study of Torah,” Levi explains. “As far as the ultra-Orthodox community is concerned, anyone who doesn’t study Torah is second class members of the community. One of our struggles is to turn ultra-Orthodox soldiers into ‘first class’ members. The way to do this is only by expanding the number of ultra-Orthodox soldiers. This will normalize military service and turn it into a matter that is not only legitimate but even appreciated. If today only about 1,000 ultra-Orthodox men enlist each year, it means that the average ultra-Orthodox person knows perhaps one soldier, and probably not someone close. On the other hand, if we succeed in recruiting even just a third of the ultra-Orthodox population that is eligible for enlistment, this will mean that every ultra-Orthodox home will have a soldier. When that happens, the entire attitude in the ultra-Orthodox society toward soldiers will change, and we will see both an increase in enlistment and a decrease in the unfortunate phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox soldiers becoming excommunicated.”

What about objective obstacles such as the need to observe the kashrut laws or separation of men and women?

“People tend to think that these are the reasons that deter the ultra-Orthodox from enlisting, but that’s not really the case. Let’s start with kashrut (Jewish Orthodox dietary laws) – all units in the army maintain kashrut, and units designated for ultra-Orthodox maintain strict (Mehadrin) kashrut at the most exacting levels, so, for the most part, there really shouldn’t be a problem. Regarding gender separation – it is indeed a complex issue because an ultra-Orthodox Jew will not serve in a place where women serve. However, there are units that are designated for men only, so this should not constitute a problem either. When we examine all these excuses in depth, we see that they can all be shelved. The ultra-Orthodox can and should serve, but the army, for its part, is obligated to provide them with all the necessary accommodations.”

Such as?

“We insist on five main principles: Mehadrin (strict) kashrut, gender separation, prayer time, study time and an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle – that is, a non-explicit environment, devoid of topics of conversation that are considered inappropriate in the ultra-Orthodox culture. In order for an ultra-Orthodox to feel comfortable in the IDF, he has to receive this whole package.”

Can these adjustments hurt other demographics that serve in the army, namely women?

“The IDF is the largest organization in Israel, with the ability to make adjustments to one sector without infringing the rights of another. That is why we encourage the establishment of dedicated homogeneous ultra-Orthodox units. There is a tendency to see sectoral and single-gender units as a negative thing, but in practice, such units allow the ultra-Orthodox to integrate into the army without causing the exclusion of other serving populations.”

The goal: the recruitment of 22,000 ultra-Orthodox

Recently, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement published Plan 8000 – a proposal for the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox society in the security service. This plan addresses the need to recruit 8,000 ultra-Orthodox men to serve in the IDF, the police and additional security bodies as early as the upcoming year. To implement this, the IDSF offers four main service programs: service in the IDF, service in the Israel Police or Border Patrol, service in the search and rescue forces, and service in the armaments industry.

Maj. (res.) Yossi Levi had read the plan in depth and supports most of the points it touches upon, but he also has some reservations – the first relates to the number of ultra-Orthodox soldiers that must be recruited. “Security experts are talking about 8,000 soldiers, I’m talking about 22,000,” he says. “Today, there are 66,000 ultra-Orthodox men aged 18-24 who do not serve in the IDF, and at least a third of them are suitable for enlistment even in the eyes of the great leaders of the Orthodox communities, and that third is the target audience as far as I’m concerned.”

In Levi’s opinion, one way to encourage ultra-Orthodox recruitment is to expand the IDF’s service offerings. This understanding is also at the basis of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s proposal, Thus, each of the recruitment tracks presented in the proposal also includes several sub-tracks. The IDF enlistment program for ultra-Orthodox men, for example, includes designated combat units such as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion. In addition, it was suggested to establish the first ultra-Orthodox brigade that would operate as a dedicated security force along the Seam Line – the security separation zone between Palestinian and Jewish population areas in the Jordan Valley and Judea and Samaria. “Such a border enforcing division offers two main advantages,” Yossi Levi elaborates. “First of all, it allows for a softer integration into the IDF, because the operational training there can be shorter and less taxing physically. Beyond that, an important matter of perception figures into this option – ultra-Orthodox Jews who serve in the Jordan Valley or Judea and Samaria will de facto be protecting their home because many of them live in the area, and that alone connects them emotionally to the mission.”

Another sub-track proposed for the IDF Ultra-Orthodox enlistment plan is service options in the Home-Front forces, in a format of staggered weeks of service and religious studies. According to Levi, this idea is actually not very advisable simply because a week-long absence from military duty might compromise continuity and performance. As far as he is concerned, the preferred alternative is to allow a format of half a day of service and a half-day of study. “This format,” he explains, “can allow the soldiers to still get a lot of study time, while at the same time – remain in the system and maintain continuity of service.”

Another proposal included in Plan 8000 is the recruitment of Ultra-Orthodox into Israel Police, Border Police or the National Guard. According to Yossi Levi, the great advantage of this track lies in the fact that many ultra-Orthodox communities hold a better opinion of the civilian enforcement forces than the IDF, hence, integration in those forces could be more comfortable for some ultra-Orthodox.

Similarly, he supports a recruitment initiative of ultra-Orthodox men to munitions factories that are expected to be built as part of the lessons of the Gaza War. According to Levi, such a service will both connect the ultra-Orthodox to operational activity while enabling them to acquire a profession. His hope is that this kind of service will be done in uniform, in order to normalize the use of uniforms in ultra-Orthodox society.

The only track in the 8000 plan that Yossi Levi has reservations about is the recruitment track for rescue organizations the likes of as ZAKA disaster response search and rescue NGO and United Hatzala emergency medical response NGO. In his view, this volunteering is welcome and worthy of recognition, but it cannot be an alternative to military service. According to Levi, young people up to the age of 22 should enlist in a security body such as the IDF or the police, and perform full-time service there. However, since ultra-Orthodox Jews who have already passed this age will probably not enlist at all, he agrees that they could be appropriate candidates for recognized national service in one of the rescue organizations.

Beyond the public discourse: Conscription of Ultra-Orthodox in practice

Major Levi has been active in the military system for a decade and a half. Over the years, he has seen the issue of the integration of the ultra-Orthodox into the IDF take form – not only in public discourse but also on the ground. His conclusion is that it is possible – and indeed necessary – to integrate ultra-Orthodox into the IDF, and that such a move – if done correctly – could contribute to both the state and ultra-Orthodox society.

In order to promote the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox men in the IDF, or any other national security service, Yossi Levi emphasizes the need for an authorized civilian body to oversee the process. “The army is constantly changing and there is a high churn rate of commanders, so you can’t rely on the IDF alone to upkeep the know-how and maintain the processes,” he explains. “In order to carry out long-term support for ultra-Orthodox recruitment, you need a civilian body that knows that society from the inside out, and can provide support to ultra-Orthodox soldiers even after their discharge.”

Another conclusion Levi had drawn from his many years of enterprise is that in ultra-Orthodox society, there is no second chance. “When establishing a conscription program for the ultra-Orthodox, it is very important that it be perceived from the onset as a program that is tailored to the specific needs of the ultra-Orthodox way of life, such that allows them to preserve their religious identity,” he explains. “If we succeed in correctly branding the program from the very beginning, and establish trust with the ultra-Orthodox community, that’s where our victory will lie.”

הפוסט The Notion of Equality is Irrelevant”: Netzah Yehuda Director General Yossi Levi Believes Ultra-Orthodox Can be Conscripted הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. In formulating the national vision, the IDSF HaBithonistim research department examines the security threats on Israel through a magnifying glass, to obtain a comprehensive understanding thereof and yield recommendations for the most effective method of addressing them. Recently an IDSF HaBithonistim research team spoke before the Nagel Commission on Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Building, and presented a detailed opinion paper to the decision makers.

This paper was written with the assistance of six key researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik, Lt. Col. (res.) Shosh Raban, Dr. Yaakov Rimmer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Or Issachar. They elaborate on the current challenges and perceptions that govern the IDF, and detail the steps that must be taken to ensure that the IDF’s force buildup fully responds to the reference scenarios facing the State of Israel.

Reference scenarios as the basis for the IDF’s force buildup

Israel is a small country with little strategic depth, surrounded by a choke ring of enemies and a slew of threats. Many of these threats have existed from the very first moment of Israel’s existence. However, the past decades have seen processes and changes that had bred new trends. If the formative years of Israel saw the young state surrounded by enemy countries, then today, after 75 years of fighting against many of them for its mere existence, Israel is now contending with a pernicious remote enemy in the form of Iran, and with terror militias operating on its borders and in its very midst. Nowadays, Israel is contending with a convergence of theaters, meaning that any conflagration of one almost inevitably sparks a flare-up in another. In this current map of challenges, Israel exists in a permanent state of security volatility that may see unexpected attacks from foreign entities and from hostile elements from within.

In order to optimally deal with such threats, as well as with many others, the IDF’s force buildup must be carefully designed and executed. Traditionally, the Israeli army’s force buildup had stood on six pillars: doctrine, armaments, training, professional advancement, organization and infrastructure. Force buildup has long-term implications on Israel’s military readiness, and demands careful consideration of the current reference scenarios and threats, as well as projections thereof for the future.

Paramount security threats:

• Iran: although almost 1,000 miles from Israel, Tehran operates a vast proxy-terror mechanism across the Middle East, and has succeeded in sending its tentacles into the heart of Israel, into the Palestinian arena. Iran sits on a huge stockpile of missile and drones, developed and dedicated solely to target the civilian heart of Israel. And on top of it all – Iran is now a nuclear threshold state that is dedicated to the development of weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with Iran’s aspirations for instilling global Shi’ite Islam, this places it not only as a major threat to Israel, but indeed a threat to the rest of the world.

• Syria and Lebanon: the conflict on Israel’s northern border is a clear and present danger to Israel as Syria and Lebanon, its neighbors to the north, are enemy states. Syria had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war, and its outcome is not yet clear in terms of the new regime’s stability or long-term intentions towards Israel. Lebanon is for all intents and purposes, ruled by Hezbollah and by proxy – Iran. This state of affairs renders Israel’s northern border highly volatile and demands the constant presence of Israeli forces along that border and a high level of military readiness.

• Egypt and Jordan: the State of Israel does have peace agreements with these two countries. However, they are extremely precarious, and with more than a few inherent vulnerabilities. One is the fact that these accords do not really render redundant the IDF’s activity along the borders with these countries. But they do limit it to a great extent, simply due to the fact that one country cannot operate militarily against an ally in the same manner it can against an enemy. Furthermore, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan do not reflect the current sentiment on the streets of Cairo and Amman. Most of their citizens are openly hostile towards Israel. In the event of a change of governments – a very plausible scenario in both highly unstable countries – their relations with Israel may in all likelihood be impacted. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a reversal of alliances wherein either or both countries become once again enemies of Israel.

• Gaza: the destiny of Gaza in the day after the Gaza War is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, Israel must be prepared for a long period of instability in the Strip. Once the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia of Gaza is completed, the IDF will have to remain deployed in the area to act as a bulwark and ensure the safety of the population along the Gaza border, while crushing further attempts from within the Strip to reignite terror activity against Israe.

• Terror militias: during the past several years, due mainly to misguided concepts, Israel had allowed the terror organizations on its borders to build up their force and stockpile weapons to staggering levels, with the help of Iran. Thus, these organizations – namely Hezbollah and Hamas – have grown to become highly trained and armed terror militaries. The October 7 massacre had made it clear beyond any shred of doubt that Israel cannot allow terror and terror militias to germinate on its borders or anywhere near them, and it must adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards any such attempts.

• The Palestinian arena: this is a pressing challenge for Israel. the Stability achieved by the security forces in Judea and Samaria in the wake of Operation Defensive Shield is wearing thin, and the area has become a hornet’s nest of renewed terror activity, inspired by the October 7 events. The Palestinian Authority is failing – if indeed it even wishes to – conduct effective counter-terror activity in the area against the mounting Islamic terror in its jurisdiction, forcing Israeli security forces to undertake this task in these areas as well.

• Internal arena: the multi-front conflagration is pouring over into the Israeli Arab population. Since the outset of the Gaza War, there has been an awakening of terror activity among the Arab population living within the Green Line and holding a full Israeli citizenship. To contend with this problem without further drawing on the already buckling IDF, Israel must form a national guard to reenforce the civil guard system.

The sad truth of the matter is that the IDF does not have the numbers to address the entire spectrum of threats and reference scenarios with which Israel is currently contending. Therefore, the IDF must build up its force in terms of manpower as well as its operational and firepower capabilities. Some of these changes, such as higher recruitment rates must be executed on a systemic level while others, such as the buildup of new divisions or the incorporation of advance technologies that better enable the designated units to achieve their mission, should be delivered in a manner tailored to the specific needs of each of these units, as detailed below.

The Vision for IDF Force Buildup – A Systemic Point of View

Upscaling manpower

Over the past decades, certain processes have been put in place to downscale the IDF’s manpower, mainly in the ground forces. This led among others to the mustering out of entire divisions, the reduction of mandatory service duration, and increased cuts in mandatory and reserves personnel. These processes were undertaken with the notion that the “army of the people”, as the IDF is perceived in Israel, could be downsized and shaped into a “small and smart army”. However, the outbreak of the Gaza War proved the fallacy of this approach, and has led to the detrimental shortage of regular and reserve manpower with which the IDF is currently struggling.

An additional manpower crisis, dubbed “The Captain Crisis”, referring to the phenomenon in which low raking officers opt to end their military career at the rank of captain, mostly due to better conditions waiting for them in the civilian labor market. This creates a shortage of officers that could have been designated to be the next generation of the IDF’s leadership.

The personnel shortage in the IDF consequent of these cuts, is a significant operational constraint for the IDF, in particular when it must juggle a number of fronts at the same time. Compounding this problem, is the erosion of those of the forces that bear most of the operational brunt due to an unbalanced assignment of the operational load.

Ideal situation:

• Extension of service: in June 2015, the length of the men’s mandatory service – and some of the women’s – was cut from 36 to 12 months. The mandatory three-year term must be reinstated as was the standard for decades – a move that will boost the ranks of the regular army.

• Extension of the reserve service: the increase in the number of reservists is an indispensable element of the buildup of the IDF, such that responds effectively to the current security realities. Recently, the age of discharge from reserves duty was upped by a year, and it may have to be further extended, at least until the army’s manpower had sufficiently been boosted and service exemption policies tightened.
• Expansion of mandatory service to additional demographics: for decades, there have been in Israel’s society entire demographics, which for numerous reasons are automatically exempt from military service – some under the dictates of law and policy, while others slip “under the radar”. This means that there are tens of thousands of able individuals, who are not part of the IDF’s service cycle. In order to address this issue, there are steps that the army can adopt, such as expansion of female induction and the extension of the mandatory induction to “special” demographics such as the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab populations. An additional course of action would be to have soldiers sign on for a short – salaried – extension of their service once their mandatory term is done.

• Improved officer retention: The army must improve the retention of its officers and boost the attractivity of the military careers it can offer young officers, with the aim of keeping them in the system for long-term careers. For this end the military must overhaul and modernize its HR practices and offer terms and conditions of service that can parallel with comparable jobs on the civilian labor market.

• Modernization of the organizational operation: As a hierarchal structure, the IDF is weighted down by a uniformity of approach and thought and its resistance to creative ways of thought that challenge deep seated conceptions. The IDF must adopt organizational cultures that accept diverse ways of thought and are open to a diversity of opinions and concepts.
• Establishment of an auxiliary national guard force: in tandem with the expansion of the military ranks, the IDF’s areas of responsibility must be streamlined. Currently, beyond its border security and defense of the country, the army is also burdened with the task of internal security, which hinders its capacity to prioritize missions and assign sufficient manpower to this and other tasks. To alleviate this burden and allow the army to focus on the missions for which it exists, a national guard that is subordinate to Israel Police should be formed, responsible for all matters pertaining to internal security threats and sharing the army’s workload.

Optimization of logistic readiness

Current situation:

The IDF’s logistic readiness is part and parcel of its operational readiness, but sadly, it is plagued by various problems mainly in the areas of armaments, maintenance and infrastructure.

In terms of armaments, Israel has been developing an increasing dependance on the import of technology and weapons from foreign countries, mainly the US. The Gaza War made it clear to what extent Israel’s deep dependance on foreign munition supplies is to the detriment of the IDF’s operational flexibility and its freedom of action.

In terms of maintenance, many of the army’s bases and headquarters are in dilapidated condition, and are not fully prepared for internal threats and ballistic attacks. This state of affairs poses a risk factor to IDF’s operational capability. Furthermore, most of the IDF’s infrastructures are above ground, and exposed to threats in scenarios of surface-to-surface rocket and missile attacks.

Ideal situation:

• Upscaling inventory and supervising its integrity: Inventories should be assigned minimal stock threshold as per standardized operational requirements, with mechanisms of timely restocking in times of emergency. Furthermore, munitions and weapons should be inspected regularly to maintain integrity and immediate usability.

• Reinforcement of the security industry: Israel’s security industry must be allotted further investment and developed to reduce Israel’s dependance on imported weapons, lower costs of ammunition, and develop dedicated technologies and systems, while allowing for fast restocking in times of war. A positive by-product of this kind of policy would be the creation of new jobs and a boost to the economy.

• Expansion of international arms supply relations: Alongside the development of a more robust local industry, Israel must establish procurement deals with as many countries as possible, to free it from the shackles of dependency on a handful of leading countries for weapons and ammunitions supply.

• Upscaling and optimization of military infrastructures: The IDSF bases and headquarters are a strategic asset for the State of Israel, and as such they must be maintained and secured to the highest level. The bases should be inspected to determine their level of regular operation and their readiness for a state of war.

• Introduction of underground infrastructures: Important strategic assets must be relocated to underground premises to ensure their protection in the event of missile and rocket attack. Additionally, Israel must be prepared for a contingency wherein it must use underground routes to deploy forces. Alongside the planning of dedicated underground spaces, it is advisable to turn existing civilian infrastructures such as tunnels and public parking lots into dual-use infrastructures that can serve military purposes in emergency times.

Technology & Cyber

Current situation:

Alongside the traditional battlefield exists an emerging crucial theater of battle – the technological arena. Over the past several decades, technology – and war technology – has advanced by leaps and bounds, introducing new weapons and widely used cyber warfare.  Recently, with the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), new, highly sophisticated systems have been introduced that pose even a greater challenge for Israel security establishment.

Israel’s security technology and cyber warfare are some of the most advanced in the world, but there are still significant barriers to the incorporation of these technologies on the battlefield. These are related, among others, to the organization’s resistance to changes, the need to work exclusively with large vendors and the limited access to such technologies for commanders in the field.

Even though technology is by no means a complete substitute for human capabilities and for the value of the national contribution of a people’s army, Israel must ensure technological superiority over its enemies, and remain at the forefront of technological development and progress.

Ideal situation:

• After-action review: the shortcomings that arose during the Gaza War must be studied, such as the shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and uncrewed vehicles, the lack of technologies that would allow the forces to deal with the Hamas tunnels and shortcomings in quick and effective responses to anti-tank rockets.

• Investment in technology: Israel must allocate considerable budgets and manpower for the development of defense technology while at the same time boost existing local industry, with an emphasis on dedicated weapons and systems for the use specified by the IDF.

• Incorporation of robotics: robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive motorboats, can bring a significant advantage on the battle field and considerably reduce the cost in human lives. Therefore, robotics should be incorporated in all of the IDF branches.

• Cyber warfare and AI: the cyber arena is getting more sophisticated by the moment, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is on the increase, posing yet new security threats. In order to ensure it maintains the upper hand in this arena, Israel must continue to invest in research and development of offensive and defensive cyber, and begin incorporating AI in its security needs.

• Tech training: The forces in the field must be trained to use the advanced tech tools that are and will become available to them. This calls for the installation of a whole new training array across all IDF branches and units, and the professional training of all the professional personnel allocated to this end.

• Diversification of tech acquisition portfolio: Israel’s security establishment currently deals with only a handful of large tech vendors, with which it has trade relations for decades. In order to introduce sophisticated tech systems, it must be open to doing business with smaller tech vendors and entrepreneurs.

The Vision of IDF Force Buildup According to Branches and Corps

Ground forces

Current situation:

The State of Israel is often forced to engage in multiple combat arenas, wherein the escalation in one often leads immediately to a domino effect conflagration of others. As demonstrated throughout the Gaza War, the battle of order of the IDF’s ground forces proved too short to cover more than one broad campaign in a single arena, while holding a defensive position in others. This also means that in the event of unexpected developments, the army does not have enough reserves to deploy.

In light of existing and projected threats outlined by reference scenarios, the State of Israel must boost its capabilities such that it can engage in high intensity combat in at least two fronts simultaneously, while assuming a broad defensive position in others.

Ideal situation:

• Overhaul of readiness protocols: the IDF must ensure that regular and reserve forces incorporate improved readiness protocols –in terms of quantity and quality of combat gear and weaponry, and in terms of the professional and physical operational readiness of troops and commanders, in order to allow short response times in a reality where surprise terror attacks have become part and parcel of daily life.

• Augmentation of forces by one regular service division and several reserves’ divisions: The IDF should add at least one more regular army division and two more reserves maneuver enhancement divisions to its personnel headcount. These divisions will include a full divisional structure and auxiliary units including tanks, artillery, engineering and logistics. One should be deployed at Israel’s northern border and the other in the Jordan Valley. This is a necessity in order to deal with the operative shortcomings in some arenas, and will additionally serve as reserve forces when needed.

• Establishment of a dedicated standalone combat auxiliary force: a reserve force at the level of at least a division, under the command of General HQ, should be formed to provide operational flexibility and provide relief to forces in the event of unexpected or prolonged events. The reserve force may be kept at a lower level of readiness and mid-level operational fitness, ensuring that these can be brought up to par quickly in times of need.

• Formation of a tunnel capture-and-destroy combat unit: In light of the growing tunnel warfare threat on Israel’s borders, the security establishment must seriously consider the formation of a new dedicated army corps specializing in the detection and destruction of tunnels and subterranean warfare.

• General internal audit of IDF units: The IDF must conduct an in-depth audit of relevant units to asses manpower, equipment and armament needs and shortages. For example, it has become clear in the current conflict that there is a pressing need to increase the numbers of tank in the armored units. Also, in the current climate in Israel’s multiple arena reality, special units such as the Oketz canine unit and the Yahalom combat engineering unit, must be augmented.

• Improvement of mobilization and deployment mechanisms and procedures: The convergence and interconnectivity of arenas in Israel demand that the army install a streamlined mobilization and deployment system and procedures to enable the swift reallocation of forces from one front to another. For this purpose, the army would have to create a dedicated road and rail infrastructure as an alternative to the congested civilian routes, and upscale its fleet of heavy carriers to included armored vehicles. To streamline quick force deployment and movement, civilian infrastructure, such as railways, should be considered for use as supplementary systems.

The Air Force: Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles

Current situation:

The Israeli Air Force is charged with three main missions: The protection of Israel’s areal space, offensives in enemy territories, and the support of ground campaigns. In order to accomplish these missions to their fullest, the IAF is required to have extremely complex and resource-intensive capabilities. It must be understood that no matter how supreme an army’s air force is – it cannot compensate for inadequate ground forces. It can, however, provide operational flexibility to its counterparts on the ground and in the ocean. This can be further boosted by newer advanced drone technology, which aside from expanding military capabilities, help reduce the cost in human lives.

Over the past years, significant changes have been occurring in the map of the areal threats. Israel’s enemies on its borders and remotely understand that they cannot contend with the superiority of Israel’s Air Force and thus abandoned the use of fighter jets, instead opting for the development of ballistic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, steep trajectory surface-to-surface missiles, and low-tech warfare i.e. glider terror attacks, and improvised explosive kites and balloons. These new threats demand the IAF to recalculate its offensive and defensive tactics and set in place procedures for force and resource deployment and means and weapons it uses.

Ideal situation:

• Increase of drone warfare: The most important objective for the use of UMAVs is the protection of the lives of soldiers. Even in the event that the use of human forces is unavoidable, drones can support IAF’s strikes in the heart of enemy territory. UMAV’s can assist in the protection of ground sectors and lend significant aid to ground campaigns. It is highly recommended that the IDF invest resources in increasing the use of this means of war.

• Incorporation of a steep trajectory array: the IDF should examine the incorporation of a steep trajectory array with rocket and attack glider capabilities.

• Streamlining Israel’s air defense system: In order to ensure the protection of the Home Front, the IDF’s air defense must undergo a comprehensive inspection to ensure it is able to contend with scenarios of attacks of thousands of rockets and missiles a day. Furthermore, Israel should consider forging regional alliances for the protection of Israel’s areal space.

Navy: Defense as a Priority

Current situation:

Israel’s naval arena is important on a number of levels: security-wise, Israel has expansive maritime borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Egypt. Economically, Israel has prolific maritime trade activities; strategically, the most substantial source of energy in the country comes from the natural gas fields within the country’s territorial waters.

Therefore, the State of Israel must maintain superiority in all naval arenas, securing its maritime supply routes, protect its shores, protect free passage of vessels and maritime trade, and protect its gas fields. However, as the most pressing threats are ground-based and since the military is struggling with manpower deficits, coupled with traditionally high costs of maintaining and operating naval vessels, the IDF must plan how to prioritize the Navy’s needs.

Ideal situation:

• Prioritization of defensive capabilities: Controlling the maritime territory demands superior offensive capabilities from the Navy, however, due to current constraints abovementioned the focus on the IDF’s Navy must be the development of defensive capabilities.

• Integration of unmanned platforms: It is possible, and necessary, to integrate unmanned surface and underwater vessels, which would be deployed primarily for patrolling, guarding Israel’s maritime borders, routine security, allowing the IDF forces to deal with more complex threats.

Home Front Command: Delegating responsibilities effectively

Current situation:

The Home Front plays a crucial role in the protection of the citizens of Israel, but the delegation of responsibilities between the body and the civil defense and rescue forces remains unclear. This unclarity leads to overlapping of responsibilities in some cases, and in others – tasks that fall between the cracks and remain unattended.

Furthermore, the Home Front Command has been red flagging its personnel shortage for some time. Over the recent years this demanded the allocation of IDF combat forces to supplement the Home Front’s search and rescue activities – forces that should have been serving in other critical ground-force missions. This demands the rethinking of the allocation of resources between the Home Front Command and the IDF operational units.

Another issue that demands attention is the auxiliary Territorial Defense array. Nowadays the territorial defense’s main area of operation is centered around the defense against external threats and search and rescue missions. The area of territorial defense that deals with internal threats such as terror attacks remains nearly untreated by the Home Front Command and this requires revisiting to consider including this task in the Home Front’s responsibilities.

Ideal situation:

• Assignation of areas of responsibilities: The responsibilities of the Home Front and the civil rescue bodies must be assigned and delineated in a clear manner, with consideration of the capabilities each body brings to the table, to allow for the most effective fulfillment of each responsibility.

• Improvement of protection of civil structures: In order to improve the protection of the civil Home Front and reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the wake of attacks against civilians, the Home Front must identify the public structures which lack protective areas and spaces, especially those near and in conflict areas.

• Balanced distribution of recruits: Since there are certain units in the Home Front Command that are in need of recruits with the same profile as the IDF’s other ground force units, the assignment of recruits must be based on considerations of operational priorities of each of the units.

• Reinforcement of the territorial defense array: In light of the terror threats against Israel from within the Arab-Israeli population, it is worth examining the integration of Home Front forces in the protection of the communities in conflict areas and border zones.

The Intelligence Directorate: Collaboration with Civil Bodies

Current situation:

The security intelligence establishment is a critical component in Israel’s security, strategically and tactically. However, Israel had developed over the recent years a dangerous dependence on its intelligence deterrence – the full implication of which was revealed in the October 7 disaster.

Therefore, the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence establishment must be further expanded and maintained but at the same time the security establishment’s other capabilities – especially in the operational field – must be boosted. Furthermore, the intelligence apparatus is currently plagued with some deeply engrained problems that pose a challenge to Israel’ superiority in the field, such as inadequate investment in diverse fields of intelligence, and the brain drain of the system due to much more economically gratifying jobs in the civilian job market.

The ideal:

• Recruitment of speakers of foreign languages: In order to respond to the current operational needs, the Intelligence Corps must augment the ranks of its foreign language speakers through a specially tailored recruitment and training program.

• Reinstatement of an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) array: The Israeli Intelligence OSINT array plays a critical role in the understanding of the broad political landscape in Israel and is indispensable for monitoring unforeseen sudden events, identifying information leaks, producing projections and for influencing public opinion. Therefore, the OSINT array in the intelligence establishment must be rehabilitated and further cultivated.

• Social networks as a viable source of intelligence (SOCMINT): Intelligence gathering from social networks should be increased as it is an indispensable source of intel yielding platform.

• Collaboration with civilian market: It is worth examining the integration of capabilities from Israeli high-tech and local industry. This kind of collaboration can allow the IDF Intelligence Corps to adopt advanced civilian technologies to maintain superiority in the field. Furthermore, it is worth considering opening some of the career military jobs in the Intelligence Corp to the civilian job market to obtain additional professional expert manpower from outside of the military system.

IDF Force Buildup Vision – Decision Making Processes

Improvement of decision-making processes

Current situation:

The security and strategic decision-making processes, including those that pertain to the IDF force buildup and budget allocation, mostly happen in the military executive branch, and are not always transparent to the relevant political and public factors. The limited number of participants in these processes often lead to perceptual shortcomings in the absence of broad perspectives and different points of view.

Another issue regarding decision making processes is related to control and monitoring processes. Currently, most if the control and monitoring of the Israel’s security establishment and the IDF’s activity are internal and are not transparent to the political system, not to mention to the public, which subjects them to a risk of partiality and bias.

Ideal situation:

• Transparent decision-making: The IDF must incorporate non-military professionals, such as public representatives and suitable professionals from each relevant field in its strategic decision-making processes, such that allows for decision-making that is based on multiple opinions and perspectives through organizational processes such as brainstorming sessions.

• Introduction of “red teams”: The intelligence analysis process often uses “red teams” – which simulates hostile attacks with the aim of detecting vulnerabilities and flaws in existing systems and responses. Many times, these teams comprise non-military professionals who bring knowledge and perspectives from outside of the military system. To improve decision-making across the entire security system, red teams should be incorporated in every branch and arm of the IDF.

• Bi-annual Cabinet updates: The Cabinet should hold bi-annual briefings focusing on various aspects of the IDF’s force buildup – including threat assessments, manpower allocations, operational readiness, procurement and armament. These meetings should be anchored in appropriate legislation, and the consequent decisions should be shared with the public. Furthermore, the security establishment should be required to present to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee all information pertaining to changes in the IDF force buildup.

• Establishment of independent supervisory committees: Independent supervisory committees comprising public and civilian representatives are needed to examine the IDF force buildup and report to the government and official control bodies. The government’s security cabinet will be obligated to discuss the committee’s findings and include civilian representatives to partake in discussions on unclassified findings.

Thought on Israel’s security: conclusion

The dynamic map of the security challenges characteristic to Israel and the Middle East region demands constant scrutiny of the present and future threats. Only with a broad understanding of the reference scenarios Israel faces, its military force can be built up in a proper and informed manner.

Nowadays, Israel is forced to contend with a long list of threats, spearheaded by Iran, which can turn into a nuclear state at any moment. Additionally, the current reference scenarios point to a multi-arena war placing Israel on several fronts at the same time, as well as a surprise attack that could be launched by any one of the terror organizations operating on Israel’s borders.

The Gaza War has proven that Israel and its security establishment must recalculate its route forward and methodically and skillfully plan the force buildup across the system. This is the only way to ensure a strong army that could protect Israel security now and in the future.

הפוסט Ideally – IDSF HaBithonistim National Security Vision. The Force buildup of the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The crises around the recruitment, or lack thereof, of Haredi – ultra-orthodox – men, the imperative to secure Israel’s military needs, the economic crises, and the declining support of Israel in the international community – how can all these converge to a golden opportunity for Israel that would allow it to cross several hurdles with one leap?

Four hurdles, to be precise. The solution on the table is the foundation of local Israeli arms production, with manufacturing and operational personnel recruited from the Haredi community, who would be employed under conditions of military or national service. Israel’s government had already agreed on the imperative to increase Israel’s self-production of arms and munitions in light of growing dependance mainly on the US, and other countries, for the supply of arms and munitions, which significantly increased since the onset of the war. This project would afford Israel critical independence, while diminishing its dependence on the good will and political motivations of other countries and one administration or other. The military salaries paid to the recruits employed in this project would ensure its economic viability. Moreover, the global shortages in inventory and growing demand for ammunition will enable Israel to enjoy another source of revenue and a geopolitical status of an arms exporter, rather than an importer.

The crises of the military service objection in the ultra-orthodox community

Much can – and should – be said about the issue of the recruitment of young men from the ultra-orthodox community to the IDF, and an overview consisting of a handful of sentences cannot begin to touch upon the complexity of the issue. But it must be said that the solution above mentioned does not seek to serve as an overall response for the demand for equal participation of the ultra-orthodox sector in civic duties, nor can it create sufficient placements for the entire group. Rather, it offers a partial solution, such that could respond to the genuine concerns regarding the ability of Haredi recruits to aptly preserve their way of life – be it gender separation, kosher food, and daily religious studies – all obstacles to the recruitment of Haredis to the IDF today.

These munitions employees would have to be manned exclusively by male recruits, including professional positions such as managers and engineers, among others, whom also can be recruited from the Haredi community, but not necessarily. The operational workers can be recruited from special recruitment rounds of young men from the ultra-orthodox community. As part of their service, the recruits would be provided with kosher meals, communal prayer services either in the barracks or in a synagogue specially built for that purpose, and even religios studies in their downtime. This model can address many of the concerns of potential recruits from the Haredi community while at the same time provide a solution for a pressing strategic military need in Israel.

Economy of munitions

There is no doubt that Israel has been required to adhere to a well calculated munitions economy since the outbreak of the Gaza war. Although there is no doubt as regards to Israel’s military capabilities – especially thanks to the American supply train that provided Israel with hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment since the war began. However, there are numerous variables in this economy that Israel has to consider, and it cannot always trust that this supply effort will endure. Over the past months the government had held frequent discussions on the issue, with recommendations from the military and political echelons to put into action plans to cut Israel’s dependence on foreign supply and increase the capacity of its independent arms production. This is in the face of high risks of embargo against Israel, or the conditioned or delayed shipments Israel is currently contending with. Furthermore, the arrival of these shipments is subjected to the positions and interests of the various administrations with which Israel has weapons trade agreements. This is compounded by the growing global demand for weapons and ammunition, driven among others by the war in Ukraine which has no conclusion on the horizon, and many countries are now in a race to build up and improve their military power, both in Europe and in Asia, where many countries are concerned about China and North Korea, and of course in the Middle East too. Production is falling short of the growing demand and serious backlogs and delays are becoming a matter of routine. Thus, the decision to increase local production and ensure self-sufficiency is hardly exclusive to Israel. For instance, in March the European Commission presented a plan to cut arms imports from outside the EU and increase production on the continent.

Israel’s economic crisis

There is no doubt that the Gaza war has served Israel with a steep bill and is expected to continue exacting huge costs from the Israeli economy. The military technology is a relatively lucrative endeavor for Israel’s economy and it represents a significant portion of Israel’s exports with trail-blazing Israeli technologies demanded globally at considerable costs. The abovementioned proposal departs from the usual focus of the technology-intensive defense industry by broadening its portfolio to “low-tech” munitions manufacturing, and it offers the potential for a historic turning point in the industry, which could expedite the military and economic advantages for the country and pave the way into new markets where Israel’s reputation in the field of defense production would surely serve to lend credibility to and create demand for its new munitions products.

Israel’s international status

A point to consider is that Israel’s dependence on imported weapons and ammunition might compromise its foreign relations with other countries. This places political power over Israel in the hands of the suppliers and oftentimes is leveraged to dictate preconditions for the supply of weapons to Israel – even to the point of influencing Israel’s policies and decision-making processes, particularly in critical time such as wars. Israel, however, has a golden opportunity at present to turn the tables and gain exactly that kind of influence vis a vis other countries, when they come knocking at the door, wishing to purchase Israeli munitions. This potential says something about the influence Israel wields in the field of advanced military technology exports.

In conclusion, this type of munitions industry could manufacture a wide range of arms and ammunition. Naturally, the feasibility and requirements for each plant and assembly line would have to be established. It may be that certain factories would demand more unprofessional manpower while others may be technology-intensive and demand skilled employees. Differences in the cost of salaries might be significant. The State would of course determine whether it would subsidize these factories and recruit manpower at market salaries, even if it means financial losses. But the proposed model provides a cost-effective solution which is highly competitive, and can create attractive export opportunities, not only in regards to the quality of the output but also in prices.

Lastly, an additional important point is the potential abundance of unskilled manpower for this purpose, in a country where there is a shortage of this type of worker, especially in a sensitive military industry. Case in point – in other industries that are mainly based on manual labor such as agriculture and construction, it is hard and even impossible to find Israeli workers, and manpower there almost exclusively comprises of foreign workers. The situation is marginally better in the manufacturing sector. However, when considering the fact that military industry is highly sensitive, it is clear that the benefits of relying on the Haredi community for manpower may create opportunities and remove hurdles that are currently hard to clear.

This article was originally published in Now 14

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Two Hurdles with One Leap? A Proposal for the Recruitment of Haredim to New Arms Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey touches upon issues pertaining, among others, to the subject matter taught in Israeli schools, the scope of responsibility that Israel’s education establishment is charged with, and to the role of the education system, and its role in the shaping of the individual and collective identities in Israel.

In the next two papers, we will explore the results of the survey and the insights they offer. The present paper focuses on the values that should be instilled in Israel’s generation of school students, on the educational curriculum, and on the manner in which the educational system prepares its students for their future professional and civilian lives. The following paper explores the correlation between education and security, and the role of high school education in the preparation for military service.

The survey was conducted during September 2024 under the academic guidance of Dr. Ronen Itzik and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,611 respondents from the adult population in Israel (18+) who use the Internet, and was monitored to ensure appropriate representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religiosity, and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,611 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.5% with a probability of 95%; For the Jewish sample (1,354 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (257 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±6.2% with a probability of 95%.

What next after high school? Preparing students for adult life

Even a cursory glance shows one clear conclusion in regards to the public’s view of Israel’s education system: It is in urgent need of reform. The overwhelming majority of Israeli public thinks that the educational system fails to prepare its students for adult life, professionally and civically.

Results show that 80% of all respondents stated that the educational system does not provide students with sufficient vocational preparation and tools to allow them to join the job market, or that it provides minimal preparation – 75% thought that the educational system fails to prepare students for civilian life in Israel, or prepares them inadequately.

An additional aspect that indicated the imperative to reform the educational system is the declining numbers of vocational and agricultural schools, which have been disappearing from Israel’s educational map. 85% of the respondents support the establishment of vocational schools that would train students to join the manufacturing sector, and 70% support the establishment of agricultural schools. It seems that the public deeply understands that in the wake of the October 7 attack, Israel must chart a new list of priorities, wherein it achieves greater independence in the manufacturing of arms and ammunition, and greater agricultural self-sufficiency.

“The connection between industry and agriculture and Israel’s national security was clear even before the foundation of Israel. Jewish historical icon, Joseph Trumpeldor had already determined that Israel’s security line must be akin to the furrow line in the plowed field,” says chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi. “We in the movement also believe in this close connection, and therefore believe that the vocational and agricultural high schools that were popular in the formative years of Israel should be restored. Such high schools would also enable many students, who cannot get through the formal education system, to complete their schooling with professional qualifications and, will also inject high-quality manpower into the Israeli labor market reducing Israel’s dependence on foreign workers and imports, and will also strengthen the ideological connection between citizens and their country.”

Questioning values: the ideological role of the education system

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement believes that one of the roles of the educational system is to instill values rather than just knowledge. This notion had never been more significant as after October 7th, when it became clear that in order to survive, Israeli society must unite, and step up to the flag to serve in the army. As part of the survey, participants were asked to answer a number of questions pertaining to the ideological role of the educational system in Israel, both in Jewish and Arab societies.

According to the results of the combined sample, 65% of all respondents believe that the educational system places too much emphasis on grades, while 77% believe that the system does not place enough emphasis on values. In addition, when asked to choose from given options what the main goal of the educational system is, 48% of the respondents stated that the goal is to promote values of personal development, compared to 52% who stated that the system’s ultimate goal is to promote values of group affiliation and cooperation.

“The absolute importance of grades and personal achievement – particularly in STEM subjects – indicates that the educational system concentrates its efforts in priming its students for higher academic education, thereby tying youth development to the required standard of academic performance in high education institutes, as a personal objective that must be achieved”, says Colonel (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik. “In and of itself, this is not wrong, but it clearly comes at the expense of the time and resources that the educational system could be devoting to instilling values and building a national ethos that is consistent with the uniqueness of the State of Israel. The findings show a disturbing imbalance that is expressed by the preference of the value of individualism over the collective – something that does not correspond to the demands of the reality in Israeli society with its complex challenges.”

The participants were also asked to select the values they thought are most important to instill in students in Israel. The leading value was that of personal responsibility, which was selected by 68% of the respondents. That was immediately followed by the values of tolerance (64%), patriotism (60%), Zionism (51%), and connection to tradition (48%). At the bottom of the table appeared the values of helping the weak (41%) and the service to the state (37%).

It is worth mentioning that with regard to certain values, there were significant discrepancies between Jews and Arabs. For example, 66% of the Jews chose the value of patriotism, compared to 28% of the Arab respondents.

A look at a segmentation according to political ideology also reveals several significant discrepancies:

• 68% of the right-wing respondents chose instillation of Zionism, compared to 43% on the left;

• 74% of the respondents on the right chose the value of patriotism, compared to 45% on the left;

• 47% of respondents on the right of the political map chose tolerance, compared to 91% on the left;

• 31% of the right-wing respondents chose critical thinking, compared to 75% on the left.

The most significant discrepancy was recorded around the value “Connection to Tradition”, which was chosen by 70% from the right but only 9% from the left.

“It’s pleasing to see that the values of patriotism and connection to Zionism are at the top of the chart, and that most of Israel’s public understands that it is important to instill these values in the students of Israel’s educational system”, stresses Avivi. “However, the ideological differences in relation to these values is worrying, and prove what we at the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have been saying all along – Zionism has become essential to politics, and these findings represent a great threat to the justness of our path and to our existence here”.

The educational system as an identity shaping agent

With the understanding that the educational system plays an important role in shaping students’ personal and national identity, some of the survey’s questions were directed at the Jewish respondents while other – at the Arab respondents.

Thus, for example, the Jewish participants were asked what they thought were the most important subject to emphasize in the pedagogical curriculum in order to connect students to their Jewish identity and heritage. The subject that was cited the most was the history of the Jewish nation and the Holocaust, which was selected by 62% of the Jewish participants, followed by the history of the Land of Israel (47%), holidays and tradition (40%), the geography of Israel (40%) and the history of Zionism (33%).

A look at the ideological segmentation between right, center, and left on the political map shows that there are almost identical findings on the topics of the history of the Jewish people, as well as the history of Zionism. However, there were marked differences regarding other areas of knowledge. For example, 53% of the right-wing respondents chose holidays and tradition, compared to 12% on the left; 7% on the right chose Israeli literature and culture, compared to 37% on the left.

It seems that there is a broad consensus in Israel’s public in regard to most fields of knowledge that should be on the educational curriculum. However, these are still discrepancies regarding other fields of knowledge, especially those pertaining to religious subjects. Generally speaking, the right-wing traditionally tends to have a stronger affiliation to religion, which may explain why those respondents placed the subject of holidays and tradition higher. As oppose to them, the left traditionally is more connected with humanities and non-religious philosophy which is why those respondents preferred the subjects of literature and culture.

Over the years, voices have been rising from within the Arab population criticizing the Arab education in Israel, and suggesting various reforms aimed at bringing it up to par. To gauge the sentiment in Arab society the Arab participants were asked to respond to a number of questions tailored to them. Two of these questions pertained to the body that should be in charge of formal education programs for Israeli Arabs. The first question focused on general subjects such as math, English and sciences. The second question focused on the subjects that are tightly connected with the national ethos, such as history, literature and civic studies.

The results clearly indicate that the majority of the Arab public prefers leaving the state of affairs as it is – i.e. responsibility for the curriculum for Arab students under the Education Department of the Arab Society in the Israeli Ministry of Education (58% and 49% support this, respectively). Some of the participants noted that they would like the curriculum to be transferred to the responsibility of an Arab pedagogical council, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, similar to the pedagogical councils of the state-religious and ultra-Orthodox schools (37% and 41%, respectively). Only a minority of the respondents indicated that they would like to see the Arab sector’s curriculum transferred to the responsibility of a body appointed by the educational system in the Palestinian Authority (5% and 10%, respectively).

In addition to the separate questions, both demographics were asked whether they would send their children to a mixed Jewish-Arab school. The results are almost completely opposite, with 68% of the Jewish respondents said they wouldn’t send their children to a mixed school, and only 32% agreed, whereas among the Arab respondents, 29% objected and 71% agreed.

These findings may stem from the distrust of the Arab society on part of the Jewish society in the wake of October 7, and therefore most Jews are not interested in having their children learn with their Arab counterparts. Also, it may stem from the discrepancy between the Jewish and Arab educational systems, and perhaps Arab parents believe that their children could acquire better education in Jewish schools. Another cause may be greater solidarity with Jews among the Israeli Arab population after October 7.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement sees education as a cornerstone in shaping Israel’s future citizens, preserving the national ethos, and strengthening national security, and therefore takes the results of this survey very seriously.

Above all, it seems that the majority of the public – regardless of sectoral or political affiliation – believes that the educational system in Israel is failing to prepare students for life. Moreover, most participants believe that schools should place less emphasis on grades and more emphasis on values, and promote teamwork and cooperation among students.

הפוסט IDSF Index: Education and Security – fundamental Aspects הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The previous survey touched upon the values that the public believed should be instilled in Israel’s school students in Israeli schools, their pedagogical content, and the manner in which the education system prepares students for their professional and civic lives. The present survey explores the correlation between education and security and the role of Israeli high schools in preparing their students for military service.

The survey was conducted during September 2024 under the academic guidance of Dr. Ronen Itzik and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,611 respondents from the adult population in Israel (18+) who use the Internet, and was monitored to ensure appropriate representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religious and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,611 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.5% with a probability of 95%; For the Jewish sample (1,354 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (257 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±6.2% with a probability of 95%.

To teach or not to teach? Topics of national security in pedagogical curriculums

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement strongly believes that education is a fundamental building block in a robust national security and a crucial element in the shared ethos of Israeli society – both of which are vital for Israel’s existence in the Land of Israel. This part of the survey aims to examine whether Israeli public also identifies the correlation between education and security.

According to the results, 93% of the Jewish respondents, and 86% of all respondents, agree with the statement that education is a cornerstone of Israel’s national security. Furthermore, 90% of Jewish respondents and 83% of all respondents agree with the statement that the education system plays a decisive role in shaping the national ethos.

With the belief in the tight relationship between education and security, and on the backdrop of the imperative to build an ethos of a society that steps up to the flag and all walks of life serve in the army and honor those who serve in the security forces – the IDSF HaBithonistim movement believes that it is the duty of Israel’s educational system to provide its students with knowledge regarding the strategic threats and other issues of national security. These are explored as well in the present study.

The respondents were asked to what extent they thought the Israel’s educational system deals with the current security threats. 62% of the respondents thought that the educational system does not deal at all or deals to a small extent with the security threats Israel is facing. 26% thought that the system does deal with this subject to a reasonable extent, 5% thought that the topic is addressed to a satisfactory extent while only 2% thought that the educational system deals with the topic of security threats to a great extent.

The respondents were also asked whether they thought it was important for the educational system to add to the educational program lessons on critical issues to Israel’s national security such as the multi-arena threats Israel is facing, the Iranian threat and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 86% of the respondents – Arab and Israeli participants all together – thought it was important to add this subject matter to the curriculum, while 40% of them thought this was crucial.

“The findings of the survey cast a very scathing light on the inadequacy of the preparation Israel youth receives in school for the unique life challenges that life in Israel presents, and in particular, the critical life-stage most of them are expecting – service in the Israeli Defense Forces”, argues Colonel (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik. “The lack of knowledge in regard with the security challenges that ring Israel inherently impedes the understanding of the significance of military service, and at that enlistment into combat service. This is not congruent with the existing reality in Israel, in which only half of Israeli youth complete their mandatory military service, especially in the current reality with which Israel is dealing”.

In the State of Israel, most high school graduates enlist in military service in a very short while after finishing school. This means that the only reasonable time to prepare them for their military service is during high school. This survey explored public opinion on whether high schools should indeed be tasked with this undertaking, and what would be the most effective preparatory programs.

Results show that 95% of the Jewish participants thought that high schools should offer to some extent preparatory content and only 5% thought they shouldn’t. Of those who supported this idea, nearly 50% thought that high schools should deal with this matter to a large extent.

The participants were then asked to select which activities they deemed most appropriate for inclusion in preparatory programs. Most respondents thought that excursion and history and heritage tours were most important – selected by 70%. This was followed by meetings with serving school graduates (47%); youth movement activities (39%); one-week military youth (GADNA) program (35%) and lectures and talks by security and military personnel (34%).

“Preparation for meaningful military service begins in high school, and schools that shirk this responsibility are first and foremost hurting their students by not letting them gain the knowledge and tools that are crucial for the next phase of their life”, says chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim Brigadier General Amir Avivi. “We in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement try to help with this and prepare young men and women for their military service, and hold seminars on security issues and history and heritage excursions tailored for youth”.

Education is indeed a cornerstone of security: conclusions

In order to ensure the security of Israel, Israeli society must be one that serves in the army. However, this notion is not a call to focus on the collective and security concerns alone. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s aspiration is for a society that is “between Athens and Sparta”. In other words, a society with a rich culture that promotes education on one hand, and on the other – an ideological society that is willing to make personal sacrifices for the sake of the collective.

Since the educational system is the agent that shapes the future generation of Israeli citizens, it should also be responsible for providing knowledge and instilling values. However, the survey shows that oftentimes, it falls short of fulfilling this duty.

This understanding had led the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to add education to its list of activities.  Members of the movement frequently meet with high school students and students in pre-military preparatory programs, conduct heritage tours for youth, and give lectures and meetings on issues of national identity and security. The movement is also currently working on establishing a new pre-military preparatory school called “Tekuma,” which will be established in the settlement of Tekuma in the Gaza envelope, and will focus on Zionist values, connection to the Land of Israel, and the instillation of a national Zionist ethos.

הפוסט The IDSF HaBithonistim movement Index: Education and Values – Education as A Basis for National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the past year, anyone who has given even a cursory glimpse at the newspapers knows that Israel has been fighting a multi-theater war on its borders in Gaza and Lebanon, and overseas against Iran and Yemen, but many are not aware of the fact that this is a multi-dimensional war, says Yishai Gelb. “We’re fighting in a number of theaters, but also in several dimensions”, he clarifies. “Aside from the battles in the field, the State of Israel is also waging battle in international courts, and also over public opinion in the international community. It’s important to understand that a positive public opinion is critical for the overall war effort, as Israel is in the midst of a prolonged campaign and needs diplomatic and economic support from the countries of the world”.

Since the outbreak of the Iron Swords war (Gaza war), Yishai Gelb has been spearheading the War in Israel initiative, which is part of the IDSF HaBithonistim website. This is a comprehensive data base, updated on a daily basis, which provides reliable data on the war and its casualties. The website was founded and sponsored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, after it had become clear that the Foreign Ministry and the IDF spokesman unit are overloaded with the public diplomacy demands. The website hit the air already in November 2023, in Hebrew and English, becoming a pioneer in the private sector of Israeli public diplomacy.

“Our enemies are sharing information through a host of platforms, and a very large portion of this information is false and is contrived for the purpose of establishing and promoting an anti-Israel narrative”, says Gelb. “Our aim is to provide an alternative source of information that is based on credible and verified facts, and to mobilize the international public opinion to support Israel, advocate the justness of Israel’s actions, and afford the world access to reliable information on which they could base their support of Israel”.

Debunking disinformation begins with hard, cold facts

Yishai Gelb and his team of data workers collect large volumes of information, some is basic, statistical data such as numbers of casualties on both sides, numbers of wounded and the number of hostages still held in Hamas tunnels; other information is operational – the Israeli cities and villages targeted, the number of shells fired into Israeli territory and the number of targets that the IDF had eliminated in Gaza. Additional data provides a broader outlook with which the current war can be compared with other conflicts around the world, both current and from modern history e.g. the Cambodian Civil War, and the ongoing armed conflict in Darfur. This data examines among others the ratio of soldiers to casualties recorded during various wars and armed conflicts.

“We’ve created a database of figures from many wars and conflicts across the world that have occurred since the establishment of the ‘New World Order’ in 1945, and are comparing these figures to those of the Gaza war”, explains Gelb. “Our goal is to project a broad and clear picture that reflects Israel’s status as oppose to other conflict zones and prove beyond doubt just how groundless the accusations hurled at Israel are”.

The data collected in the IDSF HaBithonistim database shows among others that the current war in Gaza has claimed the lives of 22,000 civilians – both on Israel’s side and the reported casualties in Gaza. This admittedly, is a regretfully high number; however, a comparison with the numbers of casualties in other recent conflicts casts this figure in a rather different light. Case in point: The ongoing civil war in Yemen has claimed to date some 150,000 casualties; the Nigerian civil war – claimed the lives of about 225,000 civilians, and in Syria – approximately 206,000 civilians had lost their lives in the civil war there. These figures are instrumental in fighting the false allegations, such as the claim that Israel is committing genocide.

Similarly, the figures in the database irrefutably disprove the claim that the State of Israel is deliberately causing  mass starvation of the Gaza population. A look at starvation casualties of other conflicts shows that in Yemen, 85,000 died of starvation; in Somalia – 260,000, and in Congo – four million. In Gaza, according to the highest end of estimates – 33 people have died of starvation, hence debunking the claim of deliberate mass starvation by the hands of Israel.

Furthermore, claims of humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip due to insufficient aid – whether on Israel’s part of the international community – take on a different perspective when comparing the two-billion-dollar aid sent into the Gaza Strip for its 2 million citizens, to the Ukraine – which had received humanitarian aid in the value of two billion dollars as well – for a population of over 40 million people.

“The debunking of myths is one of the most important tools in the shaping of public opinion”, explains Gelb. “When you see the figures relating to Israel as oppose to the global numbers, it’s plain to see that the war in Gaza is certainly nearly not as horrific as some are attempting to portray it. Moreover, it shows the world’s hypocrisy that is all too happy to hurl accusations at Israel while remaining silent about the horrible war crimes other countries are committing”.

Credibility above all: challenges in the age of fake news

In the current digital age, we are all constantly inundated with information, and it is hard to tell what is true and reliable and what is biased, false, or downright lies. This challenge is keeping the War in Israel research team busy at their desks. In order to tackle this issue and ensure that the data in the database is reliable, they check and recheck every piece of information, and cross-reference the data with different sources. The main sources of information that are used to glean data are the official reports of Israel’s General Security Service and the IDF, authorized research institutes such as Israel’s Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the broad proprietary IDSF HaBithonistim database, which also collects discrete data such as every fallen Israeli soldier and every senior terrorist operative eliminated. Furthermore, the researchers themselves engage in data collection, diligently laboring for long hours each day.

On the other side of the divide are information sources that the  IDSF HaBithonistim research team steer clear of, like the media and social platforms and of course information published by Palestinian sources or platforms such as  Al-Jazeera, since they tend to propagate mis- or disinformation. Furthermore, the team will not use data from classified sources as it cannot be revealed and therefor verified. They are able to verify to a high degree a large majority of the data they collect, and in the few cases in which the information could not be fully validated – it is mentioned. Furthermore, each data that is presented with references to its sources and explanations on how the research was done, to allow the reader to independently determine whether they view the information as reliable or not.

“Sadly, it’s very easy to fabricate information today”, says Yishai Gelb. “There are many sites, such as the “Betzelem” organization website, that operate huge databases, but refrain from referencing their sources of information, thus, it is virtually impossible to determine how they obtain the data they publish. Additionally, there are reputed bodies that albeit a credible reputation at first glance, are found upon a more circumspect examination to rely on biased sources. One prominent example is the UN, which adopts resolutions and decisions based on data published by the Gaza Ministry of Health, which is in reality controlled by no other than Hamas – in other words, even data published by the UN’s official bodies must be taken with a grain of salt, and such data published on the War in Israel is accompanied by a disclaimer mentioning this. An additional issue in this field is the problem of cyclic requoting, when for example, the UN quotes a certain organization that had quoted the UN to begin with, creating a closed circuit of sorts, making it hard to discern the original source”.

Artificial intelligence (AI) tools, which are multiplying and becoming increasingly sophisticated by the day, do significantly contribute to the work of data-gathering, but also open the door to  irresponsible and even intentionally malicious use of information, and at times actually make it even harder to corroborate information.  “We use AI tools quite a lot, mainly for cross-referencing information”, explains Gelb. “Until these tools were introduced, we would have to first find the information, determine the source and then cross-reference it with other data and sources. AI tools actually reverse the process by starting with cross-referencing, thereby considerably streamlining the work. Nonetheless, these tools must be used with circumspection because as tempting as it may be to use them, the information they present must be carefully inspected”.

Not a lie, but not exactly true: crafty methods of misrepresenting information

The credibility of sources and figures is a complicated issue, but the validity of the information in itself is hardly an assurance to the overall integrity of the report, as even true facts can be introduced in a biased manner to serve agendas. According to Yishai Gelb, there is no shortage of website that do in fact present verified and true information, yet manage to portray a biased picture.

One method often employed by such sites is selectively presenting certain facts while omitting others. Many niche sites do exactly that. A prime example is the website called “Israel Palestine Timeline”, which shows a timeline of the figures of casualties in each side of the Gaza war, however, the information in the site shows a much higher casualty-count of Palestinians as compared to Israelis. Hence, when such information is presented without any context or background, it immediately achieves the impression of injustices committed on part of Israel.

Another method of misrepresentation of  true facts to convey a one-sided and skewed impression is optics. Yishai explains that any body that engages in data collection knows that presentation is everything, and not the facts themselves. Terminology is also a tool that is used deliberately and discerningly in support of the presentation. For this reason, databases put a lot of effort into planning the presentation of the facts. Information appearing at the head of the page, or presented through graphics, for example, carries more weight, while information that appears in small letters in text form, or at the bottom of the page – is often overlooked or ignored. Additionally, the segmentation of the information, i.e. the breakdown of a information into smaller units according to specific criteria, is another method with which to formulate intentional messages and create desired  impressions.

Not only with tanks: Israel’a all-out campaign

The data Gelb and his research team use, are posted in the website on a regular basis, with an exposure of some 30-30 thousand views a month, in addition to exposure on various social networks. Furthermore, they are published on the IDSF HaBithonistim weekly report, which is submitted to diplomats and members of government across the world, and presented in the movement’s various conferences and events. Oftentimes, the data is used for research purposes, and researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department and from other research institutes, such as the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), rely on them regularly for their research. Much of this data is also often used by leading media outlets in Israel, such as Ynet and Channel 14, and appears in newspaper articles and investigative stories.

Gelb welcomes any publicity the information receives but expresses his desire to gain even more exposure. “It makes me very happy to read reports that are based on data we’ve collected, and I feel especially pleased to see researchers using this data because it lends them validity and credibility”, he says. “Now our challenge is to connect this data to other bodies that present data on Israel, and expand to additional platforms such as more research institutions and social networks”.

The waves that the information in Gelb’s website created, reinforce his sense of mission that comes with his job. “All my activity is centered around supporting the Israeli narrative, and with that, the collection of data stems from my desire to promote the interests of the State of Israel”, he says. “It’s true that data collection is a very technical endeavor, but it’s not the be all and end all of the work. A lot of marketing skills and psychology are needed  to optimally determine how to present each piece of data, how to turn data into infographics or articles. In a nutshell – my job is to take numbers and use then to support Israel in the campaign over the local and international public opinion  – and viewed through that lens, the entire endeavor takes on a whole new meaning”.

Yishai Gelb is determined to collect data so long as the Gaza war is raging, and plans to continue maintaining the website after the war ends, and to make it into a vast and rich database with information pertaining to Israel’s security situation. However, it is clear to him that his activity and that of other similar NGO websites is not enough. “Israel’s war is not restricted to the use of tanks, planes and submarines”, he states. “To win this campaign, the State must take the war over public opinion seriously, as it directly affects the support and legitimacy Israel gains. It cannot be that Israel’s public diplomacy has become the task of the private sector alone, and the government and its official agencies must take this matter seriously and invest the appropriate resources and effort into it”.

Iron Swords War (Gaza War) database

הפוסט Through the Statistics: The “Dry” Figures that Promote Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Not many people are as strongly connected to the northern region of Israel as Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi. Although she wasn’t born in the Galilee, she spent many years there during her military service, and today she lives in the Galilee with her family. Zehavi is the founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in the security challenges Israel faces on its northern border. “What happens in the North,” Zehavi says, “must be recognized as important by every Israeli citizen. The State of Israel must recognize that the North is a strategic asset that demands investment. The equation is simple: If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us.”

“The state didn’t take the North seriously”

Because Zehavi warned of the Hezbollah forces’ considerable preparations at the northern border long before the war, and because she is well experienced with the results of inattention to those warnings, the past year of warfare has got her goat. “The state didn’t take the North seriously,” she asserts. “The attribution scenarios relating to an attack from the North and a combined attack were well known, yet we did not prepare for them, neither offensively, nor defensively. If there had been any such preparations, maybe matters in the North would have developed differently and we wouldn’t have needed to evacuate 60 thousand people from their homes.”

Despite her anger and frustration, Zehavi acknowledges that the recent progress on the northern front, including the elimination of senior Hezbollah leaders and the significant damage to the organization’s infrastructures, certainly inspires some optimism in her. “The past weeks have given me hope that things will be changing and that we’ll be able to rebuild the North,” she notes. “You could say that we have the color back in our cheeks, after going through a whole year without seeing where this was headed.”

Research and fieldwork at the Alma Research and Education Center

Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi served for close to 15 years in the Intelligence Corps, and many of her positions were in the Northern Command. In 2018, four years after her discharge from the army, she founded the Alma Research and Education Center, which focuses on the security challenges facing the State of Israel at its northern border and how they affect Israel’s home front.

Zehavi grants that her Center didn’t anticipate the current war that broke out from the south, but she and her team of researchers did give plentiful warning that Hezbollah operatives, including the organization’s elite Radwan Force, were coming closer and closer to the fence and that they appeared to be actively preparing for an attack. At the same time, the Center’s researchers were also monitoring global trends, particularly on the Shiite axis; and there too, they saw a growing inclination to attack Israel. “Our main conclusion as a research institute was that the ability to observe at the juncture between tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence is an important ability — and without it, anyone would be hard put to warn of a coming war,” she relates. “Taking the tactical viewpoint, you look at what’s actually happening around the fence, like Hezbollah operatives gathering or patrolling. Taking the strategic viewpoint, you examine the moves that are under way on the Shiite axis, like Iran cultivating militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, or like the detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Only from the combination of both viewpoints, one up close and one at a distance, can you construct a complete intelligence picture and truly understand the scope of the danger we’re facing. Today we can see clearly how various processes that occurred in the Middle East converged eventually in the activities at the Israeli-Lebanese border.”

Since the outbreak of the war, the Alma Research and Education Center has been focusing mainly on creating a database that details all the attacks on the North. “We are monitoring every single incident and cross-checking data from different sources,” Zehavi relates. “Our objective is to understand the attributes of those attacks to assemble the clearest possible picture of the situation. The data we assembled enabled us, for example, to point out that since July the targeting of areas that had not been evacuated has expanded. Similarly, we can also point out increases and decreases in the use of means such as UAVs and anti-tank guided missiles.”

The progress is impressive, but the threat has not yet been removed

Many operations on the northern front during last September weakened Hezbollah significantly. Most of the organization’s senior leaders, foremost among them Hasan Nasrallah, were eliminated already in the initial stages. In parallel, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks not only hit thousands of operatives but also damaged the internal communications of the organization. Additionally, attacks by the Israel Air Force damaged many of the organization’s infrastructures. Although it is still early to talk about the dissolution of Hezbollah, the organization certainly is in a very different place today than only a few weeks ago.

According to Zehavi, the many blows being dealt to Hezbollah are necessary and welcome; but she does not delude herself into thinking that this will restore complete calm to the North. In fact, she expects new problems that may arise at this very moment, when Hezbollah is already not the same powerful, hierarchical organization that it was. “When we take action against an organization that isn’t really organized any longer, new challenges come up and they require different methods of operation,” she explains. “I expect that in the future we’ll see a lot of scattered operations by all kinds of offshoots and squads that are trying to take charge — and in such a situation, prior warning is harder to attain. Besides that, when it’s not clear who the commander is, pushing for negotiations and diplomatic arrangements is harder.”

Nonetheless, she emphasizes that the terrorist threat from squads and individual operatives is less severe than the strategic threat from a well-structured organization backed by a strong state such as Iran. “I’m not saying that the strategic threat that challenged us at the northern border has been completely removed,” she says, “but if we keep up what we’re doing — I believe that we’re approaching the point where that will happen.”

“Without security, we have nothing” — the North’s most urgent problems

Despite the impressive progress in dealing with Hezbollah, many problems on the northern front still require a response. In Zehavi’s opinion, the state and its society will need to mobilize for the rehabilitation of the North and the rebuilding of the communities there, but currently the most urgent of the problems on the table is the security problem because “without security, we have nothing.” Zehavi believes in confronting the remaining security threats on three levels: offensive, defensive, and the quest for a diplomatic arrangement.

On the offensive level, attacks should continue intensely over at least the short term. Afterward, there should be zero tolerance. Hezbollah and all its operatives should be made to understand that for every missile launched toward Israel, hundreds will be launched in return. On the defensive level, Israel should devise a dedicated defense plan for each community. In each community, a civilian emergency squad should be armed and trained. It should be able to rely on reservists who are on alert, without a full-scale mobilization that would require more budgeted personnel. In addition, all homes and institutions in the North must be properly secured, as there are still many private homes, schools, and kindergartens that do not have shelters.

Zehavi explains that progress must be made not only on the offensive and defensive levels but also on processes that will eventually lead to a diplomatic arrangement, since Israel has no interest in dealing with endless guerilla warfare. Zahavi emphasizes that such an arrangement is not intended to replace the military actions currently taking place and that it should occur only after we achieve a sufficient outcome against Hezbollah. A sufficient outcome, according to Zahavi, would be having clear evidence that a high percentage of Hezbollah’s rockets and launchers have been destroyed and that there are no operatives near the border. “Two messages for the decision-makers are important to me in this connection,” she adds. “The first is that we must be prepared for the attribution scenarios already the stage of the military’s force buildup, and the second is that the only way to deter our enemies is to take away as many of their capabilities as possible.”

“Returning civilians to their homes in the North is a national mission”

Beyond the security aspects, returning the residents of the North to their homes requires a comprehensive solution to problems and providing incentives for the residents. Even before the outbreak of the war, many northern communities were suffering from insufficient infrastructure, limited opportunities for work and recreation, and a shortage of basic public services – including health services. Since the war began, that situation has only worsened. Today there is also a need to repair many roads and buildings that were wrecked by missile fire and by various military operations.

According to Zehavi, the approach to that problem must involve first mapping out the various needs of all the communities. “Thought needs to be invested in each type of locality here — moshavim, kibbutzim, community settlements, and cities — because each type of locality has different requirements,” she says. “While the war damage is being repaired, projects need to be resumed that were under way before war broke out. There were lots of initiatives here for setting up centers of employment and frameworks for young people. Improving public services was also discussed a lot because, for example, a city like Kiryat Shmona can’t do without an emergency room.”

Zehavi notes that along with the work of repair and construction, there must be incentives encouraging residents to return to the North, and even attracting new residents to the area. Those incentives, she says, must take the form of financial grants, tax benefits, and preferential housing terms. She also indicates that where demography is concerned, preference should be given to young families with children because the children will be the foundation of the area’s future; and where occupations are concerned, preference should be given to the fields of agriculture and industry. “In recent years, the North has seen investment primarily in tourism, while fields that are no less important, like agriculture, have been badly ignored. It’s important to understand that besides being a profession, agriculture is a major instrument in carrying out the Zionist vision. Trumpeldor said that the plough’s furrow marks the boundaries of the state. It was true a hundred years ago and it’s just as true today.”

The end of the war? It’s not here yet, but it’s coming into sight.

In her professional capacity as a researcher, Sarit Zehavi had an eventful and fascinating year — but in her capacity as a Galilean, she primarily faced difficulties. “During the war’s first weeks, there was real fear that Hezbollah would invade in the way Hamas did. And the fear was backed up by proclamations from Hezbollah and statements by the Foreign Minister of Iran,” she recounts. “Later, a new kind of difficulty set in, and it’s still with us. The children haven’t been to school in a long time, we constantly hear alerts and explosions, and dozens of communities are still evacuated. The beautiful North that we had is burnt and unsafe. But the real difficulty, for sure, was that we could see no end to it all. Even before the strong attack in the northern front began, we were living for months with the feeling that something horrible was about to happen at any moment. And that feeling can drive you crazy.”

Despite all the difficulty, Zehavi stresses that she has never for a moment had second thoughts about living in the North. “We’ve been through a lot recently, but we never thought of leaving,” she says. “I’m happy that I put down stakes in the North. My children have the privilege of growing up in a mixed population, and they’re used to being around people with different lifestyles and different beliefs. This special Galilean atmosphere is something we won’t give up on.”

הפוסט “If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us”: A research-based and personal perspective on the reality of the northern border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A year and a half before October 7, officers of the IDSF movement sat in the living room of Amir Avivi, the movement’s founder and CEO. They understood that something was afoot and that they must warn the security services about what was liable to happen. At the meeting, they discussed a “strategic, tectonic, global, and regional change” that we were experiencing and that would lead, in their view, to immense escalation. “When we connected the dots, we understood that we were heading for war,” Avivi recalls.

At the same meeting, they decided to write a situational assessment. The IDSF movement delivered a 300-page document to Naftali Bennett and Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time were prime minister and opposition leader respectively, and to the head of the Mossad, the National Security Council, and others.

As early as May 2022, Avivi visited the Knesset with the report, which he’d prepared together with some leaders of the security services, and he warned that “today we’re in a situation where processes that have been under way for many years are reaching their culmination.” He expanded on the existential threats against the State of Israel. “There is an Iranian deployment that, in practice, embraces both the drive for nuclearization and the rockets, missiles, and drones. There is a force that will guide Iran toward the understanding that on the one hand they can attack, and on the other hand we’ll be forced to if they don’t.”

Today, a year after the Sabbath that saw the murder of more than 1,200 people, Avivi isn’t brandishing the report and its prophetic conclusions. Instead he is thinking of what comes next. He speaks of the hostages’ return as a matter of central importance, of the need for broad democratic consensus regarding the State’s deep-level processes, and of what the future may hold — a campaign for regional peace agreements.

“There was a belief in holding out a little longer”

On the anniversary of the events that opened the war, Avivi visited the Ynet studio for a special interview with Sharon Kidon. “Israel has been avoiding war, as part of a strategic choice that resembles what the USA chose in the face of the USSR — to wait for everything to settle down on its own,” Avivi said, explaining why Israel hadn’t taken action that would have prevented the massacre. “The Arab Spring gave the security services and the Israeli government a lot of confidence that the strategy was working. That while we were avoiding war, the other Mideastern states were reducing themselves to fragments. Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Syria. There was a belief that if we held out a little longer and then a little longer, eventually Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranians would all collapse. It was just a matter of holding out a bit.”

The IDSF warned of a severe attack impending, but without knowing what the timing would be. “I said, ‘When you see a swarm of rockets flying, you can be sure that’s the beginning of the war,’” Avivi relates. “We’ve learned that when you have a terrorist army at your fence, even the security services won’t necessarily be aware of the timing. For that reason, terrorist armies shouldn’t be at the fence.”

You’ve mentioned victory more than once. What’s your vision of victory?

“The developments we’re currently experiencing will force us to adjust our war objectives. We started out on October 7, a year ago, entering a war really against our will, and we set three objectives: eliminating Hamas as a governmental and military organization, returning all our hostages, and creating conditions in Gaza that will prevent a terrorist army from ever reappearing. We’ve more or less dismantled Hamas as a military organization, but not as a government. This is where the pronouncements of the security services and the prime minister come in, and they’re now getting into the humanitarian issue. We need to finish the work. We need to return our hostages.”

Can you define what victory looks like in this connection?

“Victory doesn’t mean that there’s not a single terrorist in Gaza,” he clarifies. “So what does it mean? That all the hostages are back. That Hamas has lost its hold on Gaza both militarily and governmentally. That everyone with a home in northern Israel is back, is safe, and can live confidently with no threat from Hezbollah. The State of Israel understands that it must add the Iranian nuclear program to its war objectives. Victory will mean that the existential danger from the Iranian nuclear umbrella has been dealt with. I hope that the Americans will open their eyes and understand that we need to handle that one together.”

“No need for uniformity — just unity”

On the issue of internal polarization in Israel, Avivi contends that what’s needed is not uniformity but unity. Differences in outlook should be put aside for the sake of joint decision-making that will make development and growth possible. “We don’t need to be uniform,” he explains. “We have lots of opinions, but we need to converge on the ethos on which the nation was founded. Let’s remember what we are here for, what the Land of Israel means to us, who and what we are as a people — and let’s hold a tolerant discussion. We don’t need to reach agreement on everything. Where we don’t, our democracy decides. But we need to agree on broad issues. Our culture needs a lot of work. A firm majority of Israeli society is tired of the squabbles and wants a safe, thriving, meaningful future.”

Avivi’s expectations for the future are optimistic, including regional peace agreements. “We all feel that within this war, there was a revolution,” he emphasizes. “We’ve all seen now what we’re capable of doing when we’re together in battle. I think that this year will be the decisive one, with us defeating our enemies. From there, we must proceed to peace agreements, a thriving economy, mass immigration, and a discourse among ourselves that makes for togetherness and unity in the spirit of our ethos. We have a tendency to embrace extremes, but we need to converge in the center. I’m optimistic. I think our society’s has wonderful days ahead.”

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט From the unheeded warning to the vision of peace: “This will be the decisive year” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the days of gloom that followed October 7, 2023, it was unclear exactly how we would manage to win the war. Now, with Hamas already shattered as a military organization and with Hezbollah being heavily hit, not only can an Israeli victory be glimpsed on the horizon but a time of thriving, initiated upon the Day After, can be dreamt of.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

Most decisions were right: The war in retrospect

The October 7 disaster wrought great confusion and uncertainty, but one thing was certain from the start: This war will take time. There were two main reasons — first, that the Gaza Strip was full of tunnels and that the Hamas infrastructure there would require a complex, systematic effort of dismantling; and second, that among the ground forces the level of strength and armament was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. In recent decades, the IDF had closed down a number of reserve battalions and the army had a relatively small stock of weaponry at hand. Israel had to resolve itself to mount a counterattack in Gaza while mounting nothing more than a defense on the other fronts. Because of that gradation of fighting, it was only after 11 months that the State of Israel shifted the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

From examination of the circumstances in which we entered the war, it appears that the fighting was handled successfully for the most part and that most of the decisions were correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to act differently.

First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. The military dismissed large numbers of reservists relatively early, and it may be that if it had not done so, we would have been able to pressure Hamas more strongly and shorten the fighting in Gaza.

Second, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Hamas long enjoyed an oxygen supply in the form of control over the Corridor, which enabled it to fortify itself through the Sinai. If we had cut off that oxygen supply in the first days of the war, the entire course of fighting would have looked different.

The third point, which to this day has not been properly addressed, is the control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives and thus it enables Hamas both to strengthen itself and to preserve its standing as the authority governing the Gazan populace.

Shock and awe: The current state of the war

The southern front

At the start of the war, the Southern Command estimated that it would need a year to dismantle Hamas as a military organization. Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity, as shown by its markedly reduced ability to launch rockets into Israeli territory.

The nature of the fighting in Gaza today differs from what we saw at the war’s beginning. In the first months, the IDF was obliged to operate at great intensity, with a large deployment and with coordinated attacks. In addition, it needed to operate systematically — that is to say, street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood — in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy the infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks together with air force personnel. At the same time we see systematic elimination of senior Hamas officials. Most senior officials of the organization, including Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif, have already been eliminated. The loss of senior officials weakens the organization not only militarily but in terms of governance as well, and it is an important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. We see a method of operation in the north that is reminiscent of the military doctrine developed by the USA in the late 1990s, known as “Shock and Awe.” The idea behind the doctrine is to frighten and weaken the enemy until it loses the will to fight. In that spirit, almost all the senior officials of Hezbollah, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, were already eliminated early in the fighting.

Furthermore, the IDF is undermining Hezbollah with a series of unusual operations. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. Over and above the physical harm to the terrorists, the operation also spread powerful intimidation and proved how penetrable the organization was. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force, which battered the Hezbollah infrastructures and deprived the organization of some significant capabilities.

Israel hoped that such a sequence of operations would compel Hezbollah to retreat completely from southern Lebanon and to stop firing at Israel — thus enabling the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Still, Israel took into account that Hezbollah might continue fighting nonetheless, in which case a ground operation in Lebanon would be necessary.

That operation, if it goes forward, will differ from the operation that we saw in Gaza. On the one hand, southern Lebanon is significantly less densely populated than Gaza and most of its residents have already fled, so that there will be less friction with the locals. On the other hand, southern Lebanon’s landscape is liable to present a greater challenge, with its many hills and abundant foliage. It must be stressed that Hezbollah, like Hamas, has upgraded its subterranean capabilities; and we know that many of the organization’s strategic assets — including arms factories and bases — are underground. Thus southern Lebanon too portends difficult fighting, at least some of it in tunnels.

You can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon: Important conclusions from the war’s first year

On October 7 last year, we suffered a catastrophe. But that catastrophe awakened Israel from a long sleep and made Israel aware of what sizeable threats it faces. With time, that awareness has eroded among some of the leadership and public; and today there are those who call upon us to return to a policy of keeping our eyes closed.

In order that Israel remain secure over the coming generations, the State of Israel — leaders and society alike — must take action at a number of levels:

• Strictly preserving external security: First of all, we must confront the immediate threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But there’s more to the story. We must revise our outdated national security doctrine and understand that “deterring, alerting, and defeating” does not sum up the essentials. Israel’s security doctrine must include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders, and of nipping any terrorist force in the bud. It is unthinkable that we tolerate a situation where 50 thousand armed terrorists are located 100 meters from our border fence. That is a tsunami, and you can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon. Or a tablespoon.
• Strengthening governability and internal security: In the shadow of the external threats, we must not forget that the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has dogged us for 100 years now, is still alive domestically. The State of Israel must deal with the matter of governance within the country and ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel may feel safe in their country.
• Battling delegitimization and anti-Semitism: For years we have been confronted with inciteful attempts to delegitimize Israel and stir up anti-Semitism all over the world, and since the outbreak of war the campaign has only intensified. The State of Israel must subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague, encouraging demonstrations, and bringing anti-Semitism into the streets and universities — forces led by the Palestinian Authority. To our regret, the State of Israel has not yet formulated a strategy for concrete action in the face of this severe problem.
• Instilling a common national ethos: We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. Solidarity is not a luxury but a requirement for ensuring our security and survival, because without a set of values and an ethos, no tanks or airplanes will avail.
• Establishing an enlisted society— In the State of Israel, not serving is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate. At the same time, it must be stressed that this does not mean turning into Sparta. Israel is not a nation that glorifies power and violence. On the contrary, this nation lionizes culture and innovation. The balance is an important one, which we must all practice as individuals and as a society.

As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the pathway is a long one. Today, after the many drubbings we’ve delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts.

We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Our view is that the more greatly Israel triumphs in the war, the more greatly it will thrive after the war. When the states of the world, including our enemies’ states, see our strength displayed, they will be spurred to sign peace agreements and establish strong coalitions with us. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon. There will be mass immigration to Israel and we will also see the birthrate surge as it generally does after wartime.

In order to reach those optimal days, we must maintain patience, determination, and solidarity, and not ease off the gas pedal until we have passed successfully through all the challenges that lie before us.

הפוסט The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges: Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The principal goal of the IDSF movement is to safeguard the security of Israel for the coming generations, but the movement understands that security and economics advance hand in hand. In this article, Dr. Zvi Marom will detail what the State of Israel must do in order to develop its industrial sector and maintain its standing as a “start-up nation.”

Dr. Marom is one of the best-known and most experienced figures in Israel’s technological sector. As an academic, he holds degrees in electronic engineering and industrial electronics as well as a doctorate in dentistry from Tel Aviv University. As a businessman, he founded BATM Ltd. and managed it until December 2022; and for years he chaired the board of directors at the Israeli High-Tech Association (part of the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel). Dr. Marom is also the recipient of important awards including techMARK Personality of the Year and the 2021 Industry Prize from the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel. In March 2024 he was even awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit of Hungary.

Background — Hi-tech and other advanced industries in Israel today

Israelis have come to consider their country a “hi-tech nation,” but in fact it is primarily a “start-up nation.” Israeli entrepreneurs excel at forming small and medium-size companies based on innovation and creativity, but in many cases those companies are sold to large enterprises, or are floated on the stock exchange, so that control passes to new shareholders — primarily American. Figures show that the number of start-ups in Israel is high even in comparison much larger countries, and the reason lies in two factors:

• In the past, the country aided start-ups with government guarantees and conditional grants, for example under the “Yozma” program, and thus the start-ups were better able to raise funds for the critical fledgling stage.
• Israel has skilled and talented workers in the engineering and computer fields. It owes that workforce to a number of factors: immigration of experienced professionals from the former Soviet Union, the release of trained engineering workers upon the halt of the Lavie project, and demobilized soldiers who bring training and experience from the IDF’s technological units.
• The hi-tech sector has gained in strength worldwide, and it set many private venture capital funds scouting in Israel. Those funds established channels of nongovernmental funding and presented start-ups with further opportunities for growth.
• The large number of start-up companies produced an accumulation of managerial knowhow that contributed to the growth of further start-ups, so that a self-nourishing cycle emerged here.

Today we are witness to a new process in which Israel is changing from a “start-up nation” into an “innovation nation.” That is to say, Israel’s economy rests on creative, innovative workers at the forefront of their fields. The objective is to advance Israeli innovativeness while continuing to support the founding of start-ups.

Aside from hi-tech companies and start-ups, the technology sector in Israel also includes advanced industries and security industries that are also considered world leaders in their fields. Those companies have the potential to contribute enormously to Israel’s economy and security, and they can also help by leveraging projects of international cooperation.

However, we must not rest on our laurels. The hi-tech and other advanced industrial sectors, however successful they may be, must constantly innovate in order to retain Israel’s technological advantage in the world. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that those sectors are already suffering today from more than a few difficulties that threaten not only themselves but also the overall Israeli economy and security services, which depend on innovations and technological developments from Israeli industries.

Dr. Zvi Marom: The Economic Vision for the Hi-Tech and Other Advanced Technology Sectors

Advancing education and professional training

The current situation:

Like all other fields, hi-tech and other advanced industries depend strongly on their workforce. Among the measures of a workforce’s quality are education and professional skills — two aspects that require improvement.

Where education is concerned, academia in Israel and worldwide is deteriorating. A portion has turned into a trade guild, and a portion has surrendered to the progressive agenda that prevents it from impartially promoting academic learning. In addition, many universities have become diploma mills where the demands on students — and especially on those considered “less privileged” — constantly decline.

Where professionalism is concerned, certain jobs in technological industry are unjustly considered inferior. Technology in all its aspects is an intrinsic part of industry as a whole, and jobs such as operating industrial machinery, which require higher education, should be properly rewarded.

Ideally:

• Investment in technological education: Technological education in Israel needs to be dramatically strengthened, and young people need to be encouraged to study technical subjects. In that connection, the universities must adapt themselves to the technological demand from the marketplace, update their curricula, and expand the relevant departments such as computer engineering. The students from underprivileged backgrounds should be supported with scholarships and benefits but not by means of academic concessions that reduce their level of education.
• Professional training: Technological workers must be trained, with an emphasis on industrial workers who will command the technological knowledge necessary for operating heavy machinery and for undertaking advanced manufacturing processes. Appropriate education and high standards should be expected from those workers, and at the same time they should be rewarded with good conditions and suitable salaries.

Encouraging competition in the defense industry

The current situation:

Our defense industry is outstanding, but because of excessive bureaucracy and regulatory difficulties, small companies are not managing to enter the defense industry. Thus a situation has evolved in which the defense industry rests primarily on three companies: Elbit, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael. They have become a near-monopoly. Such a situation violates the principle of business competition and brings harm to Israel’s standing as a hi-tech nation.

Furthermore, whereas in the past Israel’s armaments industry was highly developed, over time it has shrunk and today we rely primarily on importing materiel from the USA — thus harming our economy and our self-reliance.

Ideally:

• Total war against monopolies: Entrepreneurship and competition must be nurtured, especially in the defense industries, and small companies must be encouraged to grow alongside the three giant defense corporations.
• Enlarging the armaments industries: A well-developed armaments industry will be very profitable to Israel, in contrast to today when we are paying more for American materiel than we would pay to manufacture our own. Moreover, a well-developed armaments industry will also give Israeli security more independence.

Fighting bureaucracy and wastefulness

The current situation:

Israel’s governmental services are mostly inefficient and rife with obstacles, resulting in delays and in improper usage of workers and of resources. Regrettably, many of the difficulties that the governmental services present are deliberate. The jobs are intended to inflate the staff of one manager or another, and their usefulness is nil.

Similarly, the military suffers from inefficiency and has slipped heavily into wastefulness in terms of resources and staff. Waste in the military takes various forms: Many units, such as the Army Radio, make no contribution to security but use up money and personnel; many bases, including the Kirya in Tel Aviv, are tying up some of Israel’s most valuable real estate; soldiers in the regular army receive outsized financial benefits; IDF delegations travelling overseas are overstaffed; and the list goes on and on.

Both in the civil service and in the security establishment, the wastefulness peaks toward the end of the fiscal year on the understanding that any money remaining unspent will be lost and possibly even excluded from the next year’s budget. Thus as each calendar year nears its end, we witness voluminous unnecessary spending.

The problem of wastefulness is well recognized, but budget cutting is greatly opposed at the highest levels of government. Among the reasons for that opposition is the overly close relationship between security and politics. After all, many security figures in Israel continue almost immediately into a political career — so instead of considering the good of the military, they’re considering mainly their professional future.

Ideally:

• Tackle the government bureaucracy: Israel’s public services must be made more efficient in order to prevent wastage of time, resources, and staff. To that purpose, the way of management at the ministries must be comprehensively improved, from the point of budgeting to the point of implementation.
• Fight wastefulness: Wastefulness, in the public services and in the IDF, must be attacked with full force. First, budget-cutting options must be examined — such as closing departments and units and relocating offices and bases to locations in the periphery. Second, the budget must be managed transparently and there must be certainty that outlays contribute to the nation and to its security.
• Separating security from politics: In order to make budget-cutting possible, the political and military systems must be separated. More precisely, there must be an end to the cycle of Chiefs of Staff who become Ministers of Defense. It was clear to David Ben-Gurion, back in his day, that the army must not be its own regulator. And even the Romans asked: Who will stand watch over the watchmen?

Grant tax relief

The current situation:

A liberal policy of taxation is fundamental to the development of entrepreneurship. If burdened by taxes from the outset, an entrepreneur will have great difficulty achieving growth and may fail to reach take-off. The State must understand that it has an economic interest in encouraging business growth and success. Successful entrepreneurs contribute in due course to increasing the treasury’s tax revenues.

However, as of today Israel’s state support for its growing businesses is insufficient, imposing difficulty on entrepreneurs and harming economic growth.

Ideally:

• Tax benefits: The government must provide significant tax benefits to growing businesses so that they may consolidate a foothold in the early stages of business development.

The defense industry: Two sides of the same coin — Summation and conclusions

It is pleasant and easy to keep viewing Israel as a start-up nation or hi-tech nation, but it is necessary to understand that technology moves ceaselessly forward and if we become complacent we will no longer deserve those titles. For the sake of its economy and security, Israel must strengthen its hi-tech sector and other advanced industrial sectors, with an emphasis on military industry.

To that end, we must examine the existing difficulties — including bureaucratic restrictions, wastage of resources, and insufficiently trained students — and find a way to overcome those difficulties and make Israel not merely a start-up nation worthy of the name but also a nation of innovation one step ahead of all others.

It must be understood that the necessary changes will not come about at a single stroke. Long-term processes must be put into place encompassing all the relevant fields in order to return Israel’s hi-tech and other industries to a stable leading position in the international arena.

הפוסט Ideally — The Economic Vision of the IDSF Movement Featuring: Hi-tech and Other Advanced Industries הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the year that has passed since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, the State of Israel has been grappling with an historic challenge requiring total national mobilization. Without such a mobilization, we are not going to be able to share the burden properly over time, and we are bound to burn out the few servicemen and women who are currently doing reserve military service.

The solution to this crisis within the reserve military lies in two main areas: the first is augmenting the pool of servicemen and women through measures such as recruitment of additional populations, extending the retirement age from reserve military service, and granting substantial benefits to servicemen and women, including in housing.

However before we get down to the solutions, one must first understand how this severe crisis arose in the first place – a crisis in the State of Israel’s most important defensive apparatus.

The military reserve force: Problems

A small, smart army? Not in Israel’s circumstances

In the early 1990s, with the fall of the Iron Curtain. there was a feeling the world was heading into an agreement-oriented reality, in which there will be no more large-scale world wars. This optimism filtered down to Israel as well, where it drove various political processes like the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan, and later on the signing of the Oslo Accords.

Along with these moves, the conviction that there are not going to be any more large-scale wars brought about a change in the nature of the IDF. The Israeli military began focusing on localized operations and, as a consequence, it placed its main emphasis on developing the Air Force and the special forces, and on procurement of precision weapons. At the same time, more and more commanders that got promoted to key positions in the IDF came from the special forces. This served to reinforce the concepts of reliance on special operations.

Besides the intra-military processes, various politicians promoted the notion of a “small, smart military” – meaning an army less reliant on manpower and more reliant on technology. According to this concept, the regular army and the reserve army got substantially downsized over the years. This gave rise to two significant vulnerabilities: the first is the functional capabilities of the Israel security forces – the trimmed-down order of battle led to a reality in which nowadays only a small percentage of the entire Israeli population serves an active reserve military service, which creates a burden disparity and at the same time prevents the security forces from waging large-scale warfare on multiple fronts. This is the reason why the Swords of Iron War is taking so long. The second impact is hardly ever mentioned, since it is a creeping impact. However to my mind it is more severe than the first: erosion of the ethos of the mobilized nation – an ethos that has been with us since the inception of the State, which recognized the importance of the contribution to be made by each and every citizen.

In this context it is worth mentioning that the downsizing of the IDF manpower and the defensive organs within the settlements and communities is not the sole factor that erodes the mobilized society ethos and the ethic of service, on which the State of Israel had been based in the past. In recent years we have been witnessing an alarming process of politization of the security forces. One such example was evident a mere year and a half ago, when as part of the conflict over the judicial reform, many reservists, including senior Air Force pilots, refused to show up for duty. As a society, we have got to understand that the security of the State of Israel supersedes all else. Security issues must not be mingled with political considerations.

The military reserve force: Solutions

Comprehensive national mobilization

As mentioned, nowadays only a small percentage of Israeli society does active reserve military service. This disparity cannot be sustained for long. We must recall what had been so clearly obvious in the early days of the State – that in order to sustain the State of Israel, the entire Israeli society has got to do its share.

The goal is to see a mobilized nation – whether in conscription service or in the reserves, whether in a civilian national guard, which is an issue in and of itself. If there will indeed be a comprehensive national mobilization, including within populations that currently do not serve, then each citizen will be required to do reserve military service for two to three weeks every year and the burden, when distributed equitably across the board, will be relatively lighter. It is important to emphasize that the burden sharing is vital not merely for practical reasons, but also for ethical reasons. Such sharing constitutes a degree of social justice – signaling that we are all equal and that we are all working together for a common goal.

Genuine support for those who serve

The Israeli public, for the most part, is deeply appreciative of the reservists. However it is also important that the State should prove its appreciation of their contribution by compensating them accordingly. To make it clear just how important the reserve military service is, the State has got to work in two main thrusts.

The first is the ethical thrust – this is a long-term process that begins in the earliest stages of the education system. It is intended to institute the service ethos. A comprehensive study in the field of education, conducted by the IDSF among hundreds of teachers and schoolchildren in Israel shows that the education system barely deals with the national ethos and with matters concerning Israeli society, knowledge of the land and preparation for military service.

The second is the practical thrust – the State has got to prove, through its actions here and now, that it is appreciative of the reservists and that it supports them.

Already now the State and the IDF grant the reservists benefits in accordance with the number of days served, however due to cumbersome processes and communication problems, the serving reservists are not always aware of their entitlements and they are not always able to benefit fully from them. Besides these impediments, there is also scope for improving the benefits given to the reservists and to offer them opportunities transcending the financial benefits. Thus for example, the families of the servicemen, which pay a heavy toll as well, ought to be given support – one thing would be to make sure that the spouses, who stay at home and need to care for the household and children receive assistance, another thing would be to provide the servicemen’s children subsidized psychological therapy as needed, and even to offer the spouses themselves marital counseling to help them get through these challenging times.

Another important benefit should be concessions in housing and land in areas of strategic importance. This idea, as will be shown in the next section, represents a clear convergence of interests both of the reserve military servicemen and women and of the State.

Housing solutions in areas of strategic importance

We have got to place the reserve military servicemen and women at the top of the list of priorities when it comes to housing while leveraging the State of Israel’s strategic interests. The point is to grant them substantial discounts for the purchase of land and housing in the Negev and Galilee – areas of great strategic importance for Israel. Additionally, in these areas, neighborhoods dedicated to the reserve military servicemen and women should be built, just as special neighborhoods get built for ultra-Orthodox Jews or for new immigrants.

Such an initiative will also be of value to the servicemen and women themselves, helping them achieve decent housing solutions. It will also increase the motivation to serve, and it will advance Israel’s interests of populating those regions with a high-quality, robust people. Obviously the State must also work to develop the infrastructures in these areas with special emphasis on opening employment centers and on developing a high-quality education system.

This idea has already been put on the table and the State has even declared that it would grant substantial discounts for the reserve servicemen and women for the purchase of lands in the Negev and in the Galilee, however there is an insufficient supply of land and apartments, and there is no clear communication between the State and the servicemen and women, resulting in most of them not knowing how to exercise their entitlements.

We at the IDSF regard affordable housing for the reservists in the Negev and Galilee to be a national mission of the first order. We have therefore decided to actively promote this idea. To this end we are conducting registration of reservists interested in living in the Negev and Galilee, in order to prove that there is indeed demand and to build a purchase group. At the same time we are in touch with the government ministries and with mayors in the Negev and Galilee to advance land allocation and the construction of neighborhoods for reserve military servicemen and women.

Summary and conclusions

The solution for the profound reserve military service crisis begins with a return to the seminal ethos that has been with us since the establishment of the State – the ethos of the mobilized nation. First and foremost there has to be equitable sharing of the burden, and populations need to be recruited into the conscription and reserve army, which so far have not been recruited.

Beyond distributing the burden, the State must support the reservists and their families. They must be granted financial benefits, including sizable discounts in the purchase of land in the Negev and Galilee. Such an initiative would signal to the reservists that their service is being appreciated, it will increase the motivation to serve, and it will also make a positive contribution toward the settlement and security interests of the State of Israel.

הפוסט The solution to the reserve military service crisis:   Realization of the “Mobilized Nation” Vision הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“Israel’s economic policy over the past 15 years has been endangering the nation’s security. When I said so in the past, people answered back “Think you’re so wise?” says Prof. Yaron Zelekha, former Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance. “By now it’s no stroke of genius to propose that such an economic policy contributed to the situation on October 7, but there were indications far earlier.”

Zelekha is currently a professor of accountancy and economics and he heads the School of Accountancy, Economics, and Financial Management at Ono Academic College. He served as Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance between 2003 and 2007, when Benjamin Netanyahu was Finance Minister. In this interview, he speaks about the destructive influence of the many years of reductions in the defense budget, and about the inefficiency of the public sector — including the security services. But he begins by explaining how Israel reached its current pass in the first place.

“The GDP in Israel — the gross domestic product — comes to something like 2 trillion shekels and it’s built from 5 factors: private consumption, private investment, government outlays, exports, and imports. In a normal situation, exports and imports more or less balance out and the rest are responsible for the level of the GDP. But in Israel today, private consumption amounts to about 50 percent of the pie, and that’s very low as compared to a country like the USA where it’s 68 percent, or the UK where it’s 63 percent, or as compared to Israel in the past.”

What about other countries in Europe, where private consumption is relatively low?

“It’s true that in countries like Germany and Sweden, private consumption is lower than in the USA and the UK, but their governments are very efficient so that the factor of government outlays compensates for the limited private consumption. In contrast, Israel falls short on both counts. On the one hand, private consumption isn’t allowed to grow into an engine big enough to propel the GDP. And on the other hand we don’t have a government of Germans and Swedes to propel the economy. We lose on the swings and lose on the roundabouts. No private consumption and no governmental efficiency.”

So the main problem is simply low consumption?

“The low private consumption is a result of unsuccessful policy. One of the main factors restraining private consumption in Israel is that the trillion shekels of private consumption are channeled into our own country of thievery, where competition suffers from many problems. If I let you choose where to shop with a trillion shekels, you wouldn’t shop here. You’d shop somewhere much cheaper, in Europe or in the USA. But we’re forced to spend the trillion shekels here in our beloved land of robbers. As a result, the consumers’ money — instead of driving the economy — lines the pockets of monopolists, sole licensed importers. bankers, and an inefficient government.”

It’s no wonder, then, that so many Israelis make purchases overseas for shipment to Israel.

“Israel is under-importing. When consumption rises, imports should rise. But in Israel, that doesn’t happen. Although everything you might want is priced lower by tens of percent a few hours away by plane, imports are blocked. Ideally when exports rise there are more dollars circulating, the dollar weakens, and imports become cheaper, raising the consumers’ standard of living. But in Israel the surplus from exports doesn’t trickle down to raise the consumers’ standard of living. In our lopsided economy, it’s impossible to extract the full benefit from the export engine. Our economy is repressing private consumption by means of distorted prices and high taxation, while the government is large and dysfunctional.”

So what economic policy would help Israel out of this predicament?

“The main point is to liberate the consumers and enable them to freely drive the wheels of the economy, without having the banks and the big importers slice themselves an unnecessarily large share at the expense of the consumers and small businesses. When I came to the Finance Ministry at the start of 2003, the national debt had reached almost 100% of the GDP, the deficit was 10% of the GDP, and the income per capita in real terms had sunk to 49% of the income per capita in the USA — a drop that put us back at the 1960s level — while the price of housing had risen to 96 monthly salaries for an average apartment. That situation was an all-time low for our economy, worse even then 1985. But after 5 years of a policy that stopped repressing private consumption, the real income per capita had risen to 62% of the income per capita in the USA. In 2007 prices were 5% to 10% lower than in the USA, and housing prices dropped to a level of 80 monthly salaries for an average apartment. And prices could have dropped farther if the policy that I’d set out had continued. Today apartment prices have risen to 170 monthly salaries on the average and prices overall are higher by 35% than in the USA.”

What are the implications of that economic predicament for our security?

“The powerful growth during my term enabled us to channel 7% of the GDP to security. But in the 15 years since then, the economic policy has been entirely different under Netanyahu, Gantz, Bennett, and Lapid. As a result, the economy was in trouble even before the war. Real income per capita in Israel, with purchasing power factored in, dropped to less than 50% of the income per capita in the USA. In that situation, it’s impossible to keep channeling 7% of the GDP to security as we’d been doing before, and so all those prime ministers and ministers of defense and finance were forced to cut back on security. Before the war hit, the defense budget stood at 5% of the GDP as against the former 7% that I mentioned. The difference amounts to 40 billion shekels per year. But that’s not all. The defense budget includes two elements: salaries and operations. The salary part has increased in the meantime, meaning that the part for operations — that is, the money available for weaponry, training, and so on — suffers twice over. There’s a smaller pie to divide up, and operations receives a smaller fraction of it.”

You’re saying that economics is the key to security.

“Yes. Everyone knows about the Battle of Waterloo, where the British and Prussian armies fought Napoleon to his final defeat and ended the Napoleonic Wars. Who was the most important participant in the battle? None of the commanders. It was Rothschild, the funder of that carnival, and without him the British and the Prussians couldn’t have advanced a single step toward the enemy. In Israel, our distorted economy is unable to support the army and therefore downsizes it. Divisions and air squadrons are closed down, training is reduced, and less ammunition is manufactured. The 40 billion shekels missing from the budget make a dent that the security services feel strongly — not to mention the similar effect on health, education, and infrastructure.”

Fighting against monopolies just as against the (not comparable) Hamas terrorists

Zelekha believes that the core crisis in Israel’s economy is the cost of living and the government’s unwillingness to deal with it. The high cost of living is caused by the hampering of free competition, by corruption and intermingling of the power of capital and the power of government through the agency of public servants and politicians who favor the wealthy, and by the monopolies, sole importers, and banks that dominate the economy. Under that banner, Zelekha founded the New Economic Party, which ran in two elections — for the 24th and 25th Knessets — but did not pass the electoral threshold.

The million-dollar question is how to fight the cost of living and the housing crisis.

“In fighting the cost of living, there are three fronts to address. The first is against the monopolies and the sole importers, and most of it is rather easy to tackle. Cancel all the customs duties and all the local standards, and most importantly ֮— break up the interlocking ownership of the import companies. If you’re sole importer for a big international player, you shouldn’t also be the sole importer for a competing international player, because then you’re fixing prices for them both. If you’re a local monopoly manufacturing some product, you shouldn’t also be the main importer of the same product because then you’re blocking competition against yourself.”

Is it really that simple to stop the monopolies?

“It won’t be an instant cure. Battling against the tycoons’ practice of centralization, and against their attempts to control the economy, is a ceaseless job because capital always wishes to create centralization. But the government must fight back. Just as it fights terrorism — although those two enemies are obviously not comparable. Even a small change will bring a plentiful return.”

So that’s the first battlefront against the cost of living. What’s the second?

“The second front is our lopsided taxation. Among other things, it adds to the burden not only on consumers, as I mentioned, but also on small businesses. It prevents them from competing properly with large businesses. The tax benefits for large businesses should be cancelled and the small businesses should be free to compete with them on the basis of equal taxation.”

Isn’t there added value for the local economy in the economic activity that big multinationals bring to Israel?

“Yes, there is added value, but there is a price as well and the price outweighs the benefit. In my opinion, they would come to Israel even after cancellation of the benefits — which they don’t receive in the West anyway.”

Let’s go on to the third battlefront against the cost of living.

“The third battlefront concerns the budget. Both the size of the budget and the quality of governmental services. When government services in infrastructure, education, and health are inefficient, it doesn’t help to increase the budget. For example, if you add hours to the school day instead of investing your money in reducing class sizes, you’re cultivating an absurdity. We have many more class hours than are customary in Europe, but we also have many more children in each classroom. So an hour of school isn’t worth much, because it’s impossible to teach in those conditions. When there are 40 children in the classroom, more hours won’t benefit you because zero plus zero plus another zero is still zero. But progress on the three fronts that I’ve mentioned will reduce housing prices even with no other intervention.”

“I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers.”

After the attack of October 2023, you said no more Palestinian laborers should be admitted into Israel from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza because they come to envy the Israelis and they impede the self-reliance of the Palestinian Authority. Aren’t you worried for the many Palestinian families who depend on work opportunities in Israel?

“First and foremost, I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers because of the distortion caused to the Palestinian economy and to the Israeli construction sector. The Palestinians do receive lots of jobs at better pay than they could earn in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, but they work in low-productivity sectors so we’re actually diverting labor from places where in the long run the productivity could be higher. For example, when a factory opens in the Judea and Samaria area and offers wages lower than in the Israeli construction sector, the best workers will go to Israel instead of to the factory even though the factory has the potential of eventually offering higher wages. So working in Israel raises the standard of living for the Judea and Samaria area in the short run, but it freezes the standard of living at a relatively low level over the long run.”

Don’t you think that letting Palestinian laborers work here promotes peace and quiet on the ground?

“On the contrary, I think that the Palestinian economy’s dependence on the Israeli economy made the intifadas and other confrontations possible. Confrontations like those do wreck the economy, but if you have no local economy anyway, you have nothing to lose. Furthermore, it aggravates the conflict when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians come and see what our own standard of living is. They envy us. Envy is human. They can be replaced by Chinese, Thai, and Indian workers. Is it hard to find laborers whose families don’t live two meters from us?”

Then what about the Israeli construction sector? It depends on cheap labor.

“But the problem is that if you bring cheap labor in, the contractors have no reason to invest in automation and in modern working methods. What should be replacing the laborers is, above all, equipment and technology. Technology will enable the sector to do well with fewer workers. I mean not only the technology underlying equipment, but also methods of construction and also advanced knowhow. In Israel, the construction methods are labor-intensive whereas elsewhere in the world much more advanced methods are used.”

Let’s move on to agriculture. You said that you believe direct support for the farmers is preferable to raising customs duties on imports. Why?

“Because it’s cheaper and more efficient. Currently we’re trying to help the farmers by impeding imports. We’re paying for the world’s most expensive fruits and vegetables, and how much of the retail price reaches the farmers? Zilch and zero. It’s simpler to give the money directly to the farmers while importing freely and cheaply.”

How vital are the farmers economically?

“There are many reasons for well-developed agriculture. Food security, retention of the border areas, distribution of the populace, environmental quality, and more. But economics isn’t one of them. It would be wrong to say that agriculture is vital to the economy. But not everything is about the economy. The economy needs to be strong enough to support our values.”

In conclusion — if you were appointed Minister of Finance, what would you do first?

“Ultimately, economic policy is intended to affect the public’s expectations. As soon as it starts improving their expectations, it starts to achieve benefits — even before any material change occurs. So the first target is expectations. In taxation, benefits should be cancelled for large companies and VAT should be reduced. For pricing, it’s enough to grab 4 or 5 big monopolies and wipe the floor with them (pardon the expression) to send a clear message that policy toward monopolies and importers has changed. Visibility is an inseparable part of economic policy, because if we want the public to consume more, it needs to believe that we’re going to reduce the cost of living. Then we need to deal with the three biggest gougers, and as soon as the public sees we’re serious, consumption will be spurred.”

הפוסט Prof. Yaron Zelekha: “Israel’s economic policy contributed to October 7.” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, we will be focusing — with the help of Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen — on the topic of settlement. With Hacohen’s remarks as our guidelines, we will examine the geographical traits of the country’s various regions, expand on the connection between settlement and national security, and detail the settlement vision that the State of Israel must adopt in order to ensure its security for generations to come.

Background: From the Crusaders to Yitzhak Rabin — The Land of Israel as a strategic asset

The Land of Israel connects Asia to Africa and is linked to Europe by the Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of its location, it has served since ancient times as an important passageway between continents and between great powers, and for that reason many nations have tried to take control of it.

The various conquerors, and the Crusaders above all others, understood that the Land of Israel cannot be conquered and defended by occupying its coastal plain alone. So the Crusaders deployed a network of fortresses not only in the coastal cities but also in Sinai and on the ridges east of the Jordan, such as the Ajloun Castle in the land of Gilead.

Unfortunately, that important concept of breadth is not expressed in the distribution of communities today. On the contrary, more than 60% of Israel’s Jewish residents live on the coastal plain, a strip no more than 15 km wide. Furthermore, most of Israel’s strategic assets — including Ben Gurion Airport, the power stations, Ashdod Port, an office for supervision of banking, and the national headquarters of the various armed services — are all in that same tight space.

Besides being narrow and crowded, the coastal plain is dominated by the Judean Hills and by the Samarian slopes that overlook it from the east along its entire length. Those hills provide a direct view of the plain — and a convenient base for attacking it, whether by short-range rocket fire or by a ground incursion. Thus whoever controls the hills of Samaria and Judea is, for practical purposes, in control of the entire coastal plain.

Many leaders from across the political spectrum have well understood the connection between control of that area and preservation of security, and they have recognized the importance of maintaining defensible borders. That understanding underlay the “Allon Plan,” which Yigal Allon first presented to Levi Eshkol’s government immediately after the Six Day War. And the same understanding was also embodied in Yitzhak Rabin’s policy approach. Rabin’s last speech to the Knesset, in October 1995, outlined his national security policy and put forward four principles of settlement that he saw as vital:

• The first principle stipulated that in order to ensure Israel’s existence as the Jewish state, its population must be 80% Jewish. That was one of the reasons that Rabin placed all the Palestinian population of Gaza and of areas A and B under the Palestinian Authority.
• Rabin’s second principle was that Jerusalem, with Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev, must be kept united under Israeli sovereignty.
• The third principle stipulates that the Jordan Valley, in the most comprehensive sense, will be the Israeli side of the security border. That is to say, Israel must maintain possession of the Jewish settlements in every part of the Jordan Valley — from Route 90 westward to the line of ridges.
• According to the fourth principle, a Palestinian entity should be created which is “less than a state.” One practical implication of that principle is that Israel must retain control over the airspace of Judea and Samaria.

It should be emphasized that those principles were set out not by some right-wing faction but by leaders of the Labor movement; and they were expressing a broad national consensus. That fact alone reflects the importance of Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel and it makes clear that before settlements became a political issue, they were already a necessity for survival.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen: The settlement vision of the State of Israel

Jerusalem: A metropolis, not a border town

The current situation:

The historical, religious, and cultural importance of Jerusalem is clear, but the city also carries critical strategic importance. Jerusalem sits among hills, dominates central traffic arteries, and is also the only place with a Jewish majority on the watershed.

Possession of the Jerusalem area is essential both for ensuring that Jerusalem remains Israel’s capital and a central Israeli metropolis, and for operational and strategic reasons. Because it is close to a large portion of the sources of terrorism, Jerusalem makes a convenient base for dispatching security forces and a hub for intelligence activities.

Moreover, possession of the Jerusalem area is vital for keeping control over the central traffic arteries and over additional areas. It is Jerusalem that makes possible the retention of the Jordan Valley as a buffer zone between the coastal plain and the threats from the east. And the possession of hillside communities such as Na’aleh and Beit Arieh is what provides for control of the central traffic arteries and the strategic assets of the country’s interior, including Ben Gurion Airport. Thanks to possession of the ridge and of the Yatir region’s communities, the valley lands of Beersheba and Arad can be defended, as can the Nevatim airbase.

Furthermore, any territorial concessions in Jerusalem would be considered an Israeli surrender and would only encourage Arab and Muslim extremists to continue gnawing away at the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and in the rest of Israel.

Ideally:

• Strengthening Jerusalem’s standing as a metropolis: Before the Six Day War, Jerusalem was a remove border town, a marginal satellite of Tel Aviv. But since then, it has become an important metropolis. Jerusalem in the form of a metropolis is key to controlling the Land of Israel, and Jerusalem must retain that form. In order to remain a metropolis, Jerusalem requires all its surrounding communities — the Etzion Bloc to the south, Maale Adumim and Mishor Adumim to the east, and the Benjamin district to the north.
• Ruling out the partitioning of Jerusalem: Partitioning Jerusalem would not only endanger its standing as Israel’s capital but also critically harm Israel’s national security. There is no guarantee that partitioning the city would actually end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Apparently terrorism would still continue, and partitioning would merely provide it with far more dangerous opportunities for action. And all that aside, nowhere else in the world has such a large city been divided. Even on paper, the idea is simply not feasible.

Judea and Samaria: To become Israel’s backbone to the east

The current situation:

In the Oslo Accords, Rabin divided the Judea and Samaria area into areas A. B. and C. Only Area C is fully under the civil and security authority of the State of Israel. Area C currently includes some 120 Jewish communities, with more than 500 thousand residents in all. There are also some 500 Arab communities with roughly 200 to 300 thousand residents.

Although Israeli control over Area C is anchored in the Oslo Accords, many voices around the world are raised against Jewish settlement in that territory. Much is said about the “illegal settlements,” and about the wildcat outposts in Area C, but illegal construction by Palestinians in that territory is in fact immeasurably greater than Jewish construction. As of December 2023, Area C contains roughly 90,000 illegal Palestinian structures; and there is no attempt at removing them.

Another accusation leveled against the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria is that the Jews there burden the Israeli security forces. That accusation is fundamentally erroneous. Above and beyond not being a burden, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria is what provides the IDF with freedom of operation in those territories. The size of the IDF’s deployment in Judea and Samaria is not sufficient in itself to preserve stability in such a complex area. Stability persists only thanks to the weight of half a million Jews who live there.

Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria also provide the security forces with convenient access to areas A and B — a benefit that has served the IDF well in various operations such as the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield.

Furthermore, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria also demonstrates to the Palestinians that our presence there is stable and dominant and that they are obliged to cooperate with us. An Israeli withdrawal of any size would indicate weakness and encourage our enemies’ thoughts of seizing the area and even expanding beyond it.

The settlements in Judea and Samaria also deserve to be credited with contributing to objectives mentioned in the previous section (which dealt with the Jerusalem area), including turning Jerusalem into a metropolis, retaining control over the Jordan Valley, defending the coastal plain and Ben Gurion Airport, defending the valleys of Beersheba and Arad, and keeping constant control over the main traffic arteries. Every settlement and outpost in the Judea and Samaria area is serving at least one of those objectives, and therefore they all are justified on grounds of security.

Ideally:

• World opinion cannot dictate our policy: As even David Ben Gurion understood in his day, Israeli policy cannot address all the objections raised around the world. Cooperating in response to the various rulings handed down by the international court in the Hague would mean a death sentence for all the Jews in Israel, because if we try to survive only inside the Green Line we will not survive at all.
• Driving home the perspective on settlements: As demonstrated, all the territory of Area C is vital to security and must remain in Israel’s hands forever. That understanding must be made clear to all the decision-makers, and preferably to all the country’s residents.
• Development of the settlements in Judea and Samaria: Not only is settlement in Judea and Samaria less than extensive; it is in fact too limited. A backbone of 3–4 million residents is necessary between Arad and the Gilboa, in order to relieve Israel of the crowding in the Dan Bloc. To make that possible, the existing settlements must be enlarged, new ones established, and the system of roadways and trains expanded to connect all those communities to the country’s center.

The Jordan Valley: Apply Israeli sovereignty

The current situation:

The Jordan Valley is Israel’s security border to the east. As of today, the Jordan Valley is under Israeli control but is not officially considered part of the State of Israel. In January 2020, the USA published its “Deal of the Century” peace plan, which gave Israel a historic opportunity to assert its sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and to fully annex the valley and the northern Dead Sea. Unfortunately, Israeli politicians torpedoed the plan and the Jordan Valley remains in a precarious status, exposed to both domestic and international criticism.

To understand the Jordan Valley’s strategic importance, it is first necessary to understand the geography. The Jordan Valley is located 250–400 meters below sea level, while the hills of Samaria and of Hebron rise to an altitude of up to 1,000 meters above sea level. Thus as long as the Jordan Valley remains in Israeli hands, an invasion of Israel from the east is very difficult because there is no easy way to move massive military forces across such steep territory.

Granted, we are at peace with Jordan today and no invasion from there is expected soon. But we must not forget that our eastern border is the most important one for Israel’s defense, both because it is our longest border and because it is the closest to the triangle — defined by Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa — where most of the country’s Jewish residents and its most important infrastructures are located. Moreover, even if relations with Jordan remain stable, it must be understood that without Israeli possession of the Jordan Valley, Iranian militias can quickly move into Qalqilya and Tulkarm to fire artillery at the Dan Bloc. It is not lightly that Rabin called the Jordan Valley, in its most comprehensive sense, the security border of the State of Israel.

Above and beyond its strategic importance, the Jordan Valley also possesses no little residential value. It is a very extensive territory that can, and should, accommodate millions of dwellers. By settling the Jordan Valley, we can balance the geographical distribution of Israel’s citizenry and ease the currently worsening population density of the coastal plain.

Ideally:

• Applying sovereignty to the Jordan Valley: Not only must possession of the Jordan Valley not be waived, but action must be taken to fully annex the area and apply Israeli sovereignty to the valley. Only such action will enable wide-ranging governmental plans to be established, and the valley’s standing as Israel’s security border at the east to be ensured for the long term.
• Expanding the settlements in the Jordan Valley: In order to solve the problem of crowding in central Israel and provide for better geographical distribution of the populace, the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley should be expanded. In addition, new immigrants should be encouraged to settle in the valley rather than in the already crowded coastal cities.

The Galilee: Expand the Jewish communities

The current situation:

In 2005 the Israeli government approved National Master Plan 35, known as Tama 35. In accordance with that plan, it was decided to limit construction and settlement in open areas because of the importance of preserving green spaces. In practice, the plan limited only Jewish settlement and was not applied to Arab communities. In many parts of the country, including the Galilee, it has been impossible to establish new Jewish settlements since the plan’s approval. And it has been very difficult to expand existing communities, because of quotas limiting the number of residents.

Tama 35 created an absurd situation in which Arab communities such as Sakhnin can expand with approval and even double their population whereas a Jewish community such as Yodfat is not allowed to expand beyond the 400 households that it already includes. Furthermore, the land sold to Jews and the land sold to Arabs differ dramatically in valuation. In Karmiel, for example, plots of 350 sq m were marketed in 2021 for 1.2 million shekels. But five minutes’ drive from there, at Deir al-Assad, similar plots were marketed the same year for only 20,000 shekels; and moreover the land development there was subsidized.

Because of those conditions, the Galilean heartland (leaving aside the cities of Nahariya, Safed, Tiberias, and Afula) is only 15% Jewish.

Ideally:

• Change the National Master Plan: The National Master Plan must be promptly changed and a new plan approved that is based on the understanding that an extensive network of Jewish villages must be developed. Thus the Jewish communities must be freed from the limitations imposed only on them and become the basis for an approved expansion.
• Encourage young people to settle in the Galilee: Jewish residents, and especially young families, should be encouraged to settle in the Galilee. To that purpose, they must be offered land at worthwhile prices and with economic benefits; and the vicinity must be developed with convenient roadways, public transportation, workplaces, etc.

The Golan — Hoping for a hundred thousand Jewish residents

The current situation:

The State of Israel wrested the Golan from the Syrians in 1967, and the area has been controversial since then. Many countries around the world see it as “occupied territory,” but most Israelis see it as an integral part of their country. In December 1981 the State of Israel decided to apply Israeli law in the Golan Heights, and that decision remains in force today.

In 1994, in the spirit of the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government took steps toward returning the Golan to Syrian hands as part of an attempt to reach a peace agreement with Syria. The Barak and Olmert governments weighed a similar idea but did not proceed to carry it out.

Meanwhile, over time, the Golan’s standing as Israeli won a degree of acknowledgement in the world; and in 2019 US President Donald Trump signed an executive order declaring that the USA officially recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. However, most of the world’s nations still do not officially consider the Golan a part of the State of Israel, and Israel’s hold on the area is still under threat.

Ideally:

• Quash the idea of retreating from the Golan: International pressures must be withstood, because giving up the Golan Heights would bring terrible consequences. First of all, without the Golan Heights we have no chance of living securely. We would be vulnerable to threats from Syria and Lebanon. Also, giving up the Golan Heights would cost the State of Israel heavily in terms of culture and tourism because the Golan is a beautiful area and one of the country’s few green lungs.
• Enlarge the Jewish population in the Golan: Currently the Golan is home to 23 thousand Jews. In order to anchor our presence in that area, as well as relieving Israel’s overcrowdedness elsewhere, the hope is to settle 100 thousand Jews in the Golan over the next five years. With suitable conditions and proper incentives, such an undertaking is certainly feasible.

The Negev: Extensive rural Jewish settlement

The current situation:

The Negev covers approximately 60% of the State of Israel but it remains one of the country’s least populated regions. David Ben Gurion is remembered as recognizing the importance of developing and settling the Negev. He even called it “a great Zionist asset, with no substitute anywhere in the country.”

Unfortunately, Ben Gurion’s vision has not yet been carried out fully and the Negev still suffers from slow development and scanty Jewish settlement. The volume of settlement no longer depends only on how well motivated the settlers are to move south. It is now also subject to governmental limitations — first and foremost Tama 35, which makes establishing new Jewish communities and expanding existing ones difficult.

The few Jews who already live in the Negev are concentrated in Beersheba and in urban settlements such as Ofakim and Sderot, where they live in apartment buildings. Thus we have no truly extensive presence in the area and consequently no control over the main traffic arteries. The Bedouin population, in contrast, is distributed over broad tracts of land and thus enjoys control over the grounds and over the traffic arteries.

The Negev, it must be understood, is important to the State of Israel not only because of its size. It is home to a number of critical military and strategic assets, including the Nevatim airbase. Because control over the area was lacking, Bedouin rioters during Operation Guardian of the Walls, in 2019, managed to block access to the airbase and thus interfered with the IDF’s freedom of action. That was a severe security incident, and lessons must be learned.

Ideally:

• Extensive rural Jewish settlement: Development of Jewish settlements in the Negev must be encouraged, with an emphasis on rural settlements with single-family houses, in order to cover broad tracts. That is the only way to create balance in the area and ensure security along the traffic arteries. To that purpose, settlement planning in the Negev must be revolutionized to reduce land prices, create proper conditions for settling, and provide incentives for those who will come settle the Negev.

The Gaza Strip: Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities

The current situation:

The Gaza Strip has known many vicissitudes in recent decades. In the 1970s, Israel’s government established Jewish communities inside the Gaza Strip under the “Five Fingers Plan” put forward by Ariel Sharon. However, in 1982, Israel withdrew from the Yamit district and later the Oslo Accords obliged Israel to abandon further implementation of the Five Fingers Plan and waive control over the Philadelphi Corridor as well. In 2005, it will be recalled, the Jewish communities of the Katif Bloc were all evacuated under the Disengagement plan — and thus Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip came to an end.

Aside from the settlements inside the Gaza Strip itself, the Gaza Envelope communities and those surrounding the Gaza Strip in the northern Negev must be borne in mind. Following the Disengagement, those communities became the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from central Israel; and as such, they suffered many attacks — which climaxed on October 7, 2023.

As of this writing, there is no end yet to the Swords of Iron war that was engendered by that disaster; and most of the Gaza Envelope communities have not yet been repaired and fully repopulated. Despite the security threats, the State of Israel must repopulate the area bordering the Gaza Strip. Some of the veteran residents may not wish to return, but there are enough ideologically motivated citizens who understand the area’s importance and will agree to replace them there.

Ideally:

• Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities: The Gaza Envelope communities must be repopulated, whether by returning residents or by newcomers. The area is vital to Israel’s security and must not be abandoned. Even leaving aside Zionist pioneering ideology, it is a beautiful area suitable for a balanced lifestyle close to the land. The Gaza Envelope communities are actually not far from the center of Israel. Most are an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv and are well connected to public transportation, so that life there is definitely convenient.
• Jewish settlement in Gaza: Although valid in principle, this idea must be weighed against other national priorities and it may be that efforts should concentrate not on settling inside the Gaza Strip but on settling other areas in the Land of Israel.

There is no security without settlements: Summation and conclusions

The country’s first leaders, foremost among them Ben Gurion, appreciated the close connection between possessing and settling the land on the one hand and national strategy and security on the other hand. Subsequent leaders across the political spectrum, including leaders of the left such as Rabin, also understood that territory may be conceded only up to a certain point.

In practice, under cover of “green” programs, a National Master Plan has been adopted that prevents the plan of settlement from being fulfilled. Tama 35 limits the development of the State of Israel and weakens its security. The Master Plan must be revised. Among other things, Judea and Samaria must be regarded as strategic, economic, and security assets for Israel, and their development should be given consideration accordingly. In addition, the Jerusalem metropolis should continue being built extensively; the Jordan Valley, Galilee, and Golan should be settled; and the intolerable concentration of most of Israel’s assets and residents in a certain narrow district.

The drawing of Israel’s boundaries is a decision of concern to future generations, and so it must reflect more than the current situation. Our responsibility is to draw secure boundaries for the State of Israel — borders that can withstand the political upheavals of the Middle East and the changes in technology. Any policy that fails to consider possible threats to Israel’s future security is a policy of irresponsibility toward the nation.

And finally, it must be remembered that programs at the national level are carried out by the citizenry. At the cutting edge of any settlement plan stand the settlers who build the houses, plant the trees, bond with the land and the location, and are ready to fight for them as necessary.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Settlement and Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Declaration of Independence is first and foremost the most seminal document in Israel’s history. It lays out succinctly and clearly the blueprint and justification for the newly founded State of Israel and tells the story of the Jewish people.

The declaration opens with the assertion of the Jewish people’s historical right to the land of Israel and points to the thousand years of Jewish life in the Land before the Jews were taken into exile. It cites the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate as international confirmation of the  legal right of the Jews to the Land of Israel, and refers to the Holocaust as testament to the urgency in which the Jewish State must become a reality. The Declaration also establishes the values on which the State shall be founded, and calls upon all diaspora Jews to congregate in the Land of Israel and together bring the vision of the redemption of the land to life.

It tells a story of the Jewish nation which is historically accurate as it is conclusive. Unfortunately, over the past decades there are those who strive to diminish that narrative’s internal cohesiveness by using groundless narratives to pick at the justifications presented in the seminal document, and many of the Jews in Israel are losing sight and conviction of the justness of the Jewish nation’s cause.

This loss of conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause is one of the most dangerous phenomena manifesting recently in Israel’s society; without deep faith in the absolute right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, we have little reason to exist in that land. Without that conviction, we cannot ensure a conclusive and long-standing victory in the current war and we surely will not be able to guarantee peace for our future generations.

“Accordingly we are here assembled”: the factors laying the groundwork for the establishment of the State of Israel

Historical right

The Declaration of Independence was penned only three years after World Ward 2 and the atrocities of the Holocaust. Nonetheless, the document does not open on the story of the six million Jews who perished in Europe, but with the assertion: “Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel] is the  birthplace of the Jewish people, where its spiritual, religious and political identity was forged”. In other words, the Declaration’s point of departure is the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, stating: this is the place from which the Jewish people had arisen as a nation; here we lived as sovereigns of our land for generations, and here we created our national cultural inalienable assets. The Declaration underscores the “forcible” exile of the Jews from their land, and asserts that despite this, even in its exile, the Jewish people had staunchly kept its allegiance to the Land of Israel, yearningly praying for the return to the Jewish homeland and the renewal of its national liberty.

The Declaration addresses the Zionist enterprise, mentioning the pioneers who came to the Land of Israel to cultivate its soil and revive the Hebrew language, as well as the speech in the  first Zionist Congress (1897) by the founding father of the Zionist movement, Theodor Hertzel, stating the Jewish nation’s right to be reinstated in its land as a nation.

Legal justification

Furthermore, the Declaration addresses the legal right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel. It draws on the Balfour Declaration from 1917, which acknowledges the right of the Jewish people to establish their national home in the Land of Israel. The Balfour Declaration was the basis for the British Mandate in Israel. The Mandate document states: “…the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917 by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers [the Allied Powers], in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people…”

The Mandate, conferred upon Britain by the League of Nations (predecessor of the United Nations) is the most binding legal document pertaining to international recognition of the Jewish people’s right to the Land of Israel, in which the British have accepted the responsibility of acting to put this right into effect. It should be mentioned that Arthur James Balfour’s original intention was to establish a national home for the Jewish people on the entirety of the land of biblical Israel, including the Transjordan territories – Greater Eretz Israel.

However, history shows that the British Mandate in effect acted in contradiction to the mandate they were given, and rather than facilitating the establishment of the Jewish State as agreed upon in the Mandate document, the British administration prevented the immigration of Jews to Israel and moreover – allowed scores of Arabs from the entire Middle East to pour into the area. Furthermore, the British issued the White Paper (policy paper), which blatantly flouted the terms agreed upon in the Mandate. And if that were not enough, the British excluded the Transjordan territories from the historic territory of Greater Israel and of the Jewish national homeland, and allowed the creation of a new sovereign entity unorganic to the area under the Hashemite rule, named Jordan, in the Transjordan area.

Despite the British violation of the Mandate conferred upon then, and their commitment to the League of Nations, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate remained legal binding documents that stated beyond doubt that the Jewish people have national rights to the Land of Israel.

The Holocaust imperative

It is only after the declaration asserts the historical and legal right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel, that it addresses the Holocaust, citing that “The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people – the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe” as a “clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State”. The Declaration states that the State of Israel would be open for Jewish immigration from all exiles of the Jewish nation, thereby laying the foundations for the Law of Return, which grants people of Jewish descent the automatic right to live in Israel and gain citizenship.

The fashion in which the case for the Jewish right to the Land of Israel is laid out aimed to ensure that the Holocaust would not be taken as the framework of – and surely not the sole justification for – the Jewish entitlement to their national homeland. The authors of the Declaration single out the Holocaust as testimony to the urgency of an immediate solution, such that is deeply engrained in the historical and legal right of the Jews to the Land of Israel – far predating the events of the Holocaust.

Fast forward to present day Israel.

Sadly, over the recent decades, a growing number of Israelis have been forgetting this right, and have come to see the Holocaust as the driving factor justifying the existence of Israel.

It behooves us to understand that albeit a deeply painful reminder of the importance of a Jewish homeland, the Holocaust is not the pretext for the establishment of Israel, and that the Jews live in Israel by right and not by the grace of others.

The Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly

The first part of the Declaration ends with the mention  of the UN resolution for the establishment of a Jewish State in the land of Israel, on November 29, 1947.  The Declaration underscores that this recognition is “irrevocable”, and emphasizes that the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel is “… the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State”.

This takes us to the most historic and iconic declaration in the document: “We, members of the people’s council…declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel”

As envisioned by the ancient profits of Israel: the bedrock values of the Declaration of Independence

The values of the state to be

The last portion of the Declaration addresses the nature and values of the new State, and chiefly the assertion that the State “shall be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles”, in effect designating the State as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Later are mentioned additional values such as liberty, peace, equality and the freedom of religion, as envisioned by the biblical profits of Israel, thereby indicating, again, a return to the historic and religious anchor that defines the Jews as a nation.

Today, they are voices that accuse Israel of failing in its commitment to afford equal rights to all its citizens. These claims are with no foundation as every eligible citizen of the State of Israel has the right to vote, and all votes are equal; Evey civil body – including all bodies of government, Knesset and the Judiciary – have representatives from every demographic in the State of Israel; All Israeli citizens are equal before the law, regardless of their ethnicity, and since its very inception the State never had separate systems of laws for Jews and Arabs. The State’s education system and employment market have equal opportunities for all, and the increasing rate of Arab students in the country’s education institutions year on year – reflect almost their portion in the country’s population – all these stand as testimony that refutes such claims. Moreover, since 2020, nearly half of the new doctors in Israel come from the Arab and Druze sectors. This is the shape of a society based on equal rights.

Extending a hand to peace

The latter part of the Declaration also addresses the complex security demands of the Jewish state vis a vis the Arab population therein and the surrounding Muslim countries. It opens with inviting the Arab population to partake in the building of the State as fully equal nationals. Then the Declaration addresses the Middle East countries, stating “We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness”, and expresses the commitment of the new State to “do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East”, thereby clearly establishing the peaceful nature of the State of Israel.

The redemption of Israel

The Declaration ends with an appeal to the Jewish people of the diaspora, calling on the world Jewry to come to Israel and together realize the dream of generations of Jews of the redemption of Israel.

The last line of the Declaration is a return to that which unites the Jewish people as a nation, and mentions that the Declaration was signed with “Trust in the ‘Rock of Israel’”, i.e God.

Refraining from determining the form of government and borders: what is not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence

A Jewish egalitarian state

The authors of the Declaration were deliberate in selecting each word in the document and no less – that which was not mentioned. Nowadays it is a matter of fact that the State of Israel is Jewish and democratic; however, it is interesting to see that while the words “Jew” and “Jews” appear 20 times in the Declaration, the word “Democracy” does not appear even once. This is no coincidence.

The Declaration of Independence refrains from specifying the new state’s form of government simply as at the time it was not a given that Israel would become a democracy. In fact, the majority of the leadership was deeply connected to communist Russia and held the ideology of the kibbutzim – agricultural coop communities – in the highest regard, hence many among them supported the installation of a communist, rather than a democratic, form of government.

On the other hand, the Declaration proclaims a statehood that upholds such values that are congruent with those underpinning the democratic ideology i.e. equality, justice and liberty, thereby establishing the balance which is much addressed by Israeli society, of a national homeland for the Jewish people on the one hand, and a democratic state, on the other. Fully understanding the Declaration of Independence shows that the two are compatible and not contradicting.

Without demarcation of borders

Another topic that the Declaration of Independence does not address – and justly so – is that of the borders of the state-to-be. The authors of the Declaration refrained from mentioning the Partition Plan, voted on by the UN General Assembly on November 29. This stems from the understanding that the borders of the State of Israel are yet to be formed.

And indeed, no sooner was the Declaration signed, seven neighboring hostile armies rose against Israel, which found itself in a fight for its survival in the War of Independence. Not only was that war won by Israel – it redefined the country’s borders. Since that war, Israel had found itself in numerous confrontations that led to the reshaping of its borders, and there are large parts of Israel’s society that would see Israel regain its historic biblical borders of “Greater Eretz Israel”.

Between politics and security: the Declaration of Independence and the reality today

The politicization of the Declaration

The Declaration of Independence had become the defining document of the State of Israel. Sadly, in recent years – particularly on the background of the loaded debate on the judicial reform – it has become a battering ram of sorts, for all stakeholders.

Many groups in Israel resort to the Declaration of Independence to buttress their claims. As welcome as this renewed interest and discourse may be – as it reflects a wide recognition in the seminal importance of the Declaration – it also misuses the document by cleaving from it a narrow political interpretation that defies the full meaning of the Jewish nation’s most important document in modern history. It is imperative to understand that the Declaration of Independence represents an organic concept that cannot be partially accepted or rejected, no more than the story of the Jewish people can be partially acknowledged.

One of the most dangerous things Israeli society can do is turning the document that is the foundation for its existence in the Land of Israel, into a means to political gain.

The loss of an ethos

Without understanding the Declaration of Independence with all of its articles, we allow subversive elements to undermine not only the entire national ethos of Israel but also the conviction in the  right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel.

Over the past several years, we are witnessing the proliferation of lies attempting to show Israel as a colonialist force scheming to occupy a land with which it has no legitimate connection. These lies wish to expunge the story of the Jewish people and the State of Israel and as such should be  vehemently rejected, not only by Jews but also by any truth seeking individual.

It is imperative that the Israeli public knows to differentiate between essence and practice – firstly, it must understand and embrace the narrative of a Jewish people, returning to its lost land, and rising again as a nation in the comity of nations. Only on the foundation of this inalienable document can true and long-term solutions be had. Thus, even when compromises are necessary – as painful as they might be – they will stem from a practical vantage point that clearly sees the dictates of reality, rather than from a position that turns its back on the values that define the Jewish people.

Protecting ourselves, by ourselves

Sadly, the current debate on issues of security and defense in Israel have been derailed to the realm of shallow, political sloganism. In order to truly address this topic with all the seriousness and reverence it deserves, we must look to the Declaration of Independence as a guiding light.

The Declaration states that the Jewish nation had never stopped demanding its natural right to live as a free, respected nation in its birthright land. Implied in the narrative of the document is the imperative of the Jewish nation to establish the ability to protect its land, by itself, thereby laying the ideological and ethical foundation on which the new state should stand.

The DNA of the Jewish nation: the eternal importance of the Declaration of Independence

The current “iron Swords” war in Gaza and its counterpart in Lebanon underscore the importance of the conviction in the justness of the Jewish claim to its land. The prime entity that is the driving force behind this war is Iran – a country with which Israel has no common borders and no territorial disputes whatsoever. The Iranian Republic and its global and regional network of proxies are fueled by a single-minded desire to eradicate the State of Israel, stoked by Teheran’s zealous hatred of Israel. Hence, the real struggle of the State of Israel is not for land – it is ideological.

In this respect, Israel has a long way to go. Its enemies are well skilled at preserving and instilling their own ethos, while the infighting that is tearing at the very fabric of Israeli society only weakens its ethos as a nation and alienates it from the values that have been the bedrock of the Jewish nation for thousands of years, akin to a tree, whose roots are rotting and can no longer sustain itself, destined to eventually collapse.

To sustain the tree that is the Jewish nation and the State of Israel, and prevail in this ideological war, we must reconnect to the Declaration of Independence and to the defining narrative of the Jewish people. It is the spirit – not only the size of the army and the superiority of its weapons – that will win the present struggle and ensure the security of Israel for generations to come. It is the spirit that derives from the conviction in the justness of the Jewish nation and its historic and present right to the Land of Israel.

הפוסט Understanding the Declaration of Independence – Understanding the Jewish Right to The Land of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

It is often reported in mainstream and state-controlled media, as well as in international forums, that Israel deliberately targets civilians and might even be committing genocide against the population of Gaza. These accusations are not only baseless but are also easily debunked by the following data, numbers and facts from the War in Israel database, an IDSF project.

Before launching any strikes on cities, refugee camps or other territories, the IDF takes extensive measures to warn civilians in the Gaza Strip. These measures include distributing evacuation maps, dropping leaflets, sending SMS messages, making automated calls and even conducting live phone calls.

Since the war began, the IDF has dropped over 9.3 million pamphlets, sent over 1.55 million SMS messages, made more than 17 million automated calls and conducted over 100,000 live phone calls—all aimed at ensuring that non-combatants can move to safety.

The primary responsibility for evacuating civilians from combat zones lies with Hamas, the governing body in the Gaza Strip. However, Hamas often neglects this duty and even forces civilians to remain in harm’s way, which may itself constitute a war crime.

Israel critics have claimed that Israel is deliberately starving Palestinians in Gaza by imposing strict blockades that severely restrict the flow of food, medicine and other essential supplies. They argue that these measures exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, leading to widespread suffering and malnutrition among the civilian population in Gaza. The truth is the exact opposite.

The IDF works closely with NGOs and international governments to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Since the onset of the war, Israel and its partners have transported over 900,000 metric tons of supplies by land, air and sea. This includes 727,000 metric tons of food, 73,000 metric tons of shelter equipment, 49,000 metric tons of water, 25,000 metric tons of medical supplies and an additional 36,000 metric tons of other essentials.

For example, the IDF has provided Al Shifa Hospital with medical equipment, incubators and baby food, and in February, delivered over 20 oxygen tanks and additional medical supplies to Al Amal Hospital in Khan Younis.

Targeted strikes

The Israeli Air Force was a pioneer in integrating computers into bombers, drastically improving the precision of airstrikes. By the 1990s, these computers became small enough to be installed directly into bombs, leading to the development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

The IDF has increasingly adopted this technology, particularly since the mid-1990s, to minimize collateral damage. For instance, during the First Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. used smart weapons in just 8% of strikes, but by later conflicts like 2008’s Operation Cast Lead, nearly 100% of the munitions used were smart bombs.

In the current war, Israel has not only employed smart bombs to target terrorists embedded within civilian populations—a Hamas war crime in itself—but has also integrated new technologies to enhance the accuracy of ground troops and artillery.

One such innovation is the Dagger sight by Smart Shooter, which uses computer vision and artificial intelligence to ensure that every shot is precise, effectively turning each soldier into a sniper and significantly reducing the risk of hitting unintended targets.

Another game-changing technology is the Iron Sting mortar, developed by Elbit. Unlike conventional mortars, which are generally imprecise, the Iron Sting is accurate to within meters. It relies on inputted coordinates rather than electro-optical imaging, significantly reducing collateral damage and the likelihood of civilian casualties.

Throughout the war, there were several well-known instances where Israel targeted terrorists in schools, with international media echoing Hamas propaganda by claiming that Israel killed many civilians during these strikes.

For example, on August 10, Israel targeted terrorists at Tabeen School. The Guardian reported: “At least 80 people have been killed in Israeli missile strikes on a school compound in Gaza City, according to the territory’s civil defense service.” In reality, the IDF targeted 20 terrorists, causing minimal damage to the school, and provided evidence demonstrating that the inflated number of casualties was highly unlikely. The IDF even posted the names and photos of those killed in the attack.

The Tabeen School strike is just one example of numerous propaganda attempts by Hamas and their allies to tarnish Israel’s image and further their strategy of maximizing civilian casualties to pressure Israel on the world stage.

A comparative perspective

These practices have enabled the IDF to achieve remarkable success on the battlefield while minimizing civilian casualties. The IDF reports that it has eliminated over 14,300 terrorists. Even if we accept the inflated figures from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which are based on numbers provided by Hamas, the civilian death toll would be around 24,000. This results in a ratio of approximately 1.5 civilians killed for every one combatant. In comparison, the Soviet-Afghan War had a ratio of 10 to 1, and the Biafran War had a ratio of 15 to 1.

When we consider the total civilian death toll, which stands at around 26,000 (including Israeli civilians), this conflict is far less deadly for civilians than other recent wars. For example, the war in Yemen has resulted in over 367,000 civilian deaths, the Syrian Civil War has claimed over 617,000 lives and the Liberian Civil War left more than 200,000 civilians dead.

The IDF’s efforts to avoid civilian casualties stand in stark contrast to these conflicts, demonstrating a commitment to minimizing harm even in the midst of intense warfare.

To get additional data and numbers, debunk myths, read analysis and watch informative content on the wars Israel is fighting, visit warinisrael.org

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Debunking the myth: Inside the IDF’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Ahiram Levi, a 30-year-old combat engineering soldier, opens our interview with an apology. He has much to say, he explains, but he isn’t quite sure how to phrase his opinions.

And indeed, as we embark on our discussion, the words come tumbling out with passion and pain. However, as the interview progresses, Ahiram gets a better handle on his thoughts and he presents structured and concise messages – sentiments shared by himself and his comrades in the field; messages that must be heard by every decision-maker in Israel.

“I speak for many reservists, all who sanctify life – regardless of their political leanings”, he wishes to clarify. “When I talk about the leadership, I mean all of Israel’s leadership – political, judiciary, military, media. As far as I’m concerned, they all should shoulder the responsibility”.

“No one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to reserves’ service”

Ahiram was summoned to report to duty at the outbreak of the October 7 attack, just eight months after his wedding, and a month after he quit his job. During the long months of fighting he also had to move and found himself contending with a complex series of personal difficulties. Added to this were the challenges from the battle field: the uncertainty, the constant fear, and the loss of comrades, which breaks the heart each and every time.

Ahiram is well aware that he’s not alone in this story. All of his comrade reservists are dealing with similar difficulties. “The reservists in particular are paying a dear price in this war, and this does not receive the attention it deserves”, he says. “I still have a hard time finding a job since no one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to duty. I have friends that because of their [prolonged] reserves’ duty have gotten divorced or have lost their jobs.  There are even some reservists who have committed suicide between tours. And the public – try as it may to be supportive – doesn’t really understand how difficult things are for us”.

Despite the mounting difficulties, and personal costs, Ahiram states that if summoned again he would immediately report, no questions asked. He only has two requests, both of which he wishes to convey to Israel’s decision-makers and to the citizens of the country: respect our lives by giving us your support and letting us win, and take responsibility for the unity of the public in Israel”.

“No more back-and-forth raids”: the reservists want to win

Since October 7, uncertainty has become part and parcel of the daily lives of the Israeli public. But there are those who deal with more uncertainty than the rest. Putting aside uncertainties that are products of being a combat soldier in war, there is the uncertainty that arises from the reservist’ constant transition lately between civilian and military life. “There is a large measure of unclarity regarding the reserves’ service”’ says Ahiram. “It starts already at the moment we get our summons. I’ve repeatedly received summons that were either postponed or called off all together. You must understand that when we receive a call to report for duty, our entire life circles around the upcoming tour. We stop everything, change plans. When we receive a summons out of the blue – it makes us feel that we – and our time – are being taken for granted, because they know that whenever called – we will step up to protect the country”, he shares candidly. “But the lack of clarity doesn’t end here. During fighting we usually are not informed of the objective of our missions. We’re told to go in, get out, fight, desist. This is has become even more prevalent in the recent months of the fighting”.

Can you see any difference between the fighting at the onset of the war as oppose to now?

“Absolutely. When the war began, the troops fought intensively and aggressively, however, lately, the soldiers feel that we’re bogged down in the Gaza mire instead of driving the fighting towards victory. The leadership and the public must understand that the longer we’re in Gaza – the more soldiers die. The troops in the field want to see a return to continuous intensive fighting, coupled with heavy artillery, mopping-up operations, a concerted military effort and a broad seizure of territory; no more back-and-forth raids; no more tours. [we want] warfare that means business and says to us: ‘we brought you here from home to win this war’”.

What in your opinion, is holding back the IDF from victory?

“I don’t intend to address the bringing of politics into the military; however, I would like to touch upon the considerations of international pressure. I understand that this is an important issue – but it’s not more important than our lives. The lives of the soldiers should be treated with reverence. Beyond that, there is a gap between the mindset of the troops in the field and the messages that are sent out by the leadership. As common soldiers we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that our army has everything it takes to tackle a terrorist organization – as complex is it might be – and to crush it. But without the conviction in the imperative of victory on part of the leadership, we can stay entrenched in this fight for another three years with no conclusion in sight.”

What is you view on the possible cessation of the war before all its objectives have been reached?

“As a civilian I would comment on the issue, but as a soldier it is not my place to voice an opinion. The army’s job is to execute decisions and we, as soldiers, are committed to carrying out in the field any decision coming down from the top. The problem is that we see mainly foot-dragging. It’s frustrating. We get up and leave everything – our families, our work, our businesses, and report to duty, but then have to face indecision. I say – if you don’t want to win, then don’t call us in. End the war and let it go at that. But if you do wish to win – let us fight until we do.”

“The lives of the reservists are not even on the public agenda”

On July 1st, Sergeant Major (res.) Nadav Elchanan Noller, an old and good friend of Ahiram’s, fell in battle. This is not the first friend he has lost since the beginning of the war, but Elhanan’s death had rattled him in particular.

“Every person killed is a world onto its own. But seeing such high numbers of casualties leads to indifference. The fallen march by in a long line and most of us aren’t even familiar with their names, don’t know who they are, hurt for their loss for one moment. Unfortunately, it is only when grief comes knocking at your own door you understand its meaning”, he says. “This indifference is displayed by the public as well as by the leadership”.

Ahiram says that as citizens of Israel, it is our duty to take pause to hear and honor every single name of a fallen soldier. But this is only one side of the story. “I want us to be honored and respected while we’re still alive”, he stresses. “We risk our lives and souls for the country and the public, and you don’t have to see the epitaph ‘Rest in Peace’ near our names to call us heroes. We don’t need to be loved as dead heroes”.

How would you have the leadership treat the soldiers and reservists differently?

“I expect the leadership to back us up: in the battles in the field as well as in life outside the battlefield. At the moment the sentiment is that everything is on the table – international relations, the economic situation, the hostages, the evacuees. Everything but us. I’m not underestimating any of these issues; they’re all important. But it is not acceptable that the lives of the reservists are not on the public agenda as well. The day Nadav was killed, the sole issue on everyone’s mind was whether to reconnect Gaza to electricity or not. It feels like were getting stabbed in the back; it’s as if the lives of the Gazans are more important than those of the reservists. You have to understand that the attempts to appease the international community not only divert the limelight from us, but also lead to decision-making that impedes our ability to fight – reconnecting Gaza to the electricity helps Hamas and most of the humanitarian aid reaches the terrorists’ hands and reenforces them. Creative alternatives can be put in place that can protect our international interests but also allow us to engage in continuous aggressive operation. Furthermore, we also want to see an enveloping support system for us and our families. That means real financial aid and not occasional benefits of one sort or another, as the reservists cannot shoulder that burden on top of everything else.”

What do you expect of the Israeli public?

“There are amazing people who have been nonstop supporting the soldiers, the wounded and the families of the victims. Nonetheless, most of the public has returned to routine life, and this manifests in the levels of volunteering and emotional involvement on their part. It’s understandable. I didn’t expect the level of support at the beginning of the war to continue on such a scale, and at the end of the day – we’re out there fighting so that the public can live its routine life, but still, it’s hard for me to deal with the indifference in society now and the obliviousness to the difficulties that the reservists are experiencing”.

What can be done to help the reservists?

“People want to tell us ‘Well done’ and even reach into their pockets and donate. But when they encounter these difficulties in a challenging setting – they don’t really know how to help. I’m not saying that everyone needs to volunteer, but there are other ways to share the burden, like refraining from firing employees that are absent due to reserves duty, despite the difficulties. Similarly, employers should be patient with employees returning from reserves duty and have difficulties readjusting. Furthermore, the families of reservists should be supported, especially the wives, who are alone at home with the children. Generally speaking, society can – and should – be sensitive about seeing how it can help others, even if it’s not clear what difficulties they’re dealing with.”

“The TV studios are like kindergartens”

One of the most common expressions heard since the onslaught of the war is “unity”. We encounter it in almost every junction, on signs proclaim “Together We Shall Win”. We hear it repeatedly in politicians’ speeches. Commanders preach it to their soldiers. Social media posts are replete with it and it appears in musical releases – but as far as Ahiram is concerned, at the moment unity is little more than a catchy slogan.

“I watch what goes on in the TV studios – they’re like kindergartens now”, he says. “It’s hard to watch our leaders go at each other’s throats, and foment intrigue. We’ve reached a state in which the government is identified with the right and the army – with the left. This is unacceptable. I want to call on all levels of the political and military leadership – and to the media as well – be responsible. Think twice before you speak and ask yourself wither your cultivating love or stoking hate; promoting unity or fomenting  discord”.

According to Ahiram, there is a significant gap between the manner in which the Israeli leadership and society manage disputes and how the soldiers and reservists handle them. “There is a very high degree of cohesion among the reservists. We are able to conduct discussions bringing up opinions across the political spectrum and do so in a respectful manner. Sometimes I feel that we have parallel universes here – the universe in which the reservists exist and that of the outside world”.

Still, how can unity be promoted in the “outside world”?

“It is the leadership that must take the responsibility for promoting unity among the people – this should be the number one priority of the Knesset. It starts with the way the politicians themselves talk to each other and continues with the comments we hear in the media. We must shift the idea of unity from a slogan into practice and get it into our heads that if we continue to split into factions and camps, and if we don’t learn how to build a future for us all – we’ll simply no longer be here”.

“I’m needed, so I’m there”

As of now, Ahiram Levi is back at his civilian life, but he knows that at any moment he could be summoned back to reserves’ duty. And it is clear to him that if he is– he will report for duty. Meanwhile, as long as he is home, he is working on his fresh marriage, getting used to his new house, and trying to finally find a job. And in between it all, he visits the troops, but as a volunteer. Beyond Ahiram’s important contribution as a fighter, he has also recently founded the “Unity War Room” – an organization dedicated to helping soldiers, operating under the slogan “Because We Have No Other Country”. Ahiram and his volunteers travel the country, distributing food and gear to soldiers and mainly conveying to them: we see you.

How do you find the motivation to continue to serve and volunteer?

“What gives me the strength is the knowledge that the people of Israel have experienced difficulties throughout history, and prevailed. When you stick to a narrow view – it’s hard to get up in the morning. But adopting a perspective that sees us as a link in a long line of Jewish generations, allows me to rise above the hardships. I also understand that no one else is going to do it for me and my family. I’m needed – so I’m there.”

Now that you’ve expressed such painful thoughts, what is your message to Israel’s leadership?

“My first message is: take responsibility and show us we are important. Put our lives on the scales when you weigh your decisions and give us real support. The second message is: don’t toy with us. If you want to win the war – let us fight properly and bring about its conclusion. Don’t leave us in this limbo because we are sick of sacrificing our lives because of your indecision.”

הפוסט You Called Us to Serve. Now let Us Win הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As part of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index project, an ongoing survey of Israeli society on questions of security, military and society, this month’s report explores an issue that has become the focus of attention in Israel following the events of October 7: the role of Israel’s civilians in the country’s national security strategy.

In the next reports, we continue to review the survey findings and the insights they offer. Whereas the previous report focused on public opinion in regards to the civilian role in national security in times of quiet and at war, and explored the public’s opinion on expanding the compulsory military service to the ultra-orthodox (Haredi) community and the role of the youth in the country’s security, the present report deals with public opinion on the contribution of settlement, agriculture and industry to Israel’s national security strategy.

The survey was conducted on May 2024, under the statistical direction of Dr. Hagai Elyakim. It included 1,453 participants from Israel’s internet-using adult population (18+) and was sampled in a manner that ensured its representativeness in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,453 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.6% with a 95% probability; For the Jewish sample (1,079 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (374 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±5.1% with a probability of 95%.

Instrumental or detrimental? Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, Gaza and in border areas

The participants were posed with a series of questions that explore their opinions on Jewish settlement along the borders of the country and the border envelope communities and the extent of the contribution thereof to national security. On the question whether settlement along the country’s borders contributes to boosting national security – 70% of all the respondents and 83% of the Jewish respondents replied affirmatively. An ideological segmentation reveals a considerable variance: 92% of the respondents on the right of the political map thought that settlement along and in the border areas of the country contributes to the security of the Israel; in the center – 72% and the political left – 65%.

The respondents were then asked whether the Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria contributes to the national security. 53% of all the respondents and 65% of the Jewish respondents replied positively. The distribution by political ideology shows even a larger variance than the previous question, with 88% of the right-wing respondents believing this to be true, as oppose to 42% in the center and only 17% in the left.

The participants were further asked if they thought that the Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria contributes to the security of the Tel-Aviv metropolis area in central Israel. 58% of the respondents replied positively as compared with 70% of the Jewish respondents.

The issue of the Jewish settlement within the Gaza Strip was also explored: the results show that 49% of the respondents and 58% of the Jewish respondents believe that Jewish settlement of the Gaza Strip will boost the security of Israel’s southern communities. An ideological segmentation shows variance among the political ideology groups: on the right of the political map, 81% of the respondents thought this was true; in the center 32% supported this statement and on the left – only 14%.

As part of the section exploring opinions on Jewish settlement in Israel, the participants were asked whether Israel should arm Jewish communities situated along conflict lines. 85% of all participants answered affirmatively, yet a segmentation by ethnic group shows a large variance with 95% of the Jewish respondents feeling that the government should arm conflict-line communities as oppose to 57% of the Arab respondents.

All colors of the rainbow: broad support of agriculture

The survey also explored the public’s opinion of the extent to which the agricultural sector contributes to national security.

The results show that Israeli-Jews see a strong correlation between agriculture, Israel’s independence and the protection of their country: 82% of all the respondents feel that Israeli agriculture is vital for the connection between the people of Israel and their land; 79%  thought that Israel should reduce its dependence on imports and increase local production of food; 75% believe that agriculture is vital for the protection of the country. Similarly, 78% of the respondents noted that Israel should encourage young people to choose a career in agriculture and 77% thought that the country should facilitate the foundation of agricultural vocational schools.

The various statements yielded similar variances among right-wing, center and left-wing respondents, but a distribution according to nationality shows marked differences. Apparently, 86% of the Jewish respondents believe that agriculture connects people to their land, as oppose to 63% of the Arab-Israeli respondents. Furthermore, 83% of the Jewish respondents thought that agriculture contributes to the protection of the country’s borders, as oppose to 53% of the Arab-Israeli respondents.

From vocational schools to high-tech: the contribution of Israeli industry to the country’s security

Lastly, the survey explored the Israeli public’s opinion on Israeli industry and its contribution to Israel’s national security. Industry, similarly to agriculture, received high support rates: 90% of all the respondents believe that Israel should invest in the development of high-tech and AI technologies for security purposes, with 83% maintaining that the country should develop self-manufacturing of missiles and ammunition.

It is likely that the high rates of support for the development of technology and industry are a direct outcome of the Gaza war. This war has revealed just how much Israel’s dependance on the import of munitions from other countries is an encumbrance. It seems that the public now understands that Israel must aspire for independence in terms of development and production as well.

Similarly, it seems that the public understands that a stepping stone to such independence is the cultivation of professional, skilled manpower. The results show that 84% of all the respondents maintain that the country should encourage the foundation of  vocational schools for the training of industrial workers. 81% think that the country should encourage young people to pursue a career in the construction industry to reduce its dependance on foreign workers. Interestingly, support for the foundation of more vocational schools and encouragement of young people to choose a career in the construction sector was almost equal between the Jewish and Arab respondents, thus it would appear that this is an interest that serves both demographics.

Security is much more than an army: conclusions

The present IDSF HaBithonistim index aims to explore the extent to which the country’s civilian population could contribute to Israel’s security, with the understanding that security involves many areas of life, aside from military aspects. To create a broad perspective, three main civil sectors that may have an impact on national security were examined: settlement, agriculture and industry.

Following the October 7 disaster, it seems that Israeli public realizes that Israel must reduce its dependence on other countries. For this end – the public mostly agrees – Israel should boost its agriculture, industry and construction sectors and establish the means to provide the manpower to do so.

On the topic of settlement – there is a noticeable perceptional change in Israel’s society. Despite disputes on political matters, is seems that most of the Jewish public supports Jewish settlement across the country – particularly in Gaza and the Judea and Samaria region – and views this as an inseparable component of Israel’ national security strategy.

“The idea of incorporating Israel’s civilians in the military effort might seem unnatural and even jarring to some, however, Israel’ security reality deems this a necessary marriage”, says Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “It’s important to understand that this approach is not new. The founding fathers of Israel’s Labor party in the State’s formative years – led by Ben Gurion – understood the importance of Jewish settlement across Israel. Similarly, it was clear to the leaders of the young state that the presence of the Israeli farmer plays a material role in establishing the country’s borders and sovereignty. As regards to industry – this, too, is a matter that was discussed years ago. In the past, the State of Israel had invested considerably in civil and security industry, with the understanding that the less the country depends on foreign aid the more independent it would be. However, over the years the country has been departing from that perception and Israel’s industry became increasingly dependent on import.  The present war in Gaza has made it all too clear that Israel must strive to develop self-manufacturing – particularly of weapons and defense systems. The public has come to fully understand this and now the State’s decision-makers must as well and act accordingly”

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: Settlement, Agriculture & Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As part of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index project, an ongoing survey of Israeli society on questions of security, military and society, this month’s report explores an issue that has become the focus of attention in Israel following the events of October 7: the role of Israel’s civilians in the country’s national security strategy.

The results of the survey and analysis thereof will be shared in a three-part report. The present part focuses on the perception of Israel’ society regarding its role in the national security, in times of quiet and during military emergencies. It further explores the public opinion as regards to the conscription of Haredi (ultra-orthodox) Israelis and the role of Israel’s youth in contributing to the country’s security. The next sections of the report take a closer look at Israel’s settlement, agriculture and industry enterprises and their contribution to the national security.

The survey was conducted on May 2024, under the statistical direction of Dr. Hagai Elyakim. It included 1,453 participants from Israel’s internet-using adult population (18+) and was sampled in a manner that ensured its representativeness in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,453 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.6% with a 95% probability; For the Jewish sample (1,079 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (374 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±5.1% with a probability of 95%.

Would you risk your life for the country? Most citizens are willing to do so

In the first part of the survey, the participants were presented with a series of questions aiming to determine the extent to which they thought Israel’s civilian population should take an active part in the protection of the country’s security. 81% of the respondents thought that in security emergency times the civilian population should play an active role in the protection of the country; 58% thought that the civilian population should do so as a matter of routine. A distribution of the responses according to nationality and ideology shows significant variance: 91% of the respondents affiliated with the political right thought that civilians must partake in the protection of the nation’s security in times of war while 66% of that group thought that this should extend to times of quiet as well; Of the respondents in the center of the political map, 82% maintained that civilians should be involved in national security in times of war while 53% supported this for times of quiet as well; On the left of the political map, 70% of the respondents thought civilians  should be actively involved in national security in times of war while only 37% thought this should extend to times of quiet as well. As for the Israeli-Arab respondents – 68% thought that civilians should be involved in national security during war and 61% maintained this involvement should include times of quiet.

A marked variance is evident when comparing the perception among the Jewish and the Arab respondents regarding civilian involvement in national security in times of war as compared with times of quiet, as the survey shows that Israeli-Arabs place more importance on this role as compared to the political center and left-wing Jewish respondents.

The participants were also asked whether they would be willing to risk their lives protecting the country. 71% of the respondents replied affirmatively, yet here too, there are noticeable differences between the ideological groups – 86% of the right-wing respondents would risk their lives for their country as oppose to 70% from the political center and 60% of the left-wing respondents.

The participants were then asked whether they thought Israel should instate a national guard comprised of army veterans for the purpose of maintaining Israel’s internal security. 63% of the respondents responded positively to the idea, again, with significant variance between ideological affiliation: 86% of the political right supported the idea as oppose to 50% of the center and 31% of the left.

From studying Torah to military reserves service: the activities that contribute to Israel’s security

The survey participants were asked to tick any activities on a list that they thought contribute to Israel security. The leading choice was “military reserves service” with an overall 88% support, followed closely by “volunteering in community security teams” at 86% and by “regular compulsory military service” at 84%. Further down the list were “police volunteering” at 73%, “possession of a licensed firearm” at 62% and “National Service” (voluntary alternative to army service) – at 58%. At the bottom of the table was “studying the Torah” with only 35% of the respondents thinking this is material for the security of Israel.

A segmentation according to religious affiliation shows a broad consensus regarding the first three items. Non-religious, Conservative, orthodox and ultra-orthodox (Haredi) respondents all thought that military reserves service, volunteering in security teams, and regular compulsory military service are vital to the security of Israel. However, regarding the studying of the Torah, there were considerable variances among the religious affiliation segments: among the non-religious respondents, only 12% thought that the studying of the Torah is material for Israel’s security; among the Conservative respondents 48% thought so; among the orthodox – 73% and among the Haredi – 96% supported this claim.

The majority of the public would like to see a more Zionistic and involved youth

The present IDSF HaBithonistim index explores the perception in the Israeli public in of the role the youth should play in national security. 56% of the respondents thought that young adults in Israel should take an active role in the protection of the country’s security – both in times of war and quiet. A distribution of the replies shows an interesting picture: while Jews and Arabs hold similar positions of the subject – 56% and 57% respectively, an ideological distribution shows a significant variance: 69% of the right-wing respondents supported this statement as oppose to 44% of the respondents from the center and 28% of the left of the political map.

The respondents were asked whether they thought there should be leadership groups comprised of reservists and youths within Israel’s border communities. 67% of the respondents responded positively but here, too, there was a notable variance between the ideological groups: 82% of the right-wing respondents supported this idea, while 58% of the center and 42% of the left-wing respondents supported this.

In the context of Israeli youth, the respondents were posed with questions concerning school education. For example, they were asked whether the educational curriculum should include more Zionism studies and ideological encouragement to serve the country. 77% of the Jewish respondents supported this notion as oppose to 32% of the Israeli-Arab respondents. A distribution of the Jewish respondents by ideology and religion shows that those agreeing most with this statement were the Conservative and orthodox right-wing respondents. The respondents who tended not to agree with this statement were from the non-religious, Haredi and left-wing segments of the participants.

the participants were further asked whether they thought Israel needs a new youth movement that will be founded on the values of Zionism and national security. 54% of the Jewish respondents supported this idea, as compared with only 28% of the Israeli-Arab respondents. Of the right-wing respondents, 69% supported this idea whereas 36% of the center and 27% of the left-wing respondents thought so. All in all, 48% of all the participants supported the idea of founding a new youth movement that promotes Zionism and security.

Drafting of ultra-orthodox – first and foremost a security imperative

What about the brewing  controversy over the conscription of Haredi (ultra-orthodox) men into the IDF? 56% of the respondents thought that the solution for the need to increase recruitment rates lies within Haredi society, however, 59% state that the conscription of Haredi men must be done in tandem with the recruitment of additional demographic groups that do not serve in the IDF.

The Jewish and Arab participants differ in their standing on these two issues – 52% of the Jewish respondents agreed that the need to increase the rate of enrollment in the army must find its solution in the Haredi community; 62% of the Jews and 47% of the Arab respondents thought that the recruitment of Haredi men must come in tandem with the recruitment of other non-serving populations. The variance between the two groups probably stems from the fact that as a whole, the Arab population in Israel does not serve in the IDF.

Ideologically, there is a variance among the groups: among the right-wing respondents, 40% thought that the army should recruit from the Haredi community; among the center affiliated respondents, 63% thought so, and among the left-wing respondents – 78% supported this statement. The question whether other non-serving population should be drafted yielded similar results. Hence, it appears that the majority of the Jewish population in Israel believes that non-serving groups should be recruited to the army.

Finally, the participants were asked to choose one of two options to the question whether the conscription of Haredi men is a social imperative or a security necessity. The results were very close, however, most of the public (54%) thought it was a security necessity. The variance of the political and religious distribution is within the statistical margin of error.

The bottom line: the public wants to be more involved in Israel’s security

Despite the variances among the different ideological and religious groups, it seems that as a whole, the Israeli public maintains that citizens have a great importance in the national security strategy, predominantly in times of emergency but also in times of quiet. Israel’s public believes that the country’s youth should be given an active role in the protection of the State, and agrees that this should be incorporated into the formal and non-formal education.

As regards to the question of the conscription of ultra-orthodox (Haredi) men, the survey found variances among the various groups of Israeli society. It appears that most of the public supports the conscription of Haredi men but maintains that this conscription should extent to other non-serving groups as well.

“Already from the inception of Zionism, the need was clear for the involvement of the civil population in Israel’s national security, alongside the compulsory military service”, says IDSF HaBithonistim Director, Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi. “In the past, the civil guards were part and parcel of the State’s reality, however, throughout the years this has fallen by the wayside. In the wake of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, and in full force since the October 7 attacks, the public has been revisiting the importance of civilian involvement in the country’s protection – a fact that is clearly reflected in the security squads every town and community in Israel now have. The findings of this survey show that we are returning to the basic values that were a given in the State’s formative years, and reflect to what extent the public in Israel can, must and is willing to contribute and sacrifice for the national security and the protection of our national home”.

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: The Civilian Role in National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Among the many endeavors and projects undertaken by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, it prides itself on a prolific research department and its professional academic research team, which conducts ongoing research and surveys of Israel’s society, among them the IDSF HaBithonistim Index. The survey is published every quarter and is monitored to ensure it includes a representative sample of respondents from all walks of Israeli society. The index reports the findings on public opinion on various national security and social issues in Israel. Thus far, seven indices have been published, each exploring a specific topic but also including repeat questions aiming to gauge changes in public opinion over time against the background of current affairs.

Among the topics explored, the surveys sought to determine the extent to which Israeli public has faith in the country’s authorities, its sense of personal safety and concerns over the future of the State.

The present survey report provides a longitudinal review of these topics and explores the changes over the past two years.

Support of the police on the rise, of the IDF in decline – the public’s trust in State institutions

All the IDSF HaBithonistim surveys included questions aiming to gauge the participants’ trust in the IDF, Israel Police and the government. The rationale behind these reoccurring questions is that a vital element of the national security is the social resilience of the nation, of which one derivative is the level of trust the public has for the State authorities.

In the first survey, held on March 2022, 20% of the respondents said they had faith in the police; 28% trusted the government and 63% said they had faith in the IDF.

However, in the last survey, held in May 2024, 33% of the respondents said they trusted the police; 27% said they had faith in the government and 54% expressed their trust in the IDF.

A comparison between these two end surveys shows a-13% rise in the public’s trust in the police; a 9% decline in its trust of the IDF and a nearly unchanged level of trust in the government.  However, a longitudinal examination of the findings over time reveals fluctuations in how the public responded to current events in Israel. The present report follows the trend over time in the public’s trust towards the three bodies – the IDF, Israel Police and the Israeli government.

The IDF

The IDF is the only of the three bodies that consistently gains the highest levels of trust on part of the Israeli public, leaving the other two bodies well behind. However, of the three institutions surveyed, the IDF also recorded the steepest drop in the level of public trust. The watershed moment is obvious: October 7.  Up to the July 2023 survey, the level of public trust in the IDF was 63%-72%; however, on November 2023 – the first of the surveys following the October 7 events – that trust dropped to 59% and in May 2024 had further dropped to 54% – almost a 20% drop from its peak level.

Even before October 7, there were fluctuations in the levels of public trust in the IDF. Thus for example, in the wake of Operation Breaking Dawn in August 2022, the level of public trust in the IDF was on the rise. Operation Breaking Dawn was a concerted three-day operation in the Gaza Strip during which the security forces located and eliminated 25 known terrorists, many of them senior ranking – in the Islamic Jihad and Hamas with blood on their hands. The IDF had also succeeded in shooting down 96% of the rockets launched at Israel from the Gaza Strip during the operation. No casualties were suffered on the Israeli side hence the operation was chalked up as a great success, which would explain the rise in the public’s trust in the IDF.

However, as oppose to that operation, the following Operation Shield and Arrow on February 2023 actually caused a slight dip in the levels of public trust in the IDF. Although deemed a considerable military success, with six high-ranking Jihad members and another 20 terrorists eliminated in addition to hundreds of military targets destroyed by the IDF,  the civilian population suffered more casualties  as compared with Operation Breaking Dawn – during the week leading up to Operation Sheild and Arrow, 102 rockets were fired at the Gaza border envelope communities and adjacent towns, causing the death of one foreign worker and the injury of six Israeli citizens. During the operation itself, hundreds more rockets, anti-tank grenades and mortar shells were fired at Israel, reaching as far as the center of the country. Most were intercepted by Israeli defense systems,  but  an 82-year-old woman was killed when her house in Rehovot took a direct hit. Moreover, during the operation, all schools were suspended in the Gaza envelop communities, public gatherings and events were prohibited and main roads were blocked in southern Israel. It is possible that the fact that the IDF responded only a week into the Islamic Jihad’s rocket attacks and the price that the civilian front paid may be the reason for the drop in public trust of the army.

The Police

The public’s trust in the Israel Police is consistently the lowest of all three institutions throughout the surveys. However, it is the police that has recorded the largest increase in trust levels throughout the seven surveys of the index. Similarly to the IDF, the turning point was the October 7 events – only in this case, the trend was reversed. Up to the July 2023 survey, the public’s trust level in the police was at a relatively low 20%-23%, on November 2023, it leapt to 39%. On May 2024, the level of public trust in the police slightly dipped and is now at 33%. It appears that the performance of the police,  from the onset of the “Parash Pleshet” alert code announced on the morning of the October 7 attack, and the steep price in the form of dozens of casualties from the police forces, had greatly contributed to the public’s trust in the body – at least temporarily. It will be interesting to examine the findings of the next survey.

The Government

An examination of the first of the seven surveys against the recent poll shows that trust levels in the government are nearly unchanged between those two points in time. However, following the trend throughout the seven surveys of the Index reveals significant fluctuations. At its peak, public-trust levels of the government reached 43%, but at its lowest plummeted to only 22%.  It is likely that the fluctuations stem from the political instability that characterized Israel’s politics over the past several years and the consequent series of frequent elections. Thus for example, there is a correlation between the decision to dissolve the 24th Knesset on June 6, 2022 and the ensuing early elections, with July’s drop in the public’s trust of the government. On the other hand, on October, Israel was on the verge of elections, and it is possible that Israeli society felt that political stability is at hand. Even in the survey held on February 2023,  after those elections, the level of trust in the government held at 43% – despite the social protests against the judicial reform.

Political shifts and social protests aside, the events of October 7 had an effect on the public’s trust of the government, albeit less markedly than the IDF and the police. After the October 7 massacre, the public’s trust in the government dropped from 40% to 35%, later further dropping to 27%. It should be noted that the decrease in trust of the government and increase in the public’s trust of the police following the outbreak of the Gaza war turned the tables and it was now the government that had become the least trusted body of the three.

“The changing tide after October 7 is hardly surprising”, says Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “This horrible day is a terrible failure of the IDF in terms of intel and an operational failure as well, and it is not surprising that the public’s trust in the army was hurt. I would actually expect it to drop even more. On the other hand, the police displayed outstanding resourcefulness that day and took command of sectors that are under military responsibility. The police officers – many paying with their lives – were able to stop the terrorists from advancing to Ashkelon and other areas deeper within Israel, so it is clear why the public hold the police in high regard”.

According to Avivi, the fact that the public’s trust in the government has not changed significantly following October 7 is also a built-in insight. “The public mostly believed that the government was not made aware of the intel and was not privy to the decisions that led to the disaster”, he explained. “We can see by the other questions in the IDSF HaBithonistim Index’s survey that the IDF command is held more responsible [for October 7] than the political leadership”.

Concerned mostly about the country: the sense of security among Israel’s public

In all the surveys in this series, the participants were asked about the extent to which they had concerns over their personal safety and the future of Israel.

In March 2022, 64% of participants indicated that they feared for their personal safety, and 61% said that they were concerned over the future of the country. In May 2024, 60% said they feared for their own safety, and 70% said they were concerned over the future of the country. Thus, the  public’s sense of personal security increased slightly, but its concern over the future of the country was even higher.

Here, too, we will try to understand how the security and political events in Israel affected the results of the survey.

Concerns over personal safety

A longitudinal analysis of the surveys shows that a large percent of Israel’s population fears for its personal safety. The highest level of concern was recorded on July 2022 at 46%, and the lowest – 30% – was recorded in February 23.  In the poll from May 24 – 42% of the respondents said they feared for their personal safety in Israel.

At first glance, it may seem surprising that people were more concerned about their personal safety in July 2022 as compared to the present, when Israel is at war, and when it was only recently attacked in an unprecedented missile strike by Iran. However, July 2022 was the peak of a massive wave of terror attacks across Israel, resulting in the murder of 21 people.

According to Amir Avivi, this low in the public sense of personal safety has an additional cause. “Prior to the war, the public felt that the government was tolerating the situation, was unresponsive and was not taking appropriate action”, he says. “Only following October 7 the country woke up, understood what it was facing and went to war. The shift from a passive and helpless position to a proactive engagement that is standing up for its own, gives the public a stronger sense of security, even on the background of a complex and difficult reality”.

Fears for the fate of Israel

The survey results reveal that  Israel’s civilians are in a perpetual state of concern over the future of the country. On February 2023, the public’s concern was at its lowest of all the surveys but still considered rather high, at 58%. The two most recent polls, held after the outbreak of the Gaza war,  recorded the highest levels of concern and it is easy to understand how the surprise attack on the Gaza border, the raging war in the south, and imminent war in the north of the country caused a spike in the public’s concerns over the fate of their country.

Avivi, too, was hardly surprised by the public’s growing concerns for the future of the country, but at the same time is convinced that under a skilled guiding hand, the public’s sense of personal safety could be restored. “We need a national vision that has clear vectors of operation, and we must mediate the reality to the public even if it is complex, and make it absolutely clear – not only by words but in actions – that Israel places its security before anything else”, he says. “This connects me to one of Britain’s most difficult and dramatic moments in World War Two, when its army was surrounded by the enemy and could not see how the German war machine could be stopped. At that moment of strife, Winston Churchill said candidly: ‘I can offer nothing but blood, toil, tears and sweat’, but at the same time stated that there is one aim: ‘…victory, victory at all costs’. This speech galvanized the British nation and led it to victory in the war – and precisely this spirit is what is demanded of Israel’s leadership”.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement is fully committed to continuing gauging and reporting on the sentiments and trends of public opinion in Israel, with the understanding that the public’s trust in the State institutions, and its sense of personal and national security have a direct impact on Israel’ social resilience and in turn – its national security.

הפוסט Citizen-State Relations – A Longitudinal Survey of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Is Israel fated to eternal war over its protection and existence? Sadly, the answer is yes. This is the cold, harsh truth and indeed, the only truth. The sooner Israel understands and accepts this, it will better be able to address its security concerns.

In this paper, I would like to discuss this axiom on three levels: religious, national and historic.

On a religious level, the hostility towards Israel in all its forms and manifestations in the Middle East falls under the umbrella of a war of religion. The end goal of the Islamic religious war is the establishment of world-wide rule of Islam. This fight comprises two parts: “Dar Al-Islam” (house of Islam) and “Dar Al-Harb” (house of sword). Dar Al-Islam refers to the regions held or conquered in the past by Islam, whereas Dar Al-Harb pertains to those regions that have not yet been taken over by Islam. According to Islam, one of the duties of the observant Muslim is to liberate the Dal Al-Islam areas that are controlled by non-Muslims (heretics or others). Israel, having been for a certain period under Islam rule, must be “liberated” and returned to Muslim control, as the per Dar Al-Islam doctrine.

Furthermore,  Muslims buck against the very idea of being under the rule of Jews, and living as a minority under Jewish rule in the State of Israel is an insult added to the injury that is the Jewish control over the many biblical Jewish heritage sites across Israel that throughout history have taken on religious significance to Islam, such as the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron and the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Put all this together in one small land and you have all the ingredients for a holy Jihad. It was not incidental that Hamas dubbed the October 7 massacre “The Al-Aqsa flood” – all Muslim believers, whether Shia or Suni , subscribe to the principles above mentioned. This is also the reason why Muslims around the world – Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and more – closely follow what is happening in Israel, and are even mobilizing to send forces to join their Muslim brethren in the current war. Any expectation that this would – and indeed could – change, is absurd and has no leg to stand on.

Peace with Egypt – Why is the Egyptian army building up its forces?

Some may wonder how, then, in light of the Dar Al-Islam and the pan-Islamic solidarity could Egypt and Jordan sign a peace agreement with Israel. This is explained by the approach in Islam that commands Muslims to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad, who preached that peace with an enemy is acceptable when a Muslim is in a disadvantage, but once the Muslim is strong enough to uphold the Islam rules of war the agreement may be broken. When understanding this way of thought, who can guarantee that these peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan will last for long? Over the recent years, the Egyptian army has been undergoing a rapid and significant buildup of force, including the construction of infrastructures under the Suez Canal and in the Sinai Peninsula on the border with Israel. It is true that Egypt has its own threats and conflicts within the African continent (Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia), but these conflicts are not on a scale that could justify this buildup of force. Why, then, are the Egyptians doing this? Isreal has a track record of warm relations with Muslim states that have soured and turned hostile – Iran and Turkey to name but two. Is there really anyone who truly believes that the same cannot happen with Egypt?

The State of Israel was established on the territories of a decaying Ottoman empire. At the time, the territory was considered part of what was called the Greater-Syria region, as were the territories of Jordan and Lebanon. Modern Syria has never disguised its ambition to regain control over Lebanon – a state that was artificially created in the 20^th century by the French and British mandates over territories in the Middle East. The same is true of Jordan, that continues to exist in the past decades thanks to Israel’s close attention. Can we truly say that Syria had gave up its desire to regain control of the Land of Israel?

A Palestinian state has never existed, and inasmuch as it depends on Israel – one will never come to be. The October 7 massacre helped many understand this. Furthermore, all public opinion polls taken in the past year among the Judea and Samaria Arabs show that the overwhelming majority would commit such a massacre of Jews if given the opportunity. It takes a great degree of naiveté to believe that there would come a time when the entire Arab population from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea would forsake their collective aspirations to be the sole lords of the entirety of the Land of Israel.

Moving on to the historical level. Several years ago I spent the day with my children at an amusement park in the Netherlands. Looking around and seeing all the happy faces of the children, I thought to myself how wonderful it must be to be able to live life without being under constant threat. However, this, apparently, is not the lot of generations of Jewish children. History shows time and time again, that no matter where Jews live there will always be those who persecute them, whether for religious causes, xenophobia or – mostly- pure antisemitism. Anyone with even a general knowledge of history cannot but acknowledge this simple yet sad fact. Whether Jews staunchly uphold their religious believes and traditions or try as they might to assimilate into the society they live, whether we live in Europe, America or Israel – this is the truth. Do the images from university campuses across the United States leave any doubt that this is not something that will change in the foreseeable future?

I do not know of one Jew who does not wish to live a peaceful threat-free life; I do not know of any Jew who lives in a place that allows this. To put it succinctly, nothing has really changed since founder of the Revisionist Zionist movement Zeev Jabotinsky wrote in his seminal essay “About the Iron Wall” from 1923, that we can live in the State of Israel only through military might that would deter Israel’s enemies from without and within.

And those of us who still choose to leave Israel and try their luck elsewhere, all we can do is wish them the best of luck and remind them that the State of Israel will always be here to welcome them back when the next pogrom sends them back home.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Shall The Sword Devour Forever? For Israel the Answer Is Yes הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

If you read IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s statement of beliefs you will find among other the following principle: “The IDSF HaBithonistim is not a political movement. It is open to any person who believes in its founding principles”. And what are these principles? The principles of the movement’s activity are exclusively anchored in Israel’s security concerns. Why then is the movement occasionally pegged as a “right-wing” movement? Because nowadays in Israel, Zionism has become a political concept. But it is precisely with the aim of debunking this misconception that the movement was founded.

The ideology tier vs. the action tier: do not mix them

The principle of neutrality is an important factor for the IDSF HaBithonistim movement in its dealing with the most important question of all: how to safeguard Israel’s security for generations to come. This type of issue cannot be pegged as politics, simply as it is an existential question that has a bearing on the lives of all Israelis and Jews across the globe.

According to the movement’s approach, the rationale at the basis of the question of Israel’s security is the fundamental belief in the rightful claim of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. In other words, this fundamental belief has no affiliation or leanings neither to the left nor to the right of the political map.

The politicization of Zionism stems from the unfortunate marriage in recent decades of these two tiers that ought to have remained separate – ideology and action. the ideology level may absolutely subscribe to the notion that the Jewish people are entitled to the entirety of the land of Israel whereas the action level may offer pragmatic solutions such as the withdrawal from parts of that land, so long as such a measure is deemed material for the long-term security of the State. However, once the notion of parting with sections of Israel rests on the fundamental assumption that the Jewish people had no right over that land to begin with, Zionism begins to disintegrate.

An illuminating example of the disparity between ideology and action is the story of the destruction of the Second Temple. Raban Yohanan Ben Zakai upon viewing the ruins of the temple chose to leave Jerusalem and in its stead, set the city of Yavneh as the Jewish spiritual center. Some sixty years later, Rabbi Akiva viewed those same ruins and as oppose to Raban Ben Zakai, concluded that in the face of such a reality of oppression, the Jews must revolt.

Looking at these two historic giants, can any one of them truly be accused of non-Zionism? The answer of course is no. Both Raban Ben Zakai and Rabbi Akiva had no qualms as to who has the rightful claim to the land of Israel, but each chose to respond and act in a different fashion.

This lesson is applicable to Israel today. We can uphold Zionism as our common cause as a people yet still support different diplomatic and security solutions. Once we come to realize that there is no contradiction between Zionism and opposing politics, and understand that Zionism is an ideology and not a political statement, we can bridge the gaps that are tearing us apart.

Leave politics at the door: the politicization of Zionism

At its inception, Zionism bred many approaches, the most prominent of which were the spiritual Zionism, diplomatic Zionism and religious Zionism. However, despite the differences among the various approaches, they were all driven by a common cause: the foundation of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel.

In the formative years of the State of Israel, Zionism was at the consensus of the nation, and any opposition to this notion, if at all, was at the fringe of the discourse. It was only during the seventies and eighties of the 20^th century that politics were attributed to Zionism and claims were voiced that it is not an ideology but a political statement.

The Politicization of Zionism also forced a shift in the public’s perception of the Israeli Defense Forces. If until this change the IDF was seen as a liberating army, once politics were attributed to Zionism many had begun to view the army as an occupying military. It is important to understand that this shift is not just semantic, but a deep perceptional shift with regard to the legitimacy of the Jewish people’s claim over the land of Israel.

If there is one thing that the opposition to Zionism had succeeded in doing was to put the notion that Zionism is not a fundamental ideology but a political stand in the minds of Jews themselves. This notion is an existential threat to the State of Israel for the simple reason that when the Israeli nation forgets why it is in the land of Israel, it can not muster the strength it needs to sacrifice and fight for its country.

That notion also drives wedges among the diaspora Jews. Presently, there are thousands of Jews around the world that are turning their backs on the State of Israel and its fundamental values. Zionism must return to center stage and the global Jewish community must be made to understand that they do not have to reject their Jewish identity in order to see a resolution of problems In fact, they must not do so.

No such thing as half an ideology: Zionism is a complete narrative

Many citizens of Israel attests that they “are Zionist, but…” Reservations are perfectly acceptable, and there is room for a variety of opinions on core issues pertaining to Israel and the Jewish diaspora. However, one cannot be half Zionist. Zionism is an acknowledgement of the rightful claim of the Jewish people over the land of Israel. One may either support this notion or oppose it – there is no middle ground here.

When there is an understanding that Zionism is a complete narrative, then it cannot be argued that the core of the land of Israel, which was the setting for the Jewish people’s ancient history, is an occupied territory over which Israel has no legitimate claim. This approach is dangerous ideologically and security-wise. Ideologically, it is a threat to the Zionist notion since how can it be claimed that only part of the land of Israel belongs to the Jews, whereas another part of it does not? In terms of Israel’s security, an immediate withdrawal from entire crucial swaths of land would leave Israel exposed without maneuvering space and the ability to undertake actions to ensure the country’s security and existence.

Is it rational to assume that Tel Aviv is rightfully a part of Israel whereas Shiloh in Judea and Samaria does not belong to it? A point to ponder for those who would uphold a partial view of Zionism – what difference should it make it the former was taken by Israel in 1948 while the latter – in 1967? The post-war borders of Israel are nothing but arbitrary. Would the claims regarding Judea and Samaria be any different if Israel would have taken over the area in 1948 as it did Tel Aviv? Or alternatively – what would be the claims if Israel had taken Tel-Aviv – and Jaffa at that – only in 1967? Would the bustling Israeli metropolis be considered an occupied territory as well? This notion is a fallacy.

As oppose to Zionism, which is a complete and sound ideology, anti-Zionism is full of holes; a flawed unmarketable product.

The question of Israel’s security is not political – it is existential

The perception according to which we are demanded to separate between our identity and values and the problems at hand and the solutions thereof is the bedrock of the IDSF HaBithonistim’s existence. This is the reason behind the movement’s non-political nature. This fundamental principle is also manifested legally, otherwise the movement could not have been registered as a non-profit foundation.

In order to comply with its stated political neutrality, the members of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, although no longer in active military service, use their expertise that won them their ranks solely to comment on matters of national security without digressing to politics. We expect the same from Israel’s security establishment, whose task it is to ensure the security of Israel and the safety of its citizens, and thus must cleanse its hands of the political discourse. Sadly, many still choose to attribute questions of national security to left or right-wing politics, thus, rather than engaging in a true and sincere debate, a shallow and cliché-ridden exchange is forced upon us without any real solution. Rather than considering the structured and research-supported security approach as presented by the IDSF HaBithonistim regarding the proper measures to safeguard Israel’s security, the conversation centers around whether the movement is affiliated to the political right or not. For this reason precisely, the movement takes pains to remain politically neutral.

In the name of said neutrality, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement does not welcome into its ranks people who hold positions in the civil service. Granted, two members of the movement were recently appointed to important government roles – Maj. Gen. Yiftach Ron-Tal was appointed as project manager for the rehabilitation of the north, and Maj. Gen. Eli Marom (Cheney) was appointed as project manager for the rehabilitation of the south. Accordingly to the movement’s nature, the two are no longer active members of the movement.

Further proof of the movement’s neutrality can be found in the military security principles that guide it. Albeit at first glance these principles may seem as if they resound those of the political right, a review of public opinion shows that they in fact reflect the sentiments of the majority of the Israelis. Moreover – these same principles were upheld by more than a few past leaders of the political left.

Furthermore, as the IDSF HaBithonistim movement deals only in matters of security and does not engage in social, economic or legal issues, it is open to members of the public from the entire political gamut and as such may have members who identify with the movement’s national security agenda while at the same time subscribe to left or right wing social and economic beliefs. This diversity allows for a pluralistic movement.

Being the heroes and not the villains: conclusion

The Zionist ethos is a story, and every story has a hero and a villain. What our enemies are systematically trying to do is to change the narrative wherein the Jews are the heroes of our story, and make them the villains. Sadly, there are those among us who are beginning to adopt that narrative and view Israel as the villain. Who would wish to be part of such a narrative?

The people of Israel must remember that they are the heroes and not the villains. Israel is the liberator – not the occupier. Once we truly and fully understand this, we can be free to engage in pragmatic matters from a healthier point of departure and explore what must be done to contend with Israel’s challenges and produce true coexistence. But if we begin to doubt ourselves and our rightful claim over the land of Israel in its entirety, once we start seeing ourselves as occupiers – not only does our foundational ideology of Zionism begin to disintegrate, but Israeli society – and the Jewish people as a whole – begin to loss their common ties.

It is our hope that the Jewish people in Israel and the diaspora will come to understand what is crystal clear for the IDSF HaBithonistim movement: Zionism is a value and not an opinion; Israel’s security is an existential – not a political – matter. We can feel a through and through connection with the land of Israel and its people and still uphold pragmatism and an approach that at times may lead to compromises such as the one chosen by Raban Ben Zakai, while in other occasions – to resistance, such as the path chosen by Rabi Akiva.

הפוסט “Zionism Must Stop Being Treated as a Political Issue” – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi on the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement and Unconditional Zionism הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The October 7 failure is not rooted in technology. Rather, it occurred despite technology. The failure on that fateful day was the performance of the high-command in the IDF and the Shabak – Israel’s General Security Services, who were bogged down by a dated security concept and thus failed to put the advanced military technology in their hands to the full use for which it was developed. Recent allegations claim that the military debacle of October 7 was caused by the overreliance on technology, and those who subscribe to this notion are demanding that the IDF roll back its methodology and invest more in boots on the ground and less in futuristic weapons and systems.

The author of this document aims to show that these claims are misguided and to assert Israel’s imperative to maintain technological superiority in dealing with its enemies.  This in fact, is nonnegotiable. Indeed, is there really anyone who would contend that Israel can prevail in the fight for its existence without technological prowess in the air, cutting edge drone technology, superior intelligence capabilities, advanced tunnel-detection systems, and a decisive advantage on the ground campaign, to name but a few?

We will begin with a review of some of the misguided applications of the technology, that had led to the October 7 failure, and how this is related to the mistaken concept that is prevalent among Israel’s security apparatus’s command. All the information henceforth has been publicized even before official inquiries have been ordered.

We will then suggest several causes for these failures and explore them. Finally, the article will present suggestions for avoiding these kinds of failures in the future.

A. The Misguided Use of Technology During the Events of October 7

Over the past decades, Israel’s strategy for dealing with Gaza focused mainly on containment. The decision makers did not view the Strip as any kind of significant threat, but rather a persistent nuisance, a pebble in Israel’s shoe. The captains of Israel’s security establishment were bound by the misconception that Israel could actually live alongside Hamas, the power that has been controlling Gaza since its violent takeover of the Strip in 2007. These captains preached a gospel according to which if Israel simply extended Hamas economic and financial gifts, complemented by diplomatic pressure, the next confrontation could be held off indefinitely. Puzzling, as it was common knowledge that regardless of these efforts, Hamas is continuing to build up its force and acquire new and alarmingly advanced capabilities in the hiatus between confrontations.

As part of this containment paradigm and the shadowing of Hamas’s advancements with ever increasing technological capabilities on part of the IDF,  Israel had diligently added to its hailed “Iron Dome” aerial rocket-interception system a cutting- edge and staggeringly costly underground barrier to prevent the tunneling into Israeli territory. To that it added a highly  sophisticated border fence that was armed with some of the world’s most advanced surveillance systems to alert in the event of breach attempts.

Tragically, we have all witnessed on October 7 the crushing failure of this advanced and supposedly unbreachable barrier, when Hamas terrorists were able all too easily to cut through it with the use of rudimentary methods such as explosives, bulldozers and planks of wood, after using simple cheap drones to take out the state-of-the-art surveillance system in a matter of minutes.

Indeed the Iron Dome system is an impressive achievement on a global scale, and has save hundreds, if not thousands of lives, since it was put into use. Yet, on the downside, it also facilitated a growing adoption of the containment concept in the decision-making echelons of security and government.  The capabilities in Israel’s hands with the Iron Dome had also tipped public opinion in Israel and the world against the need  for measures against Hamas and The Islamic Jihad on the ground, the general consensus being “If you have Iron Dome to minimize the damage, why risk losses among the IDF soldiers and the innocent in Gaza?”.

Alongside the colossal failure of the underground barrier and the military forces in the protection of the Gaza envelop communities, we have witnessed an utter failure on part of the IDF Intelligence Directorate and the General Security Service to raise a red flag in the days before the October 7 attack – including blatantly ignoring the plethora of alarming developments on October 6. For decades the Intelligence Directorate has been the most technology-intensive branch of the IDF, alongside the Air Force. In recent years, the intel collecting network of the IDF Intelligence and General Security have become increasingly reliant on advanced technology, and there are many who claim that this came at the expense of classic indispensable human intelligence, or HUMINT.

Moreover,  the IDF intelligence unit 8200, had completely forgone the gathering of electronic intelligence – SIGINT- such as radio interception for the sake of the latest technological “hit” – collection by cyber technology. Thus, 8200 had stopped altogether intercepting the Hamas tactical radio transmission. Albeit the undisputable value of cyber collection, it cannot remain a single tactic. A tragic proof was the failure of these sophisticated means employed by the IDF to provide the security establishment and the Israeli nation with the critical warning before October 7.

The aforementioned would ostensibly  indicate that the October 7 attack was a result of technological failure, but this article aims to disprove that claim.

B. Possible Causes for the Failure

The misconceptions and overconfidence of the senior command

October 7 did not come to pass because of technology, rather, it happened in spite of technology. The surveillance system along the border fence functioned appropriately, timely transmitting warnings to the system operators. However, what is the use of all the costly sophisticated technology if the chiefs of intelligence and the  General Command blatantly choose to ignore its input?

For over an extensive period of time, a number of analysts in the Intelligence Directorate raised the alarm regarding Hamas’s intentions. Several of these warning attempts have been made public in the wake of the attack, and it seems that those were just the tip of the iceberg in the body of evidence that was collected and presented to the commanders. One staggering example of the overconfidence and inaptitude of the IDF and GSS senior command, was the intel showing that dozens of Israeli SIM cards were activated at once from within the Gaza Strip. Even the most low-ranking intelligence analyst knows that this is a clear red flag that demands alerting the entire Gaza region command. The intel was based on the most advanced monitoring technology that can intercept such irregularities and alert the system. But again – similarly to the surveillance soldiers at the border fence – although the technology performed as it was designed to do, its was the senior Intelligence and GSS command that chose not to heed the unequivocal and  resounding  warning.

These responses can only be explained by an over confident leadership that is bound by unrealistic concepts  according to which:

1. The Hamas is deterred and cannot breach the physical border fence.[i]
2. The Gaza economy is more important to Hamas than fighting Israel and the organization has no intentions on engaging in a conflict for the foreseeable future.[ii]
3. Israel’s intelligence capabilities are superior and can not be taken by surprise such as what happened in the Yom Kippur War in 73.[iii]
4. All the indications observed ahead of October 7 were simply Hamas’s military exercises.[iv]

All the questionable statements above were made by heads of Israel’s security establishment, present and past, in the months leading to the October 7 massacre.

Even the most advanced technology does not stand alone. The more the failures are uncovered in the wake of the attack, the more it seems that the operation of the border fence surveillance system left much to be desired. If the system’s maintenance is poor, it cannot come as a surprise when it does not operate as designed in real-time. Moreover, the designers of the particular system on the Gaza border fence underestimated Hamas’ capabilities, and failed to thoroughly address the need for critical operational systems that could withstand attempts to destroy them, i.e.  alert, command and control systems. One example is the alert system, which was designed without any protection from drone attacks. Moreover, the alert systems in the 8200 unit, which designed the system, were not online in the hours before the attack. Furthermore, another no less critical system did not produce critical data ahead of the attack because it was shut down due to the Sukkot holiday.

At the end of the day, any physical security barrier, sophisticated as it may be, requires protection by an adequate military force. However, the misguided concept and a large measure of complacency on part of commanders provided an extremely small force to protect the border fence. Clearly even a state-of-the-art fence cannot stave off an assault by thousands of Hamas terrorists, particularly when the chiefs of military and security brush aside all the preliminary clear warnings that the technology provided in abundance, to the extent that they failed to demand even the lowest level of alertness from the border forces.

Overly reliant on technology; understaffed in the field

Those who point the blaming finger at the shortcomings of technology, use what was dubbed after  the Second Lebanon War “the plasma screen failure”( wherein commanders chose to command the forces from their plasma screens in the headquarters rather than from the field) to illustrate their point. This is nonsense. Are monitors the cause for the military failure of that war? Obviously not. The failure was the lack of planning, and the misguided belief that commanders can control their forces without actually being in the battle arena.

The problem is not the technology. It is the human misuse thereof.

In recent years the IDF has greatly improved the  cooperation  between its intelligence gathering elements and the combat units in the field. This is an important step in the right direction, proof of which is the outstanding results in the continuous fighting in Gaza and in Lebanon. This synergy is possible thanks to skillful use of the technological means.

However, in recent years, the IDF Intelligence Directorate has unfortunately become out of touch with the enemy – its intentions and modes of thought and even its language. Just to illustrate: there is an increasing reliance on automatic translation technology to understand the intel. Although this is a good solution what with the lack of soldiers who speak the Arabic language, it is a double-edged sword that hinders the Intelligence’s ability to have an in-depth understanding of the enemy.  Every soldier dealing with intelligence from Israel’s Arab enemies must have a profound understanding of them and their culture – language included. At least at a fundamental level. Thus, means such as automatic translation may play an instrumental role in intel gathering, but cannot be the main pillar of any SIGINT collection effort.

A love story with technology

Many times, the issue is not the over reliance on technology but rather the excessive passion towards it,  often regardless of the actual benefits it may or may not offer. This is largely prevalent in the army’s technological units, where the young soldiers prefer to work with the latest and “coolest” technology, even when it has no evident operational value. This is evocative of NASA, which developed impressive technology to produce a  pen that can write in zero gravity and be used in space. The Russians simply used a pencil.

There are more of such examples in the IDF that are classified and thus cannot be discussed in the present paper, however one example that should be mentioned due to its relevance to the current conflict is the Trophy, aka Windbreaker, armored vehicle protection system. This is a very advanced and highly demanded technology, no question about it. But the IDF neglected to provide the technology to protect tanks against armed drones, although the ongoing conflict both in Syria and the Ukraine prove that this is a prevalent and significant threat on tank maneuverability.  Could it be that this consideration was swept aside because the easy solution of mounting an awning on the tank turret is simply not technologically “sexy” enough?

C. The imperative to maintain technological superiority

The pages of history prove that he who holds technological superiority on the field – be it war elephants in the ancient world or advanced weapons in modern times – controls the battle arena. This has been true since the Iron Age and throughout all mankind’s wars. However, technological superiority did not always guarantee victory. Trained fighters, suitable doctrine and stratagem have always been necessary to complement technology, and in fact on many occasions, were instrumental in prevailing over the enemy’s technological advantage. Such was the case of Alexander the Great’s famous victory  in the  Battle of Gaugamela against a far superior numbered  Persian army and the Persian scythed chariots, due to the Macedonian leader’s clever tactics.

Unfortunately, Hamas was able to marginalize some of the IDF’s technological advantages by employing primitive means such as planks of wood to breech the border fence. But as we have seen above, this was possible due to the unskilled use of the border-fence technology and the insufficient deployment of troops to guard the border. This in no way suggests that technological superiority is unimportant – it was and still remains a crucial component in the IDF’s ability to deal with the vast armies of Israel’s enemies.

Even after the shock of October 7, many cases illustrate this. The superiority of the IDF in the air, on land, at sea and in intelligence gathering is a crucial factor in its ability to deal with many simultaneous arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Anyone with a modicum of sense understands that no significant achievement can be made in these arenas without aerial superiority  (especially against anti-air systems) sophisticated  drones, advanced intelligence capabilities, tunnel detection technology, and clear technological superiority on the battle field. Yet technological superiority – as crucial as it may be – is not enough on its own and must be complemented with a fighting spirit, ever-adapting doctrine, leadership on the battle field, and human intelligence and creativity. This is what wins a war – not technology alone.

D. Recommendations for the future

As stated, the IDF must maintain technological superiority in the conflict against our enemies. Thus it would be gravely misguided to reduce investments in technology; however, at the same time, the IDF is required to instill in all technological units the perception that technology is a means and not an end. Technological developments must always adapt to the needs of the units for which they are developed. IDF commanders must be educated on the technologies placed in their hands – how to use them to their maximum capabilities,  and no less – about its limitations. This requires more extensive technological training for all senior commanders, including those in the field units.

Moreover, it is imperative to develop the right doctrine for the use of technology. If offensive technology is used, it is imperative to formulate a doctrine that implements the technology such that it becomes instrumental in defeating the enemy. And if defensive technology is involved, it is necessary to ensure that a doctrine is put in place that complements the technology with appropriate human forces and decision-making procedures.

In recent years, the use of artificial intelligence for evaluation and decision-making processes on various intelligence issues has also been examined. For example, the use of large language models (LLM). This field is still in its infancy, and for now there is no sufficient substitute for a skilled intelligence analyst. However, already there is great value  in using artificial intelligence to challenge the conclusions and decisions of intelligence analysts and commanders. This measure may help prevent the future misguided and detrimentally limiting conceptions, and in turn – another tragic outcome such as October 7.

The article was originally published on “Maariv”.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

[i] https://www.mako.co.il/news-columns/2023_q2/Article-c822771c6c90881026.htm
[ii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4Vj8vI4TJQ
[iii] https://dyoma.co.il/military/2364
[iv] https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/sk931aez6

הפוסט The October 7 Failure – Not Because of Technology; Despite It הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

It is not easy for a senior officer such as myself to say the following, but it is all to clear to me (and to others as well), that the time has come for the leaders of Israel’s present military campaign to take their leave, salute the flag and pass the torch on to others.

Ther are more than a few causes that have laid the ground for the gravest disaster in the history of Israel of October 7. Granted, when the time comes there will be much that will have to be investigated and many questions will have to be posed – to the commanders of many ranks in Israel’s military. But one rank must be addressed without delay, meaning those who captained the IDF over the past year. Anyone with even a basic understanding of military tactics and strategy can see that the attack perpetrated by Hamas stems from a resounding oversight in the military intelligence analysis, decision making and execution. This is a bona fide system failure, that has claimed many innocent lives, delivering a mortal blow to Israel’s citizens’ faith in the army’s ability to do its job and protect them.

Any commanding officer knows that when it comes down to the battlefield, there is no room whatsoever for politics, and the order of the day is to get the operational mission with which you are tasked completed successfully. This is the single imperative for a commander to uphold in the heat of battle. This principle governs the way you think and act and it is the yardstick according to which your performance will be measured – in the eyes of your commanders and your subordinates. Only then you look to the political echelon.

I do not wish to pursue questions on the IDF’s performance during and in the aftermath of the attack, but rather to direct the limelight at the following point: this failure – the gravest in Israel’s history – is first and foremost a shortcoming of the country’s military body, which should be on its guard, day and night, but had failed to do so – even when at dawn of the attack, the senior IDF command had begun to grasp that something is amiss. Yet, somehow, it did not deem fit to take any preventative – or at least precautionary – action, which would be the obvious thing to do in light of the fact that the area involved is of close proximity to the border with the enemy visibly positioned just hundreds of meters from the front doors of Israeli citizens, meaning that the forces there would have zero response time.

The outcome of this lapse of judgement is no more evident than in two images that are seared into the collective memory: the first – that of the border security soldiers being dragged out of their beds in their underwear and pajamas by Hamas terrorists, and the second of citizens – women, children, men, elderly, infirm – slaughtered in their homes, also by Hamas terrorists. No security standby or heightened alert – the IDF had failed colossally and its subordinates have failed to carry out the most sacred of tasks that rests on their shoulders. Indeed, it is hard to look into the eyes of those soldiers who were on duty on the border that fateful morning without knowing the imminent grave events about to hit them – them, the heads of security in the many communities along the border, and anyone else tasked with the defense of the civilians.

Even at the level of general military preparedness for a multi-front scenario, the army was not present where it ought to have been. Discussions with military personnel that participated in the events of that attack reveal the grim reality with which they were forced to contend – the reservists that were summoned to the north of Israel, tank crews that had to fend for themselves and find critical gear that the army failed to provide, citizens that ran to the fighting arenas and literally fought with their bare hands to save lives and many, many others. No commander can accept this state of affairs and surely not the highest commander of the army, who is charged with ensuring that his forces are prepared for such scenarios and with deploying said forces to respond immediately to attacks. Effectively – we had neither – no preparation and no deployment.

There are those who claim that the fact that the event did not escalate into an all-out ground assault on Israel on all fronts – including from within the country – is a miracle. But whoever was able eventually to make it to the arena and fight the terrorists did not do so as a result of orderly battle command on part of the Chief of Staff, or on part of any of the high command for that matter, but were reservists and military personnel who did not wait to receive a summons and forged ahead, risking their own lives, on their own volition, to save lives. One such individual told me “It was not the IDF that saved the people. It was us and our sense of duty. In fact, there were times when the army actually got in the way”. Talk to any reservist that was there that day and you will hear similar claims.

As mentioned, I have no desire to address the IDF’s offensive tactics once it stepped into the picture. Suffice it to say that the statement by the IDF spokesman, in which he claimed that Hamas is an idea, and as such cannot be destroyed, is a clear reflection of the current winds blowing through the IDF leadership. It seems that his words speak for themselves. When an officer – any senior officer – voices such a notion, there seems no point in having that officer remain in his post a moment longer, and the responsibility must be transferred to a suitable replacement – the sooner, the better.

It must be said in all honesty that these are all good people. I have personal acquaintance with them. They aspired to make things better, and have always tried – and are still trying – to bring about a different outcome – but this is not the point. At this stage, they should no longer stand at the helm, ethically and professionally. It is time they take their farewell salute and leave the job to a new military leadership, that has not been tainted by this historic failure.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Salute Farewell and Take Your Leave הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On June 27, 1976, an Air France flight with 248 passengers – mainly Israeli and Jewish – and 12 crew members departed from Ben-Gurion airport in Israel to Paris. The plane landed for a stopover in Athens, where four terrorists – a male and female German nationals and two Palestinian men, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) – boarded the flight. Shortly after takeoff, the  terrorists hijacked the airplane and ordered the captain to change the flight’s course to  Benghazi in Libya, where the plane was held on the ground for several hours for refueling and joined by an additional three terrorists. Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi refused to allow the plane to remain on Libyan soil and the plane took off towards Uganda, there it landed in the Entebbe International Airport on June 28. In Entebbe, the hijackers were joined by yet another six, armed Palestinians to assist in guarding the hostages as well as some 100 Ugandan troops, under the auspices of Uganda ruler Idi Amin. The hijackers barricaded themselves and the hostages in one of the old unused terminals of the airport and stated that they rigged the entire area with explosives. Later, the terrorists singled out the Jewish and Israeli passengers and isolated them in a separate room in the terminal.

Two days after the hijacking, most of the non-Jewish and non-Israeli passengers were released. They offered the captain and crew to join the released hostages, but they chose to remain with their passengers that were kept in Uganda, bringing the headcount of hostages to 117: 105 passengers and 12 crew members.

Ugandan President, Idi Amin, lent his support to the hijackers and allowed them to use the Entebbe terminal to hold the hostages. The terrorists gave the State of Israel an ultimatum wherein they demanded the release of 53 terrorists – so called “freedom fighters”, most of which were held in Israeli prisons – by July 1, otherwise they would commence with the execution of all the hostages. The terrorists further demanded a $5 million ransom from the French government for the return of the Air France airplane. The demands of the hijackers were publicized in Israel and the families of the hostages sent a letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, imploring he give in to the demands of the terrorist, claiming that “human life is more important than ideals”.

Albeit the sympathy on part of the government to the families’ cause, it was reluctant to accept the terrorists’ demand in the concerns that such a move would encourage more terror hijackings in the future. Eventually, the voices demanding military intervention were heeded and Rabin ordered a military operation to release the hostages.

With precious little time and intel: preparing for the operation

In order to buy some time, Israel agreed to negotiate with the terrorist on the release of the hostages, thus the ultimatum was extended to July 4.

During that time, IDF Intelligence Corps scrambled to gather and analyze the necessary intel. Since Uganda did not have diplomatic relations with Israel at the time, but was not considered a terror-supporting state, Israel was short of intel on the country.

To gather as much detailed information as possible on Uganda, Intelligence consulted with Baruch Bar-Lev, who was the last Israeli military attaché to the country and was known to have warm relations with Idi Amin. The Israeli Mossad sent an undercover operative on a civilian airplane to take air photos of the Entebbe airport and the terminal where the hostages were held. Additionally, crucial intel came from one of the released passengers – an Israeli with a duel British citizenship – who feigned having a miscarriage and was released by the terrorists. Upon arriving in England, she shared initial intel on the hijackers with the British Intelligence, reporting what the terrorists stated to the hostages and describing the atmosphere in the airplane at the time of the hijacking. MI6 delivered this information to Israeli Intelligence, which was now able to determine that the hijackers were members of the organization of Wadi’ Haddad, former operations officer of the PFLP.

More crucial information came from another released hostage – a passenger with dual Israeli-French citizenship and a military background, who was able to impart impressively accurate information on the weapons held by the hijackers. Furthermore, Israeli construction firm Solel-Boneh, which built the Entebbe terminal on the 60s – was instrumental in building a replica of the terminal on which the commando forces trained.

Thanks to these efforts and more, the Israeli Intelligence was able to form an accurate picture within a relatively short time and gather enough intel for a military operation to release the hostages.

The decoy Black Mercedes: the unfolding of the operation

On noon July 3, the day before the expiration of the new ultimatum, four IAF Lockheed C-130 Hercules planes took off from the southern Sinai city of Sharme-el-Sheik towards Entebbe airport. Onboard were 176 elite Matkal recon commandos, and paratrooper and Golani troops. Due to the urgency of the operation, the planes took off before the government’s final green light, which came when the force was already airborne. Due to the long flight-rout, Israel had with great effort, obtained the permission of Kenya to land the planes in Nairobi, for refueling.  In a sheer stroke of luck, despite intel on the imminent attack leaking from Kenya’s air force to the Ugandan military and to Idi Amin – the latter did not take the news seriously and rejected it as mere rumors.

On the night of July 4, the planes landed at Entebbe International Airport. For the purpose of deception, the forces unloaded jeeps and a Mercedes car identical to the one driven by Idi Amin, who would visit the hostages daily, and thus were able to drive towards the building where the hostages were being held, posing as the Ugandan president’s convoy and security force.

According to the plan, the force was to drive directly to the hostage terminal, however, on the way encountered two Ugandan soldiers, whose suspicions arose as they were informed that Amin had swapped his famous Black Mercedes for a new white model.  Head of the commando force, Lieutenant Colonel Yoni Netanyahu, ordered them shot. The noise from the firing eliminated the element of surprise for the Israeli force and they had to make the rest of the way to the terminal under fire.

Despite these disruptions, the force successfully reached the terminal, eliminated the terrorists and freed the hostages.

Almost all home: outcome of the Operation

Within 24 hours, the seven hijackers and some 20 Ugandan soldiers were killed, and the hostages were transferred to an evacuation plane and flown to Israel. Despite the impressive success, the Israeli force did not emerge unscathed – commander of the commando force, Yoni Netanyahu – older brother of who was to become Israel’s Prime Minister,  Benjamin Netanyahu – was killed in the exchange of fire, and it was later decided to name the operation after him – “Operation Yonatan”. Four Israeli hostages were also killed: Jean-Jacques Maimoni, Pasco Cohen, and Ida Borochovitch, who were killed in the crossfire during the operation, and another– 74-year-old Israeli Dorah Bloch, who was murdered as an act of cruel revenge at the local hospital where she was sent prior to the operation.

The rest of the fighters, rescuers and hostages safely arrived in Israel, and were received at Ben-Gurion Airport with a moving reception. The operation, which was conducted under pressure of time and with very little intelligence, made a strong impression around the world, proving once again the strength and prowess of the Israel’s defense and security forces and the unwavering fortitude of the Israeli spirit. The daring operation eventually became part of Israel’s popular culture with the release in 1977 of the Israeli film “Operation Entebbe” starring famous Israeli singer and actor Yehoram Gaon as Yoni Netanyahu. In that same year, NBC released the television film, “Raid on Entebbe” and the heroic tale was later adapted in 2018 to a film titled “7 Days in Entebbe”.

הפוסט 48 Years Ago: Operation Entebbe (Yonatan) Releases Palestinian Terror Hostages from Entebbe הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In a divided country like Israel there are not too many events that can bring all people from all walks of life into the same jubilant emotions at the same time. The news of the successful rescue operation of the 4 hostages in Gaza on Saturday noon, was one of those rare occasions. Triumphant celebrations erupted spontaneously as Israelis were crying tears of joy upon hearing that the 4 hostages, including Noa Argamani who had become a symbol of the hostages, were rescued, unharmed and well.

This is a moment demonstrating the essence of “Israelism” which will forever be etched in Israel’s collective memory. Israelis’ hope that despite everything, we will win and get our kidnapped members of our families back home and celebrate life with them. This is a feeling that is undergirding our political conscience.

The sight of news anchors holding their tears back as they announce the return of the hostages, seeing political leaders who cannot hold back their excitement upon hearing the news are just prime examples of this “Israelism”.

This boost for morale has also important strategic implications for the remainder of the war. Israel’s internal legitimacy for continuing to pursue the war and apply military pressure on Hamas as a means to rescue the hostages has been waning over time with demands from the hostages’ families and the political Left to accept a hostage deal at all costs would in essence mean capitulation to Hamas.

The IDF proved that it through meticulous preparation, precise intelligence and stellar operational capabilities, it is possible to go right into the hornet’s nest and extract the hostages. This is Israel’s modern Entebbe Operation – daring, bold, courageous, and performed in a way that the wildest Hollywood screenwriters would not imagine.

This successful operation injected a boost of confidence to the Israeli public, reminding them what the war is fought for and more importantly that through sheer determination and resolve it can be won. This morale boost has also strategic benefits as it buys the government more public credit. Wars are long and often public sentiment is very short sighted which can make the pursue of a long-term goal without short term more difficult as public pressure can mount more quickly than public “wins”. This operation also highlighted in the international media shows the immediate benefits from applying military pressure on Hamas and releasing the hostages, providing Israel PR win which could be translated into more international credit to pursue the war.

Amidst, an atmosphere of defeatism within Israeli military ranks, the mainstream media, and pundits who call upon Israel to accept its defeat and cut its “loses”, encouraging the belief in Israel’s ability to achieve its goals- defeating Hamas as a military and governing body and releasing the hostages, is the best way to increase the likelihood that these goals would be achieved.

Through changing the public’s beliefs about the feasibility of achieving the war objectives, despite the enormous difficulties and pressure against Israel, the public would be able to tolerate more hardships in the short term in order to achieve the strategic long-term goals in Gaza which have implications for generations to come.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Hostage Rescue Operation: The Boost of Morale that Israel Needed הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In 2000, the IDF withdrew its forces entirely from Lebanon, ending an 18-year engagement in the security zone. The hasty exit left a vulnerable Lebanese military force in south Lebanon, leading to the disbanding of the south Lebanese army and creating a vacuum into which Hezbollah stepped, having risen to power during the war, making its driving doctrine the elimination of the State of Israel by any means available to it. While this goal was impeded for several years during the Second Lebanon War and the civil war in Syria, where the organization was preoccupied temporarily with assisting the Assad regime fight the rebel forces, the war against Hamas in Gaza was a signal for the terror movement that the conditions had ripened for an active offensive against Israel.

To date, Israel has been refraining from officially declaring war in its northern border. Some hoped for recourse in the form of diplomatic pressure to push Hezbollah away from the border with Israel and out of southern Lebanon, in accordance to UN resolution 1701 issued after the end of the Second Lebanon War. This resolution charged the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the task of peacekeeping in south Lebanon. However, despite the resolution, Hezbollah was able to rebuild its force and regained control of the area. Today, the prospects of Hezbollah complying with the resolution and withdraw from south Lebanon are slim, as it had never accepted it to begin with and is currently under no significant pressure to do so. Hezbollah and Iran clearly see the laxness of the international community on this matter, and support from the American administration is lagging as well. Seeing that the majority of the diplomatic pressure on part of the international community is actually aimed at Israel and not on it, Hezbollah sees no deterrence that could force it to hold its fire, or to withdraw.

In the absence of any diplomatic solution that would prevent Hezbollah from establishing its presence on the border and operating there against Israel, and such that can allow the evacuated residents of the northern communities to return to their homes and live their lives safely – the war on the northern arena is not a fanciful notion but a sine qua non. It is nothing short of a moral duty towards the tens of thousands of people who had been living for decades under Hezbollah’s sword of Damocles, and eventually were driven out of their homes and lives by the terror organization’s unrelenting attacks, living for over a year as refugees in their own land and continuing to pay a heavy price for that organization’s bloodthirsty ideology. The time has come for Israel’s war Cabinet to draw the line in the sand and fully advocate a decisive solution on the northern border with the understanding that without an all-out campaign against Hezbollah, the north will never know quiet and the conflict will not see an end – certainly not a victorious one.

South and north: different players, different theaters

The Gaza War is playing out both on Israel’s southern and northern borders. However, while the campaign in Gaza on the southern border is an official offensive action, the campaign on the northern border has yet to be declared an all-out war against Hezbollah, and Israel’s forces have been operating mainly within a mostly defensive position.

The main reason that Israel had refrained from officially declaring war on both fronts out of the gate is related to the size of the IDF’s personnel. Over the years, the army has been downsizing its numbers, creating a situation wherein it cannot undertake a wide scope of operation in both areas at the same time. Thus, it is forced to operate in stages – first completing most of its mission in Gaza, thus allowing it to leave a smaller peacekeeping force in the area, and only then deploying what forces it has to deal with the northern theater, with the intention of making this happen as soon as possible, as with every passing day that Israel is forced to engage with Hamas, it is prevented from taking care of the Hezbollah problem.

In viewing the southern arena against its northern counterpart, it is important to keep in mind that Hamas and Hezbollah are two very different types of enemies. In certain aspects, Hezbollah’s capabilities significantly outweigh those of Hamas, but the Lebanon-based terror organization contends with more than a few Achilles heels.

Operationally, there is no dispute regarding Hezbollah’s superiority over Hamas, with an army of highly trained combat soldiers, huge stockpiles of precision-guided missile, and a vast fleet of attack drones, all supplied by Iran, which is not only the sponsor of the organization but in effect its true handler.

But despite its operational shortcoming in comparison to Hezbollah, Hamas does enjoy a significant advantage that its northern counterpart lacks, and that is overwhelming regional support. Up to the war, Hamas controlled the entirety of the Gaza Strip, militarily and civically. The majority of the residents in Gaza supported Hamas and even mobilized to assist the terror organization. This was made unquestionably apparent with the advent of the war and the daily discoveries by Israeli security forces of tunnel-entrances, military posts, and stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions cached in almost every other house. Contrarily, Hezbollah is ensconced within a hostile arena, surrounded by a host of enemy factions such as the Christians, the Druze and the Suni Muslims. The Lebanese not only do not support Hezbollah, but they point the blaming finger at the terror organization – as well as at its Iranian mentor – for Lebanon’s dire situation which has brought the once vibrant and developed Land of Ceders to the brink of collapse.

Hezbollah’s precarious position in Lebanon means that its war with Israel carries potential critical risks for the organization, as it is well aware that if Israel is able to sufficiently compromise its capabilities, it will affect a shift in Lebanon’s internal politics and enable the rival factions in the country to change the balance of powers such that would prove detrimental to Hezbollah’s position.

The discrepancies between the two theaters and the nature of the enemies naturally sets different objective for each front. While in Gaza the declared goal is the total upending the rule of Hamas’ in Gaza, in the north Israel has no designs of toppling Hezbollah, as it knows that when all else fails, Hezbollah could always resort to withdrawing solely to Beirut or even to Syria. And anyhow the organization is a proxy of the Iranian Ayatullah regime, which supports and assists it and views it as a more important player than Hamas, thus the total eradication of Hezbollah is highly unlikely within one limited campaign.

Therefore, Israel’s objectives in the northern war theater are to push Hezbollah northward to upper Lebanon, destroy its infrastructure on the border with Israel and debilitate its leadership and ultimately create the conditions for the residents of the north to return safely to their homes.

These are three crucial objectives. All three are within Israel’s reach.

Beyond the red line; time for declaring the objective of the war in the north

The State of Israel has of yet to officially declare war up north. This despite the fact that the IDF has been operating in that sector since October 7. In the time that has passed, the IDF had targeted Hezbollah’s areal defense systems thereby restoring Israel’s freedom of operation in Lebanon’s aerial space. At the same time, it had also taken out a considerable portion of the command of Hezbollah’s special ops unit in south Lebanon, Radwan Force, and had destroyed many of the organization’s infrastructures and had pushed part of Hezbollah’s forces several kilometers northward into Lebanon.

All the above have created probably what would be the best conditions Israel can hope for to launch a broad offensive against Hezbollah. Yet there are many voices calling for the suspension of such a move due to considerations of personnel and ammunition shortages and battle fatigue of the forces, among others. However, anyone calling for suspension lacks a clear understanding of the reality on the ground and the severe consequences such a decision could have.

The first issue with this approach is the indefinite delay in the safe return of families to their homes, which aside from the humanitarian issue also constitutes a consequential ideological crisis that could truly jeopardize the Zionist enterprise. The longer the residents of the north remain in their substitute homes, chances of their full return home to live yet again under threat grow slimmer, thus the vital continuity of settlement along a border with a major security importance unravels, and decades of achievements gained by the Zionist enterprise of settling the entire historic land of Israel are rolled back, not to mention the gaping loss of productivity that the region contributes to Israel’s GDP – these are but a few of the prices a delay in a resolution on the norther border will exact on Israel.

The second outcome of such a delay is akin to gifting one of Israel’s largest enemies with the time it direly needs to lick its wounds, regroup and regain its malicious power. If Iran and Hezbollah know that Israel will declare an all-out war only in a year, or possibly two, the immediate action they would undertake is to pour their entire network of militias in the Middle East into south Lebanon, reequipping and retraining them, now with a better understanding and more experience in Israel’s military tactics and strategies, and use them against us, having had the time to prepare for Israel’s new order of battle.

It is also worth mentioning that beyond the above considerations, there is the toll that a war with Hezbollah will exact on the Israeli population. A crucial element in an army’s resilience is a strong civilian backbone, and a war against such an able enemy is sure to subject the civilian population of Israel to challenges such as advanced missile attacks wreaking destruction on vital infrastructures (roads, water, electricity) possibly even claiming lives, rising costs of living, and the disruption of daily life. These burdens are easier for civilians to bear when moral is high and they can get behind the leadership and army and support the cause. Israel has been at war for over a year, with the civilian population’s support and willingness to contribute whatever it takes to win and restore quiet and security. However, in a year or two, a new war might prove to be a very difficult sell to the jaded Israeli public.

A crucial element in an army’s resilience is a strong civilian backbone

Short and forceful: possible scenarios for a war in the north

Many in Israel fear a third Lebanon War that would drag on for years, as the collective memory still holds the pain of the first and second Lebanon wars that claimed a precipitous cost in lives and left the country in deep trauma that is still felt to this day. However, with lessons well-learnt and with the right command, a war in Lebanon now could be even shorter than the campaign in Gaza. The goal is to land a swift, decisive blow on Hezbollah, twisting the organization and Iran’s arm into seeking a mechanism that would provide them with a quick exit. Iran fears the loss of its most nurtured proxy, and a debilitating blow on part of Israel to Hezbollah could very likely leave Iran scurrying to end the war. Moreover, it can put into play another lever against Iran in the form of internal Lebanese forces that are hostile to Hezbollah and would be more than happy to get the organization’s back up against a wall.

But this might prove easier said than done, what with pro-Iranian support players the likes of Syrian militias, which would likely come to Hezbollah’s help, complicating things for Israel. A suitable preemptory action would be Israel informing the Syrian regime, that if it chooses to join the fray, a swift and decisive retaliation will follow.

Iran’s active involvement in such a war could actually play out to the advantage of Israel, as it would be a green light for America to join in, possibly putting in motion what might very well become a global war, with strong western militaries – and odds – stacked up against Iran. The Shi’ite Republic would be advised to weigh its steps carefully in such a scenario.

One way or another, Israel will have to ensure that south Lebanon remains a sterile, unpopulated area without any presence whatsoever of Hezbollah. Israel has no designs of annexing nor settling in south Lebanon, surely. Nonetheless, Israel must control the area at least for an initial interim period, meaning that all the Israeli forces positioned on the Lebanese border on the Israeli side will have to be moved into Lebanon. Similarly to the IDF’s military buffer zone in Gaza, Israel will have to deploy its forces in the south Lebanon area, using the Litany River as a natural border. The short-term objective is to have the returned residents of northern Israel see the IDF when the look towards Lebanon, and not Hezbollah.

Alongside the deployment of forces, Israel must generate international pressure that would lead to the disbanding of Hezbollah, as the state of affairs in which a neighboring country is controlled by a terror organization hell-bent on the annihilation of Israel can no longer be acceptable. The international community must be harnessed to devise a long-term and sustainable solution, as Israel can no longer trust what until now was an ineffective UN peacekeeping force to ensure the quiet on its border, and expects a solution that includes the placement of a substantial international military force that could deal with Hezbollah if necessary.

The initiative must be in Israel’s hands: conditions for ending operations in Lebanon

As explained above, there are three conditions for ending Israel’s operations in south Lebanon – the scouring of that area of Hezbollah’s presence, the crippling of the organization and its infrastructures, and the securing of conditions for the northern residents to return safely to their homes. All of these are obtainable objectives, even perhaps in the near future. It requires creative thought and determination, and Israel must take the initiative to make this happen.

Finally, in response to the claims that Israel’s soldiers are already suffering from battle fatigue at this point of the war – it is important to remember the other side of that coin: the soldiers and commanders that will go to the northern front have immense battle experience and understand crucial lessons learnt in the past year. So rather than a fatigued army, the IDF is now a well-oiled and unstoppable fighting machine, so let us not stop it from doing its job.

הפוסט When to Begin and How We Should End: The Imparative of a Broad Military Campaign in South Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.