• The IDF is currently focused on systematic demolition of buildings in the
  neighborhoods of Zeitoun, Jabalia village, Shejaiya, and eastern Gaza City.
• Jerusalem rejected Hamas’s offer of a cease-fire deal which would have left
  Hamas standing and holding on to 10 Israeli hostages after the war ends,
  maintaining its demand for the release of all hostages in one deal and not partial
  deal like before. The Trump administration publicly backed Israel’s position,
  with Trump himself declaring that Hamas must be militarily defeated and
  eradicated.
• On August 21, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he had
  approved the IDF’s plans to take control over Gaza City. He emphasized that the
  war must end “on Israel’s terms” and that he had directed the immediate initiation of
  negotiations for the release of all hostages. The upcoming operation, dubbed
  “Gideon’s Chariots II”, will last for several months and is projected to continue well
  into 2026. It will involve five IDF divisions – three maneuvering directly inside Gaza
  City.
• Coordination with medical facilities in northern Gaza has intensified. An Israeli
  liaison officer instructed a senior hospital official to begin preparing for the transfer
  of all patients to southern hospitals.
• In Paris, a significant meeting took place between the Syrian Foreign Minister
  Asaad al-Shaibani and senior Israeli officials to discuss security arrangements in
  southern Syria. Damascus publicly acknowledged the meeting—the first time it has
  done so.
• According to reports, Israel and Syria are preparing to sign a security agreement on
  September 25, which would establish new security arrangements but not full
  normalization.

Full report is at the PDF ready to download.

הפוסט Israel Weekly War Summary Week #98 | August 17-August 23 ,2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

• Mossad Director David Barnea traveled to Doha, Qatar, to advance negotiations for a comprehensive hostage deal. Israel’s position remains firm: only a total release of all hostages in exchange for an end to the war under five conditions set by Prime Minister Netanyahu.
• Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF) plans to expand the amount of distribution points from 4 to 16, to better regulate humanitarian aid. More than 300 aid trucks enter Gaza, daily.
• Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich approved the construction of 3,401 housing units in the E-1 corridor, connecting Jerusalem with Ma’ale Adumim. This decision effectively creates territorial continuity between the two cities.
• Senior Iranian official Ali Larijani visited Beirut, meeting President Michel Aoun, Prime Minister Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. His mission was to pressure Lebanon’s leadership not to disarm Hezbollah.
• In Suwayda, large-scale Druze demonstrations took place, led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, in which crowds waved Israeli flags, held signs in Hebrew, and chanted slogans like “We want Israel,” “Thank you Netanyahu,”
• The E3 states (UK, France, Germany) have set a 31 August deadline for Iran to return to nuclear negotiations and grant full access to IAEA inspectors. Failure to comply would trigger the Snapback sanctions mechanism.

הפוסט Israel Weekly War Summary Week #97 | Aug 10-Aug 16 ,2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The purpose of this paper is to delineate and describe The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) – why it was created, how it operates, and what it has managed to accomplish in Gaza. The paper will cover the operations of the GHF as well as the international campaign attempting to tarnish its humanitarian work by citing false claims originating from Hamas-aligned sources. This paper explains the humanitarian-aid complex and how the interests of UN bodies, Hamas, and certain mainstream media outlets all converged to chastising the GHF rather than collaborating with it in its humanitarian mission.

הפוסט Beyond Aid: The Vital Mission of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Overview

• Three senior Hamas leaders have informed Egypt of their willingness to discuss surrendering the organization’s weapons to a committee tasked with managing the Gaza Strip, contingent on the implementation of a comprehensive hostage deal that includes an Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza.

• Approximately 600 Druze religious leaders from the Khadr region in northeastern Syria (not Mount Druze) entered Israel to celebrate a Druze holiday at the tomb of Prophet Shuaib in the southern Galilee.

• Iranian media reported a powerful explosion at Shahid Rajai Port near the southern city of Bandar Abbas, followed by footage of a massive fire engulfing the port, which houses oil and petrochemical facilities.

• Jordan’s Interior Minister declared the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal organization, banning its activities nationwide.

Gaza

Hostage Deal

• Three senior Hamas leaders have informed Egypt of their willingness to discuss surrendering the organization’s weapons to a committee tasked with managing the Gaza Strip, contingent on the implementation of a comprehensive hostage deal that includes an Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza. This development reflects significant external pressure on Hamas, primarily from Egypt, to disarm and transition governance. Similar messages have been conveyed to Hamas leadership in Qatar and Turkey by Gulf states and the Palestinian Authority (PA), urging the group to relinquish its military control and integrate into a political framework under Palestinian state legitimacy. This shows that Israel’s strategy of maximalist pressure works and could potentially create a reenactment of the 1982 PLO evacuation from Beirut.

• Hamas published a video and proof of life of Israeli hostage Omri Miran, the first such release in approximately a year. The video contains messages aimed at exacerbating political divisions within Israel, indicating Hamas’s intent to exploit internal Israeli discord.

Diplomatic

• A senior Hamas delegation, led by Muhammad Darwish, Chairman of the Shura Council, and including prominent figures such as Khaled Meshaal (Hamas leader abroad), Khalil al-Hayya (head of the political bureau in Gaza), Zahar Jabarin (Hamas leader in the Judea and Samaria), and Nizar Awadallah, met with Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin in Ankara. The delegation also held discussions with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

• UN’s World Food Program announced that it had distributed its last food rations in Gaza, as its warehouses were depleted. U.S. President Trump, responding to a journalist’s question, stated that he is pressing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to “be good to Gaza,” emphasizing the need for food and medicine to alleviate civilian suffering. He added that the U.S. is applying “very significant pressure on Israel to allow food and medicine into Gaza” and is “taking care of Gaza,” signaling a diplomatic push to address the humanitarian crisis.

Operational

• A tank from the 79th Battalion of the reserve armored brigade “Hamahatz” was traveling along an administrative movement route in the buffer zone near Beit Hanoun when a terrorist cell opened fire with anti-tank weapons and sniper rifles. Three soldiers were injured in the attack: an officer and a soldier were severely wounded, and a third soldier was killed in action.

• Drawing on lessons from previous maneuvers in Operation “Strength and Sword,” the Israeli military established a reconnaissance platoon (Palatatz) for each armored battalion, composed of reserve soldiers who previously served in armored reconnaissance units. These reservists underwent specialized training in drone operations to enhance situational awareness and operational effectiveness.

• The Morag Corridor, a strategic IDF-controlled route in Gaza, spans 12 kilometers, with 6 kilometers already paved with gravel. The corridor’s width ranges from 300 meters at its narrowest point to 2 kilometers at its widest, equipped with observation masts providing oversight of Rafah and Khan Younis. Current efforts focus on expanding the corridor southward into Rafah, with plans for future northward expansion into Khan Younis. So far, 60-75% of the Rafah and the adjacent Tel Sultan refugee camp demolished, including flattened or heavily damaged buildings, with debris being cleared.

• In a joint operation, the IDF and Shin Bet targeted and destroyed 40 pieces of engineering equipment across Gaza. Some of these machines were used to breach the border fence during the October 7 massacre, while others were smuggled into Gaza from Egypt during a ceasefire and employed to build terror infrastructure, dig tunnels, or create pits for planting explosives. The operation aimed to cripple Hamas’s engineering capabilities, limiting its ability to clear rubble, open movement routes, and maintain governance functions in the Strip.

• The IDF and Shin Bet conducted airstrikes on Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad command and control centers located in civilian areas. One target was a facility in the “Yafa” school in Gaza City, and another was in the Jabalia refugee camp, both embedded within civilian populations.

• An IDF investigation into the March 23 incident, where Golani Brigade reconnaissance soldiers fired on an ambulance convoy in a dangerous combat zone, revealed that 15 Gazans were killed, including at least six confirmed Hamas operatives. Chief of Staff Zamir ordered the dismissal of the deputy commander of the reconnaissance unit, a veteran soldier who fought since the war’s onset, was wounded, and returned to combat. The commander of the “Hamahatz” Brigade received a command reprimand for procedural errors and post-incident management, highlighting the IDF’s commitment to accountability in complex wartime scenarios, despite Hamas’s continued use of medical facilities as human shields.

Judea and Samaria

• In a speech to the PA’s Central Council, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas urged Hamas to release Israeli hostages to undermine Israel’s justifications for continuing the war in Gaza. Abbas accused Hamas of providing Israel with a pretext to “destroy Gaza” through its 2007 takeover of the Strip, which he described as a “catastrophe.” He called on Hamas to end its rule in Gaza, surrender its weapons to the PA, and transform into a political party operating under the legitimacy of a Palestinian state.

Lebanon

Diplomatic

• Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, strongly opposed efforts to disarm Hezbollah, describing such initiatives as a “clear plot” against regional states. Amani warned against falling into this “trap,” prompting Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, Youssef Rjei, to summon him for a formal protest. In response to the backlash, Amani clarified that Iran respects Lebanon’s internal decision-making and does not intend to impose its views.

Syria

Military Activity

• ISIS released a new video announcing a war against the regime of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, accusing him of collaborating with the United States and deviating from Islamic law. This declaration marks a significant escalation in intra-jihadist rivalries, with ISIS positioning itself as a purist alternative to HTS’s governance in rebel-held Syrian territories.

Diplomacy

• Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani met with U.S. Congressmen Cory Mills and Marlin Stutzman in Damascus, marking the first visit by a U.S. congressional member to Syria since the new regime’s rise. The discussions focused on Syria’s security and economic developments

• Syrian security forces detained senior leaders of the Islamic Jihad’s Syrian branch, indicating a crackdown on militant groups within the country. This action underscores the new Syrian government’s efforts to consolidate control and neutralize potential threats from jihadist factions, and also signaling to the West that the new regime is not Jihadist.

• The British government announced the removal of sanctions previously imposed on Syria’s defense and interior ministries, as well as several intelligence agencies.

• Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa expressed interest in joining the Abraham Accords “under the right conditions.”

• Approximately 600 Druze religious leaders from the Khadr region in northeastern Syria (not Mount Druze) entered Israel to celebrate a Druze holiday at the tomb of Prophet Shuaib in the southern Galilee. This follows a previous entry of 100 Druze leaders, with the larger group permitted to stay overnight, authorized by Defense Minister Katz to strengthen ties with Syria’s Druze community.

Iran

• Iranian media reported a powerful explosion at Shahid Rajai Port near the southern city of Bandar Abbas, followed by footage of a massive fire engulfing the port, which houses oil and petrochemical facilities. The incident raises concerns about sabotage or infrastructure vulnerabilities, though no official cause has been confirmed.

• Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran has no current ties with the Syrian government and is not rushing to establish them, but it is also not acting against it. Araghchi emphasized that Iran is waiting for the Syrian government to ensure security, stability, and a legitimate administration inclusive of all sects.

• Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni visited Tajikistan and signed a security cooperation agreement between the two countries.

• In an interview with Politico, Reza Pahlavi, the exiled Iranian Crown Prince, proposed a “third way” to topple the Iranian regime through support for civilian protests, rejecting diplomacy or military action. Pahlavi suggested using $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets to fund popular resistance and called for Western assistance in providing communication tools to bypass government censorship.

Nuclear Talks

• U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio clarified that the Trump administration aims to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons but does not rule out a civilian nuclear program, provided Iran halts its uranium enrichment activities.

• In recent days, commanders of the Revolutionary Guards’ air and aeronautics units inspected nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, Arak, and defense industries in Isfahan to assess air defense systems. These visits reflect Iran’s heightened alert status amid fears of an Israeli attack on its nuclear infrastructure.

• During previous talks in Rome, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told U.S. negotiator Witkoff that reaching a nuclear deal within Trump’s 60-day timeline is unfeasible, proposing an interim agreement for a civilian nuclear program. Iran aims to alleviate time pressure, avoid the Snapback sanctions mechanism, and deter an Israeli-U.S. military strike.

International

• President Donald Trump expressed confidence that Saudi Arabia will join the Abraham Accords, stating, “It will happen!” He revealed that he made it “less convenient” for Israel to strike Iran’s nuclear sites during his presidency, believing a deal with Iran is possible without military action. However, Trump warned that if negotiations fail, he would lead an offensive against Iran. He also indicated openness to meeting Iran’s Supreme Leader, signaling a willingness to engage directly with Tehran’s leadership. Trump further cautioned that while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could initiate a war with Iran, the U.S. would not be drawn into a war unwillingly, as he stated that if negations fail, the US “will be leading the pack”

Yemen

The Houthis launched two ballistic missiles toward Israel this week, both intercepted by Israeli defenses. Since March 18, the Houthis have fired 22 missiles and four drones at Israel, escalating their role in the regional conflict. Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Command’s operation against the Houthis continues, with a spokesperson stating on April 24 that over 800 Houthi targets in northern Yemen (primarily in Saada and Sanaa provinces) have been struck since March 15, killing 500-600 Houthi operatives, according to Al-Arabiya.

Global Jihad

• Jordan’s Interior Minister declared the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal organization, banning its activities nationwide. This decision follows the arrest of a terror cell in Jordan that manufactured rockets and drones with support from Hamas. The move reflects Jordan’s heightened security concerns and its efforts to curb Hamas’s regional influence.

Fallen Soldiers

• Master sergeant (res.) Asaf Cafri

• Captain Ido Voloch z”l

הפוסט Israel Weekly War Summary Week #81 | April 20- April 26 ,2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

UNIFIL I.D

Full Name: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

Established: 19^th March, 1978.

Budget: $551,113,500 (for 2023-24 year, which reflects increase of 9.6% from 2022-23)[1].

Personnel: ~10,000 deployed personnel. While 13,000 authorized uniformed personnel (military & police). | ~800 civilian personnel.

Mission: “To confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area”[2].

“Following the July/August 2006 crisis, the Council enhanced the Force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.” [3].

Participating countries (top 10): Indonesia (1,230); Italy (1,043); India (903); Ghana (878); Nepal (876); Malaysia (832); Spain (676); France (665); China (419); Ireland (351).[4]

Why UNIFIL in South Lebanon Failed, and What’s The Alternative?

Brief Identification of UNIFIL

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in 1978 through Resolutions 425 and 426, represents a pivotal chapter in the UN’s peacekeeping efforts. Initially tasked with overseeing Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and facilitating the restoration of peace, UNIFIL’s scope has expanded in response to the 2006 Lebanon War. Resolution 1701 not only mandated a cessation of hostilities but also positioned UNIFIL as a critical actor in maintaining peace, monitoring the Blue Line, assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in disarming Hezbollah, the Shi’ite pro-Iranian terrorist group and proxy that has been dominating Lebanon and vowing its commitment to Israel’s destruction. Over the decades, however, UNIFIL has found itself increasingly constrained, both operationally and politically, with Hezbollah leveraging its deep integration into Lebanese society to systematically undermine the mission’s effectiveness.

While UNIFIL’s force peaked at over 10,000 personnel, its presence has gradually devolved into a largely symbolic one, unable to meaningfully assert control or influence in southern Lebanon. The mission’s increasing entanglement with political complexities and local power structures has left it as a passive observer—one whose mandate has been repeatedly undermined by Hezbollah’s growing military presence.

UNIFIL’s poor performance led directly to Hezbollah’s unchecked takeover of southern Lebanon, entrenching its infrastructure of rocket launchers and attack tunnels, and deploying its elite Radwan force and militants all across the Israel-Lebanon border, using a civilian environment to conceal ground-to-ground missiles and a host of weapons and armament. This has posed a significant risk of ground invasion into Israel. Hezbollah’s ever-deepened presence in southern Lebanon has played a key role in its attacks on Israel, and has inevitably led to the current war.

UNIFIL’s Challenges: Strategic Failure of Restricted Movement

Broader Strategic Implications

One of the fundamental failures of the UNIFIL mission has been its inability to navigate the systematic obstructions posed by Hezbollah, whose influence in southern Lebanon has rendered UNIFIL effectively powerless. Hezbollah’s control is both overt and covert, using entities such as ‘Green Without Borders’ to disguise military installations under the pretext of environmental work. This deception has allowed Hezbollah to build infrastructure—such as observation posts and arms depots—while cloaking them in civilian operations, making it nearly impossible for UNIFIL to conduct thorough inspections or maintain credible oversight along the Blue Line.

The implications of these restrictions are profound, as Hezbollah continues to expand its influence without consequence (Or at least did so almost before “Swords of Iron War” and Operation “Northern Arrows as part of it). By controlling the narrative and leveraging legal loopholes like property ownership and environmental regulations, Hezbollah has successfully limited UNIFIL’s freedom of movement, ensuring that key strategic areas remain inaccessible. These “no-go” zones, effectively controlled by Hezbollah, have diminished UNIFIL’s ability to perform even the most basic aspects of its mandate—such as disarmament monitoring and ceasefire enforcement—turning the international force into little more than a bystander.

This, however, comes against the backdrop of clear Hezbollah infrastructure being developed in both urban and rural areas, with major attack tunnels and military bases. Hezbollah also began patrolling the border with uniform, unmasked, with no significant or effective counter-action by UNIFIL, which rendered its role in southern Lebanon moot.

Hezbollah’s unchecked growth, bolstered by Iran’s regional ambitions, is not just a local threat—it has broader regional and global implications. The strategic failure of UNIFIL to curb Hezbollah’s military buildup emboldens the group to continue expanding, posing a constant threat to Israel’s northern border while contributing to Lebanon’s ongoing instability. This lack of oversight and deterrence emboldens non-state actors across the region, signaling that international peacekeeping forces can be rendered ineffectual through strategic manipulation and local dominance.

Furthermore, Hezbollah’s influence extends beyond territorial control; it actively works to erode UNIFIL’s legitimacy on the ground. By engaging with local communities while fostering distrust of international forces, Hezbollah positions itself as the true governing authority in southern Lebanon. This dynamic undermines any potential gains UNIFIL could achieve and entrenches Hezbollah’s de facto control, further complicating any efforts toward long-term peace and stability.

Specific Incidents of Restricted Movement

UNIFIL’s operational failures are not theoretical; they are deeply rooted in specific incidents that have undermined the mission’s credibility and operational capacity. Notably, Hezbollah has orchestrated a series of actions aimed at limiting UNIFIL’s ability to patrol and inspect critical areas. Over the years, peacekeepers have been routinely blocked from accessing key zones, often under the pretense of private property rights or agricultural protections, where Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is known to exist. These obstructions are not isolated but form part of a broader strategy to maintain Hezbollah’s freedom of movement while denying the same to UNIFIL.

Tragically, this obstruction has led to the loss of life among UNIFIL personnel. In 2022, an Irish peacekeeper was killed in a Hezbollah-led confrontation, a stark reminder of the physical dangers that peacekeepers face in this hostile environment. Such incidents are not rare; in 2007, six Spanish peacekeepers were killed in an IED attack orchestrated by Hezbollah operatives. In other cases, UNIFIL convoys have been ambushed or targeted with explosives, resulting in multiple fatalities and severely undermining the morale of the international force. These targeted attacks, combined with Hezbollah’s manipulation of legal and societal frameworks, have created an environment where UNIFIL’s role has become largely ceremonial.

Moreover, Hezbollah’s military entrenchment has continued to grow despite UNIFIL’s presence. The group has expanded its arsenal, constructed fortified positions, and established a robust intelligence network that operates without interference from international forces. UNIFIL’s inability to prevent these activities—due to both operational limitations and political considerations—has rendered the mission ineffective, further emboldening Hezbollah to act with impunity. The stark reality is that, while UNIFIL exists on paper as a peacekeeping force, it is Hezbollah that exercises actual control over southern Lebanon.

Between 2006-2019, UNIFIL reported over 100 violent incidents against it by Hezbollah or their cooperatives. For demonstration purposes to the scale of the problem, we add here just one report of many: Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2023, Annex I: Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 February to 20 June 2023, as a shortlist of examples to UNIFIL restrictions forced by Hezbollah.

Further complicating UNIFIL’s mission were several instances where it was found complicit in withholding critical information. Most notably, in 2000, the abduction of three Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah occurred in full view of UNIFIL personnel, who filmed the abduction without immediately reporting it. UNIFIL not only failed to intervene in real-time but also withheld a videotape documenting key moments of the incident, leading to accusations that the UN had misled Israel. The tape, which was kept secret for months, depicted Hezbollah’s use of UN vehicles in the abduction and contained evidence that could have helped locate the soldiers. This failure to act and the subsequent concealment of vital intelligence became emblematic of the broader ineffectiveness of the mission. UNIFIL’s refusal to release the tape under the guise of neutrality raised serious questions about its commitment to peacekeeping, especially when lives were at risk. Such inaction has contributed to the perception that UNIFIL’s role in southern Lebanon has often been passive, at best, and complicit, at worst, in Hezbollah’s operations.

UNIFIL-Hezbollah Collusion

The former Danish UNTSO soldier’s testimony

On October 20^th, 2024, a retired United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) soldier, under the alias “Michael”, testified that UNIFIL was “totally subject to Hezbollah” when he worked in Lebanon 10 years before. The testimony was made in an interview with Danish news site B.T. “Michael” stated that he was speaking for himself as a private individual and not on behalf of UNTSO.[5]

The soldier’s tasks were to observe and report potential violations of the 2006 UN Security council Resolution 1701, which was supposed to remove Hezbollah presence from southern Lebanon.

Here are several quotes from the former UNTSO soldier: “We were totally subject to Hezbollah…We clearly had limited freedom of movement. For example, we never operated after dark for fear of Hezbollah. So they had free time in the evening and night hours.”

“They simply blocked the road. They were not visibly armed but aggressive, and it was quite clear that they were members of Hezbollah. We knew very well who decided things, especially in the Shia cities. They didn’t want us to see what they were doing.”

“When we patrolled the Blue Line, we often saw ‘civilians’ very close to the Israeli military installations taking pictures. When that happened, we withdrew and observed from a distance; we were simply instructed to do so”.

The UN soldiers were not allowed to take photos or videos:

“It was forbidden to film and take pictures. And if we did, we could end up with the locals confiscating our cameras. It happened to my colleagues in UNIFIL and UNTSO”.

Regarding the presence and territory control of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and near the Israeli border, the witness said: “The civilians who did not care about Hezbollah, especially the Christians, were afraid to speak out against them. There was a widespread fear of them. But at the same time, we experienced cooperation with the Shia Muslims. For example, we had a number of interpreters who were indoctrinated into Hezbollah. I ended up throwing one of them out of my car once while he was praising Hassan Nasrallah. I simply didn’t want to listen to it”.

Michael cited the inaction taken against the violations of U.N. Resolution 1701:: “We reported daily violations of Resolution 1701 to our superiors, including restrictions on our freedom of movement, and we were instructed to report all violations regardless of number. But nothing ever happened,” he said. “We did not hear back from them, and nothing was initiated. It was wildly frustrating and only confirmed what I had experienced in other countries I was posted to: The U.N. is incompetent.”

UNIFIL and Hezbollah – The unknown ties?

Regarding the Italian UNIFIL activity in Lebanon, it is worth recalling what Francesco Cossiga[6] said during an interview with the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot, 2008: “Cossiga to the Italian Jews: We sold you out.”

According to Cossiga, Italy implemented an agreement with Hezbollah that would enable UNIFIL forces to move freely in southern Lebanon, without fear for their safety, in exchange for a closed eye and the possibility of rearming given to Hezbollah. The former President further added that he was certain about the existence of the agreement and that he would be willing to testify before the judges that it was a state secret and he would not be required to reveal his sources.[7]

Moreover, the Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani, stated in April 2024, following Iran’s first missile attack against Israel:

“The Iranians have assured us that our Italian soldiers in the area will be respected…The Italian contingent in Lebanon is under the aegis of the UN, it is in a condition to be protected, I don’t think there are any dangers either for the Italian soldiers or for the Italian citizens in Israel and Iran”. As for the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the minister explained how he was assured that “only ships that bring weapons to Israel would be attacked”. (Agi, Apr 14,2024). [8]

Tajani’s statement indicate that the Italian government interacted with Iran to ensure the safety of the Italian UNIFIL troops and that can be considered in line with Cossiga’s statement regarding an agreement with Hezbollah, which is Iran’s proxy in Lebanon.

In addition, on April 14^th 2024, Germano Dottori, a professor of Strategic Studies at Rome’s Luiss Univ argued that Italy had given up its freedom to express itself on Iran at the very moment in which, in 2006, it deployed in the lair of Hezbollah a thousand soldiers. [9]

An April 17, 2024, Startmag article highlighted the failure of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah. It criticized Italy’s subservience to the group, noting that Hezbollah is now more armed and dangerous than in 2006, continuing to destabilize the region as an Iranian proxy. [10]

Furthermore, since the land maneuver of the IDF against Hezbollah, evidence of UNIFIL’s failure came from the recent interrogations of Hezbollah terrorists, who testified that the terror group paid UNIFIL members to use their positions for surveillance and military operations. In several testimonies the admit that Hezbollah also took control of UNIFIL cameras near the Israeli border.

Conclude UNIFIL’s Mission

UNIFIL’s mandate should be terminated immediately, as it no longer provides tangible benefits for either Lebanon or Israel. The mission, once envisioned as a stabilizing force, has instead become a mechanism through which Hezbollah consolidates power. Rather than continuing to fund and support an ineffective peacekeeping mission, the international community should shift its focus toward direct diplomatic and security initiatives that address the root causes of instability in Lebanon.

UNIFIL’s repeated failure to act decisively, coupled with its misleading of Israel and complicity in Hezbollah’s activities, underscores that it has long ceased to be a force for peace. Its inability to prevent Hezbollah’s military buildup, coupled with its refusal to cooperate even when lives at stake, not only undermines its mandate but also raises the question of whether it has betrayed its role in Lebanon.

Ending UNIFIL would also remove a key element of Hezbollah’s manipulation, forcing both the Lebanese government and the international community to confront the realities on the ground. For Israel, terminating UNIFIL’s mandate would eliminate the false sense of security that the mission provides, allowing for a more realistic approach to border security. Similarly, for Lebanon, it would offer an opportunity to reclaim sovereignty over its southern region, free from the constraints imposed by Hezbollah’s military apparatus.

The Lebanese people, particularly those living in Hezbollah-controlled areas, also deserve the chance to live without the looming threat of violence and conflict. By removing UNIFIL and placing the onus on local and regional actors to address the security situation, there is potential for a recalibration of Lebanon’s internal dynamics. Ending the mission would mark the first step toward a more durable peace, one that is not built on international intervention but on the accountability of the region’s true stakeholders.

Specific recommendations for effective optional substitutes for UNIFIL may be found in the following paper by the IDSF Research Department: Turning Point in the North: Prospects for the Israel-Hezbollah War.

Conclusion

After more than four decades of operations, it is clear that UNIFIL has failed to fulfill its mandate in southern Lebanon. The mission’s inability to counter Hezbollah’s military buildup, combined with restrictions on its movements and the growing danger to peacekeepers, has rendered it ineffective. By terminating UNIFIL’s presence, both Israel and Lebanon can begin to address the root causes of instability in the region.

A Hezbollah-free southern Lebanon is not just in Israel’s interest, but also in the interest of the Lebanese people, who deserve to live free from external interference and conflict. Only by confronting the realities on the ground and ending a failed peacekeeping mission can real progress be made.

Key Question that should be noted

1. UNIFIL was establish in March 1978, to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli troops. The IDF withdrew from Lebanon in August 1978. What was the justification for UNIFIL onwards?
2. Another objective was to “restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area”, if so, why UNIFIL failed to do so between August 1978 to 1982 and allowed the presence of the PLO in south Lebanon?
3. Also, how it allowed the establishment of Hezbollah and the Iranian influence inside Lebanon? Which is the direct opposite to “assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority”
4. In continues, how it allowed the Syrian involvement in Lebanon during the 1980’s?
5. How it allowed the 1982 War between Israel and Lebanon?
6. How has it allowed the formation of the South Lebanon Army? In total contradiction with the “assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority”?
7. How come UNIFIL became enabler and even cooperative force for terrorism?
8. How is it possible that after all these failures, after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, UNIFIL still operates and increased its budget each year?
9. Why after all these failures, the UN administration keep putting in risk the troops on ground, in many times for vain, and why does the international community stick with UNIFIL to the point they stress it has no viable alternative?

[1] UN. Secretary-General. (2023). Budget for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024: report of the Secretary-General. In United Nations Digital Library System (A_77_740-EN). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4008431
[2] United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.). UNIFIL Fact sheet: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Retrieved November 11, 2024, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unifil
[3] See 2.
[4] Top 10 contributers out of 48 countries as of 22th Oct., 2024. UNIFIL Troop-Contributing Countries. (2024, October 22). UNIFIL. https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-troop-contributing-countries
[5] See Jotam Confino, B.T., “Michael var FN-soldat i Libanon: ‘Vi var totalt underlagt Hizbollah’”, October 20, 2024, https://www.bt.dk/udland/michael-var-fn-soldat-i-libanon-vi-var-totalt-underlagt-hizbollah
[6] Prime minister of Italy from 1979-1980 and the president of Italy from 1985-1992.
[7] Focus on Israel, “Cossiga agli ebrei italiani: “Vi abbiamo venduto”, Oct 6, 2008 – https://www.focusonisrael.org/2008/10/06/cossiga-ebrei-italiani-vi-abbiamo-venduti-lodo-moro/
[8] Agi Press Agency, “Tajani, “segnali incoraggianti da Iran e Israele. La diplomazia è al lavoro”, Apr 14, 2024 – https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2024-04-14/attacco-iran-israele-medio-oriente-tajani-26026362/
[9] https://x.com/GermanoDottori/status/1780185313278582842?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1780185313278582842%7Ctwgr%5E5cd465fb019c7da8f7f919db8294c3bb82bfaa49%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.startmag.it%2Fmondo%2Fitalia-sovranita-limitata-hezbollah%2F
[10] Marco Orioles, “L’Italia è un Paese a sovranità limitata su Hezbollah?”, Startmag, April 27, 2024 – https://www.startmag.it/mondo/italia-sovranita-limitata-hezbollah/

הפוסט Why UNIFIL in South Lebanon Failed, and What’s The Alternative? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Authors: Adv. Yifa Segal, Lt. Col. (Res.) Baruch Yedid, Jennifer Teale

Editing and guidance: Or Yissachar

Professional consultancy: Brig. Gen. (Res.) Yossi Kuperwasser

Graphic design: Natanel Kenan Studio | Nat.co.il

About the IDSF

IDSF – Israel’s Defense and Security Forum, Habithonistim is a movement with more than 35,000 senior officers, commanders and combatants in the reserves and civilians who are former members of all the security forces. It was founded in order to defend the state of Israel’s security needs in a way that will enable it to exist and prosper for generations to come.

Our policy is clear: We are committed to Israel’s right to safe borders, the borders of the land of Israel; we believe that Israel’s security needs head the national priorities; and we believe that Israel does not have the privilege of losing any war. The IDF must act freely in the entire area in order to fulfill its responsibility and to defend Israel.

We clarify that the movement is non-partisan, but puts the values and the vision that define it at the forefront.

Our management

Chairman and Founder: Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi

CEO: Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila

Or Yissachar, Assaf Voll, Jessica Barazani, Ortal Ron, Moshe Davis, Elie Pieprz, Keren Balila, Ronit Farkash, Eva Nagar, Lt Col (res) Tal Nir, Yitshak Lev, Ariel Shafir

Our board of directors

Major General (res.) Gershon Hacohen, Major General (res.) Yitzhak Gerry Gershon, Commissioner (res.) Shlomo Katabi

Among our members

Major General (res.) Yossi Bachar, Major General (res.) Kamil Abu Rukun, Major General (res.) Yossi Mishlav, A., a former senior officer in the Mossad, M., a former senior officer in the General Security Services, former Commissioner Shlomo Katabi, Brigadier General (res.) Hasson Hasson, Brigadier General (res.) Harel Knafo, Brigadier General (res.) Avigdor Kahalani, Brigadier General (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, Colonel (res.) Tal Braun, Prof. Alexander Bleigh

Program principles

Israeli Humanitarian Directorate

Israel will oversee the aid distributed by international organizations, effectively dismantling the distribution networks of UNRWA and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, guided by the principle: “The hand that distributes the aid is the hand that controls it.”

IDP cities

Humanitarian zones will be established in open areas based on international disaster response models and aligned with the UNHCR’s Needs Assessment for Refugee Emergencies (NARE) guidelines.

Gaza’s division and zoning

According to the “divide and rule” principle, a system of longitudinal and transverse axes will partition the Gaza Strip into distinct segments, restricting population movement between them.

Humanitarian, rather than political role

The humanitarian islands will not serve as a political solution but will provide an interim step toward a final settlement in Gaza.

International aid

Aid will be delivered directly to the population through international donations, not the Israeli taxpayer. |Actionable: Since October 7, 2023, donations totaling $2 billion have funded the delivery of over 1 million tons of aid transported in 60,000 trucks.

Introduction

After suffering the October 7 massacre, Israel embarked on the Swords of Iron war in the Gaza Strip, along with additional theaters of war. Following the ground maneuver, the IDF issued instructions for Gaza’s civilian population to evacuate the battle areas in order to minimize harm to non-combatants and allow for orderly operational deployment. Concurrently with a wide-ranging humanitarian operation which to date has achieved distribution of roughly a million tons of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip, the humanitarian situation there has remained a challenge as Hamas continues to steal considerable quantities of the aid. Meanwhile, extensive built-up areas have been left destroyed, or are no longer inhabitable, in the wake of the IDF’s operational deployment against the extensive terrorist infrastructures from which Hamas was operating. More than a million Gazans have been designated IDPs (internally displaced people) after evacuation from their homes.

Over and above the situation on the ground and the needs that it generates, security and strategic needs arise as well. The existing Hamas infrastructures, through which Hamas controls the population and maintains its power, are largely based on pre-existing infrastructures above ground and underground — as well as on the Gazan social structure, by means of which Hamas has solidified its hold and its dominance over the years.

For those reasons, it is currently neither feasible nor recommended that the IDPs return at the conclusion of the war.

A system should be adopted that can on the one hand optimally assist the population as circumstances require while on the other hand not returning power and control to Hamas.

More than a year into the Swords of Iron war in the Gazan theater, fighting still continues significantly despite the end of the major intensive phase. In the meantime, Israel has not yet officially entered the next phase — the interim phase between fighting and a long-term arrangement in Gaza.

At present, it is already clear that the end of intensive fighting does not mean the end of fighting, and apparently the phase of “mopping up”, or “clearing” — the battle in pockets of Hamas activity — will last a long while.

Alongside the question of fighting is the question of The Day After: Who will assume administration of the Gaza Strip, when, and how? It is not yet clear what official plan will eventually be adopted by the Israeli government. (We once more recommend the December 2023 Gaza Security and Recovery Program published jointly with JCFA and presented to top Israeli decision-makers.) However, it is definitely clear that none of the proposed programs can be started immediately. Therefore there must be an interim phase, which our program calls the “mechanism construction phase.” That period will last for at least several months and might even require a year or two.

The proposed model for the interim phase involves the construction of a temporary Humanitarian Directorate in the Gaza Strip, purely civilian in character and with no political attributes. The model’s implementation will involve the construction, on vacant spaces, of IDP cities. As it relates to the construction of IDP cities, commonly-used models around the world can be of hand, with extensive international experience in their implementation – whether in response to natural disasters or to the ravages of war.

In light of the plentiful and successful international experience, this model can be quickly and efficiently applied. Moreover, it can be applied immediately and gradually so that there will be no need even to wait for the official end of the war or the end of the current phase of fighting. Implementation can and should be gradual. The first IDPs would be constructed in the northern Gaza Strip where the military and administrative hold of Hamas is relatively slight. With the success of the model and in consideration of the needs and opportunities in the field, the system can be extended to other parts of the Gaza Strip.

As noted above, this paper deals with the interim phase and posits the establishment of a Humanitarian Directorate with purposes confined to answering basic immediate, critical needs of the Gaza Strip’s residents. The Humanitarian Directorate will not seek to solve complicated political problems or to suggest long-term solutions. Rather, it will facilitate an efficient flow of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip’s residents, while denying Hamas control over the population and over the aid resources that have enabled Hamas to survive.

The program will seek to demonstrate how those two objectives can be simultaneously met, and it is compatible with the war objectives Israel has set. This is in contradiction to the claim that in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Gaza, the existing mechanisms such as UNRWA must be preserved or, worse yet, the civil authority of Hamas must be accepted.

Later, this paper will consider suggestions for returning the system of a “military administration” to Gaza. While this system offers certain undoubted advantages, particularly because the IDF gained much experience in operating it efficiently over the pre-Oslo years, it also carries many disadvantages. This paper proposes new models, from sources including case studies in management of humanitarian crisis areas around the world. The models incorporate out-of-the-box thinking, understanding of the failures among past models, and aspects of successful models from other parts of the world.

At the same time, a distinction must be stressed: As this model is implemented, the attitude of the Palestinians, unlike that of the victims of natural disaster, is not to be taken for granted. Support for Hamas still runs high, and the local Hamas leadership may be expected to forcibly resist any project of this sort.

The Humanitarian Directorate will facilitate the achievement of the most important objectives in the interim phase while generating the minimum of resistance. First and foremost, it will facilitate preparations on the ground for the Day After, in the most efficient and unobtrusive way — relatively unobtrusive, specifically, at the international level. Second, it will facilitate prevention of a humanitarian crisis in Gaza and manage the aid resources efficiently, accelerate the process of eliminating Hamas as a governmental force, and ultimately build the foundation for granting a certain measure of managerial authority over civil matters to those in the Gazan population who are not involved in terrorism.

The Humanitarian Islands Plan for Gaza

Key points of the proposal

• Responsibility for humanitarian aid in Gaza will pass from UNRWA and Hamas to a Humanitarian Directorate based on IDP cities and biometric certificates.

• In general, the Humanitarian Directorate coordinating the operations will be Israeli, but the IDP cities and the aid in the field will be managed autonomously from inside the IDP cities by the local population and the aid organizations, according to the customary standards of international aid agencies, with no Israeli intervention in day-to-day administration.  Aid missions will continue to be posted and funded as they are today, relying on the budgets of the various aid providers and not on an Israeli budget.

• Israel will be responsible for facilitating the system’s smooth, efficient operation. It will guard the perimeter of Israeli territory and of the crossings in the Gaza Strip outside the territory of the IDP cities.

• Financial responsibility will not rest with the Israeli taxpayer, but rather with international donors as is the case in Gaza today and in many of the world’s disaster areas.

• Civil and apolitical: The Humanitarian Directorate will have no political or diplomatic authority. Its role will be confined to the humanitarian plane.

• Proximity to the population, and control over aid, will also serve the objective of finding a realistic alternative to Hamas for the next phase of the Day After in Gaza.

• For security purposes, the IDF will retain complete freedom of operation throughout the Gaza Strip, including the humanitarian islands, under any scenario.

The difference from the current situation:

• “The allocating hand is the ruling hand”: The IDF will closely supervise the allocation of humanitarian aid, and it will deny UNRWA and Hamas control over the basic needs of the population, thus strengthening its ability to disempower Hamas and to oust UNRWA from Gaza.

• Proposing a horizon for the next phase of the war.

• Close supervision of aid in order to prevent Hamas or other gangs from taking control of the aid.

• Residents will enter with biometric certificates and undergo security checks and metal detection. Smuggling of weapons, and infiltration of Hamas or other hostile elements into the islands, will be prevented.

The model’s basic principles:

1. Setting up IDP cities in pre-defined areas, according to an accepted international model for disaster zones

Description: IDP cities with temporary housing in open sites, outside the existing urban areas where damage is heavy or where the Hamas system of civil control still exists, or where terrorist infrastructures have remained above ground or underground. Humanitarian aid will be distributed only within the system of IDP cities and by means of the mechanisms to be established inside them.

Construction: The cities will be constructed by the aid organizations, after the IDF has cleared and allocated areas. Israel will assist as needed.

The principle of open areas: The cities are to be set up in open areas only, and only after the IDF has checked and ensured that there are no openings of terrorist tunnels in the intended area. Keeping Hamas out of the IDP cities is a top priority. Any access for Hamas operatives through terrorist tunnels could mean significant harm to the objectives for which the Humanitarian Directorate and IDP cities are intended. There should be readiness for a scenario in which Hamas tries to militarily disrupt the orderly routine at the IDP cities.

Examples of proposed models that may be implemented immediately

It is recommended to proceed according to the familiar models. UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has published detailed recommendations for the size of the recommended camp, the size of each room or tent, and the recommended services such as health, education, food, water, sanitation, administration, safety, logistics, etc. for the period of residence set by the agency.

The guidelines are titled NARE – Needs Assessment for Refugee Emergencies and are intended to enable agencies to evaluate the local population’s requirements and, on that basis, to determine the appropriate aid operations. The agency stresses that this list is dynamic and individually adjusted rather than compulsory clause by clause in every case.

The agency evaluates a long list of criteria according to categories, including conditions of geography and climate, the age distribution of the population, the health situation, unescorted children, women living alone, the nature of existing services (health, policing, sanitation, government offices), the factors that endangered the population, the resources existing at the location, the available sites for setting up new infrastructures, etc. Among the criteria used is the basic WASH criterion — Water (safe for drinking), Sanitation, Hygiene.

For a summary of the agency’s NARE procedures, use the following link:

https://emergency.unhcr.org/coordination-and-communication/refugee-coordination-model/needs-assessment-refugee-emergencies-nare

And below is a link to the agency’s complete guide to the NARE procedures for assessing a population’s needs:

https://www.unhcr.org/handbooks/assessment/sites/assessment/files/2023-10/UNHCR%20Needs%20Assessment%20Handbook.pdf

See the test case appendixes covering Iraq and Afghanistan for successful implementations of the procedures.

Experience from existing IDP cities in the Gaza Strip: Note that already today IDP cities of a sort are being set up throughout the Gaza Strip, but they differ significantly from the model proposed here. Firstly, the proposed IDP cities will be well ordered and well planned; they will not need to be set up without forethought. Second, the cities will be free of Hamas control and therefore more likely to succeed. Subsequently the population is less likely to undergo continual relocation, chiefly because Hamas will be unable to exploit the humanitarian systems as it currently does and mount terrorist activity from those areas.

2. Establishment of the Humanitarian Directorate to serve as an administration responsible to the State Security Cabinet rather than to the IDF

Description: Transferring the responsibility for humanitarian aid distribution to the Gaza Humanitarian Directorate. Among the Directorate will be representatives of the IDF (including COGAT) and of the other security services, the government, and the international aid organizations.

Hierarchy: Each IDP city will interface with Israel’s General Humanitarian Coordination Authority.The General Humanitarian Coordination Authority will fill very limited roles, which will not include administration of the IDP cities’ internal affairs. Its roles will include:

• Coordinating the arrival of supplies

• Coordinating perimeter security

• Coordinating lists of residents and filtering Hamas operatives from them

• Coordinating the construction of new cities, defining the special areas for them, preparing them, and clearing them of underground infrastructures and other terrorist infrastructures

Management of the population: Each IDP city will be considered a separate temporary administrative territory, and its residents will receive biometric certificates unique to each IDP city, which will permit them to enter and receive humanitarian aid that is provided at the camp. Note that these are not identity cards; the residents are to use them to receive services, but not as a permanent solution. They will enable the population to be monitored as it passes through the crossings and will prevent operatives of Hamas and other terrorist organizations from entering.

In parallel, the operations of UNRWA in Gaza will be eliminated. Refugee certificates from UNRWA and identity cards from Hamas will be invalidated.

Local representation: In each IDP city, a local representative body will also be selected as is customary in the international model for IDP cities. The representative body’s purpose is to convey the residents’ needs to the aid organizations. The hope is that Israel will be minimally involved and its important role will be to enable the system to work properly. Foremost among its responsibilities, Israel will retain the job of ensuring that shipments of aid continue entering the Gaza Strip and reaching the refugee camps as needed.

Limitation of the mandate – Humanitarian but not political: It is important to understand that the humanitarian directorates play no political, diplomatic, or security role. Their mandate is solely humanitarian.The limitation on the Directorate’s sphere of activity will also make possible broader cooperation with the local population.

3. Splitting and zoning the Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip will be split and zoned according to the following operational principles:

1. Establishing a “perimeter zone” where the IDF will provide defensive security: the IDF will play no role inside the camps. Its presence in the zone will serve to prevent Hamas and other terrorist organizations from entering and assuming control. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the IDF will be free to operate throughout the Gaza Strip, including inside the camps, for purposes of counter-terrorism if necessary.
2. A system of corridors: Establishing a system of lengthwise and crosswise corridors that will divide the Gaza Strip and deny power to Hamas, like the Netzarim Corridor which isolates the northern Gaza Strip from the other parts and impedes Hamas from entrenching its power in the north. Such a system of corridors will oblige the residents who wish to travel from one part of the Gaza Strip to another to pass through an IDF monitoring system. The system of corridors will be helpful to the IDF’s perimeter defenses and to the prevention of significant infiltration by Hamas forces into the area of IDP cities, thus ensuring them conditions of personal safety and relatively smooth management of the humanitarian campaign.

Districting: The current situation in the Gaza Strip — Approaching territorial separation

A look at the current situation in the Gaza Strip indicates gradual but intensive IDF activity throughout the Gaza Strip with the intent of establishing territorial separation de facto. The policy could be called “districting,” or “engineering a change on the ground.” It lays the foundation for implementing a concept of the future, by engineering certain alterations in the field.

The Gaza Strip does not currently exist in its previous form. In practical reality, what exists is a series of separately controlled regions.

1. The Netzarim Corridor: From a dirt road at the start of the war, the Netzarim Corridor has expanded to cover a width of 7 km efficiently separating the northern and southern Gaza Strip.
2. The Philadelphi Corridor: Since capturing the Gazan–Egyptian border in May, the IDF has strengthened its control of the route and has established an infrastructure, paving a road and maintaining a continuous military presence. The IDF is estimated to control a width of hundreds of meters along the southern border.
3. Perimeter: There are now hundreds of meters of perimeter dividing the Gaza Strip from the neighboring Jewish communities. Since the start of the war, work has been in progress on evacuating the few buildings and infrastructures that were in this area — the clear majority of which was farmland — and creating a buffer zone. Elements from the IDF and from the civilian sector have been demanding establishment of a one-kilometer buffer zone, on the Gaza Strip side, since the start of the war.

Crossings

The plan must also rely on the operation of a set of crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

• The Erez Crossing, which also serves for pedestrian traffic and the delivery of goods;

• The Karni Crossing, including the old crossing for fuel in the Karni area;

• The Sufa Crossing, which has served in recent years for the passage of aggregates and building materials;

• The Kissufim Crossing; the Kerem Shalom Crossing, which has been serving for some months as an alternative to the Rafah Crossing for the entry of goods into the southern Gaza Strip.

Israeli supervision of the anchorage at the Gaza Port area — near the site where the Americans set up the floating dock — will also assist in Israel’s future control over the Gaza Strip, by helping to secure shipping lanes that will be drawn and controlled from a command center to be set up at Ashdod Port, turning the anchorage into a “branch” of the Israeli port.

4. Costs — Not at the expense of the Israeli taxpayer

From among all the alternatives that have been suggested, the proposed model for a Humanitarian Directorate is also what will impose the lowest financial burden on the Israeli taxpayer.

International aid organizations assume the budgetary and operational burden of distributing humanitarian aid in disaster areas worldwide. Similarly, Israel is not funding the humanitarian aid budget in the Gaza Strip today.

We acknowledge emphatically that according to a certain contention, the financial outlays devolving upon the State of Israel in any scenario where it controls Gaza, including a case of controlling nothing but humanitarian aid there, will be heavy and even reach the tens of billions of shekels a year. We adjudge that contention to be baseless.

We will be examining the various participants’ financial outlays in humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip and in test cases from the world’s disaster areas.

In the case of Gaza and in the other cases, broad participation has been enlisted internationally from aid organizations, human rights organizations, states, private donors, corporations, financial bodies, and other sources who have contributed many billions to humanitarian aid. The Israeli taxpayer will not bear the expenses of humanitarian aid.

The Gaza Strip — Financial outlays on humanitarian aid, October 2023 – October 2024

Between January and October 2024, the international financial aid for the purchase of humanitarian supplies to benefit the Palestinians (in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) amounted to roughly 2 billion dollars. In comparison to previous years, when donations amounted to roughly 1 billion dollars, the war generated a significant wave of international donations. A clear majority of the aid was donated by the world’s governments, led by the USA, the EU, Germany, and the UAE. Additional donations were received from a number of governments, mostly in Europe and the Arab world; from charitable foundations; from international aid organizations such as WFP and Oxfam; and from private donors and other organizations. We stress that the Israeli taxpayer is not included in the list of donors.

International funding for humanitarian aid for the Palestinians | Jan. 1, 2024 – Nov. 9, 2024

87.7% Governments

2.3% Private and corporate donors

4.9% NGOs and charities

4.3% International agencies

0.8% Others

Following is the breakdown of humanitarian aid donations in tons, by donating body:

Remarks, advantages, and disadvantages

Remarks:

• Applying the model of a humanitarian directorate without political authority, as described above, will — in contrast to a model of martial law, for example, or any model of Israeli rule — maximize the chances for continued cooperation with the various players in all the categories mentioned above.

• The proposed model can minimize the theft of aid by Hamas, bring maximum aid to the population while increasing efficiency, and afford the aid workers more safety. All this will lead, in turn, to an increase in the aid actually reaching the residents.

• Administrative costs — Whereas martial law requires the establishment of an entire apparatus of authority — from the level of management and political guidance to the level of operations, and involving the costs of implementation on the ground — the Humanitarian Directorate is a very lean model. The Humanitarian Directorate requires only the capability of coordination, and Israeli authority will remain minimal during the interim phase. Thus, for example, Israel will not be responsible for trash collection but will active in coordination, facilitation, and assistance.

The model’s advantages

1. This is a recognized international model backed by broad experience — Many IDP cities have been constructed around the world over the years — for example, in Pakistan, Turkiye, Uganda, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as elsewhere.
2. International and local resistance is minor — Applying the model of a humanitarian directorate without political authority, as above, will — unlike the military administration, for example, or any model of Israeli authority — maximize the chances for continued cooperation with the various players in all the categories previously mentioned. The Directorate, having (as noted) no political authority, will be defined as temporary and will involve the local population, as well as the aid organizations, in the work of administration.
3. Minimizing looting by Hamas — Efficiently delivering the maximum amount of aid to the population and increasing the safety of the aid workers.
4. Finding and developing local elements with the potential to cooperate constructively in the future as well — The local forces that will be deployed as representatives inside the IDP cities may potentially assume a more active role in the Gazan leadership of the Day After as well. Today Israel has difficulty establishing ties with elements that are able and willing to assume leadership, are considered legitimate in their locality, and are opposed to or independent of Hamas. Because Hamas has been totally and cruelly dominant in the Gaza Strip, such voices have refrained from presenting themselves and in the rare cases when they did receive publicity, those same possible alternative elements met fierce and even murderous responses from Hamas.1 In this connection, the IDP cities and the need for local leadership to administer humanitarian tasks can constitute an opportunity for establishing such ties.
5. Denying power to Hamas — It is important to remember this at every step of the way, because every part of the program has the objective of removing another link from the chain of powers possessed by Hamas. The growth of a new local leadership, detached from Hamas, is an important part of the program.
6. The State of Israel is confronting heavy international pressure to return the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and establish a Palestinian state in the context of a “two-state solution” as the “only possible” solution to the conflict. For want of available alternatives in Palestinian society today, as well as a lack of imagination and patience, the countries of the world believe that strengthening the PA is integral to the path that will finally lead to the Palestinian state that they wish to promise their home constituency. In the Gaza Security and Recovery Program that we have composed, we deal at length with those two issues. First, why the PA is no partner for any plan that enables a peace-loving state to be established alongside Israel but is rather a feeble, corrupt supporter and funder of terrorism which cannot be returned to Gaza at this point and is definitely not wanted there either.2

The second question has to do with a Palestinian state. Here too, our paper deals at length with a long-term possibility envisioning a multi-stage program which, if implemented patiently and successfully, could bring the ascendency of a different Palestinian leadership, one uninfected by hatred and by support of terrorism. A generation inculcated with different principles and embodying different possibilities. The objectives of all the participants from western nations, from moderate Sunni Arab nations, and from Israel are similar. A benign Palestinian entity, one that does not dedicate itself wholeheartedly to the endless cycle of violence and bloodshed, to plundering humanitarian aid, and to no building of any beneficial economy or social structure. A benign, stable entity that will build an economy and cooperate with the West and with the moderate states. Our program seeks to create all that, over time. First by implementing the interim phase and then by implementing the full Gaza Security and Recovery Program.

Disadvantages of a military administration versus the Humanitarian Directorate

1. The phrase “military administration,” even if referring to a temporary humanitarian mechanism, is loaded with negative connotations for a range of relevant target audiences — for the Palestinian population, and for potential partners both in the West and in the Arab world. In addition, it is reasonable to expect that re-institution of martial law in the Gaza Strip would be opposed by more than a few Israelis, for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, the lack of international support would leave Israel to shoulder all the expenses, would increase the pressure on Israel to leave Gaza or to agree to conditions unfavorable to Israel, and would further the delegitimation campaign against Israel on the grounds of “military occupation.”
2. Legal complexities could gradually embroil the implementation of a military administration. A Humanitarian Directorate can be gradually instituted in any number of steps, as long as it is possible to set up one IDP city after another. The quick establishment of a military administration is a challenge, because of the legal complexity, and therefore it may be assumed unlikely to come about speedily and unreasonable to foresee before the end of the intensive warfare throughout the Gaza Strip.
3. Temporariness — A temporary model may turn permanent over time. However, if the intent is to find an optimal model for the interim phase, then the Humanitarian Directorate will naturally advance Israeli interests much better than a return to military administration would.

Appendixes

Appendix A

UNHCR’s procedures of evaluating the humanitarian needs of a population in disaster areas

For a summary of the agency’s NARE procedures, use the following link:

https://emergency.unhcr.org/coordination-and-communication/refugee-coordination-model/needs-assessment-refugee-emergencies-nare

And below is a link to the agency’s complete guide to the NARE procedures for assessing a population’s needs:

https://www.unhcr.org/handbooks/assessment/sites/assessment/files/2023-10/UNHCR%20Needs%20Assessment%20Handbook.pdf

Appendix B

The successful Iraqi case study for the UNHCR procedures

The willingness of Arab states to host large numbers of refugees with limited rights has been illustrated by their response to the Iraqi refugee crisis since 2003. The Iraq response has been highlighted as a testing ground for UNHCR’s new approach to protecting and assisting urban refugees, and has been thoroughly profiled elsewhere. In general, UNHCR’s experience has been regarded as a relative success, in that protection space was expanded beyond early expectations, especially in view of the fact that the key host states are not parties to the Refugee Convention and are opposed to local integration of refugees.

Although governments did open some services to refugees in the fields of education and health, the response to the Iraqi refugee crisis was in others ways to strengthen the preexisting UNHCR surrogate state. UNHCR experimented with new means of directly delivering food and monetary assistance to needy refugees and carried out reception and registration. Whether services were delivered by governments or UNHCR, much of this success has been attributed to the high interest of donors and resettlement states in the Iraqi refugee issue, allowing UNHCR to mobilize considerable resources for responsibility sharing3.

Appendix C

International financial mass donations for disaster and conflict areas

Executive Summary

In the relief efforts after major natural disasters and in recent conflict zones, a number of different types of donors have contributed. These generally have included national governments, regional organizations, major corporations and individual donations, donations from religious organisations and humanitarian aid organisations.

Given the estimates that any involvement in Gaza would entail massive expenditures for the Israeli tax-payer, it is important to underline that in none of the following cases did the expenses related to humanitarian aid borne by the disaster-affected country.

The following What follows is an overview of the the donors to the relief in the following major conflict areas and natural disasters: – t

• The Turkey-Syria earthquake in 2023, t

• The Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022-),

• Haiti earthquake relief in 2010 and t

• The Indian Ocean Earthquake in 2004.

Turkey/Syria earthquake in 2023 – Humanitarian Response

National Governments and Regional Organizations

A number of national governments contributed to the relief. Regional organizations also included: ASEAN, the Arab League and NATO.

Humanitarian Aid Organisation Donations

Major humanitarian donors to the Turkey-Syria earthquake relief in 2023 included the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam GB, Syria Relief, the World Health Organization and World Vision International. Various UN programs donated including United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

Corporate Donations

A number of corporate donors made sizable contributions. These included:

• Kraft Heinz who donated $500,000 through the Red Cross to support humanitarian aid efforts in Turkey and Syria.

• Starbucks gave $1 million to nonprofits focused on providing immediate relief and aid.

• Boeing gave a $500,000 donation through the American Red Cross and match dollar-for-dollar donations from employees.

• Uber made a $100 million donation to local nonprofit Ahbap.

Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Major humanitarian donors to Ukraine have been:

ActionAid International, Catholic Relief Services, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, the Polish Red Cross, the Salvation Army and the Slovak Humanitarian Council.

Corporate donations

Boeing, Visa, Mastercard, IBM, Johnson and Johnson, Pfizer, Caterpillar, Delta amongst other major corporations all committed humanitarian contributions at the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council in Washington D.C., on Monday, March 14, 2022. Boeing committed US$2 Million to support the humanitarian Response in Ukraine. The Visa Foundation provide a $2 million grant. Mastercard announced a $2 million contribution to the Red Cross, Save the Children and their own employee assistance fund for humanitarian relief.

IBM employees around the world were encouraged to continue making donations to the International Red Cross towards humanitarian relief in Ukraine. Pfizer provided a total of $2M US in humanitarian grant funding to UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), American Red Cross, International Medical Corps and International Rescue Committee (The IRC) through The Pfizer Foundation*.

Haiti Earthquake relief 2010

Regional organization donations

The European Council and its member nations later announced more than €429 million for Haiti relief efforts. The EU pledged €122 million in humanitarian assistance. The Union of South American Nations also pledged US$300,000,000 to help rebuild Haiti in the long term.

Corporate Donations

In coordination with the Kenya Red Cross, Kenya Airways—the country’s largest airline and flag carrier—raised money for earthquake relief efforts by collecting donations on local and international flights. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, an international pharmaceutical company headquartered in Israel which is the world’s largest generic drug manufacturer, donated over $7 million worth of medication.

Several days after the earthquake, Deutsche Bank announced that it would donate 100 percent of net US agency equity trading commissions on January 15 to the humanitarian cause. The initiative raised approximately US$4,000,000. Nestle gave $1,000,000 in bottled water donations.

Worldwide Fundraising Events and Donations from Individuals

Organisers of the 2010 Australian Open, a day prior to the tournament opening, held a quickly organised event called “Hit for Haiti” conceived by tennis star Roger Federer to raise funds.

Jennifer Aniston announced a donation of US$500,000 to Doctors Without Borders, Partners in Health and Americares. Leonardo DiCaprio donated US$1,000,000. Queen Elizabeth II made a donation to the relief effort and issued a personal message of condolence to the President of Haiti. Tiger Woods donated US$3,000,000.

Response by online communities

Various online communities raised considerable funds. Following the earthquake of January 12 2010, Users of online community Avaaz had raised over US$800,000 as soon as January 16. Reddit users had raised over US$178,000 by February 15 of that year.

Indian Ocean Earthquake 2004 Major Donors

National Governments and Regional Organizations

National Governments and regional organizations including the African Union, and the European Union to the relief efforts. The EU provided immediate emergency aid of €3M (US$4.1M) for victims to meet “initial vital needs”, with more substantial aid (€30M) to be provided later. This is separate from contributions by individual member countries. The African Union Commission Chairman Alpha Oumar Konaré announced that the organisation would put forward US$100,000 towards disaster relief.

Religious Organisation Donors

Jewish Organisations

Religious organizations provided major donations and this group included numerous Jewish organisations. The American Jewish Committee established a Tsunami Relief Fund, and initially allocated US$60,000 out of its own account. It subsequently raised an additional US$450,000. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee collected more than US$2M in individual contributions to the organisation’s non-sectarian South Asia Tsunami Relief mailbox. With US$3.25 million raised, The American Jewish World Service focussed efforts on providing direct material relief to the poorest families in affected areas, including providing food, water storage containers, cooking supplies, blankets and temporary shelters and partnering with Direct Relief International to provide immediate shipments of basic medical supplies, water purification materials and oral rehydration therapies to the heavily affected communities in India and Sri Lanka. Just 24 hours after United Jewish Communities Federation of Greater Toronto opened its Tsunami Relief Fund, the fund had raised more than C$150,000 from over 500 donors. The United Jewish Association commissioned two quarter-page ads in the New York Times, raising at least US$500,000 in support of South Asian Tsunami victims. The British group, World Jewish Aid, initially providing £25,000, working with partners on the ground in India, Indonesia and other affected areas so to realise where their aid should be directed best.

Other religious organisations

Catholic Relief Services mounted one of the largest responses in its history – a $190-million, five-year relief and reconstruction effort that would help more than 600,000 people. CRS had more than 350 employees working in the hardest-hit areas in India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Islamic Relief Worldwide increased its emergency appeal to US$5M. This included an initial US$270,650 for relief and rehabilitation intervention in the region, and US$27,000 to meet the immediate needs of victims in Sri Lanka. The Mennonite Central Committee responded with more than US$15 million in immediate and long term assistance[153] They completed their disaster response in Indonesia in July 2008 after spending US$10 million for recovery in Aceh.

Humanitarian Aid Organizations

Médecins Sans Frontières dispatched 32 tonnes of relief supplies to Sumatra. Medical and assessment teams were sent to many of the affected areas. In Geneva, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies appealed for CHF 7.5M (about US$6.6M) for “immediate support” to an estimated 500,000 survivors.

Within days of the tsunami, Mercy Corps rushed emergency responders and relief supplies to the devastated coastal region of Aceh, Indonesia – the closest landmass to the epicenter of the quake. Mercy Corps delivered emergency food to over 288,000 survivors, hygiene supplies to more than 253,000, and building materials to construct more than 500 temporary shelters. Cash-for-work programs cleared debris from over 13,000 hectares of public and agricultural land and 50 kilometers of road, and got money flowing back into the decimated local economy.

In India, Oxfam directed its aid to four regions including the communities of Cuddalore, Nagapattinam, Kanyakumari, and along the southwest coast of Kerala. The agency put together a US$13.3M plan to provide immediate relief for people in those regions as well as offer them longer-term assistance to help rebuild their lives and livelihoods. The plan included digging latrines, repairing water sources, and providing temporary shelter for up to 60,000 people, as well as distributing essential household items such as soap, buckets, and coconut oil. In Sri Lanka, Oxfam was appointed as a key organisation to provide clean water and sanitation facilities in the northern part of the country. Staff members in four field offices

World Vision completed the final stage of its three-year Asia Tsunami Response (Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand). The US$346.5 million-organization’s largest relief effort-program encompassed emergency relief, community rehabilitation (including child-focused programs), livelihood recovery, and infrastructure rehabilitation. Gender, protection, conflict sensitivity, HIV/AIDS and advocacy were cross-cutting components of World Vision’s response.

Corporate Donations

Again, a number of major companies made donations to the relief effort.

These included: Pfizer who made a total US$35M contribution ($10M cash; $25M medicines), Deutsche Bank (US$13M), Coca-Cola (US$10M), ExxonMobil (US$5M), Microsoft (US$3.5M).

To conclude

All of these incidents had the support of national governments and varied intergovernmental regional organisations. Religious communities and corporations make substantial contributions, whether to the recovery following natural disasters or for conflict recovery efforts, such as in Ukraine.

הפוסט The Gaza Humanitarian Islands Plan Interim Phase הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

• Israel has broken the 11 month-long stalemate on its northern border by launching an all-out campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. This has included over 4,000 airstrikes, the elimination of the vast majority of the terror group’s leadership including Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and a limited ground incursion to confiscate weapons and remove the threat of attack tunnels.
• This followed Hezbollah’s unprovoked attacks that commenced on October 8, 2023, defined by the terrorist group as a “Lebanese support front” of Hamas’ October 7 massacre. Hezbollah has so far fired over 10,000 missiles, rockets, anti-tank missiles, and drones at Israel, triggering the evacuation of over 60,000 Israelis from 43 communities in the north, now displaced for over a year.
• Being Iran’s protégé, Hezbollah has been benefiting from economic support and advanced weapons from Tehran, posing a significant threat on Israel as a frontal Iranian base, impacting the balance of power in the region and strengthening Iran’s Shiite axis.
• During the first 11 months of the war, Israel’s tit-for-tat policy maintained a defensive posture in the north, to allow the IDF to focus on the Gaza front.
• Since mid-September, however, Israel’s renewed momentum has ushered in an opportunity to revise the war objectives into not only obtaining a ceasefire while enforcing UN resolution 1701, thus bringing the displaced Israeli residents back to their homes, but decimating Hezbollah in Lebanon, leading to the De-Iranization of Lebanon, thereby weakening Iran’s radical axis and advancing pro-Western forces in the region.
• This paper overviews the Hezbollah threat as part of Iran’s radical axis, and brings policy recommendations to the post-war end state in Lebanon. This includes a new reality in Lebanon with no Iranian influence, an amended 1701 that includes international forces with a clear mandate to demilitarize South Lebanon, preventing Hezbollah from rearming, and monitoring the Syrian border and the Beirut airport to prevent Iran from smuggling weapons into the country.
• This new reality could possibly bring about a new dynamic between Israel and Lebanon, that has been defined for the past half a century by foreign elements – Palestinian group Fatah’s takeover of South Lebanon, and pro-Iranian Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon.

Introduction

Following an 11 month-long stalemate, during which Israel focused the bulk of its war efforts on the Gaza front, the Lebanon front facing Hezbollah’s threat and terrorist attacks took a sharp turn. On October 8, 2023, Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah launched an unprovoked campaign against Israel as a “war of support” of Hamas’ October 7 atrocities and the ensuing war, attacking its citizens with non-relenting fire. On September 17, 2024, Israel broke the stalemate and its tit-for-tat policy and defensive posture, and doubled down on the Hezbollah threat. This sophisticated and coordinated effort went as far as redefining modern warfare while exceeding the expectations of numerous security experts. Israel has defined a clear war objective to bring the 60 thousand displaced residents of towns evacuated in northern Israel back to their homes.

Up until that point, Israel maintained a defensive posture towards Lebanon, as well as towards Judea and Samaria, the Houthis, and the Iranian regime. Israel has avoided taking proactive initiatives and an all-out war in these theaters, aware of its operational limitations to conduct multifront warfare. Now, as the Gaza theater has reached a certain “war routine” and an operational opportunity in Lebanon was reached, Israel has discarded its much-criticized reactive, defensive approach, and launched an all-out offensive on Hezbollah.

During the first 11 months of the conflict, after Hezbollah joined forces with Hamas to launch a self-defined “attrition war” on October 8 – the day following the October 7 massacre – Israel has seen over 10,000 attacks by Hezbollah on its northern regions. Hezbollah has fired missiles, rockets, Iranian attack drones of the same type that Iran provides Russia for its illegal invasion of Ukraine, anti-tank missiles, alongside other munitions. Israel evacuated over 60,000 residents from 43 communities, and the situation has remained unchanged ever since.

Upon the commencement of Operation Summer Arrows, Israel launched over 4,000 airstrikes, a ground incursion into Lebanese border towns that contained attack tunnels and significant military infrastructure and equipment designated for the elite Radwan unit to attack northern Israel, and reportedly carried out a beeper and walkie talkie explosion operation that incapacitated thousands of its militants. Israel also eliminated the bulk of Hezbollah’s senior leadership including notorious long-time Secretary General of the terrorist group, Hassan Nasrallah, and apparently also his successor Hashem Safi Al-Din, Hezbollah’s chief military official Fadi Shukur, and other officials. Many of them also had blood of American and French soldiers on their hands due to their involvement in the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, killing 241 US military personnel and 58 French paratroopers, and were involved in the 1992 and 1994 bombings against the Jewish community in Buenos Aires.

Unification of fronts: No longer “Defender of Iran”

Hamas’ attack on October 7 was followed by a multifront Iranian-led campaign against Iran, which rendered the framing of the war into not only an Israel-Hamas war as part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but an Israel-Iran war. Hezbollah has framed its involvement in the war as a “war of support” of their fellow members of the “axis of resistance” in Gaza, making a non-negligible contribution to the efforts to distract Israeli resources and attention. This has been part of the Iranian strategy of unification of fronts, integrating war efforts on multiple theaters aimed at distracting and exhausting Israel’s war focus.

Nasrallah himself, calling it the “Lebanese support front”, bragged on multiple occasions about the intensity of the military effort by Hezbollah that makes use of novel missiles and continuously “exhausts” Israel with an “attrition war”. The escalation during the summer made Nasrallah declare a new regional dynamic.

Therefore, the offensive military campaign initiated by Israel to tackle this threat holds the potential of not only significantly diminishing Hezbollah’s capabilities and relevance, but by extension, affecting other fronts as well. Significant gains on the Lebanon front can affect Sinwar’s decisions in Gaza vis-à-vis consenting to a significant hostage deal in more favorable conditions to Israel.

Crucially, Hezbollah was established from the outset as an Iranian proxy designed to fundamentally alter the regional Shiite balance of power confronting Israel and force Israel to recalculate her defensive and deterrent postures. Israel has no claims nor conflict with Lebanon, that used to be considered the Switzerland of the Middle East and an obvious candidate to make peace with Israel, yet Fatah’s takeover of South Lebanon, followed by Iran’s takeover of the country have fundamentally deteriorated relations and created the conditions for the present state of war.

Iran established Hezbollah as its protégé in the 1980s in Lebanon, during the First Lebanon War with Israel and the IDF’s permanent presence in Lebanon, following years of non-relenting Palestinian terrorism initiated by Arafat’s Fatah movement on northern Israeli townships. It quickly gained a foothold in the country as it filled the vacuum that was left by the many years that the country was torn apart by deadly civil wars. It has since become one of the world’s richest and most well-equipped militia groups, armed with Iranian advanced weapons and with self-manufacturing capabilities, and has since evolved into a powerful political group that effectively controls Lebanon. The official government bows to Hezbollah’s – and by extension Iran’s – will.

Hezbollah had enjoyed an annual budget of over $1 billion, of which around $700 million originate in Iran, and reportedly held over 150 thousand projectiles including precision-guided missiles, rockets, attack drones, among others. In addition, Hezbollah nurtured the elite Radwan force for its masterplan to take over the Galilee region of Israel, conquering towns and taking hostages in a form reminiscent of Hamas’ October 7 massacre.[1]

Hezbollah has also established a political party, which has made significant gains in the Lebanese politics as part of the March 8 camp, gaining many seats in parliament and forming a part of the government.

To preclude a potential Israeli attack on Iran, it became clear that the powerful Hezbollah would be activated, raining down thousands of missiles, rockets, and drones on Israeli cities every day, thus significantly complicating the options for Israeli decision-makers. Nasrallah has positioned himself as the “Defender of Lebanon”, yet now his organization has increasingly become the “Defender of Iran”.

Now, as the Hezbollah card has been weakened substantially, Israel has a much freer hand to act in Iran itself. Israel pledged to do In the aftermath of the 181 ballistic missiles that Iran fired on Israel on October 1, Israel pledged to retaliate against Iran.  Given that Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders vowed not to allow Iran to ever obtain nuclear weapons, and with Hezbollah compromised enough to prevent it from deterring Isreal, it creates more leeway for Israel to seize the opportunity and tackle the Iranian nuclear program head-on, if it so chooses.

Policy recommendations

Revised war objectives

The updated circumstances on the Lebanon front now present Israel and the international community with an opportunity to revise the war objectives, from moderating Hezbollah’s willingness to launch attacks and enforce UN resolution 1701, to outright decimating Hezbollah and usher in a new era in the history of war-torn Lebanon. Weakening Hezbollah, even taking the Hezbollah card off the table, will also mark a significant blow to the Iranian axis and the pro-Shiite forces in the region.

Israel’s allies, first among them the United States, have advised Israel against “escalation” and to accept a ceasefire, during which a final arrangement will be negotiated. However, Israel has given every opportunity for diplomacy over 11 months of unprovoked conflict and escalation initiated by Iran and its proxy Hezbollah. Multiple voices in Lebanon disapproved of Iran and Hezbollah’s aggression as well, rejecting their country’s sacrifice as a pawn in the Iranian masterplan of the Middle East. Israel has also agreed to settle for the enforcement of UN resolution 1701, though UNIFIL has proven itself ineffective in tackling the grave threat to Israeli civilians and carrying out its mandate to ensure no Hezbollah forces are allowed in South Lebanon.

This is all taking place in the context of the last time that Israel relied upon international diplomacy to secure its northern border, resulting in the aforementioned UN Resolution 1701 and led to Israel vacating south Lebanon in 2006. The result was that less than 20 years later, Hezbollah has significantly enhanced its capabilities, and embedded itself along Israel’s borders and right under UNIFIL’s watchtowers.  UNFIL and UN Resolution 1701 were designed to avoid the exact war that we are now in and has cost numerous Israeli and Lebanese lives.

Therefore, Israel’s intense effort to uproot the Hezbollah threat is designed to create significantly enhanced conditions for stability along the Israel-Lebanon border after decades of war, and to augment diplomacy with assertive military actions.

Israel is therefore facing a trifold challenge:

• Crushing Hezbollah’s military capabilities
• Preventing it from rearming and redeploying its forces in South Lebanon
• Ushering in a new reality in Lebanon

The following are advised as Israel’s updated strategic war objectives:

1. Outright decimation of Hezbollah as a relevant fighting force while continuing to pound its military infrastructure, weapon silos, attack tunnels alongside operatives and senior officials.
2. Denying Hezbollah the possibility to rearm by one of the given scenarios.
3. Bringing the displaced Israeli residents back to their homes in the north, after having been evacuated for over a year due to Hezbollah’s unprovoked attack, by securing the northern border while selecting one of the given scenarios below. IDF presence will likely be required for the foreseeable future, until an enforceable international arrangement or other tenable arrangement can be forged, driving a wedge between northern communities and Lebanese territory.
4. Generating international support for securing a long-term international arrangement in Lebanon that would further promote political and social stability in the country while empowering non-violent factions.

End-state for the future – a post-war arrangement

Unless a dramatic, fundamental shift takes place in Lebanon, achieving these objectives will not be possible. Lebanon has to regain its sovereignty and assume absolute control over the use of force from its territory.

The following are advised as strategic, long-term guidelines for the final post-war status in Lebanon:

1. ‘De-Iranization’ of Lebanon: Dismantling all Hezbollah organizational infrastructure and destroying the bulk of its military capabilities. All Iranian domestic influence in Lebanon must become a thing of the past, much like the ’de-Sovietization’ of Eastern Europe following the fall of the USSR. Weakening the Shiite factions loyal to Iran while strengthening other factions should be the top international priority. This is a golden opportunity to uproot the corrosive Iranian influence in Lebanon once and for all, especially given the wide-ranging dismay by loyal Lebanese at the Iranian hijacking of Lebanon, and of Hezbollah’s aggression toward Israel, by leading Lebanese politicians and multiple voices from among the Lebanese general public.
2. Enforcement of UN resolution 1559: This 2004 resolution called for the disarmament of Hezbollah and any other armed militias in Lebanon, and for free and fair elections.
3. Ushering in a new political era in Lebanon: Hezbollah, the Shiite faction loyal to Iran, has effectively taken control of this highly-diverse country, containing multiple ethnic groups e.g. Sunni, Christian, Druze, and others, breaking the subtle balance that has long shaped Lebanese politics and society. Holding an election for president as well as broad support to outright reject any pro-Iranian presence in Lebanese politics, reminiscent of the de-Russification of Ukrainian politics, is vital to prevent Lebanon from continuing to be used as a pawn in the Iranian regional game. Anti-Iranian factions from the March 14 camp should therefore be empowered.

The following are advised as specific military objectives for the post-war arrangement:

1. Demilitarization of South Lebanon: This area closest to the Israeli border has been a launchpad for continuous attacks on Israel and threat on the residents of the north. Any scenario from total evacuation of the pro-Iran Shiite population to excessive and efficient military presence is necessary to enforce this objective.
2. Securing the Lebanon-Syria border: This pathway has enabled the continuous militarization of Lebanon with arms smuggled from Iran. As from 2011, Israel has been pounding weapon deliveries and silos in Syria to prevent advanced weapons, or any weapons to flow from Syria to Lebanon. Any post-war arrangement must include proper and efficient screening of any and all goods flowing from Syria to Lebanon through land crossings in order to prevent these arms smuggling from continuing.
3. Securing the Beirut Hariri International Airport: This airport could be used to smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon. Proper and effective screening of any and all goods arriving at the airport is imperative to prevent Iran from abusing it.
4. Training and empowering of the Lebanese Military to position it as the only armed force in Lebanon, possibly with international support.

Operational scenarios to enforce the renewed security dynamics in Lebanon

With the objective to carry out de-Iranization in Lebanon and deny Hezbollah the ability to rearm, the following scenarios should be considered with their potential pros and cons:

1. Amended UN resolution 1701: The existing resolution failed to achieve its preliminary objective to deny Hezbollah presence in southern Lebanon (see: IDSF Research Department – What is UN Security Council Resolution 1701?). Therefore, a robust upgrade to this resolution is needed, inter alia in form of strengthening it with more “teeth”. The UN forces have to be replaced by a force that has a clearer mission and mandate to enforce it rather than the current form of UNIFIL. In addition, land crossings in and to Syria must be monitored.
2. Buffer Zone in South Lebanon: A buffer zone should be established in South Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah or any other armed group to ever pose a direct ground threat to Israel. IDF soldiers must be part of this new reality, in one form or another. It is to be determined whether all Shiite population should be evacuated from the area close to the border with Israel in South Lebanon, to prevent a future direct fire threat on the part of a pro-Iranian group from ever metastasizing again.
3. Potential deployment of international forces around Lebanon, akin to NATO’s Yugoslavian model: Following the Balkan wars, a once-war torn region in Yugoslavia has become relatively quiet and enjoying tourism and prosperity, despite existing tensions. Assisting Lebanon to rise from the current dynamics and enforce the disarmament of militia groups in the country can be done by means of NATO or other international forces securing South Lebanon, land crossings in and to Syria, the Beirut international airport, possibly even dividing the country into segments while enforcing inter-faction social stability.
4. The international community, including the European Union and the UN, should follow the lead of the United States and recognize Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist group.

UNIFIL’s failure to enforce peace and security in South Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in 1978 to oversee Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon and assist in restoring peace. However, since the 2006 Lebanon War, its mandate has expanded, including disarming Hezbollah and monitoring the Blue Line. Despite peaking at over 10,000 personnel, UNIFIL has largely become ineffective, constrained by Hezbollah’s increasing influence in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has systematically undermined UNIFIL by creating no-go zones and using civilian fronts, like environmental groups, to disguise military installations, restricting the peacekeeping force’s movement and ability to enforce its mandate. UNIFIL’s symbolic presence has failed to prevent Hezbollah’s growing military buildup, leaving it powerless to fulfill its core objectives, thereby ensure northern Israel is not threatened by a direct invasion of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces nor any of its rocket capabilities.

UNIFIL’s operational limitations are further evidenced by specific incidents where its personnel were blocked, ambushed, or even killed while attempting to patrol key areas. Hezbollah has consistently restricted UNIFIL’s freedom of movement, making critical zones inaccessible, which has allowed the group to expand its military infrastructure unchecked. The strategic manipulation by Hezbollah, combined with legal loopholes and local power structures, has turned UNIFIL into a passive observer, unable to disarm Hezbollah or maintain peace. Any effective post-war arrangement between Israel and Lebanon must significantly boost the capabilities to prevent Hezbollah’s rearming in South Lebanon.

Background: The trajectory of the war in the northern front

IDF operation in Lebanon 8th of October 2023 – September 17th 2024

In the aftermath of the October 7th attacks by Hamas, Hezbollah began launching rockets, attack drones and anti-tank missiles into northern Israel. At that time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were primarily focused on responding to the immediate threats in the south. Recognizing the potential for Hezbollah to initiate a similar large-scale ground attack by its elite Radwan force, the Israeli cabinet made the strategic decision to balance the deployment of ground forces by mobilizing several divisions to the northern border. On October 16, Israel began evacuating 43 communities with 61 thousand residents along the northern border to mitigate the risk. From that point until September 17, 2024, the IDF maintained a defensive posture in the north, carefully balancing its response to Hezbollah’s provocations in order to avoid escalating the conflict into a full-scale war for several strategic reasons.

Focusing on Gaza

On October 7th, Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, killing 1,211 civilians and capturing 250 hostages.^[2] This unprecedented assault caught the Israeli government and military off guard both in terms of intelligence and operational readiness. Lacking a pre-established strategy for handling a crisis of this scale, Israel’s leadership decided to focus its full diplomatic, military, and logistical resources on the Gaza front, opting not to divert significant efforts to other potential threats or additional fronts at that time.

Smaller Army

Between 2006 and 2023, the IDF underwent significant changes in its size and composition, reflecting shifts in military strategy, budget priorities, and technological advancements. This period saw a reduction in the number of divisions, tanks, and active combat soldiers, as the IDF adapted to new security challenges and emphasized high-tech capabilities over sheer land manpower and heavy equipment. Below is a focused comparison of the IDF’s size in terms of divisions, tanks, and active combat soldiers in 2006 and 2023.

Comparison Summary (2006 vs. 2023):

• Divisions: Shrunk from around 15 in 2006 to 10 in 2023.
• Tanks: Decreased from around 3,800 in 2006 to 1,650 in 2023.
• Active Combat Soldiers: Reduced from approximately 186,500 in 2006 to around 170,000 in 2023.[3]

Key Reasons for the Shrinking of the IDF:

• Strategic Shift:

Israel’s military strategy shifted from preparing for large-scale conventional wars with neighboring states to handling asymmetric threats like Hamas and Hezbollah. This led to a focus on mobility, special forces, intelligence, and precision air strikes rather than heavy armored divisions.

• Technological Advancements:

The IDF invested heavily in missile defense (e.g., Iron Dome), cyber warfare, intelligence, drones, and precision-guided munitions. This allowed the IDF to maintain effectiveness while reducing its reliance on manpower and heavy equipment like tanks.

• Budget Constraints:

Defense budgets have seen some constraints over the years, with more resources allocated to advanced technologies, missile defense, and air superiority, leading to cuts in traditional ground forces and large tank divisions.

This reduction reflects a broader trend in the IDF’s evolution toward smaller, more agile forces, leveraging advanced technology and air power, and a shift away from the large-scale conventional warfare model that dominated Israeli military thinking in the earlier decades.

Due to this strategy’s implementation, the IDF did not have the number of forces needed to fight full scale wars in Gaza and in Lebanon. Therefore, the first 11 months of the war were focused on the Gaza front, and the Lebanese front remained a defensive front.

11 months of Defensive war with Hezbollah

Over the course of the 11-month conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, an unofficial status quo emerged, dictating the scale and depth of each side’s responses. Both parties appeared to calibrate their reactions based on the size and impact of the other’s attacks. For instance, when Hezbollah launched a rocket that struck 5 miles into Israeli territory, Israel would retaliate proportionately within a similar range. Similarly, if Hezbollah conducted a larger-scale missile barrage, Israel’s response would be significantly more forceful. At a certain point, the IDF announced that it was shifting its tactics to pre-emptive strikes of militants preparing for rocket launches, and elimination of senior officials to gradually undermine Hezbollah’s command and control. As per this shift, senior officials were eliminated, such as Wisam A-Tawil, commander of the Radwan forces, on January 8, 2024; and Talib Abdullah, commander of the Nasser unit, on June 11, 2024.

Throughout the conflict, Hezbollah largely set the pace, having initiated hostilities by declaring war against Israel on October 8, 2023. Their actions, as per instructions from Tehran, dictated the escalation and nature of the exchanges.

Hezbollah attacks

During the stalemate period, Hezbollah shot into Israel approximately 9,800 rockets, missiles and drones, mostly into northern Israel including the upper galilee, Western galilee, and the Golan Heights. 25 IDF soldiers and 23 civilians lost their lives. Over 62,000 Israeli citizens from 43 different communities were evacuated during that time period.

Notable attacks:

• The constant barrage of missile attacks on northern Israeli towns in 2024 has caused widespread devastation and forced the evacuation of entire communities. Cities like Metula and Kiryat Shmona, close to the Lebanese border, have been hit particularly hard by Hezbollah’s relentless rocket fire. Over 50% of the houses in Metula were damaged, with many homes completely destroyed, while Kiryat Shmona suffered severe damage to 40% of its residential structure The intensity of the attacks and the threat the drones pose to Israel’s air defense systems forced thousands of residents to flee southward to escape the danger. These attacks have not only destroyed infrastructure but have also disrupted daily life, with schools, businesses, and public services coming to a standstill. The humanitarian crisis continues as Israel struggles to defend its northern border and protect civilians from further harm.
• Majdal Shams massacre -The Majdal Shams massacre occurred on July 27th 2024 when a Hezbollah missile struck a soccer field in the Israeli-Druze town of Majdal Shams, located in the Golan Heights. The missile hit during a children’s soccer game, killing 12 young kids and injuring dozens more. The attack shocked both local and international communities, as it targeted and murdered children.
• Arab al Aramshe drone attack – The Arab al-Aramshe drone attack occurred on April 17, 2024, when a Hezbollah drone struck a community center in the Israeli-Bedouin village of Arab al-Aramshe, located near the Israel-Lebanon border. The attack injured at least 18 people, including 14 Israeli soldiers and 4 civilians​
• Kfar Yuval anti-tank missile attack – The Kfar Yuval anti-tank missile attack occurred on August 12, 2024, Hezbollah militants fired an anti-tank missile at the northern Israeli town of Kfar Yuval, near the Lebanese border. The missile struck a residential area, causing severe damage to buildings and resulting in multiple casualties.

Israeli attacks

During the defensive period, the IDF conducted around 7,000 attacks in Lebanon, mostly southern Lebanon. The IDF’s focus was hitting Hezbollah operatives, infrastructure and missile launchers. During that period, Israel assassinated around 12 Hezbollah terrorists in leadership positions, most notably Tawiland Fuad Shuker, The most senior military commander. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Health and Hezbollah’s publications, around 439 Hezbollah militants and estimated dozens of Palestinian and other Lebanese terrorists were killed, though that figure could not be independently verified.

Notable attacks:

• March 14, 2024: Destruction of Hezbollah Weapons Depots

Israel carried out a series of precision airstrikes on Hezbollah weapons depots located near the Bekaa Valley. These depots were reportedly storing advanced missiles and munitions provided by Iran. The destruction of these stockpiles was seen as a major blow to Hezbollah’s military capabilities, reducing its ability to conduct missile strikes against Israel.

• July 29, 2024: Bombing of Hezbollah Command Centers

In retaliation for a deadly missile attack that killed 12 children in Majdal Shams, Israel launched a powerful strike on Hezbollah command centers in southern Lebanon. The attack targeted key Hezbollah leadership and operational hubs, aiming to disrupt the group’s command-and-control capabilities. The strikes caused significant damage to Hezbollah’s operational infrastructure.

• November 22, 2023: Assassination of Senior Hezbollah Commander Ali al-Moussawi

In a covert operation, Israeli intelligence agents successfully targeted and killed a senior Hezbollah commander, Ali al-Moussawi, in southern Lebanon. Al-Moussawi was a key figure involved in coordinating Hezbollah’s missile attacks on Israel. The operation was carried out using a precision-guided drone strike while he was traveling in a convoy near the town of Nabatieh. His assassination dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah’s strategic leadership.

• February 5, 2024: Assassination of Hezbollah’s Head of Logistics Mustafa Shukr

Another high-profile assassination occurred when Israeli forces eliminated Mustafa Shukr, Hezbollah’s head of logistics, responsible for smuggling weapons from Iran into Lebanon. The attack took place near the Lebanese-Syrian border as Shukr was overseeing a shipment of advanced missile systems. Israeli drones struck his convoy, killing him and several of his associates. This assassination further disrupted Hezbollah’s supply chain of weapons and arms into Lebanon.

• June 20, 2024: Targeted Strike on Hezbollah Military Compound

In a major escalation, the Israeli Air Force bombed a Hezbollah military compound in southern Lebanon that served as a training center and storage facility for advanced weaponry. The strike, carried out after intelligence reports indicated the presence of senior Hezbollah operatives, resulted in the death of several key figures, including Khaled al-Safadi, a prominent military strategist. This attack significantly hampered Hezbollah’s ability to plan future operations and coordinate large-scale attacks against Israel.

September: Shift to Offensive Warfare

Israeli Attacks

On September 17th 2024, Israel initiated its first offensive move with a beeper and Walkie-talkie explosion hitting over 4,000 Hezbollah operatives all over Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. This operation was one of the most targeted attacks in the history of warfare, focusing solely on militants carrying operational devices. Just 12 civilians were reported killed while dozens of Hezbollah operatives were killed, over 500 became non-operational, and another 3,500 wounded and hospitalized.

In the following week, the IAF launched Operation Summer Arrows, targeting thousands of Hezbollah missile storage facilities, rocket launchers, and hundreds of targets all across southern and central Lebanon. One estimate claimed that within two days of operations, the IAF managed to dismantle around a half of Hezbollah’s firing capabilities. The casualty rate in Lebanon ballooned from 439 pre-September 17th to over 2,100 on October 13th, less than a month after the IDF began its offensive war. It is estimated that the vast majority of these fatalities are attributed to Hezbollah militants.

On September 28th, Hezbollah experienced another massive blow with the targeting and killing of Hasan Nasrallah and over a dozen high ranking officials in their Beirut bunker. A senior IRGC commander, Abbas Nilforoushan, was present on site and was also eliminated. Just five days later, on the night of October 3, Israel targeted Nasrallah’s cousin and successor and a long-time Hezbollah senior official, Hashem Safi A-Din, who was likely also eliminated.

On October 1st, Israel launched a ground incursion into Southern Lebanon with the objective of removing the threat that the Radwan forces posed to northern Israel, who had plans to only launch their own ‘October 7’ in the north, but they actually had plans to conquer the Galilee (northern Israel). Hezbollah spent over 18 years preparing and training for an assault on northern Israel with over 9,000 fighters trained to capture large swaths of the Galilee. The goal was to capture territory which would become the battleground as opposed to southern Lebanon, and take hundreds if not thousands of hostages to completely shake the state of Israel. The IDF admitted to having previously conducted dozens of clearing operations in southern Lebanon that remained confidential until that moment.

In parallel, the IDF went to great lengths to minimize civilian casualties by taking several steps, that include the evacuation of a total of 46 villages in Southern Lebanon, as well as sending warnings by dropping leaflets, sending text messages and taking over the national radio. Reportedly, over 1.2 million Lebanese have evacuated northward.

Since the ground invasion, 4 IDF divisions have entered Southern Lebanon and are clearing the villages right on the border with Israel. The forces have uncovered a wide array of weapons used and stored by Hezbollah. The most commonly found items include:

1. Anti-Tank Missiles: Hezbollah has stored and utilized advanced anti-tank guided missiles, such as Kornet missiles, which have been a major threat to Israeli armored vehicles.
2. Rockets and Rocket Launchers: IDF forces discovered rocket launchers, including some hidden in civilian homes, loaded and prepared to fire at Israeli northern communities. Hezbollah has fired thousands of rockets during this conflict, including medium- and long-range varieties.
3. Drones: Hezbollah has increasingly used drones for reconnaissance and attacks. The IDF has encountered drones and drone launch sites as part of Hezbollah’s expanding drone warfare capabilities.
4. Small Arms and Ammunition: Large caches of AK-47 rifles, grenades, and other small arms have been found in Hezbollah compounds and bunkers, some of which were hidden in underground tunnels and bunkers beneath residential areas.
5. Tunnels: In addition to weaponry, the IDF uncovered underground tunnels used by Hezbollah for smuggling and positioning troops. The tunnels found were heavily equipped by advanced communication lines, equipment storage rooms, toilets and other means to sustain long-term fighting, and ample ammunition. Some of these tunnels crossed into Israeli territory, reinforcing the strategic significance of Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure.
6. Attack Vehicles: The IDF found jeeps and motorcycles in the tunnels jeeps and motorcycles equipped with weapons ready for the command to invade Israel, reminiscent of Hamas’ technique on October 7.

Hezbollah Attacks

In the immediate aftermath of Israel’s beeper attack and widespread airstrikes across Lebanon, Hezbollah’s response was initially delayed. However, within weeks, Hezbollah began launching aerial assaults targeting northern Israel, specifically Haifa, Yokneam, and the Jezreel Valley, with attacks quickly progressing southward toward central Israel. Over the course of four weeks of intense warfare, Hezbollah fired more than 2,000 missiles, drones, and rockets into Israel. Casualties in northern Israel increased from 42 to 68, a rise of 26. During September and October alone, over 5,400 sirens were sounded in response to attacks on northern Israel, compared to approximately 4,000 sirens in the previous 11 months combined.

Notable attacks:

• Constant shooting at the north, which also includes regular shooting at around Haifa and the Krayot region as well as fires in open fields. Hezbollah also ramped up attacks on the Tel Aviv region, firing multiple times at central Israel – which it avoided doing over the first 11 months of the war.
• Drone attack on Herzliya: On October 12th, on Yom Kippur, a drone attack from Lebanon targeted Herzliya, marking a significant escalation in cross-border hostilities. The drone, launched by Hezbollah, breached Israeli airspace hitting a building in Herzliya. The attack occurred during one of Israel’s holiest days, further intensifying the impact of the incident. While no casualties were reported, the attack underscores the growing threat posed by unmanned aerial vehicles
• Drone attack on Golani base: A Hezbollah drone struck the dining hall of the Golani Brigade base during dinner, killing four Israeli soldiers and injuring 58, including seven seriously. The attack involved two drones launched from Lebanon, with one drone successfully evading Israel’s air defense systems before hitting the base. The incident has raised concerns about the effectiveness of Israel’s air defense capabilities against Hezbollah’s growing use of drones. Investigations are ongoing to determine why the attack was not detected in time to trigger sirens and intercept the drone.
• The Drone Problem: Tackling drone attacks in the Israel-Lebanon conflict presents significant challenges, much like in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by Hezbollah complicates traditional defense strategies, as drones can evade radar systems, penetrate deep into enemy territory, and deliver precise attacks on key infrastructure. Israel, like Ukraine, must contend with the difficulty of detecting and intercepting smaller, more agile drones, which can overwhelm air defense systems and create new vulnerabilities, especially when combined with conventional missile attacks.

הפוסט Turning Point in the North: Prospects for the Israel-Hezbollah War הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Emerging capital of terrorism?

The Tulkarm district has not traditionally been one of the most challenging and hostile districts in Judea and Samaria. From among the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority, it is areas such as Jenin and Nablus that have, over the years, been seen as a hotbed of nationalist extremism that continually breeds terrorist groups and orchestrates attacks. For years, the security services have actively responded to intelligence alerts, targeting terrorist groups and preventing attacks throughout Judea and Samaria.

Examples include Operation Defensive Shield, the lengthy Operation Breakwater, and thousands of arrests over the past decade alone. In the specific period since October 7, 2023, more than 4,000 terrorists were arrested throughout the Judea and Samaria area by the IDF, the ISA, and special police units. Of those terrorists, 314 lived in or near Tulkarm.

The city of Tulkarm and its surrounding area, including the refugee camps and Nur Shams, made headlines recently because of videos on Telegram in which armed and masked young Palestinians documented themselves shooting across the Green Line at Hefer Valley communities and threatening Israeli citizens. Throughout the months of the War of Iron Swords, operational activity in and around Tulkarm intensified to a challenging level, demanding significant resources and heightened focus from the security services.

Nearly every week of the war, reports emerged of arrests in Tulkarm. The area became a launchpad for terror attacks, the formation of cells, and even airstrikes by the IDF targeting terror squads. From among 600 terrorists eliminated in Judea and Samaria since the start of the war, 125 were eliminated in and around Tulkarm — a weighty percentage. [1]

How did the Tulkarm district gain prominence, and how is Israel responding?

Operation Summer Camps, August 2024: An unprecedented and extensive operation in Tulkarm

On October 27, 2024, an extensive operation began in the north of the Judea and Samaria area, focusing on Jenin, Tulkarm, and the Nur a-Shams refugee camp. According to the IDF, the objectives were to impede terrorism by destroying various instruments of terror, to extend the area where the security services enjoy freedom of action, and to root out terror in the Judea and Samaria area. During the operation, explosives were cleared, several terrorists were eliminated by air strikes, and various war materials were confiscated, including light weapons. The operation included air support by drones, and air force aircraft took part in attacks.

Reports indicate that 15 terrorists have been eliminated in the operation to date, including Muhammad Jabr, also known as Abu Shuja’, the commander of the Tulkarm Brigade from the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Jabr also led the Nur a-Shams group, responsible for numerous terror attacks, including the June 2024 murder of Israeli civilian Amnon Mukhtar; Adnan Jabr, who was involved in manufacturing IEDs; and Jibril Ghasan Isma’il Jibril, a key figure in terrorist activities in the Tulkarm/Qalqilya area, who was released as part of Israel’s prisoners-for-hostages deal with Hamas in November 2023.

Bursts of gunfire toward Bat Hefer

The October 7 massacre was an inspiration for terrorists in Judea and Samaria. Tulkarm and the neighboring refugee camps, such as Nur Shams, have become hotbeds of terrorism, posing a significant threat to the Israeli communities in the Sharon region. The terror cells have effectively destabilized the security situation in this central area, as illustrated by the concerns of a Bat Hefer resident who reports hearing digging sounds beneath the community’s homes at night. From time to time, bursts of fire are directed at Bat Hefer from Tulkarm and from the Nur a-Shams refugee camp. The terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria appear to be testing Israel’s responses, the way Hamas did before October 7. Hamas mounted the protests by Gazans at the border fence in order to examine Israel’s response and distract the attention of the security services.

Despite the frequent entry of security forces into Tulkarm to obstruct the terrorist activity brewing in the area, terrorists continue to trigger IEDs against them and 125 terrorists have been killed, with more than 300 arrested. IEDs and firearms are increasingly used in Judea and Samaria, and they are a challenge for the security services as well as a threat to the residents. Between January and July 2023, over 314 IED explosions and 120 gunfire attacks were reported. This number increased to 344 IED explosions and 124 gunfire attacks during the same period in 2024.

Additionally, terrorist organizations run a highly effective incitement machine that continually recruits active supporters for armed groups operating in the area. These groups pose a growing threat to Israelis in the Sharon region, whether originating from Tulkarm or Qalqilya.

After the 2002 Operation Guardian of the Walls, many arrests were carried out on a regular basis until 2007, when the agreement regarding wanted terrorists came into effect with the Palestinian Authority. That agreement brought a significant reduction in the number of arrests, and in the number of terror attacks. The IDF and the rest of the Israeli security services kept the flame of terrorism low in Judea and Samaria, but only for a while.

As an indication, in 2015 there were 2,575 arrests of terrorists in the Judea and Samaria area,[2] whereas in 2023 the number had reached 5,100. [3] Those figures include people wanted for major and minor crimes of terrorism as well as for conspiring with terrorist organizations. As of June 2024, seven months after the start of war, 4,150 terrorists had been arrested in the Judea and Samaria area, more than 530 had been eliminated, and more than 5,600 terror attacks had been committed, with 27 Israelis murdered. [4]

The Samaria “Envelope” (the Israeli communities located near the Samaria area)

The threat of terror against the Sharon region continues, with only dozens of meters separating the border fence at Tulkarm from the homes located in the eastern side of Bat Hefer. Other communities in the area also neighbor the fence. Those communities, such as Kfar Yona, have become the “Samaria Envelope.” The increase in incidents originating from the Palestinian cities in the Samaria area, and the repeated calls to attack the Jewish communities, require special precautions against an October 7–style incursion from the terrorist nests, and those precautions are being taken.

It is no secret that the terrorist organizations, led by Hamas and the PIJ, are taking root in the Samaria, operating together across localities and across organizational frameworks. The money entering from Iran serves to arm terrorist cells who are increasing in numbers and who shoot at the local Jewish communities and document their activities with body cameras (as did the October 7 terrorists with their Go Pro cameras). They flee the scene and upload videos of their activities to the social networks. In that way “The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades – Youth of Revenge and Liberation” published a disturbing post on social media at the end of last May:

“Three of us from the elite unit of the Tulkarm Brigades penetrated into the Bat Hefer settlement masquerading as cleaners. The purpose of the operation was to eliminate one of the ISA police who live in the targeted house. The identification and tracking unit had followed him for 10 days and knew his times for entering and leaving the house. Our fighters penetrated successfully to the center of the house, but he was carrying a baby and there were two more children nearby. The fighters withdrew without attacking, in accordance with the teachings of true Islam as we know it. This is a message to Smotrich, who is threatening Tulkarm. He should first of all see how our fighters entered the man’s house unbeknownst to him.”

The Al-Aqsa Brigades ended the post with a threat:

“This is a warning to the enemy. If you treat Tulkarm as your leaders have announced, we will repeat the October 7 scenario in Bat Hefer, Avnei Hefetz, and other communities, and then we will see who blockades who.”

That post was one among many and highlights the objectives of the terrorists in Judea and Samaria. Their statements must be taken seriously. The situation becomes even more alarming if such a cell did manage to infiltrate a Jewish community—especially after the October 7 massacre and Israel’s subsequent realization of the dangerous misconceptions that had previously clouded its judgment.

Conversations with Bat Hefer residents reveal that they feel insecure with Tulkarm so nearby. In the past, the residents could assume that any noise of gunfire came from a wedding; but now, in wartime, the meaning is different. The gunfire may be aimed at their homes. One resident relates: “I’ve learned to differentiate between celebratory gunfire and firing intended as intimidation or aimed at our homes. Not long ago, our community had the feeling of a kibbutz, but now we’re frightened even to leave our homes after dark.” Another Bat Hefer resident says that the situation there is unpleasant and that despite being ostensibly protected from Tulkarm by the surrounding fence, they have long felt uneasy and fearful. The feeling is intensified by the noise of explosions, gunfire, and IEDs audible throughout Bat Hefer and the vicinity, and by the various social media flooded with videos of young Arabs shooting in Bat Hefer’s direction.

The Judea and Samaria area is definitely a powder keg and a significant battleground. The repeated attacks on border communities are reminiscent of the preparations for October 7 by Hamas and by the other Gazan terrorist organizations. The residents’ sense of security has been undermined significantly. The approach must change, and efforts must be focused on this seething district.

The link between Bat Hefer and Tehran

In mid-May 2024, at Tehran, a summit of Iranian terrorist proxies was attended by Isma’il Haniyeh, who headed the Hamas Political Bureau at the time; Hossein Salami, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; Isma’il Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force; and Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah. There were also senior figures from the PIJ and representatives of the Houthis. At that summit, the Iranians and the representatives of their proxies concluded that escalation against Israel should mount further and pressure should force Israel to end the fighting in Gaza with no negotiations over a hostage deal. Incidents such as the gunfire targeting Bat Hefer, with Hamas-affiliated terror cells of Tulkarm attacking in order to strain Israel’s defenses, are part of that effort.

The terrorist strongholds in the Samaria have effectively become an ‘Iranian outpost,’ with various cells comprised of operatives from different terrorist organizations, notably the PIJ and Hamas, which are both Iranian proxies. The cooperation among various terrorist cells is already well known in Judea and Samaria. This is how the Lions’ Den organization in Nablus operates, for example, being composed of young Palestinians identified for the most part with Hamas and the PIJ, but also with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. This terrorist activity, linking Palestinian and Iranian interests, broadens the line of fire that threatens the Sharon communities.

The Iranians, like other players in the Mideast, considered the October 7 attack an achievement marking the beginning of the end for the Jewish State. The events of the massacre only encouraged Hamas and the rest of the “Axis of Resistance” to plan for another October 7–style attack. Next time, the terrorists believe, the attack will be launched from the Judea and Samaria area in order to hit at Israel’s soft underbelly. Hamas may be convinced, although as yet no specific information says it is, that it can bisect Israel at the narrowest point — between Tulkarm and Netanya.

That idea could be part of Iran’s plan to “unify the fronts.” Hamas was to participate in the plan under the guidance of Saleh al-Arouri, head of the Hamas military wing in Judea and Samaria. He was eliminated in Beirut last January and replaced by Zaher al-Jabarin, who hinted last May that “the Hamas movement holds many cards that it has not yet played…”

He added that “the West Bank will surprise the enemy soon, and we will see new chapters of creative Palestinian fighting.” In further remarks, Al-Jabarin hinted that the October 7 massacre would repeat itself out of the Judea and Samaria area.

“The resistance is continuing until the end of the Occupation and the liberation of Palestine. October 7 was a noble chapter among others. The Resistance will show creativity with the tools and the means at its disposal, and will humiliate the enemy in a place removed from the enemy’s expectations and calculations.”

Cells of youths inspired by October 7

The new terrorist cells comprise chiefly young terrorists from Tulkarm, the Nur a-Shams refugee camp, Qalqilya, and Tubas. Those terrorists were cradled in ubiquitous incitement from the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, the PIJ, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Judea and Samaria. Their militias see the October 7 massacre as inspiration for further attacks.

Thus, for example “the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades – Youth of Revenge and Liberation” was formed. It is split into terrorist nests around the Samaria region — in Tulkarm, Tubas, and elsewhere. During last June, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades – Youth of Revenge and Liberation cooperated with the new Fatah terror group “Knights of the Night” to publish videos and take credit for the gunfire targeting Bat Hefer in the Sharon, the Einav roadblock in the Samaria, and an IDF post near the Shuweika gate in the Tulkarm district.

The threat from the refugee camps

Despite the IDF’s wide-ranging preventive activity in recent months, including the arrest of thousands of terrorists, the confiscation of much inciteful material, and the elimination of senior wanted operatives and commanders, the deterrence resulting from the enormous IDF achievements was short-lived. In refugee camps such as Nur a-Shamsand in Tulkarm, nests of terrorism have significantly continued to organize in recent months. As mentioned, these refugee camps are very close to major cities of the Sharon and they could endanger Israeli citizens.

Since the war commenced, great effort has been invested in thwarting terrorism in the area of Tulkarm and the Nur a-Shams refugee camp, the primary objective being, as mentioned, to neutralize terror infrastructures such as various war materiel and explosives workshops, and to clear roadways in order to provide the security services with freedom of movement.

• On June 30, following intelligence gathering and an IDF operation, the terrorists involved in the June 23 attack on Amnon Mukhtar in Qalqilya were eliminated. The commander of the Hamas military wing in Tulkarm was eliminated after an operation of the security services.
• On August 22, IDF forces conducted an operation in the Tulkarm district to counter terrorism. They targeted and destroyed various assets, including weapons and IED workshops, and eliminated several terrorists. The operation lasted roughly 14 hours. Among the objectives was clearing the roadways of IED’s in order to provide the security services with freedom of movement there.[5] Those are only some examples of the IDF’s extensive counter-terrorist activity across the Green Line.

With the passage of time and the continuation of incitement, the terrorist brigades at the camps managed to renew their military strength and recruit new terrorists to their ranks. Any boy of 15 or older could be a terrorist endangering our troops.

Despite powerful operational activity against the “hornets’ nest” that had developed in Tulkarm, the terrorists in the field are successfully upgrading their methods of operation. One reserve commander in military engineering for the Judea and Samaria Division relates:

“From week to week, no matter how many operations and arrests are carried out, we face improvements — including an upgrade in the explosive devices, which are much more sophisticated and heavier. Their methods are becoming more sophisticated as well.”

In June, two terror attacks against IDF soldiers took place during operational activity of the security services. According to investigators, a D-9 failed, atypically, to detect an IED with a charge of dozens of kilograms; and the detonation of the IED killed a soldier and seriously injured his squad’s commander. In a similar incident during an operation in Jenin a week earlier, another officer was killed by a buried IED. Besides those two incidents, an IED exploded near the fence separating the community of Bat Hefer from the city of Tulkarm. That explosion was intended to attract IDF soldiers.

Demonstrating how deep the problem of terrorism runs in the area, some of the armed terrorist organizations include smaller local cells, which may number only a few terrorists or may amount to significant terrorist leagues, as in northern Samaria where dozens or hundreds of armed terrorists operate under a single brigade. Those terrorist cells are replete with materiel as weaponry is channeled into the area, and Iranian elements provide a large amount of knowhow as well. The terrorist infrastructures join with unarmed terrorist crowds that concentrate on rioting and on attempting to lynch Jewish residents.

Most of the war material is apparently smuggled from Jordan under Iranian guidance. Because of inadequate border security, weapons make their way into the Judea and Samaria area. Jordan, for its part, has begun reducing its supervisory activity at the border, so that weapons are now routinely smuggled. Thus, large quantities of weaponry and stores of explosives are now present in the Palestinian Authority’s territory.

Between January and April of 2022, the police successfully thwarted 9 cross-border shipments of weaponry from Jordan and Lebanon, confiscating 171 weapons. [6] In November 2023 the then-largest attempt at smuggling weaponry was thwarted. Four suspects were arrested and 137 weapons were confiscated along with 250 magazines, valued in total at 6 million shekels. [7] Last June, a shipment of 20 handguns was thwarted. They had been concealed in a vehicle at the Rabin Crossing.[8] And at the start of last July, fighters from the Judea and Samaria Border Police and IDF forces foiled the smuggling of weapons after observers in the area identified three bags containing more than 75 handguns. The Iranians’ objective is to flood the Palestinians with weapons in order to bring about terror attacks. At the start of April, the IDF Spokesperson announced that smuggling of advanced weapons into the Judea and Samaria area, for use against various Israeli targets, had been thwarted. According to Israeli security sources, the infrastructure for the new terrorist cells in northern Samaria was established with the help of Sheikh Bassam Sa’di from the city of Jenin. Saadi,[9] a senior figure in Islamic Jihad, was sentenced to only 22 months’ imprisonment.

Toward the end of December 2023, still close to the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip, the security services arrested some 33 wanted operatives, confiscated dozens of weapons, and destroyed an explosives workshop that had contained dozens of IEDs ready for use against Israeli targets. Some months later, on June 5, 2024, came the arrest of Ammar Nassallah, a resident of the Nur a-Shams refugee camp, for involvement in the late May shooting attacks against Bat Hefer. When interrogated, he confessed that he belonged to a larger cell that intended to continue attacking the communities near the border in general and Bat Hefer in particular.[10] Those are merely two reports to demonstrate the situation in the field and to show that despite all the efforts invested by the IDF forces, there is no significant sign that the trend on the ground is reversing.

Courses of action – How to prevent “the October 7 of the Sharon”

The current situation in Judea and Samaria, where terrorist organizations are forming armed militias to confront Israel and create another active front near the communities of Judea and Samaria, as well as the cities of Greater Tel Aviv, the Sharon, and the Judean Foothills, is unacceptable. Therefore, the threat posed by the terrorist nests in the cities and refugee camps of Judea and Samaria must be rooted out and destroyed, and the territory must be purged of the various weapons and war material.

1. First, Israel must dismantle the militias and sever their military coordination with all terrorist elements, especially in northern Samaria.
2. In addition, Israel must change its attitude and abandon the prevailing misconception that in this district there is a difference between Hamas and the PIJ on the one hand, and those identified with Fatah, such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, on the other hand.
3. Israel must also exact a price from the Palestinian Authority and declare it responsible for every incident of terror originating in Judea and Samaria.
4. Moreover, prevention and foiling of terrorism must be intensified and planning must begin for an extensive military operation in order to paralyze the terrorist infrastructures that are developing in the district.
5. Additional forces must be deployed at the Jordanian border in order to restore order, stabilize the area of our presence along the border, and prevent the entry of weapons and other war material. In other words, cut off the oxygen. At the same time, Israel must demand that Jordan also intensify its activity along the border in order to halt smuggling.
6. Alongside those activities, Israel must exact a price from civilians to turn involvement in terrorism into a losing game. Anyone protecting or aiding a terrorist, or a terrorist operation, must also be punished harshly.
7. The principle is to maintain freedom of action in the Judea and Samaria area as an indispensable means of blocking terrorism and preserving Israeli security.

Many people contend that while we are still fighting in Gaza, Israel must not join battle elsewhere and be dragged into a multi-front war. But Israel is already engaged in a multi-front war. Without a comprehensive military strategy in Judea and Samaria, terrorism will persist, impacting the residents of Judea and Samaria, the Sharon, and the entire country.

Appendix A: Comprehensive Data on Terrorism Originating from Tulkarm

Tulkarm: Emerging capital of terrorism?

How a District that Was Previously of Secondary Importance in Terms of Terrorism in Judea and Samaria is Heating Up and Challenging the Security System

Data from the 10 first months of the War of Iron Swords (Oct 7, 2023 – Aug 7, 2024)

** Data from the Tulkarm district, the refugee camps, and Nur a-Shams

[1] Information received from the security services
[2] ISA annual report for 2015, https://www.shabak.gov.il/media/daofn2ys/סיכום-שנתי-2015.pdf
[3] ISA annual report for 2023, https://www.shabak.gov.il/media/zpledoyg/דוח-חיצוני-סיכום-שנה-2023.pdf
[4] IDSF Research Department, Israel War Database, warinisrael.org.
[5] https://www.kikar.co.il/security-news/simnbk
[6] IDSF Research Department, Strategic Assessment for Israel, The Coordinated Assault on Zionism, June 2022, https://staging.idsf.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/הערכה-אסטרטגית-לישראל-תקציר-מנהלים.pdf
[7] https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001463894
[8] https://www.kikar.co.il/news/sfc3c1
[9] The IDF website, https://www.idf.il/כתבות-ועדכונים/2023/פברואר/נגזר-דין-באסם-א-בעדי-פעל-לביסוס-פעילות-התאחדות-בלתי-מותרת
[10] https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/765965/
[xi] The IDSF Israel War Database, warinisrael.org; the IDF Spokesperson’s Office
[xii] The IDSF Israel War Database, warinisrael.org; the IDF Spokesperson’s Office
[xiii] The IDSF Israel War Database, warinisrael.org; the IDF Spokesperson’s Office
[xiv] https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/767811/
[xv] The IDSF Israel War Database, warinisrael.org; the IDF Spokesperson’s Office
[xvi] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/12/14/mapping-west-bank-insurgency/
[xvii] Estimate from security sources. On 4 July 2024 the estimate stood at 500 terrorists. Now14 News, https://www.now14.co.il/מלחמה-ביוש-למעלה-מ-500-מחבלים-חוסלו-70-מהם-מ/
[xviii] Data obtained from the ISA
[xix] The IDSF Israel War Database, warinisrael.org; the IDF Spokesperson’s Office
[xx] Data obtained from the ISA

הפוסט Tulkarm: Emerging Capital of Terrorism? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Executive Summary

The complicated relations between Israel and Egypt go back to long before the establishment of the Jewish state. At first, Israel and Egypt were bitter enemies. The two nations fought five wars, all of which ended favorably for Israel, though it sustained heavy losses and endured difficult battles. But after the 1977 peace initiative, when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Israel and addressed the Knesset, relations changed, climaxing in the signing of a peace treaty in 1979. Since then, Egypt and Israel have collaborated in different areas, including economic ventures (joint ventures, such as gas exports from Israel to Egypt) and security (fighting ISIS in Sinai and destroying Hamas tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt). Furthermore, Israel has leveraged Egypt’s status to act as a mediator with Hamas in the various rounds of fighting between the sides. The present war between Israel and Hamas poses challenges and opportunities before the two nations at a time when Egypt is undergoing processes producing other challenges and opportunities. These may be divided into two: those affecting the near future and those with implications for the long term.

The Near Future: The Swords of Iron War

Given the events of the war, Egypt is a potential ally, and cooperation with it is both vital and necessary to determine the post-war reality in Gaza and attain the goals of the war. Relations are somewhat tense, mostly because of Egypt’s obligation to support the Palestinians, the Egyptian worry that Palestinians from Gaza will enter Sinai, and the concern that the war might result in threats to Egypt’s internal stability (to date, unlike Jordan, the situation has been relatively calm). However, generally speaking, Egypt is one of the Arab nations with the greatest potential for cooperation due to its strong ties with the West and the United States, as well as its rivalry against the Muslim Brotherhood. In this context, immediate challenges and opportunities in Israel’s relations with Egypt include:

• Cooperation with Egypt in achieving the goals of the war: Egypt borders the southern Gaza Strip and controls the Philadelphi Corridor, a 14-km. long passage roughly 100 m. wide, which constitutes the major smuggling route for most of Hamas’ – and the other Gazan terrorist organizations’ – weapons. To achieve the war goals – destroying Hamas and rescuing the hostages – Israel must continue its ground maneuver in Rafah, seize the Philadelphi Corridor, and maintain control of it after the war is concluded. In light of Egypt’s opposition to Israel’s plans and the threats it has issued, Israel must strive to reach agreements with the Egyptians about future actions, which will allow Israel both to realize its goals and demonstrate maximal sensitivity to Egypt’s interests and desires. Moreover, the tension around the IDF’s entrance to Rafah, the increased stridency of Egypt’s tone, and its desire to keep Hamas from achieving any gains, may enable Egypt to play an important mediating role in achieving a hostage release deal. And, in fact, Egypt has finally taken the baton from Qatar in leading the hostage negotiations, is in direct communication with Sinwar, and is proposing new compromises. At first, it was to keep Israel away from Rafah, but now it is aimed at ending the fighting.
• Leveraging economic aspects: Egypt has been mired in an economic crisis since long before the war in Gaza, with high inflation (34% in 2023), high poverty rates (29.7% in 2019), widespread devaluation of the Egyptian currency, and a foreign debt crisis (estimated at more than $165 billion). At the same time, President al-Sisi is carrying out grandiose projects costing billions with no immediate payoffs; these include the New Administrative Center, a new Nile Delta development, and a new seaside city. In the meantime, the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which spans the Blue Nile – the most important tributary of the Nile, along whose banks most of Egypt’s population lives – is raising the risk not only of creating new problems but also exacerbating existing ones, such as increased unemployment, higher food prices, higher energy costs, and decreased agricultural output. Israel can use economic tools such as its gas exports, its ties with the United States, and its diplomatic relations with Ethiopia to help Egypt face its issues in exchange for promoting Israel’s interests in the war and gaining Egyptian support for them, including willingness to allow passage through Egypt to refugees from Gaza.
• Using the Houthis’ activities to Israel’s ends: The Houthi attacks on ships at the gateway to the Red Sea have resulted in a dramatic drop of some 40 percent in Egypt’s revenues from the Suez Canal. In light of this, Israel can and must enlist Egyptian support for military action against the Houthis begin taken by Western nations for the sake of shared goals, such as degrading the capabilities of the Houthis and Iran, which provides their financing and guides their actions.
• Enlisting the West: At the same time, the United States and the European Union have, like Israel, the ability to influence Egypt. U.S. aid to Egypt currently stands at $1.3 billion a year (Egypt requested $1.44 billion for 2024), and the EU has extensive loans, investments, and arms deals there. If the political will is there, they will be able to influence Egypt to spearhead a change in Egyptian policy touching all issues related to the war in Gaza. This requires a change in policy on both the part of the U.S. administration and the EU. It should be noted that any pressure must be applied with care and moderation lest Cairo be pushed to trade in the West’s economic support for China’s, whose commercial ties with Egypt have grown in the last decade.

The Long-term View

For the long term too, it is reasonable to assume that Egypt’s commitment to the pragmatism that currently characterizes it and to the bloc of moderate Sunni Arab nations as well as the relationship with the United States and the West will last. Thus, its commitment to the peace treaty with Israel and opposition to the Muslim brotherhood as well as support for the Palestinians will also continue.

Nonetheless, Israel’s partnership with Egypt cannot be taken for granted. At present, Egypt is experiencing several processes and trends (military buildup, tensions with the United States, winks and nods to Russia and China) that raise the concern about the future of Israeli-Egyptian relations. Therefore, Israel must keep its eyes open and have contingency plans available in case of change, as well as a solid intelligence assessment and military force construction tailored to circumstances. In this context, challenges and opportunities in relations with Egypt over the long term include:

• Improved relations with problematic regional elements (“the axis of evil”): Given the decrease in U.S. support in recent years and doubts about the administration’s commitment to defend U.S. allies, Egypt has expanded its policy of diversifying its military supply sources and is now buying weapons and munition worth billions of dollars from many nations, including Russia and China, both of which have increased their investments in Egypt. A continued drop in U.S. and Western support and closer ties with other nations as well as the unsure, deferential approach the West is taking towards the axis of evil might push Egypt towards agreements with those nations. Furthermore, there is a thaw in relations with Iran and the countries associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, i.e., Qatar and Turkey, with which Egypt had tense relations until quite recently. Right now, this growing closeness looks like a tactic designed to improve Cairo’s bargaining power and strengthen its regional standing and ability to handle its economic challenges. But should this continue and turn into Egypt’s new strategy, it will have worrying implications for Israel’s security and damage the West’s zone of influence.
• Egyptian military buildup: Even as the nation has hewn to the peace agreement and maintained security cooperation with Israel, the Egyptian army has for many years been undergoing modernization and force construction processes: it has armed itself with many advanced weapons systems, upgraded its infrastructures, and improved its training programs. These processes create the potential for posing a threat to Israel’s security especially because Israel is not preparing for the possibility of Egypt turning from a potential to a real threat. After the war ends, the Israeli government and security establishment must hold a strategic discussion about Egypt and examine how best to prepare from such an eventuality, and especially what must be done now, e.g., improving intelligence familiarity with the Egyptian army’s capabilities.

The peace agreement: At present, there doesn’t seem to be a real danger of the peace agreement being suspended or abrogated despite differences of opinion about Israel’s actions in Rafah. Nonetheless, Israel must consider that the ongoing and worsening economic crisis in Egypt, especially those aspects affecting the younger generation and the educated classes, as well as the anti-Israel public sentiment that the Egyptian government isn’t doing enough to support the residents of Gaza might lead to protests. Such protests might grow to a scope that will make it difficult for the government to control, affect Egypt’s decision-making processes on all matters, including those related to the war, bilateral relations, and the peace agreement. In the extreme scenario, popular protests might lead to regime change and the rise of a government that does not favor maintaining the peace agreement with Israel. In tandem with this possibility, Israel must try to forge closer relations with Egypt and increase Egypt’s dependence on it, using its economic leverage and political tools. This would preclude the scenario of the peace agreement being violated no matter what government happens to be in power, just as the Muslim Brotherhood government led by Muhammad Mursi refrained from doing so.

הפוסט Egypt Gains Strength: What Will Israel’s Relations with Its Southern Neighbor Look Like? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Intro

• On October 28, 2024, the Israeli Knesset passed two laws that prohibit any interaction with UNRWA (“United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees”) or anyone on its behalf on any “state authority, including entities and other individuals who lawfully holds a public office”,[1] and prohibit any UNRWA activity, including the direct or indirect activity of delegations and services in Israel’s sovereign territory.[2] The legislation does not preclude criminal proceedings vis-à-vis UNRWA employees, including those relevant to the October 7 massacre, the Iron Swords War or any other proceeding as stipulated by the 2016 Counter Terrorism Law.
• These laws come against the backdrop of the exposure of the involvement in the October 7 massacre and in terrorism by UNRWA and its employees, its eternalization of the conflict and the Palestinians’ refugee status, and the fact that it operates under definitions and conditions that are distinct from the UN’s other refugee welfare entitie – UNHCR. UNRWA employees took part in the raid on Israeli territory and the massacre and horrors that took place on October 7, including taking Israeli hostages; concealed weapons in their homes and in structures pertaining to the agency – such as schools; and constituted an integral part of Hamas’ tunnel infrastructure.
• If the international community is interested in promoting a real, lasting arrangement to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US and the EU need to promptly reject UNRWA and its activity. Next, appropriate alternatives to the agency must be found. Specifically, Palestinian refugees can be entrusted by other international organizations that look after all refugees in the world, rather than their own distinct organization, chiefly UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). In the Gaza Strip, Israel itself must take control over vital humanitarian aid, removing it from UNRWA’s responsibility, which in practice ends up in Hamas’ hands and preserves its regime. This, in order to facilitate the humanitarian aid mechanism during the interim period until a long-range arrangement for Gaza is concluded.

General background

• UNRWA operates separately from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Thus, the Palestinians are the only group of refugees in the world that have their own dedicated agency to attend to their needs.
• UNRWA reports on its activity in two main areas –

1. Educational, in which 60% of its budget is invested. It runs more than 700 schools in Palestinian refugee camps in various countries and in places such as East Jerusalem. The school books are approved by the Palestinian Authority and are under UN supervision.
2. Humanitarian, in which it assists Palestinian refugees in 59 refugee camps throughout the Middle East, where about a third of all the refugees registered in the organization live.

• Funding: In 2022 the organization’s budget was nearly $1.055 billion USD, which were donated by 20 different countries. The countries that traditionally donate the largest sums of money are the USA ($344 million USD), Germany ($202 million USD), the European Union ($114 million USD) and Sweden ($61 million USD).
  • According to data from UN Watch, 18 countries suspended their donations to UNRWA following the report on the involvement of some of the agency’s employees in the October 7 massacre. On the other hand, there are a number of countries that continue to provide donations.
  • It appears that most of the donor countries have no oversight mechanism to monitor the purposes their aid money is used for.

Findings about UNRWA involvement in terror

• The union: In the elections for the UNRWA staff union that took place in 2012, out of 27 places, 25 candidates of the list identified with the Hamas terrorist organization were elected. Between 2012 and 2017, the UNRWA staff union was headed by Suhail al-Hindi, a senior Hamas member who served as a member of its political bureau.
• Use by terrorist organizations of UNRWA infrastructures: For years UN reports have exposed military use of UNRWA assets in the Gaza Strip by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. The IDF discovered, in course of the Israel-Hamas War, that Hamas equipment was found in UNRWA bags; UN equipment was found in UNRWA buildings from which Hamas fired at IDF forces; documentation of firing at IDF forces from inside UN buildings; and the most incriminating – the vast terror tunnel that was dug under the main UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City, the entrance shaft of which being from an UNRWA school.
• UNRWA employees took part in the October 7 massacre and subsequently helped Hamas in its war effort:
  • According to the Israeli defense establishment, at least 440 terrorists of the Hamas military wing are also employed in parallel in UNRWA; 2,000 more are Hamas operatives who are not in the military wing; and some 7,000 have a first-degree family member who is a Hamas terrorist. In total, 9,500 of 12,000 UNRWA employees are linked to Hamas.
  • According to the Minister of Defense, at least 30 UNRWA employees in the Gaza Strip took part in the massacre;
  • According to the Wall Street Journal, some 23% of the men employed by UNRWA have links with Hamas, and 49% of all the employees in the organization have a relative with links to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip;
  • At least two UNRWA teachers held hostages in their homes.

Education for terror by UNRWA

• An extensive report by IMPACT-se provides details of the education for antisemitism and violence against Jews, glorification of the principle of jihad and praise for the martyrs and the goal of wiping out Israel. The report contains details of 118 Hamas operatives who were educated in UNRWA schools; photographs from UNRWA textbooks in the schools in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, which teach the children that the Jews control money, the media and world politics; and suicide attackers are portrayed as heroes while the Jews living in the state of Israel are destined to be wiped off the face of the earth.

Perpetuating the conflict

• UNRWA’s mission is to perpetuate the conflict, not to resolve it. Unlike other refugees in the world, Palestinian refugee status is not revoked even when they settle in another country and receive its citizenship. This way the number of UNRWA refugees has grown six-fold. The estimated number of 750,000 at the end of the War of Independence, has by now bloated to 6 million Palestinian refugees, among them some 2.4 million in Jordan, 1.6 million in the Gaza Strip, some 900,000 in Judea and Samaria.

Recommendations for the Israeli government

1. Adopt an approach that supports immediate, total disbanding of UNRWA and withdrawing recognition of it as an organization, in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, including preventing its activity there.
2. Transfer responsibility for all schools, clinics and UNRWA institutions in the Gaza Strip to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
3. Replace the mechanism for distributing the humanitarian aid by UNRWA in the Gaza Strip with another mechanism to be administered by the IDF as part of its temporary military rule in the Gaza Strip.
4. Immediately close all UNRWA institutions in Israel, and transfer the responsibility for all its responsibilities to the government ministries.
5. Revoke all tax benefits for UNRWA and its activity in Israel.

Issue an official government report on the UNRWA involvement in terrorism – Currently, there is no centralized place in Israel that collects and correlates all the official information on UNRWA’s practices. Bits of information are collected and kept in various locations and partial knowledge is published by the IDF. There is a need for an orderly government policy that can be presented to foreign governments and institutions for their review.

[1] 25_lsr_5106948.pdf

[2] 25_lsr_5106937.pdf

הפוסט UNWRA: Aid Organization… for Hamas? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Relationships between Israel and various countries in Latin America have known ups and downs, and have taken turns over the past 75 years. In the aftermaths of the October 7 massacre and the ensuing war between Israel and Hamas, as well as the Iranian-led proxies Hezbollah and the Houthis, these dynamics have resurfaced, also underscoring the massive Iranian efforts to create spheres of influence in South America.

Such was the case with Bolivia. In response to Bolivia’s announcement to sever ties with Israel, Israel’s foreign ministry said that the Bolivian government decided to “surrender to terrorism and to the Ayatollah’s regime in Iran” and “is aligning itself with the Hamas terrorist organization.” These dynamics also reached The Hague as South American countries joined to or initiated legal cases against Israel. Bolivia has since presented a request to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to “investigate the situation in Palestine” on November 17.[1] In January, Chile also referred Israel to the ICC to examine events in the war against Hamas.[2] Colombia has also declared its backing for South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the International Court of Justice since the start of the year.[3]

Brazil has also taken a critical attitude towards Israel, as Hezbollah networks plotting to attack Jewish targets were exposed. Brazil has also expressed its support for the ICJ case filed by South Africa. In February, Nicaragua filed to join South Africa in its genocide case against Israel. The court said in a statement that Nicaragua considers Israel’s conduct in its war against Hamas to be in “violation of its obligations under the Genocide Convention.”[4] President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s decision was made within hours of meeting Palestinian Ambassador Ibrahim Alzeben in Brasília on January 12.[5] Brazil’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that considering “the flagrant violations of international humanitarian law,” Lula expressed support for South Africa’s case. His statement reiterated its defense of a two-state solution within mutually agreed and internationally recognized borders. In 2010, during his first tenure as president, Lula officially recognized Palestine’s statehood.[6]

Meanwhile, on February 6, recently appointed Argentinian President Javier Milei instead visited Israel on his first official overseas trip as President and reiterated his pledge to move Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Under Milei, the Argentinian government has taken 180 degrees turn in its attitude to the conflict and has shown extremely favorable positions toward Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz thanked President Milei for his support for Israel against Hamas and for recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. “You are a person of values ​​who is committed only to the truth,” Israel Katz told President Milei, “and it is no wonder that you chose to come to Israel right away to support us in the just struggle for the defense of the Jewish people against the murderers of Hamas.”[7] As South America’s second-largest economy, President Milei’s foreign policy challenges the impression that Israel is isolated in the region.[8]

The decision by the governments of Colombia and Chile to recall their ambassadors on October 31 also appears to be a clearly coordinated action. The following day, on November 1, Israel called on Colombia and Chile to “explicitly condemn the Hamas terrorist organization, for the slaughter and abduction of Israelis.” “Israel expects Colombia and Chile to support the right of a democratic country to protect its citizens, and to call for the immediate release of all the abductees, and not align themselves with Venezuela and Iran in support of Hamas terrorism,” Israel’s Foreign Ministry said. The diplomatic moves by these four South American countries come as other Latin American leaders have ramped up their criticism of Israel’s military activity.

A Complicated Road

Latin American countries have always had varying relations with Israel. Along the spectrum one may find Venezuela on the one end, who openly forms a link in the Iran-North Korea-Russia-China axis, vocal against Israel on the world stage, and refuses to hold diplomatic relations with it; and countries such as Guatemala on the other end, which was the only Latin American country to vote against a UN resolution that called for a “humanitarian truce” on October 26, together with Israel, the United States, Austria and others. In Honduras’ case, while the previous government made a historic rapprochement with Israel and declared the moving of its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the recent change of government has also dramatically shifted its attitude toward Israel. At the UNSC on December 12, 2023, Member States adopted a resolution demanding an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire”, the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and well as “ensuring humanitarian access”. Those voting against included the US, Israel, Guatemala and Paraguay.[9] On February 12, 2024, Venezuela condemned Israel’s military advance towards Rafah. Caracas has demanded Tel Aviv respect international law “as a guarantee of global peace”. It reiterated its call on the international community to take decisive decisions to prevent Israel from continuing its “catastrophic” policy.[10]

Not all Latin American countries have strongly condemned the terrorist attack against Israel. In the coming months, as Israel seeks to create the conditions for the security of its people in the face of mass murder, its actions may raise concerns. In that context, some Latin American leaders are likely to adopt a contentious rhetoric of moral neutrality.

Strong Iran and Hezbollah presence

Iranian presence is omnipresent in Latin American countries. Iran’s President Raisi recently visited Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua in defiance of the US and in violation of sanctions. Brazil’s President Lula, on his part, allowed Iranian warships to dock in ports in Rio de Janeiro in 2023[11]. He did so just after returning from a trip to Washington to meet with President Biden, where the US threatened further sanctions, which President Lula simply ignored[12]. The Iranian signal is that they are going to ignore US sanctions and pressure, even whilst though Brazil has since signed more bilateral agreements with the US on the promotion of workers right internationally. President Lula is essentially telling the world that America will no longer dictate what he does.

After the October 7 attacks, the Cuban Foreign Ministry called Israel an occupying power and refused to condemn the Hamas terrorists. Cuba indeed has been providing intelligence to Hamas for decades and holding high-level meetings with their leaders and their Iranian sponsors. Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel visited Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah in Tehran in December and reinforced their alliance to “take a common and effective position on important international issues such as the Palestinian issue.”[13] In Chile, with its strong and radicalized Palestinian diaspora, Iranian agents and Hezbollah networks have infiltrated government, media, and academia, in addition to running illicit financial networks in recent years. Iran, and groups such as the Quds Force’s Unit 840, continue to take advantage of money laundering for terrorist purposes designed and funded by the Iranian regime. The susceptibility and use of migrant transient routes by nefarious terrorist actors moving personnel and materials throughout the region is of grave concern and an increased focus on these corridors must take center stage.

In Bolivia’s case, its historic hostility toward Israel plays along a long-standing relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran’s “infiltration” of Latin America was reignited with a security deal they signed with Bolivia on July 20, 2023. For Iran, the deal seemingly only has advantages: it further breaks the narrative of its diplomatic isolation whilst simultaneously validating its strategy of forging “south-south” links as well as its “Look East” policy. Bolivia will now protect Iranian assets, giving Iran the liberty to plan and operate in the country. Israeli operatives, on the other hand, will now be restricted in their ability to confront and counter Hezbollah operatives in Bolivia. Bolivia, therefore, is acting as a haven for Iranian operatives against Israel and therefore poses a serious risk to Israeli nationals in the country, and its Jewish community.

Argentina’s relationship with Iran remains complicated by unresolved grief over Tehran’s responsibility for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center there. The perpetrators of the attacks together killed over 100 civilians. Israeli intelligence revealed that Iran’s Qods Force and Hezbollah operatives were behind the attack, including Imad Mornieh, former Hezbollah senior official who was assassinated in 2008 in Damascus, possibly by Israel; and Ahmad Vahidi, who recently served as the Iranian Defense Minister and is accused of masterminding the attack. An Argentine prosecutor later traced the attacks to Iran’s partnership with its militant proxy, Hezbollah, in Lebanon. Yet the accused perpetrators still walk free in Iran, leaving justice denied to those who lost loved ones in these attacks.

These bombings have cast a permanent shadow over Argentine-Iranian relations, although former president Cristina Kirchner was accused by the then-prosecutor Nisman of covering up Iranian involvement and avoiding to act directly to arrest Iranian wanted officials. Nisman was later found dead in his apartment. Yet geopolitics seems to drive Argentina’s rationality in engaging Iran. It has maintained diplomatic ties and avoided joining US pressure against Tehran. Bilateral trade in agriculture and other commodities with Iran exceeds $500 million annually.

However, ever since Argentina has seen a dramatic shift in its approach to the Israel-Gaza conflict and to Israel in general with the rise to power of President Javier Milei’s government in December 2023. On February 12, Israel freed two Israeli-Argentine hostages held by Hamas in Rafah in a ferocious rescue operation.[14] Argentina has strongly condemned Hamas but as yet have not designated the group as a terrorist organization. President Milei has expressed extremely pro-Israel views and a fondness of the Jewish people in general; expressed his wish to convert to Judaism and announced plans to move the Argentinian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem during his February 2024 visit, a move only taken thus far by Guatemala, Honduras, Kosovo, Papua New Guinea, and the United States in 2017.

President Milei’s trip may be as an attempt to establish an alliance with both the United States and Israel, even though Argentina has limited influence on the world stage. As South America’s second-largest economy, Milei’s foreign policy challenges the impression that Israel is increasingly isolated in the region.”[15] During the Israel visit, however, the lower house of the Argentine Congress gave Milei his first legislative defeat. The next day, whilst still in Israel, a 250% public transport price rise was announced in Argentina. In a country with a large Jewish community of some 200,000, but nonetheless a majority Catholic population, Milei’s gestures toward Israel and the Jewish world are interpreted by some as creating a sense of disconnection and confusion at a time of economic turmoil.

Hezbollah, a Narco Terrorist Organization

Hezbollah is not designated as a terrorist organization in most Latin American countries– only Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay consider Hezbollah as such. Without this designation, local authorities’ ability to monitor or prosecute Hezbollah and its local operatives is severely limited. Hezbollah enjoys open support from authoritarian regimes aligned with Tehran, such as that of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro  – which appears to largely be Iran’s forward operating base[16] in Latin America. Co-ordinated Hezbollah and Iranian fronts commingled with pro-Palestinian radical activism[17] – a popular cause with radical leftists in Latin America. This potentially gives Hezbollah easier access to political leaders and more of a viable cover for their activities.

Finally, because of its decades-long involvement with organized crime,[18] Hezbollah has extensive connections[19] with local crime syndicates in Latin America. These connections provide access to weapons, explosives, counterfeiting, and most critically, corrupt public officials in key positions at migrations, customs, and ports of entry to allow for ease of movement.

Elsewhere in Latin America, Hezbollah’s networks remain undisturbed. One key center is the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, where Hezbollah financiers and supporters have historically been involved in money laundering.[20] This area, with its porous borders, is an ideal hiding place for criminals and terrorists,[21] giving them easy movement of resources; a sympathetic population of the 30,000-strong local Lebanese expatriate community, and access to these three Latin American countries with U.S. and Israeli diplomatic presences and large Jewish communities (including Argentina and Brazil). In Brazil, the sympathetic government[22] of President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva has allowed Hezbollah and Iranian fronts to expand with little risk of scrutiny from local authorities.[23] [24]

This policy has enabled Hezbollah to thrive in the country. Sure enough, it has taken a tangible turn as well. On November 8, Brazilian Federal Police uncovered a plot by alleged Hezbollah operatives to attack Jewish targets. Brazil is home to Latin America’s second-largest Jewish community, after Argentina, and the arrests further raises fears about the region’s vulnerability to terrorism[25].

This border area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is considered a center of criminal activity and is home to a dense network of terror financing, according to a study by Spain’s University of Navarra (UNAV). This was also confirmed by Nazarian who said that it is the most dangerous area in terms of narcotrafficking and terrorism in Latin America where “Hezbollah and other Iranian agents have been exploiting using drug funds to support terrorism.” Hezbollah works closely with other cartels including the Medellin cartel and cartels in Brazil and Mexico[26]. No evidence of a direct connection yet exists between these networks that launder money for crime and the criminal networks that bring fentanyl through Mexico into the United States, but given that Hezbollah has developed this money laundering infrastructure worldwide for decades now, a connection may well emerge.

Likewise, Hezbollah’s network in Columbia remains active. Only weeks before Hamas launched its Oct. 7 surprise attack on Israel, the U.S. Treasury had sanctioned Amer Akil Rada, a member of the Hezbollah cell that carried out the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing.[27] Sanctions extended to Amer’s brother, Samer Akil Rada, and his son, Mehdi Akil Helbawy. The Akils are Colombian-Lebanese dual nationals, and Samer and Mehdi resided in Colombia until shortly before the U.S. Treasury’s sanctions were published when they moved to Venezuela.

Sources say a significant part of Hezbollah’s $1 billion USD annual budget originates in narcoterrorism, including Captagon deliveries around the Arab world as well as smuggling of drugs from South America. A mutual project to the CIA and the Mossad called “Project Cassandra” revealed the extensive ties that Hezbollah keeps with drug cartel networks around Latin America in order to smuggle drugs to the United States and Europe, filling its pockets with cash.

Given the danger and threat this border area brings to the stability of the region, the three countries of the Triple-Border have taken measures that have allowed them to put pressure on narco-terrorist groups which have resulted in important captures of Hezbollah members. According to the UNAV study, the 2018 arrest in Brazil of Assad Ahmad Barakat, an important financial Hezbollah operator and one of Hezbollah’s main operatives in the area, was made possible through the collaborative work of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. Authorities later arrested Hamdar in Peru but since Peru does not consider Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization, Hamdar was only prosecuted and convicted on immigration fraud.[28] A proper counterterrorism investigation was never conducted, despite a U.S. Department of Treasury 2016 report identifying Hamdar as a Hezbollah agent.[29]

The Iranian connection: Satellite-broadcasted disinformation in Spanish

Radical mobilization in favor of the Palestinian cause across the region is fomented by Iran-backed disinformation. Iran undertakes large-scale psychological warfare using social networks, satellites, and Spanish-language media in South America, which “promote Iranian interests to attack the West and Latin America,” Jorge Serrano, a member of the team of advisors to the Peruvian Congressional Intelligence Commission, told Diálogo in September 2022. “VEVAK [Iran’s National Ministry of Intelligence and Security] is behind this,” he said.

Among the terrorist groups supporting Iran in the region, Unit 840 of the Quds Force, one of the five branches of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), calls for attention. Unit 840 is a secret division of the IRGC led by the Quds Force, the executing arm of all acts of international terrorism designed and financed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its main propaganda tool is the Hezbollah-affiliated television station, Al-Manar, from which it broadcasts the terrorist group’s activities, as well as promoting the group’s ideology and Iranian Islamic revolution values.

The unit is responsible for planning and establishing the terrorist infrastructure outside of Iran and does so through the use of local criminals to execute terrorist acts globally and kill adversaries abroad. The regime similarly strengthens its attacks against overseas unidentified officials in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Since 2020, Iran has moved from categorizing and tracking targets for possible attack in the event of escalating pressures between the West and Iran, to launching plans, including the attempted assassination of Israeli businessmen in Colombia.

Aside from the Al-Manar television station, there is the Tertulias en Cuarentena channel on YouTube, created by two Spanish members of the Internationalist Anti-Imperialist Front (FAI). The objective behind the content broadcasted is to penetrate Latin American screens, through interviews conducted by other Iran-influenced media such as Hispan TV, TeleSur, RT, and Al Mayadeen, and to create political content that supports the ideologies of countries such as Venezuela and Cuba.

Another case is the digital platform Resumen Latinoamérica (RL). This web page created in Argentina seeks to be “the other face of the news of America and the Third World.” But the objective of the content is to misinform. Its narrative frequently attacks those who consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and just like Tertulias en Cuarentena, it uses Iranian media such as Al Mayadeen, Hispan TV, and Al Manar as sources, and often even regurgitates information originally broadcast by Tertulias en Cuarentena. All of the terrorist group’s media outlets target Lebanese as well as international audiences, broadcasting in different languages, including Spanish as a fundamental element for the strengthening of its psychological warfare and information manipulation in the South America region.

An American-Iranian Cold War

The US-Iran Cold War left many Iranian policymakers with a siege mentality where Iranian policymakers feel constantly under threat. One solution has been to invest heavily in a national narrative and broadcast that to the world—to portray Iran as a religious beacon, an anti-imperialist stalwart, and perpetual underdog vis-à-vis the United States. Internationally, the IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) operates 30 radio stations and 9 television networks. The scale of their foreign broadcasting significantly increased following the US invasion of Iraq. Hispan TV, a Spanish-language station launched in 2011, focuses on Latin America. Despite growing economic turbulence and the mounting effects of US sanctions, the IRIB maintains an annual budget of approximately $750 million.

The region serves as a major propaganda beacon for Iran, Hezbollah, and pro-Iranian organizations by using this 21st-century technology to leverage a shared narrative with Latin America’s revolutionary left. This allows Iran to overcome its inflexibilities and lack of capacity to perpetrate terrorist acts at the international level as with the additional help of Venezuela, Cuba and the Sao Paulo Forum in Latin America in particular, it infiltrates the whole region.

Former cultural attaché to the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, Mohsen Rabbani, has promoted pro-Iranian communication channels in Argentina and Chile since the 1990s. The Rabbani Network grew over 30 years, moving to YouTube, websites, and social networks and analysis shows. Rabanni has an international arrest warrant from Interpol against him for his involvement in the 1994 bombing of the Israelite Mutual Association in Argentina. The AnnurTV platform, with news in Spanish about Islam and the Middle East, is within the Rabbani network.  This AnnurTV platform belongs to the Argentine Islamic Organization. Mohsen Rabbani’s close supporters and advocates are actively involved in the official Iranian channel, Hispan TV.

Leveraging Hate Toward America for the Iranian Quest to Annihilate Israel

Iran’s proxy Hezbollah may well join the current Israel-Hamas war. Given their vast sphere of influence over Latin America, with large-scale disinformation campaign and media terrorism, their narcoterrorism networks to finance their malign activities, and in-depth ties with some governments that hold coalescing interests with them, these relations are noteworthy when examining the larger picture around Latin American countries’ actions toward Israel. Recalling their ambassadors, condemning Israel or inciting against its war against Hamas following the deadliest massacre in Israeli history is characteristic to some Latin American countries who also happen to hold extensive ties with the Iranian regime and its proxy Hezbollah, or prone to be exposed to its disinformation efforts. The Iranian challenge will have to be taken into account when considering the Latin American front in the global war on terrorism, as Israel represents only the frontline of defense against a worldwide Iranian attempt to take on the West.

[1] https://en.mehrnews.com/news/210497/Bolivia-backs-S-Africa-historic-ICJ-action-against-Israel

[2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/mexico-chile-refer-israel-and-hamas-to-icc-over-possible-war-crimes/

[3] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/colombia-backs-south-africa-s-legal-action-against-israel-at-world-court/3106142

[4] https://www.timesofisrael.com/nicaragua-files-application-to-join-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel/

[5] https://www.arabnews.com/node/2439841/world

[6] https://www.arabnews.com/node/2439841/world

[7] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/argentinas-new-president-arrives-in-israel-reiterates-pledge-to-move-embassy-to-jerusalem/

[8] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-06/ty-article/.premium/swimming-against-the-tide-far-right-argentine-president-milei-begins-israel-visit/0000018d-7de1-d008-a9cd-fff5ba0a0000

[9] https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144717

[10] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240214-venezuela-condemns-israels-plans-to-launch-attack-on-rafah/

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-allows-two-iranian-warships-dock-rio-despite-us-pressure-2023-02-27/

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/under-us-pressure-lula-delays-brazil-docking-iran-warships-sources-2023-02-09/

[13] https://www.heritage.org/terrorism/commentary/cuba-and-iran-are-still-state-sponsors-terrorism

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-rafah-refugee-camp-22-killed-local-health-officials-say-2024-02-12/

[15] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-06/ty-article/.premium/swimming-against-the-tide-far-right-argentine-president-milei-begins-israel-visit/0000018d-7de1-d008-a9cd-fff5ba0a0000

[16] https://www.meforum.org/63941/emanuele-ottolenghi-on-iranian-operations-in

[17] https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/10/12/una-polemica-reunion-en-planalto-y-las-dudas-de-lula-da-silva-que-actitud-tomara-brasil-ante-el-ataque-de-hamas-a-israel/

[18] https://oc24.heysummit.com/talks/transnational-organized-criminal-activities-of-lebanese-hezbollah/

[19] https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/police-documents-hezbollah-ties-brazil-pcc/

[20] https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/14/paraguay-is-a-fiscal-paradise-for-terrorists/

[21] https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/triple-border-criminal-haven

[22] https://americasquarterly.org/article/lulas-quest-for-a-diplomatic-balance-amid-israel-hamas-war/

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-allows-two-iranian-warships-dock-rio-despite-us-pressure-2023-02-27/

[24] https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/10/12/una-polemica-reunion-en-planalto-y-las-dudas-de-lula-da-silva-que-actitud-tomara-brasil-ante-el-ataque-de-hamas-a-israel/

[25] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67367483

[26] https://www.meforum.org/64464/hezbollah-a-worldwide-criminal-organization

[27] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1726

[28] https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/perus-missed-opportunity-against-hezbollah

[29] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm737

הפוסט The Iran-Brazil Border: How Tehran and Hezbollah Infiltrate South America הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The framework saw 80 Israelis, some of whom hold dual citizenships, released from Hamas captivity during the swap deals[8]. These included four-year-old Abigail Edan, an Israeli-American girl who was released on November 26th, who witnessed her parents being murdered by Hamas terrorists before being kidnapped[9]. They also included Doron Katz Asher, a 34-year-old Israeli-German citizen, and her two daughters, Raz 4, and Aviv 2, were taken from their grandmother’s home in Kibbutz Nir Oz[10]. Their grandmother, Efrat Katz, was murdered by Hamas. Doron, Raz, and Aviv were released by Hamas on November 24th[11].

The Israeli Justice Ministry initially posted a list of 300 Palestinian teenagers and women who could potentially be released through the deal, and added 50 names to that list as the exchanges progressed[12][13] (see Appendix A for the full list). Under the terms of the agreement, which was finalized after weeks of negotiations, Israel released three imprisoned Palestinians for every Israeli hostage released by Hamas from Gaza.

Israel ultimately freed 240 Palestinian prisoners in exchange under the week-long cease-fire deal that began on Nov. 24, exchanging three prisoners for every one woman or child hostage[14][15][16]. The 240 Palestinian prisoners were 83 women and 157 minors[17][18].

As of January 2024, Hamas holds 108 hostages alive and about 25 bodies[19]. 27 Israeli hostages have reportedly been killed in Hamas captivity according to Israel,[20][21][22] 3 hostages were killed by friendly fire from the IDF[23] and the bodies of 9 hostages were repatriated through a military operation.[24][25] Not all remaining hostages are said to be held by Hamas. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Popular Front terror groups are said to be holding many of the remaining hostages, as well as non-affiliated Gaza citizens.

Profiling the released Palestinian terrorists: Affiliated with Hamas and “lone wolves”; minors and adults; charged with offenses from stone throwing through placing explosives to attempted murder

The New York Times compared the Israeli data with lists of the Palestinians released each day by the Palestinian Authority’s Commission for Prisoners’ Affairs to assess prisoner numbers and demographics. Of the 240 Palestinian prisoners released during the swaps, 107 were aged between 14 and 17; 104 males, of whom five were 14, and three females, all 16 and 17[26]. The remaining 133 were adults; 65 men, all aged 18 except one who turned 19 in prison, and 68 women. 107 of the 240 released prisoners were under 18[27]. A majority of the people released, 155 of them, were from Judea and Samaria (“the West Bank”); 72 were from Jerusalem’s eastern neighborhoods, and one was from Gaza. The lists on Wednesday and Thursday, November 29-30, also included some Arab citizens of Israel, who are not normally included in exchange deals[28]. That raised alarm among some observers who feared their inclusion could be used to tie them to Hamas or to threaten revoking their citizenship.

Unlike Hamas’ illegal captivity of Israeli citizens and soldiers, in contravention of international law, Israel detained all of the Palestinians on the government list for offenses related to Israel’s security, from throwing stones to supporting terrorism and attempted murder following legal procedures, were the prisoners also had the right to be represented by an attorney. More than half of the cases were being prosecuted in Israeli military courts[29]. Additionally, many of the Palestinian prisoners released by Israel had been arrested for crimes such as: threatening security, illegally entering Israel without a permit, throwing stones, supporting terrorism, associating with hostile or unknown organizations[30].

Most of the released Palestinian prisoners were arrested between 2021 and 2023. The Israeli data shows that three-quarters of the released Palestinians had been in prison for less than a year; 37 were arrested during the Israeli military’s crackdown following the Oct. 7 Hamas-led attacks on Israel[31]. However, released prisoner Shorouq Dwayyat was arrested in 2015 and was serving the ninth year of her 16-year sentence. She was 18 when she was arrested and held in Damon prison in Haifa, accused of stabbing an Israeli with a knife[32].

According to data provided by the IPS and the Israel Defense Forces, at least 55 percent of the 117 Palestinian prisoners released during the first three days of the deal had been held for violent crimes, including 10 for attempted murder, 13 for inflicting serious bodily harm, 19 for placing a bomb or throwing an incendiary device, seven for shooting at people, and five for assault.[33] Ten of the released prisoners were held with stone-throwing as their most serious alleged violent crime.[34] Twenty-one percent of the released prisoners were listed as affiliated with a recognized terrorist organization, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine[35].

Here are some notable examples of released prisoners associated with terrorism felonies:

Hanan Al-Barghouthi and Roda Musa Abdelkader Abu Agamiya.[36] The detainee, Al-Barghouti, is the sister of Nael Al-Barghouti, who spent a total of more than 43 years in Israeli prison, and she is the sister of Omar Al-Barghouti. The Barghouti family is one of the most prominent Palestinian families involved in acts of terror against Israel[37]. Released prisoner Roda Musa Abdelkader Abu Agamiya was filmed upon release chanting in support of Hamas and their violence against Israelis. “We are the sword of (Al-Qassam Brigades Head) Mohamed Deif,” she exclaimed. Roda Agamiya was released after six months in Israeli prison on charges of contact with a hostile organization, illegal stay, violation of a legal provision, state security, assembly or association, and violation of the Law on Entry into Israel (See video here).

• Ragah Abu Kias, connected with Fatah, was arrested at the age of 16 in July 2021 for opening fire on Jews. As a minor, he was given a reduced sentence of five years and two months in prison before he was added to the released prisoner list[38]. Saadi Abu Adi, connected with Hamas, was arrested aged 17 in April 2023. His arrest was also for opening fire on Jews[39].Nafoz Hamad was youngest Palestinian prisoner to be released. At age 14 in December 2021, he had stabbed and critically injured a young Jewish mother in Jerusalem who had been his neighbor. He served less than 2 years of a 12-year sentence before being released and his victim still lives nearby.[40] Upon his release, police called a halt to a party being held in honor of his arrival.
• Marah Bechir, connected with Hamas, was arrested in October 2015, aged 16, when she stabbed a Border Police officer. She was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison.
• Fatima Shahin aged 33, was arrested for attempted murder of an Israeli in Judea and Samaria.
• Malak Salman, Islamic Jihad member, was 16 when she was arrested for an attempted stabbing of an Israeli Border Police officer at the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem in February 2016[41].
• Rawan Nafez Mohammad Abu Matar, 29, was imprisoned for stabbing an Israeli soldier in 2015[42].
• Shorouq Dwayyat, 26, stabbed a 35-year-old Israeli man multiple times in 2015 and was sentenced to 16 years in prison for attempted murder. The man managed to cock his handgun, and shot Dwayyat, wounding her seriously.[43] Prior to this, she had written on social media of her desire to become a martyr. All were released under the prisoner swap deals. Ahmed Marzouk, 18, was arrested four months prior to his release for assaulting police, arson, and possession of weapons[44].
• Amani Heshim, 37, arrested in December 2016 and charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm and possession of weapons[45].
• Walela Khaled Fozi Tangi, 26, detained in August 2022 and charged with attempted murder and possession of weapons and explosives.[46]
• Israa Jaabis, aged 31, attempted a car bomb attack near the Israeli community of Ma’ale Adumim in 2015 that wounded an Israeli police officer.[47]
• Majd Freihat was arrested on March 21, 2023 and sentenced to 18 months on serious weapons charges and connections to PIJ.[48]Nurhan Awad was 17 when she was sentenced to 13 and a half years in prison in 2016 for attempting to stab an Israeli soldier with scissors.[49][50]
• Maysoon Musa Al-Jabali was sentenced to 15 years in prison in 2015 of attempted murder after stabbing a 20-year-old female soldier at a Bethlehem checkpoint and seriously wounding her.
• Aisha Afghani, was convicted after an attempted 2016 stabbing attack on Israelis in Jerusalem’s Old City in 2016.[51][52]
• 17-year-old Ahmed Abu Na’im, served 12 months in jail for throwing stones during clashes with Israeli security forces at a protest. He was subsequently also charged with throwing a bomb or incendiary device. It was his third arrest in one year.[53]
• Israel also released 14-year-old Ahmad Al-Salayme and he was reunited with his family. Ahmad was arrested in May 2023 for throwing stones at Jews in Jerusalem[54].
• Noah Bseso, aged 17, had been arrested in August 2023 for throwing rocks, and incendiary devices at Israeli troops. He had participated in a July protest in Isawiya when Israeli troops entered[55].

Twenty-one percent of the released prisoners were listed as affiliated with a recognized terror organization, most common among them Hamas, followed by Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[56] Amongst them are the following prisoners:

• High-profile Palestinian activist Ahed Tamini, 22, was arrested three weeks ago after allegedly writing a social media post that promised to “slaughter Israeli settlers”. Tamimi spent eight months in Israeli prison aged 16 on assault and incitement charges for slapping and kicking two Israeli soldiers during a protest. The video of the event went viral and her mother, who made the video was arrested for incitement and served alongside her in prison (see video here).[57][58]
• Marwat al-Azza, 45, a freelance journalist, was arrested in November 2023 for inciting terrorism online and identifying with a terrorist organization. Ms al-Azza, had previously worked for US broadcaster NBC. The broadcaster cut ties with her following her arrest.[59]

The above illustrates the heavy price exerted on the Israeli public, and is reflective of the dilemma of the Israeli leadership before the release of Palestinian prisoners, in light of their danger to society, as part of a broader set of considerations as part of hostage swap deals. That includes public pressure, the value of life, and the commitment to bring hostages home alongside serious security elements.

Appendices

The full list of released Palestinian prisoners. Source: Israel Prison Service website, https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/prisoners_1

[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/30/hamas-hostages-list-names-tracker-israel-gaza/

[2] https://web.archive.org/web/20231124061507/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/24/israel-hamas-war-gaza-ceasefire-begins-hostage-release-palestinian

[3] https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2023/12/world/hostage-israel-hamas-deal-dg/

[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/30/hamas-hostages-list-names-tracker-israel-gaza/

[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/12/1/photos-palestinians-celebrate-release-of-another-batch-of-prisoners

[8] https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2023/12/world/hostage-israel-hamas-deal-dg/

[9] https://www.ajc.org/news/debunking-the-false-equivalency-between-israeli-hostages-and-palestinian-prisoners

[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/01/world/middleeast/palestinian-prisoners-released-gaza.html#:~:text=The%20Israeli%20government%20initially%20posted,against%20them%20and%20other%20information.

[13] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-november-22-2023/

[14] https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-open-to-weighing-further-hostage-deal-once-all-children-and-women-freed/

[15] https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/12/1/photos-palestinians-celebrate-release-of-another-batch-of-prisoners

[16] https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/world/freed-palestinians-were-mostly-young-and-not-convicted-of-crimes/

[17] https://www.usatoday.com/story/graphics/2023/11/28/israel-hamas-exchange-hostages-prisoners-graphics-explainer/71720120007/#:~:text=Israel%20released%20240%20Palestinian%20prisoners,Israelis%20and%2011%20foreign%20nationals.

[18] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/30/hamas-hostages-list-names-tracker-israel-gaza/

[19] https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-01-04-24/index.html

[20] https://www.kan.org.il/lobby/kidnapped/

[21] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-01/ty-article/six-israeli-hostages-held-by-hamas-confirmed-killed-in-captivity/0000018c-251a-dc03-a9ec-3d7baab00000

[22] https://www.timesofisrael.com/10-israeli-and-2-thai-hostages-arrive-back-in-israel-after-53-days-in-gaza-captivity/

[23] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna129901

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/16/world/middleeast/yehudit-weiss-hamas-hostage-israel.html

[25] https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/israel-army-says-bodies-of-2-hostages-recovered-in-gaza-operation-4662113

[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/01/world/middleeast/palestinian-prisoners-released-gaza.html

[29] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/01/world/middleeast/palestinian-prisoners-released-gaza.html#:~:text=More%20than%20half%20of%20the,Israeli%20settlers%20who%20live%20there.

[30] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/24/who-were-the-palestinian-prisoners-israel-released-on-friday

[31] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/01/world/middleeast/palestinian-prisoners-released-gaza.html

[32] https://www.jewishvoiceforlabour.org.uk/article/palestinian-prisoners-israel-an-explainer/

[33] https://www.timesofisrael.com/attempted-murder-shootings-bombings-most-freed-palestinians-were-held-for-attacks/

[35] https://www.ajc.org/news/debunking-the-false-equivalency-between-israeli-hostages-and-palestinian-prisoners

[36] https://www.algemeiner.com/2023/12/08/cnns-nima-elbagir-parachutes-into-israel-to-whitewash-palestinian-prisoners/

[37] https://www.alquds.com/en/posts/87962?language=ar

[38] https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/article-775250

[40] https://aijac.org.au/fresh-air/news-reports-whitewash-the-crimes-of-palestinian-prisoners-being-released/

[41] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170426-israel-sentences-palestinian-minor-to-10-years-in-prison/

[42] https://www.timesofisrael.com/attempted-murder-shootings-bombings-most-freed-palestinians-were-held-for-attacks/

[43] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-26/ty-article/.premium/8-of-the-39-palestinian-prisoners-released-in-hamas-deal-convicted-of-attempted-murder/0000018c-0ce4-d2ae-afcf-3df66a2a0000

[44] https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/article-775250

[45] https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-774496

[46] https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/article-775250

[47] https://aijac.org.au/fresh-air/news-reports-whitewash-the-crimes-of-palestinian-prisoners-being-released/

[48] https://aijac.org.au/fresh-air/news-reports-whitewash-the-crimes-of-palestinian-prisoners-being-released/

[49] https://www.ajc.org/news/debunking-the-false-equivalency-between-israeli-hostages-and-palestinian-prisoners

[50] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-palestinian-prisoners-describe-imprisonment-hopes-for-future/

[51] https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-releasing-palestinian-prisoners-hamas-gaza-4d21a9b4

[52] https://aijac.org.au/fresh-air/news-reports-whitewash-the-crimes-of-palestinian-prisoners-being-released/

[53] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-palestinian-prisoners-describe-imprisonment-hopes-for-future/

[54] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231129-youngest-palestine-prisoner-reunited-with-family/

[55] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/palestinian-prisoners-released-hostages-exchange/

[56] https://www.timesofisrael.com/attempted-murder-shootings-bombings-most-freed-palestinians-were-held-for-attacks/

[57] https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/criminal-injustice-in-the-court-of-occupation-palestinian-prisoners-in-israeli-jails/

[58] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/30/palestine-ahed-tamimi-released-israel-hostages/

[59] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67561603

הפוסט Who are the Palestinian prisoners released by Israel in November 2023? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In other words, most of the public does not know that the State of Israel intentionally, under an unbelievable set of assumptions, brought tens of thousands of Palestinians into Gaza, very many of them with terrorist backgrounds. Not for nothing did Faisal Husseini describe the Oslo Accords as a “Palestinian Trojan Horse” in a 2001 interview.[1] Or as he put it, “We all entered the belly of the horse, and the horse itself passed in through the walls. Now the time has come for us to say: Climb down from the belly of the horse and start your referring to was the outbreak of the Second Intifada. And we will note in passing that Faisal Husseini was considered one of the “moderates” in the Palestinian leadership.

But you will already be asking how I know that tens of thousands came in. The facts are as follows.

Official permissions under the Oslo Accords

Among the series of agreements known as the Oslo Accords, the principal agreement is the Cairo Agreement of May 4, 1994. That agreement, also known as the “Gaza and Jericho First” agreement, set out the principles for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza (and subsequently from Judea and Samaria as well) and the security arrangements to prevail from that point onward between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In Annex I to phases of Israeli troop withdrawal and the security arrangements for the present and future, Article 3 deals with “The Palestinian Directorate of Police Force.” That article defines the structure and duties of the police. Clause 3.3.3 stipulates that the force, in all branches, will total up to 9,000 police. The next clause, 3.4.1, specifies that no more than 7,000 of the police will arrive from abroad. In other words, from the Palestinian diaspora. And immediately afterward, clause 3.4.3 provides that those arriving from abroad may be accompanied by spouses and children.

On September 28, 1995, in Washington, an additional agreement was signed, known as Oslo II or officially “The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” Once more, the first annex to the agreement addressed security arrangements.[1] Clause 4 dealt with the Palestinian police force, its structure, its duties, and the recruitment of police. Clause 4.3 stipulates that there will be no more than 30,000 police: up to 12,000 in Judea and Samaria and up to 18,000 in the Gaza Strip. And clause 4.4 once more sets a limit: No more than 12,000 members of the force will come from abroad, but they too may be accompanied by spouses and children. It is also stipulated there that of those 12,000 coming from abroad, 7,000 will be posted to the Gaza Strip and 5,000 to Judea and Samaria.

As may be gathered from Clause XIV.2 in the first section of the body of the agreement,[2] the 12,000 returnees are in addition to the 7,000 who were already covered in the Cairo Agreement. That clause stipulates: “The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement.”[3]

Even if we consider only the numbers admitted according to those two agreements, Israel officially allowed 19,000 Palestinians, plus wives, plus children, inside the Trojan Horse. Since the recruits were relatively mature people, 30 years old and up (of which more later), it is very reasonable to suppose that an absolute majority had spouses and several children. In other words, by a very conservative estimate, and without considering that the Palestinians may have introduced more people than the agreements permitted, the people numbered at least 60,000; and apparently there were many more.

Additional evidence

A look into the history of the Palestinian security services underlines this phenomenon. For example, the book Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform[4] relates the story of how Yasser Arafat established those security services. On page 19, it says: “Very soon after its establishment, the PA had ten different security organizations under its command: Civil Police, Civil Defence, Preventive Security, National Security Forces, Naval Police, Aerial Police, Military Liaison, Military Intelligence, Presidential Security (Force 17), and General Intelligence. Except for the Preventive Security, these organizations were mostly based on PLO military units from the Diaspora”; and on the next page: “by 1996, the PA had more than 35,000 security officers on the payroll, even though Oslo II had limited the ‘Palestinian Police Force’ to 30,000.”

Further testimony may be found in an article named “The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993–2013,”[5] which says: “Ten days after signing the Cairo Agreement, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and the returnees (Al-‘aedin) started to return back to Gaza and Jericho to set up the PA’s security forces and institutions. The 1995 Oslo II increased the number of policemen to 30,000 (12,000 for the West Bank and 18,000 for Gaza); however, by then the Palestinian police force had already reached 22,000 in Gaza and Jericho alone. […] In 1998, the number of security personnel reached between 30,000 and 40,000, increasing to 50,000 by 2000, and 53,000 by 2003.”

Note that those accounts mention 53,000 members of the Palestinian security forces de facto, whereas the Oslo Accords permitted the Palestinians a maximum of 30,000.

Israel knowingly imported tens of thousands of terrorists onto its soil

Who are those people from abroad whom we inserted among ourselves to serve in the Palestinian police? They were members of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), 30 years old and up, who for many years had allied themselves with Arafat the arch-murderer. Many of them were living in Tunis when the Oslo Accords were signed. They reached Tunis, it will be remembered, when the State of Israel was forced to allow some 12,000 terrorists to leave Beirut in August 1982 on ships that carried them to Tunisia and other countries.[6] Most of those expelled from Beirut came to Tunis and later reunited with their families. For example, a New York Times article from 1985[7] describes a visit to one of the schools for Palestinian children in Tunis, where 445 students were enrolled. Estimate for yourself how many more people, ten years later, that number implies. Moreover, there are various accounts indicating that the mature age of the returnees and the difference in their mentality caused much friction with the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza from before the Oslo Accords.

We stress that we have been counting only those people who returned to participate in the Palestinian police forces. Besides them, Arafat also brought many bureaucrats in. Their number is difficult to ascertain; but apparently it is more than trivial, as the following quotation indicates: “The Old Guard derives legitimacy from the PLO legacy as well as the Oslo agreement and its outcome. Its power is also derived from its control over the financial resources of the PLO and the PA, the diplomatic recognition accorded it by the international community, and the control it exercises over the main bodies and institutions of the PLO and the PA, including the bureaucracy and the security services.” [8]

A significant rise in the population according to demographic figures

Another way of examining the matter is to analyze demographic data from the relevant years.

For example, a UN report from 2012[9] provides figures on the residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, including East Jerusalem.[10] In Graph 1, the two bars for the period between 1995 and 2000 show that the number of residents was increasing sharply; and the increase eased suspiciously as measured in the years 2005 and 2010.

A similar picture emerges as well when we look at the average annual rate of change in the population as it appears later in the same report (Graph 2).

The UN report also presents annual figures interpolated for the 1990–1999 period [11].A calculation of the differences in population growth, based on those figures, appears in Graph 3. Here too, an unexplained easing of population growth visibly commences in 1998.

Another source of demographic data is the US Census Bureau.[12] It estimates the population by year separately for Judea & Samaria and for the Gaza Strip. Its source is the census performed by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for 1997. In these figures too, when examined (Graph 4 and Table 1 below), a sharp increase in population may be perceived between 1995 and 1997 and it eases significantly afterward.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the figures point to a relatively sharp increase, over and above natural population growth, in a short span of years immediately following the Oslo Accords. There is no explanation for such an increase, which abates after a few years, other than a massive influx of new residents into the area. In other words, the State of Israel intentionally introduced tens of thousands of Palestinians, at the least, from abroad as part of the Oslo Accords, without headlines and without outcries. It remains only to wonder why the Israeli public is unaware of the influx of such a quantity of Palestinians as part of the Accords.

This also amounts to a significant consideration for today’s discourse surrounding the contribution of the Oslo Accords to the events of October 7. Was the influx of tens of thousands of people consistent with the claim that the Oslo Accords could be reversed at will, even if they worked out badly? Could those people really have been sent back abroad? That question intensifies the need for public discussion and criticism of the political decisions that carry multi-generational implications for Israel.

Appendix

Table 1: Demographic figures for the Arab population of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Source: US Census Bureau

[1] https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/the-israeli-palestinian-interim-agreement-annex-i – The Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement, Annex I

[2] https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/the-israeli-palestinian-interim-agreement – The Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement

[3] We note that this agreement adds 9,000 further police for Gaza; and since among the previous 9,000 there were 7,000 returnees as against 2,000 locals, apparently the same ratio is retained.

[4] https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Entry-Points%28EN%29.pdf – Entry-points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform. Roland Friedrich‏, Arnold Luethold‏

[5] https://stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.gi – The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993–2013. Authors: Alaa Tartir

[6] https://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/18/magazine/the-plo-in-exile.html – The P.L.O. in Exile, by Judith Miller Aug. 18, 1985

[7] Ibid

[8] https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/267 – Old Guard, Young Guard: the Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process at Crossroads

[9] World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision
https://population.un.org/wpp/publications/Files/WPP2012_Volume-I_Comprehensive-Tables.pdf

[10] Ibid, p. xi/13, footnote 12

[11] Ibid, p. 172/196. The difference was calculated according to a general population table at the point of the census.

[12] Independent calculation of the difference and change in population, based on data from the US Census Bureau –
https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#/dashboard?COUNTRY_YEAR=2023&COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2023&CCODE_SINGLE=XG&CCODE=XG&menu=countryViz,

https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#/dashboard?COUNTRY_YEAR=2023&COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2023&CCODE_SINGLE=XW&CCODE=XW&menu=countryViz

הפוסט Exclusive: How Many Palestinians Entered the Territory During the Oslo Accords? This Is How Israel Filled the Trojan Horse הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The barbarity of the October 7 massacre, as well as the ISIS flags and pamphlets found on the Hamas Nukhba terrorists who invaded Israel, triggered natural comparisons between Hamas and ISIS, the Islamic State terrorist organization. Global jihadi organizations, such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and their affiliates have used Hamas’s attack to promote their worldwide jihadist agenda, glorifying their attack as a ‘victory of the Ummah,’. thereby justifying their ongoing propaganda against Jews and Christians.

October

Calls for terrorist attacks against Jews

ISIS

Since Hamas’s horrific attack on 7 October, the organization has been compared to ISIS and has even claimed to be the Palestinian equivalent of the radical Salafist group. Nonetheless, despite the comparison, ISIS views Hamas as traitors and infidels.

As a Salafist group, ISIS views every entity that doesn’t follow the Sunni-Salafist system as apostates. Therefore, Hamas, as a Sunni group which acts as a regional proxy of Shi’ite Iran, is considered as infidel.

Thus, initially, ISIS didn’t react to the 7 October attacks. About two weeks later, ISIS supporters expressed outrage at the Israeli attacks on Gaza, and sought to exploit the Israel-Gaza war to recruit new sympathisers and incite attacks.

In an editorial article, followed by an infographic, in ISIS’s ‘Al-Naba’ weekly, under the title “Practical steps to fight the Jews”, the organization called for targeting Jews and their allies around the world. The article stated that the focus on fighting the Jews in the Palestinian territories is not sufficient to meet the goal of Jewish genocide. ISIS called to target Jews all over the world, especially in Jewish neighbourhoods in the US and Europe. In addition, ISIS called to attack Jewish and Christian embassies, and called on the countries bordering Israel to attack Israel’s front defense lines and fences.

ISIS also referred to the possibility of a ground offensive in the Gaza Strip and called for religious-moral preparation, which includes adherence to Islamic law and military preparation, with an emphasis on appropriate equipment, such as explosive belts “that disappeared from the scene of the confrontation with the Jews”.

Analogous to al-Qaeda, ISIS supported the Palestinians, and used the war between Israel and Hamas to emphasize its messages regarding the importance of the Jihad war, recruit new supporters and incite attacks against “infidels”.

However, ISIS appears reluctant to praise or mention Hamas in reference to the October 7 attack. ISIS does not want Hamas to gain more attention among worldwide Jihad supporters, thereby threatening its role (as ISIS itself did to Al-Qaeda – it split as a separate organization and established supremacy among the global Jihad organizations), as the dominant radical Palestinian organization.

Even though Hamas is an Islamist organization, ISIS views  it as an organization that fights under a nationalist banner and not under the banner of Islam alone – hence its reluctance to call for terrorist attacks on behalf of Hamas. However, ISIS leverages the actions of Hamas to incite attacks under the banner of Islam.

Hamas, a proxy of Shi’ite Iran is a substantial rival of ISIS, which fights and carries out attacks in Iranian controlled territories.

From ISIS’s perspective, to lose their dominance to an “apostate” organization that is close to the Shiite enemy would be double failure.

Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda called for the harming of Jews and US bases in Muslim countries.

Al-Qaeda hailed Hamas’s attack, expressing its enthusiasm by backing the perpetrators and describing the attackers as “heroes”. In addition, the jihadist group claimed that the attack had revealed Israel and the West’s weakness and represented a historic moment for “global jihad”. Al-Qaeda made multiple statements announcing that the Hamas attack was a calling for Muslims to mobilize for “jihad” in support of Gaza, warning that those who refuse will be regarded as “infidels”.

The organization’s leadership issued a statement calling on Muslims around the world to participate in the fighting in Gaza financially and through moral support. The announcement also stated that this is a historic moment and that “the Israeli enemy is a paper tiger and is collapsing from every angle: intelligence, military, security and economic.”

Al Qaeda has declared “open war” against everything that is Crusader (the Christian West), Zionist and Israeli. In the announcement, a call was also made to the Muslims in the countries bordering Israel to pierce the borders, and to the tribes living in the Sinai Peninsula to break the siege on Gaza. A call was made to target Israelis in UAE, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and to attack US military bases, airports and embassies in Muslim countries. Al Qaeda also called for the boycott of Jewish-owned products and companies.

Jaish Al-Malachem Al-EleKtroni, the media branch of Al Qaeda, published a poster quoting the words of Seif Al-Adel, the leader of Al Qaeda (who lives in Iran). Al-Adel called on Al Qaeda members and supporters to establish sleeper cells to help “jihad fighters” in “Palestine”.

In a pamphlet on behalf of the organization’s propaganda arm, Al Qaeda calls for money to be sent to mujahideen to carry out suicide attacks against Jews and Christians. It suggests a breakdown of how the Jews should be attacked around the world: burning houses, cars, Jewish shops, Jewish facilities, etc[1].

In this context, and in contrast to ISIS, Al Qaeda warns in the pamphlet not to harm children[2].

Moreover, Al Qaeda calls to continue inciting Muslims around the world to support “Palestine” in social media and in opposition to ‘infidel’ Muslims (probably the Gulf countries that maintain normalized relations with Israel and diplomatic and military relations with international coalition forces).

The pamphlet contains a section of the eliminated Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who called for jihad against Israel and its allies[3].

Al Qaeda in the Maghreb and Jama’at Nasr Al-Islam wa Al-Muslimin

Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Maghreb and Jama’at Nasr Al-Islam wa Al-Muslimin (Maghreb and West Africa), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel region, issued a joint statement stating that Al Qaeda is trying to gain the ability to reach and liberate Jerusalem. In the announcement there is also a call to the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria to act against the Jews.

Al-Shabaab

The Somali Al-Shabaab organization, which is also affiliated with Al Qaeda, held a support rally for Gaza on October 14th, in the southern Somalian Juba region. At the rally, calls were made for the liberation of Al-Aqsa and Jerusalem and it was noted that the war against Gaza is a war against Islam.

On October 22nd, Al Qaeda’s propaganda arm issued a statement in which they claimed responsibility for a major “electronic warfare” attack against European and Jewish targets. The attack included wreaking panic and chaos through false reports aimed at airports, tourist sites and educational institutions with an emphasis on Jewish institutions in Europe.

The statement claimed that the attack was carried out by the Mujahideen group, which is managed by the magazine “Wolves of Manhattan” and supported by the propaganda arm of the Al Qaeda organization.

According to the statement, the attackers collected the communication details of more than 50 airports in European cities, mainly in France, in addition to accessing the “websites and accounts” of seven major airlines, and the “websites and names” of a large number of airlines. In addition, details of Jewish institutions in Europe, including personal information for students. They also collected phone numbers of police and fire departments and emergency forces in Europe.

It is also claimed that the attackers managed to “close” a number of tourist sites, in addition to four Jewish institutions, including a Jewish school in Rome, which was evacuated following false reports about the presence of a bomb there. In addition, the attackers made more than one hundred false reports to the fire departments in Paris, Rome, Berlin and Madrid.

Al-Qaeda views the Hamas attack as a “historic” turning point. It uses the attack by Hamas to highlight the weakness of the “Crusader and Jewish enemies”, those “colonialist” actors that have oppressed Muslims – and now they have the opportunity to strike at them. Thus, Al-Qaeda is utilizing the situation: calling for Jihad and to fight side by side with Hamas.

From Al-Qaeda’s perspective, this attack also constitutes an achievement in that it succeeded in disrupting the normalization of relations between Israel (“the little devil”, a bastion of the remains of colonialism in the Middle East, an extension of the United States, “the great devil”) and its hated Saudi Arabia, a moderate Sunni- Arab country and the leader of the Sunni world.

Al-Qaeda views the historic opportunity created by the attack, as a “resurgence” of jihad and therefore incites to carry out as many attacks as possible against Christians and Jews.

Attacks by elements of global jihad

ISIS

Brussels – two killed in a stadium shooting attack

On October 16, an armed man opened fire near the stadium in Brussels, about half an hour before the soccer match between the teams of Belgium and Sweden was supposed to take place. During the shooting, he shouted “Allahu Akbar” and declared that he was an ISIS member and fled. Two fans, wearing Sweden football shirts, were killed. After a chase, the terrorist was shot and killed. He was identified as Abd al-Slam Aljilani from Fatah Al-Soud.

ISIS published a statement in which it accepted responsibility for carrying out the attack in Brussels . According to the announcement, the perpetrator of the attack, known as Abu Al-Salam Almahajr, shot at a number of “infidel Christians”, killing two of them and wounding several others.

ISIS praised the terrorist as a “hero” and claimed that the attack would provoke the wrath of “the infidel Al Qaeda” and the supporters of Iran’s “minions” – referring to Hamas.

In two additional posters, ISIS even called on Muslims to shed the blood of the infidels[4].

This choice of the attack outside of the Sweden/Belgium match, came against the backdrop of the burning of the Quran in Sweden several months ago and Brussels being the capital of Belgium and the countries of the international coalition against ISIS.

However, ISIS also calls to support the Palestinians without specifically naming the Hamas organization and the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation.

Planning an ISIS attack in Germany

Special forces in Germany broke into a residential building in the center of the city of Duisburg, in northwestern Germany, and arrested a 29-year-old man, known as “The German Ussama” and identified only by his first name, Tarek, on suspicion of attempting to carry out an attack during a rally in support of Israel held in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, in northern Germany. The suspect, an ISIS supporter, intended to drive a truck quickly into the rally and run over as many people as possible.

November

In November, global jiahdist organizations kept attempting to leverage the Hamas massacre and translate it into support for their own groups.

Al Qaeda:

The “Al-Sahab Foundation”, the official media branch of Al Qaeda’s Central Command, released a new issue of its Al-Nafir periodic bulletin, where it disparages Arab countries’ rulers, accusing them of supporting Israel and calling to kill “Zionists,” slaughter Israeli Jews, and force them to flee to Europe and America”.

The bulletin called for the expulsion by the followers of Islam against the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, and Turkey. Specifically, the bulletin calls the army and people of Pakistan to attack the American ambassador.

Al Qaeda accuses Israel for being responsible for the strike on the Al-Ahli Hospital (which was a failed rocket launch by The Palestinian Islamic Jihad)[5].

The Al Qaeda media branch, Jaysh Al-Malahem Al-Electroni, published a statement praising three recent attacks that targeted two synagogues in Montreal, Canada, using rifles and Molotov cocktails.

The statement also incited to implement a violent attack, similar to the 2015 attacks on the office of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris following that magazine’s publication of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad. In a threat it says that although many years has passed, the “ Crusaders” did not realize that their silence was “in preparation” (for an attack). This is an important message to the western misconception of Islamic organizations (such as the misconception of Hamas and Hamas massacre): the silence isn’t a real silence- it’s a preparation for an attack.

Also, it calls Muslims to carry out commando style and suicide operations in the heart of the ‘Crusaders’ lands.

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS):

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) released the latest issue of its magazine ‘Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind’, where it discusses the implications of the October 7 Hamas attack in Israel. In addition to its articles, it urges every Muslim to launch jihadi attacks in every part of the world[6].

In this call, AQIS is describing multiple ways to implement jihad: either with physical violence, with an addition we haven’t seen in prior calls since the beginning of Israel- Hamas war – a biological weapon. Moreover, AQIS calls for every Muslim who has the capability of implementing a “lone wolf” attack to do so.

ISIS

In an editorial article in ISIS’s ‘Al-Naba’ weekly, the organization addressed the ongoing events in Gaza following the October 7 Hamas attack against Israel, arguing that the “Jews and Christians” have conducted a religious war against Muslims.

To support its argument, the editorial accused Israeli officials of citing a Jewish narrative derived from the Bible ordering the Jews to kill all their enemies.

Additionally, the editorial emphasized that the IDF actions in Gaza are grounded in anti-Islamic ideology.

Conclusion

The war between Israel and Hamas highlights the competition between ISIS and Al-Qaeda and begs the question – who will lead the Islamic narrative regarding the correct way to carry out Jihad.

This situation creates a battle over the core foundations of the Salafist organizations – which might affect their affiliated groups around the world. Al-Qaeda advocates massive support for Hamas, praising the Palestinian organization as heralding a “historic turning point”. On the other hand, ISIS despises Hamas, rejects the attention it receives and calls it an “infidel”. Both organizations call for a Jihad war against the infidels – one calls for it because of Hamas, and the other in spite of Hamas.

The lack of agreement regarding the correct manner of implementing jihad may even lead to further fragmentation and the creation of a new jihadi-salafist organization, with a new narrative that combines the views and messages of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Such an organization could create a new leader who would attract many jihadists around the world.

In addition, a situation of increasing jihad operations around the world on the one hand, and a lack of clarity as to the righteousness of the path on the other – may even intensify the activities of jihadists operating individually, those “lone wolves” who carry out attacks due to their support for the idea of jihad and how they interpret it.

[1] “Attack on governmental Jewish facilities and interests in Arab and European countries, such as embassies and consulates”; “exhausting the money of Jews by burning their houses, cars and shops around the world”; and “focusing on government crusading facilities in America and Europe.”

[2] “Be as careful as you can not to harm their (Jewish) children. Our enemy is clear, and children are not on our list of enemies.”

[3] An entire page was devoted to the shooting attack that occurred on October 8th at an archaeological site in Alexandria, Egypt, in which two Israeli tourists were killed and one tourist was injured. The attack is called “the blessed Alexandria operation” and the comment was added: “This was the beginning. Who will complete themission?”

[4] “To slaughter them like sheep and kill them like beetles and flies”, “to cut off heads, oppress souls and do more”.

[5] “Every one of us must undertake to kill every Zionist he encountered in his path, “our duty today is to kill them, and those of them who remain we will exile back to where they came from – to Europe and America.”

[6] “No Israeli, American, European, non-European Zionist is safe, there is no protection for the embassies of these unbelievers and no protection for their civilians”.

הפוסט “Hamas is ISIS”?  Monitoring Global Jihadi Organizations Since October 7 הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

• “The Day after Abbas”, or scenarios for the Palestinian society in the period following the death of Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”), is presenting Israel, the Palestinians and the Middle East with both great uncertainly alongside unprecedented opportunities. During his 19-year-long tenure, Chairman Abbas from the Palestinian faction Fatah has avoided holding formal elections while holding on to power, as his popularity is plummeting and the Palestinian Authority itself is losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public. This implies that the vacuum left after his departure from the stage could trigger instability, in light of the fragmentation that is characterizing the Palestinian society, with clanships, local affiliations and local militant factions who control enclaves in supposedly PA-control areas.
• Inspecting the Palestinian public’s view on the different political factions – Fatah and Hamas, alongside the Popular Front, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and independent militant factions such as the Lions’ Den – could lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the temperature in the Palestinian street and the risk of a major political overhaul in PA-controlled areas or localities.
• For that purpose, we compared several indexes:
  • Exclusive research of Telegram groups and channels that are operated by or sympathize with the above Palestinian factions, and compared their engagement and reach to learn about the political tendencies among Palestinians.
  • Exclusive research of TikTok hashtags – the engagement Hamas-affiliated hashtags gain as opposed to Fatah, as well as engagement according to geographic location in specific Palestinian cities. TikTok is a predominant and popular social media among the Palestinian society for political expression, while unlike other societies, Facebook and Twitter are significantly less popular, especially among the youth.
  • Exclusive research of Twitter followers – followers of Hamas-affiliated accounts as opposed to Fatah.
  • Exclusive research of Facebook subscribers – subscribers of Hamas-affiliated pages as opposed to Fatah.
  • Exclusive outlook at elections conducted in major Palestinian universities – the only free elections in the Palestinian society since 2005.
  • Exclusive opinion poll among Israeli Jews and Arabs on the Day After Abbas.
  • Exclusive compilation of publicly-available data from opinion polls among Palestinians conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.
• These results have shown surprising correlation, which indicates their credibility and sheds a new light and an often-disregarded angle of the real sentiments among Palestinians on their political institutions and their view on the way their future should be shaped.
• This project was conducted as complementary to a comprehensive study on The Day After Abbas, which includes scenarios, strategic goals, comprehensive actor mapping (groups and office holders), and content analysis that maps repetitive and typical messaging of Hamas and Fatah.

Telegram

All data featured in this chapter is owned by the “Palestinian Media Watch” research institute and was commissioned by IDSF-Habithonistim – Israel’s Defense and Security Forum.

Methodology

• After monitoring and collecting Telegram groups and channels for 11 months, we managed to join 232 Palestinian sources, of which 175 support one of the five main factions – Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) under its control, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) – together with non-political organizations, such as Lion’s Den. We compared their engagement according to the following criteria:
  • Number of groups and channels
  • Number of subscribers
• We crossed this data according to two methods: general comparison, and comparison of sources with +10,000 subscribers.
• The channels vary in size, with the smallest channel having approximately 32 members and the largest having approximately 248,449 members.
• Through the analysis of the organizational affiliation of each of the sources, it is possible to generate data that opens a window to Palestinian society and give tantalizing hints of possible political developments in the Palestinian Authority.

Key findings

• Out of 175 Telegram groups and channels with a total of 2,428,859 users, it appears that the relative popularity of Hamas is higher than that of Fatah.
  • 78 groups and channels (44.6%) are identified with Hamas, as opposed to 67 (38.3%) who are identified with Fatah, 15 (8.6%) with PIJ, and 11 (6.3%) with independent factions such as the Lions’ Den. Other factions – PFLP and DFLP – only have 2 and 1 sources that are identified with them.
  • The average number of members per Fatah-affiliated channel is 9,622.18 whilst the average number of members per Hamas-affiliated channel is 12,833.78.
  • Of all the big channels – those whose members exceed 10,000 – of which 34.9% are affiliated with Fatah and an identical number are affiliated with Hamas, Hamas gets 40.7% of all members on these channels while Fatah only gets 24.4% – approximately 10% less than its footfall. Hamas channels 57,991.93, and Fatah channels get just 34,704 members per major channel on average.
• In addition to Fatah and Hamas, there are also independent factions, such as the Lions’ Den, that are not affiliated with any of the big organizations and focus on apolitically uniting forces for the benefit of an armed struggle.
  • The average number of members per communication channel of the independent factions is 32,504.45, and not far behind lies the PIJ with an average of 26,277.26 members per channel.
  • Among the major channels, the average number of members per channel representing or affiliated with independent factions reaches 86,620, and PIJ channels with 53,404.71.
• Comparison with real-life political distribution showed correlation with the Telegram data: In Betlehem, a Fatah-controlled city, the official Fatah channel has approximately 4,500 subscribed users, while its counterpart from Hamas only has approximately 380 subscribed users. At Bir Zeit University, unlike Bethlehem, where the Hamas-affiliated list has recently won the student association’s election, dominates a sentiment that leans toward Hamas: the channel of the student movement of Fatah – “Shabiba” – in Bir Zeit has approximately 940 subscribed users, compared to the channel of the student movement of Hamas, which has approximately 5,050 subscribed users.

Results

General data

The analysis is based on 175 groups and channels that have not changed since the beginning of the monitoring. Out of these 175 channels and groups:

1. 67 channels (38.3%) are identified with Fatah
2. 1 channel (0.6%) is identified with Fatah but openly opposes Mahmoud Abbas
3. 78 channels (44.6%) are identified with Hamas
4. 15 channels (8.6%) are identified with PIJ
5. 2 channels (1.1%) are identified with PFLP
6. 1 channel (0.6%) is identified with DFLP
7. 11 channels (6.3%) are identified with independent factions such as the Lion’s Den

The distribution of members in these channels and groups is as follows:

1. 644,686 (26.5%) are members of Fatah-affiliated groups and channels
2. 12,756 (0.5%) are members of the Fatah-affiliated channel that opposes Abbas
3. 1,001,035 (41.2%) are members of Hamas-affiliated groups and channels
4. 394,159 (16.2%) are members of PIJ-affiliated groups and channels
5. 17,297 (0.6%) are members of PFLP-affiliated groups and channels
6. 1,377 (>0.1%) members of the DFLP-affiliated channel
7. 357,549 (14.7%) are members of channels affiliated with independent factions

A total of 2,428,859 members participate in all the channels and groups on which the study focuses.

The average number of members per channel is as follows:

1. ~9,622.17 members on average per Fatah-affiliated channel
2. ~12,756 members on average per channel affiliated with the Fatah faction that opposes Abbas
3. ~12,833.78 members on average per Hamas-affiliated channel
4. 26,277.27~ members on average per PIJ-affiliated channel
5. ~8,648.5 members on average per PFLP-affiliated channel
6. ~1,377 members on average per DFLP-affiliated channel
7. ~32,054.45 members on average per channel affiliated with independent factions

Big channels data

Out of the 175 channels and groups there are 46 large channels with over 10,000 members. Of them:

1. 15 channels (34.9%) are identified with Fatah
2. 1 channel (2.3%) is identified with the Fatah faction that opposes Abbas
3. 15 (34.9%) channels are identified with Hamas
4. 7 channels (16.3%) are identified with PIJ
5. 1 channel (2.3%) identified with PFLP
6. 4 channels (9.3%) are identified with independent factions
7. DFLP does not have a channel or group with 10,000 or more members.

The distribution of members in the big channels and groups is as follows:

1. 520,560 (24.4%) members of groups and channels affiliated with Fatah
2. 12,756 (0.6%) members of groups and channels affiliated with the Fatah faction that opposes Abbas
3. 869,879 (40.7%) are members of groups and channels affiliated with Hamas
4. 373,833 (17.5%) are members of PIJ-affiliated groups and channels
5. 13,568 (0.6%) members of the PFLP-affiliated channel
6. 346,480 (16.2%) are members of channels affiliated with independent factions

A total of 2,137,076 members in all channels and groups on which the research focuses, and to which over 10,000 members are subscribed.

The average number of members per big channel is as follows:

1. ~34,704 members on average per Fatah-affiliated channel
2. ~12,756 members on average per Fatah-affiliated channel that opposes Abbas
3. ~57,991.93 members on average per Hamas-affiliated channel
4. 53,404.71~ members on average per PIJ-affiliated channel
5. ~13,568 members on average per PFLP-affiliated channel
6. ~86,620 members on average per channel affiliated with independent
   factions

Analysis

Each faction’s distinct strategies have clear effects on the degree of popularity of each of the organizations, with the most popular organizations relatively being the independent ones, both in a general analysis and in the analysis of the major channels only. This is probably due to the fact that the Palestinian public using Telegram supports terrorism against Israel on any possible scale and in any form, and since the independent factions do not represent any religious or political current, no person is pushed aside due to one or another political or religious positions.

Not far behind the independent organizations, the most popular organization in the general channels is PIJ. There are several possible reasons for this, among others the organization’s lack of accountability to population or place in the Palestinian leadership, which positions it in an advantage above factions perceived as “institutional”; its significance in inter-factional unions as well as it being apolitical; or how much the reader enjoys consuming the organization’s content. The fact that the PIJ is less popular than the independent factions can be attributed to being religious, unlike the independent factions which, as mentioned, are not necessarily religious. Another reason could be the PIJ’s almost complete dependence on Iran, which can cause the average Palestinian to dislike the organization for nationalist reasons.

After the PIJ, by a twice as large margin, stands Hamas. A possible reason for this is the number of tiny channels – those with less than 1,000 members – that are affiliated with Hamas. Another reason could be that it is a religio-political organization that rejects both its religious and political opponents.

After Hamas stands Fatah with about 75% of the participants per channel on average compared to Hamas. The reasons for this can be both religious and political, since on the one hand Fatah is not a religious organization but it has an affinity with religion, and on the other hand there is a lot of criticism of it by the management of the PA, something that can naturally cause potential opposers for Fatah.

Looking at the big channels with over 10,000 subscribed members, the picture appears to be slightly different, but the trend still goes against Fatah. As mentioned above, even on the major channels, the independent factions have the most participants on average per channel. In second place is Hamas, and not far behind is the PIJ. The average number of participants in any major channel affiliated with Fatah is less than 60% of that of an average channel affiliated with Hamas.

In the two types of analyzes in question, the most popular political organization is Hamas, followed only by Fatah. PFLP and the DFLP are too small to have an impact on the future of the PA after Abbas’ death, but they are third and fourth respectively in both cases. Hence, the war for control of the Palestinian Authority after the death of Abbas can end with the victory of Hamas and its control of Judea and Samaria in addition to the Gaza Strip, if this is the case and no successor to Abbas is appointed from within Fatah.

Another possibility is the possible military takeover by the independent factions of the districts in which they are located, like criminal organizations, and prevent the Palestinian Authority from entering the areas under their control in fields where they want control, such as terrorism against Israel. This can be seen in Abbas’s visit to Jenin after an operation “Home and Garden”, which only happened after negotiations by a delegation from the PA with senior officials of the Jenin Brigade of the PIJ in order to allow the visit to pass without interference from the local factions, that is despite Abbas being the President of the Palestinian Authority and his arrival with many security forces to secure it. It is likely that in the event that the independent factions take control of the PA territories militarily, they will allow the PA to operate in their territories in the areas of management and logistics, and they will replace the PA’s security mechanisms – the power will be with those factions, but the responsibility be on the PA.

Interesting angles – Telegram / Real life comparison

The official Fatah channel in the Bethlehem area has approximately 4,500 subscribed users, while its counterpart from Hamas only has approximately 380 subscribed users. At Bir Zeit University, unlike Bethlehem, you can see a sentiment that leans more toward Hamas: the channel of the student movement of Fatah – “Shabiba” – in Bir Zeit has approximately 940 subscribed users, compared to the channel of the student movement of Hamas, which has approximately 5,050 subscribed users.

It is apparent that in the largest channels, those with hundreds of thousands of subscribers, such as the official channel of Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades with over 200,000 subscribed users, the independent Lion’s Den with almost 250,000 subscribed users, or PIJ’s Jerusalem Brigades with approximately 140,000 subscribed users, the language is often done in a much more elegant way than the other forums, even those that are not particularly small. There are two types of messages in channels of this kind – long and eloquent messages called Bayan (plural – bayanat, translated as “announcement” or “proclamation”), and sometimes news updates in a higher level language than is customary in other Telegram channels. Fatah does not have such a channel apart from official channels of the Palestinian Authority, to which people may subscribe out of a desire or need to be updated, rather than support, and the biggest of which does not pass 15,000 subscribers. Fatah channels sometimes issue such statements, but they do not put a special emphasis on it like other organizations.

These announcements, combined with the relevance of the organizations, can be the reason for those channels having so many members, since users will probably prefer to read a coherently written message over a short and unclear message, which sometimes will even include spelling mistakes, as sometimes happens in other channels. The relevance of the organization greatly affects the channel’s popularity as well, since PFLP and DFLP issue statements almost daily, but since they are not politically relevant like Fatah or Hamas, or militarily like PIJ and the independent factions, despite the statements they do not manage to gain broad support on Telegram like the others.

The seemingly apolitical character that characterizes PIJ and the independent factions is not unique to it. The largest Palestinian channel, “Jenin Al-Qassam”, is engaged in unaffiliated news coverage of terrorism in Jenin and has over 360,000 subscribed users. This channel is not included in the statistics due to being a news channel that is not affiliated with any faction. Despite being unaffiliated, its owner, Ali al-Ghoul, was a 17-year-old Hamas operative. Al-Ghoul was killed in Operation “Home and Garden” on 02 July 2023. The channel gained over 55,000 subscribers within a month of Al-Ghoul’s death. Apparently, when it became known that al-Ahul owned the channel, many users signed up to it, and it is possible that this was done as a tribute to the “Martyr” after his death. Along with the news that al-Ghoul was the owner of the channel until his death, his organizational affiliation was also revealed, and it should be noted as a possible cause to the rapid growth of the channel after his death.

TikTok

Due to increased content moderation on Facebook and Twitter, content affiliated with Fatah and Hamas exists, albeit scarce. Not only do many of the users and groups affiliated with extremist content closed or suspended shortly after their creation, the content that remains suffers extremely poor engagement, with few likes and shared even in profiles that enjoy hundreds of thousands of followers. This could indicate the popularity of these platforms in the Palestinian society when it comes to politics.

However, on Tiktok there seems to be wide-scale and authentic involvement of Palestinians. Content supporting and slandering each of the two movements, Fatah and Hamas, gains hundreds of thousands of views, even reaching over a billion views. While many Israelis perceive Tiktok as an entertainment platform for the younger generation, it is viewed as a political hub among Palestinians.

TikTok’s popularity among young Palestinians is evidenced by the fact that the “Guardian of the Walls” events were accompanied by videos uploaded by young Palestinians and Israeli Arabs documenting their participation in nationalist incidents against Jews. Such was the TikTok “trend” of attacking ultra-Orthodox youth on the streets of Jerusalem and on the light rail.

TikTok has also fostered the popularity of the Lions’ Den terrorist group, and of “freelance” terrorists such as Ibrahim Nabulsi, who thrived as he uploaded documentation of terror attacks against Israelis on TikTok. This turned him into a star, and inspired some young Palestinians to follow suit.

What can we learn from TikTok on the popularity of different Palestinian factions?

Comparative analysis of Hamas- and Fatah-affiliated hashtags

Methodology:

• Comparative analysis of the popular hashtags associated with Hamas and Fatah, segmented by the number of views in the last year and in general, the number of posts in the last year and in general, and age groups.

Key findings

• When analyzing posts as per Hamas- and Fatah-affiliated hashtags, the data shows clear advantage for Hamas on TikTok over Fatah, in particular among the youngest age group of 18-24. On top of that, Lions’ Den, a relatively new and non-official armed group with far less maturity than that of well-established Palestinian factions such as Hamas and Fatah gains massive support which even exceeds Fatah’s.
• Hamas holds a clear advantage over Fatah in terms of the number of posts with Hamas-affiliated hashtags with 12.6 more posts in the past year – June 2022 to June 2023 (151,641 as opposed to 11,947) and 6.9 more posts in total (415,692 as opposed to 59,847).
• Considering the number of views, Fatah holds an advantage over Hamas when analyzing the total number of views with 135.8 million views of Fatah-affiliated videos as opposed to 102.1 million views of Hamas-affiliated videos. However, this trend turns opposite way when considering the number of views in the past year – June 2022 to June 2023, with 2.25 more views of Hamas-affiliated videos (1.7 billion as opposed to 753.6 million).

Hamas vs Fatah-affiliated hashtags on TikTok by number of posts

Hamas vs Fatah-affiliated hashtags on TikTok by number of views

• In addition, Hamas-affiliated hashtags enjoy more popularity among the youngest and have the least popularity among the oldest.
  • Among the 18-24 age group, Hamas’s share is 37.96% higher than Fatah’s, with 21.66% of its video views originating in this age group as opposed to 15.7% among Fatah videos.
  • Among the 25-34 age group, Hamas’s share is slightly larger than Fatah’s, with 69.63% of its video views originating in this age group as opposed to 65.61% among Fatah videos.
  • Among the 35+ age group, Fatah’s advantage is clear – 67% higher than Hamas’, with 14.76% of its video views originating in this age group as opposed to 8.69% among Hamas videos.
  • It is to be noted that TikTok does not enable analyzing engagement among users younger than the age of 18.

Segmentation of Hamas-affiliated hashtags on TikTok by age group

Segmentation of Fatah-affiliated hashtags on TikTok by age group

Tiktok – comparative analysis of increase in views of videos with the hashtag #Hamas, #Fatah and #Lions_Den during the 50 days between June 19 and August 9, 2023, Tiktok

Comparative analysis of engagement gained by Hamas- and Fatah-affiliated content as per combination with geographic areas-related hashtags (location tags)

Terminology

View count: In the context of TikTok, the term “view count” refers to the numerical representation of the total number of times a video has been viewed by users. Each time a user opens and watches a video, the view count increases by one. This metric provides insights into the popularity and reach of a particular video, helping content creators and researchers gauge the level of audience engagement and the overall impact of the content on the platform.

Like count: The “like count” on TikTok represents the total number of times users have expressed appreciation for a video by tapping the heart-shaped “like” button. This action indicates that the viewer enjoyed the content and serves as a measure of positive engagement. The like count helps content creators assess the reception of their videos and contributes to TikTok’s algorithm, influencing the likelihood of the video being recommended to a wider audience.

Comment count: The “comment count” denotes the total number of user-generated comments posted in response to a specific TikTok video. Comments provide a platform for users to interact with the content creator and other viewers, allowing for discussions, feedback, and community engagement. Higher comment counts can indicate that a video has sparked significant interest or has resonated with the audience on a deeper level.

Share count: In the TikTok context, the “share count” reflects the number of times users have redistributed or re-shared a particular video on their own TikTok accounts or other social media platforms. When users come across content they find compelling, they can share it with their followers, friends, or broader networks, amplifying the video’s reach beyond its original audience. The share count serves as an indicator of how shareable and viral a video may be, showcasing its potential for widespread dissemination.

Save count: The “save count” pertains to the total number of times a video has been saved by TikTok users to their personal collections. The “save” feature allows users to bookmark videos they find interesting or valuable for future reference, re-watching, or sharing with others. The save count is an essential metric that helps content creators understand the long-term impact and enduring appeal of their videos, as well as the level of audience investment in preserving and revisiting the content.

Bot: In the context of TikTok and other social media platforms, a “bot” refers to an automated software application or script that operates with minimal human intervention. These bots are designed to perform specific tasks repeatedly and at high volumes, often mimicking human behavior. When discussing bots in the context of TikTok, it typically pertains to spamming videos with artificial engagement, or repeatedly uploading the same video in order to spam search results, thus skewing any metrics.

Methodology

To conduct the analysis of data from TikTok related to Hamas and Fatah, a multi-faceted methodology is employed. The first step involves data collection, where hashtag combinations affiliated with both organizations are systematically retrieved from the TikTok platform. This process ensures a comprehensive dataset representing the content associated with Hamas and Fatah. The combination of generic hashtags ensures a content analysis that is focused on Fatah and Hamas, and avoiding “dumpster” results by combining generic keywords (e.g. “shabiba”/“youth” or “kutlatna”/“our list”) with geographical locations (e.g. Bethlehem, Jenin, etc.).

Next, a general analysis of the collected data is performed, focusing on key metrics such as views and engagement indicators, including likes, comments, shares, and saves. These metrics provide valuable insights into the popularity and interaction level of the content related to the targeted groups. This analysis aids in understanding the trends, preferences, and content dynamics associated with Hamas and Fatah on TikTok.

Subsequently, a more specific analysis based on geographic location is conducted. By leveraging location hashtags from TikTok posts, the content’s popularity and engagement are examined across different regions. This geographical segmentation allows for a deeper understanding of how the content resonates with specific audiences in different locations, identifying potential regional variations in interest and engagement patterns.

Overall, this comprehensive methodology combines data collection, general analysis, and location-based insights to provide a holistic view of the TikTok content related to Hamas and Fatah. The findings from this study contribute to a better understanding of the organizations’ presence and impact on the platform and offer valuable insights for researchers interested in these communities and their interactions on TikTok.

Data

General data

The analysis is based on 19,122 videos. Out of these videos:

1. 9,055 (47.4%) are affiliated with Fatah
2. 10,067 (52.6%) are affiliated with Hamas

The average number of views per affiliation is as follows:

1. 238,864.78 views per video affiliated with Fatah
2. 301,418.14 views per video affiliated with Hamas

The average number of likes per affiliation is as follows:

1. 9,320.28 likes per video affiliated with Fatah
2. 10,394.66 likes per video affiliated with Hamas

The average number of comments per affiliation is as follows:

1. 08 comments per video affiliated with Fatah
2. 75 comments per video affiliated with Hamas

The average number of shares per affiliation is as follows:

1. 18 shares per video affiliated with Fatah
2. 08 shares per video affiliated with Hamas

The average number of saves per affiliation is as follows:

1. 19 saves per video affiliated with Fatah
2. 52 saves per video affiliated with Hamas

Data as per location tags

General distribution by location and affiliation:

Average view count per location:

Average like count per location:

Average comment count per location:

Average share count per location:

Average save count per location:

Please see Appendices A and B for the full geotag-based data and analysis.

Outlook at the results of the Bir Zeit University’s student association election – 2007-2023

Over the past 19 years, no presidential or parliamentary elections have been held among Palestinians. The only frameworks that have been facilitating elections were municipalities – where in some cases the results are dependent on agreed-upon candidates representing certain ethnicities or clans – and the universities. This litmus test attests more than any poll on the trends in popularity of the main Palestinian political factions, Hamas and Fatah, represented by means of their respective student groups, “Kutla Islamia” and “Shabiba” (Kutlat Al-Shahid Yasser Arafat), alongside other, much more marginal groups.

Elections for the student association are held annually in all Palestinian universities. The Birzeit University case study attests to the level of popularity of a once-firm Fatah stronghold, where Hamas has reclaimed solid and consistent majority over the past several years. In 2009-2010 Hamas refused to participate in the election, citing corruption and marginalization. In 2020-2021 no election has been held due to the covid-19 pandemic.

Hamas has gained clear victories in all student association elections held since 2015, except the tied result in 2019. It is to be noted that these accomplishments have been obtained in spite of the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to undermine Hamas’ student groups in fear of a questioning the PA rule in A and B territories around Judea and Samaria, especially in light of the 2007 Gaza coup d’état. The PA has done that by means of, inter alia, arrests of student activists, raids on their facilities and possible irregularities. Israel has also arrested on a number of occasions “Kutla” activists following intelligence indicating their ties to terrorism.

It is worth mentioning that elections for the universities’ student associations are not necessarily representative of political trends among the general population. Students are often associated with more educated or affluent population groups. They tend to be younger and prone to political influence. However, campuses are precisely where revolutions and major political movements have historically thrived. Both Chairman Abbas and Hamas senior official Haniyyeh identified their potential, and cited universities as a major battlefield to win hearts and minds. Major arch-terrorists such as Yahia Ayash and Marwan Barghouti are alumni of the Birzeit University and were politically active over the course of their studies there.

IDSF Index – The Day After Abbas

The stability of the PA following President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)’s retirement is a question that affects the security coordination between Israel and the PA, and naturally on the viability of future negotiation with the Authority. Instability would hold off any sustainable agreements.

Only a minority (9%) of the Israeli public thinks that after Mahmoud Abbas’s rule, the transfer of power will occur in an orderly manner. 35% think Hamas will take over the Palestinian Authority in effect; 28% predict anarchy in the Palestinian Authority, forcing the State of Israel to intervene militarily, and 28% did not answer as they felt they do not know what will happen in the Palestinian Authority with the end of Mahmoud Abbas’s rule.

A segmentation of the responses shows that the Jewish public as well is uncertain about what the day after Abu Mazen holds: 5% believes that the transfer of power will proceed in an orderly fashion; nearly a third (28%) maintain that anarchy will break out in the PA forcing Israel to intervene militarily; 20% think that Hamas in effect will take control; 21% predict a coup or military takeover of Judea and Samaria by Hamas, and 26% replied “I don’t know”.

The situation among Israeli Arabs does not paint a dramatically different picture: almost a third (28%) of Israeli Arabs foresee anarchy in the Palestinian Authority with the State of Israel forced to intervene militarily; 17% predict a transfer of power in effect to Hamas; 18% think that Hamas will affect a coup or military takeover of Judea and Samaria, and only 9% think there will be an orderly transfer of power (28% answered “I don’t know”).

In such a state of uncertainty characterizing the near future of the PA’s security and politics, it is to be expected that the State of Israel would be well prepared for what the future might bring. However, the Israeli public does not believe it is: over half (52%) of the public deem Israeli unprepared for the eventualities of the day after Abu Mazen; approximately a third (28%) of the respondent did not know, and only 20% was confident of Israeli preparedness.

The survey was conducted by the IDSF research department and with statistical guidance from Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The sample was conducted among 1,191 respondents from the adult population (18+) in Israel who use the Internet. For the Jewish sample (956 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.17% with a probability of 95%; For the combined sample (1,191 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.84% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (235 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±6.39% with a probability of 95%.

PCPSR Opinion Poll Compilation

Public opinion polls provide another angle that teaches about the moods on the Palestinian street in preparation for the day after Abbas. The Ramallah-based Palestinian Institute for Policy Survey Research (PCPSR) is one of the important sources in this context. PCPSR describes itself as an independent research institute and non-profit institution whose goal is policy analysis and academic research in the context of Palestinian society – domestic politics and governance, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The institute is managed by Dr. Khalil Shkaki, who holds a PhD from Columbia University; its board of directors includes Dr. Modar Kassis, program director and research fellow at Bir Zeit University, Dr. Yazid Sayeh from the Carnegie Center for Middle East Studies in Beirut, and Dr. Azmi Al-Shu’aibi, senior at the Palestinian Research Institute AMAN for the Study of Corruption and former council member The Palestinian legislature.

We exclusively analyzed the results of the PCPSR public opinion polls on a 5-year timeline: every quarter between 2021-2023 and every year between 2020-2018. An analysis of the survey trend sheds light on the significant trends on the Palestinian street in the context of the day after Abbas:

Domestic Politics: Fatah vs Hamas, PA’s Popularity, Demanding Abbas’s Resignation

Do you support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future?

Do you believe any legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon?

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas

Do you want President Abbas to Resign?

Who is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people?

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, which list will you vote for?

*Notice May 2021 – Guardian of the Walls

Perception of corruption in PA institutions

Yes:

Assessment of the PA

Election results

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, whom will you vote to?

*Notice May 2021 here as well

Between Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh

“West bank”

Between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyyeh

Between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Ismail Haniyyeh

If Abbas does not run for elections, whom will you prefer as successor? (close-ended question)

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Support for the concept of the two-state solution

What are the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years?

What are the most effective means of ending “the Israeli occupation” and building an independent state?

The most preferred way out of the current status quo

What is the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today?

Multi-choice: Support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock

Armed Groups

Support of the formation of armed groups, such as the “Lions’ Den”

Does the PA have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection?

PA’s Security Coordination with Israel

Supportive of the ending of security coordination with Israel that was announced recently by the PA

הפוסט The Day Post Abbas: Where Palestinians On Social Media Stand הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The research includes an analysis of the decision-making process and its effect on the Israeli society and data on Israel’s security, including fatalities, before and after Oslo; comparison of the funds received by the PA from the international community and West Germany after WWII; special poll among 1,057 Israelis; special research group of 50 Israelis and the process they went through, toward the Palestinians, Israel’s security needs and view of the conflict; the roads paved by the Rabin government as means to entrench security and hold of the territory; new revelations from Palestinian broker Abu Alaa’s personal diary and his view of the negotiations; and in-depth analysis of Israel’s military response to developments on the ground from Oslo, through the 2002 Defensive Shield operation and on to 2023.
We are open to in-person briefing about all of the above analysis. Please contact us for any comment or question.

Click the PDF file for the full booklet.

“The statistics reveal a sharp uptick in the annual quantity of fatalities and injuries following the Oslo Accords. The figures are shocking: During the 11 years following the Oslo Accords — that is to say, the years of the 1990s during and after the agreements, plus the Second Intifada —1,018 Israelis were murdered in terrorist operations, amounting to 2.4 times as many as in all the 15 years preceding the Accords. between 1994 and 2022 there were 9.3 times as many Israelis killed and injured in terror attacks as there were during the entire period between the foundation of Israel until Oslo.”

“The Palestinian Authority was rewarded with a series of amenities for the sake of fulfilling its original purpose. International legitimacy, good will, and even perceptible eagerness from the Israeli side for enabling it to succeed, alongside unprecedented financial support. The Palestinians received 35.9 more international financial aid per capita than West Germany after World War II. But while Germany today is a thriving country, with the world’s fourth largest economy, and is Europe’s economic leader, ranked ninth in the global human development index, the Palestinian Authority has left the Palestinians far behind.”

“The underpinning of Yitzhak Rabin’s approach was that the Oslo Accords should be perceived as a process between Israel and the Palestinians, which was taking place with the expectation of reciprocal rewards. However on the Palestinian side, both in the Palestinian Authority and in Hamas, the realization of the power of blackmailing they possessed gradually solidified: The more urgent it became for the State of Israel to disengage as a matter of national interest, the better the Palestinians were positioned to exact an ever more exorbitant price, and of course to reject any agreement to the trajectory of the Rabin Outline.” Major General (res) Gershon HaCohen

“For their part, the Israeli political and security echelons fell into a recurrent optical adjustment of the reality before their eyes and refused to perceive reality correctly for fear of “spoiling the party”. Thus, indirectly, they allowed the security situation to deteriorate at the cost of thousands of Israeli casualties. both the Palestinians and senior Arab officials elsewhere were astonished that Israel trusted Arafat and brought him in from abroad rather than relying on local leadership. None of the telltale indications stopped the Israeli government on its way to initiating self-imposed disaster. In the period following the Oslo Accords, there were 9.3 times as many Israelis killed and injured in terror attacks as there were during the entire period from Israel’s foundation to Oslo.” Or Yissachar

“64% of Israelis believe that the Oslo Accords caused damage to state security. Just 11% of Israelis believe that the Oslo Accords brought Israelis and Palestinians closer. 53% of Israelis believe that interim solutions exist that are somewhere in-between ‘two states for two peoples’ and a ‘binational state’. 77% of Israelis believe that stopping incitement against Israel must be a precondition for any peace process with the Palestinians. Just 11% of Israelis are ready to accept Israeli civilian casualties resulting from terrorist attacks perpetrated while efforts are being made to reach a permanent agreement with the Palestinians.”

“The Prime Minister did not involve the Intelligence Corps in the negotiation process. He even kept them out of the loop. Even when the Accords had been reached and the IDF and Intelligence Corps presented their assessment regarding implementation of its provisions, their opinion was rejected while disregarding their claims outright, not always based on a reasoned explanation or argument, but rather based on translating their wishful thinking into an agreement.” Brigadier General (res) Oren Solomon

“How does Israeli society regard the effects of the Oslo Process from a 30-year perspective? The Oslo process left a considerable impact on Israeli society, most of which regards control of the Judea and Samaria territories to be a definite security imperative, and regards the residents to be a legitimate population forming an important pillar of principles and security. This perception is a significant change compared with opinion toward a peace process with the Palestinians in the 1990s.” Colonel (res) Ronen Itsik

“In Abu Alaa’s view, many of Israel’s leaders ‘wanted to cut the ribbon’ concluding the Oslo process… Israelis and Palestinians should have been left to negotiate directly, without American mediation… Per Arafat, This is the first time in history that Palestinians are changing direction.” Colonel (res) Baruch Yedid

“The construction of a system of transportation from Judea and Samaria to the centers of employment in Israel was the primary cause that stimulated population growth and serves until today as the most significant factor motivating people to move to these areas. There are even those who would say that the physical linkage of Judea and Samaria to central Israel was the first phase of the slow process in which the settlement enterprise made its way into the Israeli public consensus.” Major (res) Lilach Eshtar

“Despite the continuing terrorist attacks, the IDF did not alter its course of action. the IDF and the security apparatus faced considerable challenges in countering terrorism and establishing a favorable tactical and operational position. This difficulty arose because the IDF and security organizations lacked a significant presence and control on the ground. it is only in extensive military operations, where the IDF can effectively encircle the area and respond swiftly, that there is a realistic chance of substantially dismantling most of the terrorist organizations’ military infrastructure, disrupting the senior leadership, and neutralizing the leadership and operatives who form the core of the enemy’s strength.” Dr. Omer Dostri

הפוסט The Oslo Debacle: 30 Years to the Accords that Changed Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Breaking the False Dichotomy: Precedents set by the western democratic world for autonomy and special geopolitical arrangements

Notwithstanding the fervent discourse concerning the future of Israel’s control of the territories of Judea and Samaria (“West Bank”), a more nuanced assessment reveals that much of the passionate dispute is in regards to the specific details rather than the substantive position. On the one hand, the more conservative wing of the Israeli political map does not propose full sovereignty in all of Judea and Samaria – plans promoted by right-wing political actors typically call for the establishment of some form of Palestinian entity (a state, autonomy, self-rule, etc.)  in at least some portion of Judea and Samaria. At the same time, the left wing of the Israeli political map does not support a full withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines – most plans supported by left-wing actors recognize the need retail Israeli control of the Jordan Valley, Israeli sovereignty in the major Jewish settlement blocs, and effective demilitarization of the Palestinian entity. In any case, there is a broad consensus that a creative middle-ground solution is the practical approach to this issue, so that the arrangement assures the national security of Israel and considers the needs of the Palestinians to the maximum possible extent.

However, in spite of the broad agreement that out-of-the-box thinking will be necessary for any reasonable solution, to the best of our knowledge there has not yet been a comprehensive study that reviews the precedents around the world of territories that have a special sovereign status. Given that any Palestinian entity that will be established (if at all) would have to have certain elements of special (or limited) sovereignty, it would be wise to learn from other cases which implemented an arrangement of special sovereignty in order to address a unique geopolitical situation.

The study before you presents over 60 of the worldwide models that are governed as dependencies or areas of special sovereignty. These unique diplomatic arrangements reflect the aim of the sovereign country to safeguard its own interests through a form of limited control over the foreign affairs, security, and immigration policy of the given territory while allowing for a high measure of freedom in the governance of internal civil affairs, with the consent of the international community and completely within the scope of international law.

None of the following precedents should be viewed as entirely analogous to the Israeli-Palestinian context and none of the solutions should be viewed as applicable in their entirety, even with minor adjustments, to the Israeli reality. Every special arrangement is unique and is a product of its own particular circumstances. Still, we believe that acquaintance with these special cases will encourage the creative thinking that is necessary for the implantation of a workable solution to the challenge presented by Israel’s presence in the territories.

The study expands on three particular models: the Dutch model, the American model and the British model. Thus, for example, the Netherlands holds no less than six territories in the Caribbean, each with its own status, and none of which has the freedom to manage its own affairs in foreign policy, security and immigration. Neither do any of their respective peoples have the automatic right to immigrate to the European Netherlands despite the fact that they are subject to the decisions of the Dutch parliament and crown with respect to these matters. The US holds unincorporated territories, whose residents are not eligible to vote in the US presidential elections or for automatic US citizenship – this despite the fact that they pay taxes, may serve in the US military and are subject to the authority of Congress and the President. The UK rules territories and colonies whose peoples are not eligible to vote in the UK elections or make decisions on matters of foreign policy, security and immigration, although they are subject to the decisions of Parliament and crown. Consequently, there are six different types of British citizenship, among them “British subject”, “British national” and “British protected person”. All of this is endorsed by the international community and is fully in accordance with international law.

The State of Israel is not a carbon copy of the United States, the UK, or the Netherlands. It is governed by a unique form of democracy, the foundation of which is the aim to guarantee a national home for the Jewish people with certain laws and policies that are designed to safeguard the principle of Jewish independence. The models presented herein are mostly (with the notable exception of Hong Kong) vestiges of colonialism and do not reflect the deep and undeniable connection between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, as opposed to Americans in Samoa or Dutch in Curacao. Further, none of the territories presented herein are governed by radical ideological movements sworn to wage ongoing, uncompromising war, on the sovereign country. As such, this paper does not propose to adopt one model or another outright, but rather learn from each model and use the concepts as a springboard for a more productive, creative conversation.

This paper takes a trip around the world and asks a basic question – what is special sovereignty?

Review of “Special Sovereignty”

• A Trip Around the World: Examples of Special Territories
  • 66 special territories around the world: not every territory on the map is an independent state.
  • Disputed territories throughout the world, where there is no demand for full independence.
  • Territories without territorial contiguity – enclaved states, exclaves, non-contiguous territories, overseas territories: not every political entity exists within a single and contiguous territory.
• Three central models: The Dutch, US and UK models
  • The Dutch model
  • The American model
• The British model

Read the full PDF

הפוסט Special Sovereignty: International Precedents to Less-Than-A-Palestinian State הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Why a placebo agreement with Iran cannot prevent war but facilitates it l why diplomacy cannot substitute credible military threat l and how Iran’s real map reflects the regime’s “strategic depth” policy

The Iranian regime invests considerable resources and budgets in developing military nuclear capabilities, a tiebreaker weapon that could give Iran a twofold advantage: on the one hand, a powerful deterrent – an “insurance policy” of sorts – in the form of a nuclear umbrella over Iranian and pro-Iranian forces that are gradually making inroads into large parts of the region, to bring into existence its vision of a Middle East that is a sphere of influence controlled by Shiite Iran, and on the other hand – an offensive instrument that could pose a supreme existential threat to the State of Israel as an instrument in Iran’s designs to annihilate it.

A nuclear program is more than just an armaments program – it is a status symbol for a country that joins a “prestigious” and limited “club” of nuclear states. A military nuclear program is the jewel in the crown of Iran’s efforts to achieve superpower status such that will further fuel the regime’s revolution export machine and further consolidate its status and power, including domestically to cement its control over the Iranian people. Nuclear weapons are not only an end goal but also a means to achieve the regime’s strategic objectives.

Israel cannot – under any circumstances whatsoever – accept a scenario in which Iran is a state in possession of nuclear weapons. The State of Israel is now at a decisive stage, in view of the acceleration of the Iranian military nuclear program, the repercussion of which is the contraction of the breakout range from Iran obtaining enough fissile material for its first nuclear explosive device. To date, Iran has enough 60% enriched uranium to cut the threshold divide to zero breakout time, meaning that from the moment the regime gives the order, Iran would need a mere two to three weeks until it enriches enough 90% enriched uranium to manufacture its first nuclear weapon. Furthermore, in the event that it decides to make a dash to nuclear weapons, Iran could use its remaining 20% and 4.5% enriched uranium to manufacture 4 nuclear warheads within less than 3 months. In addition, Iran is conducting advanced research and development of implosion type weapons and of equipping surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads.

This is the number one threat to the Zionist enterprise today.

Based on our projections, a return to the 2015 agreement (JCPOA) might lead to a full-fledged war between Israel and Iran withing a year or two:

• The staggering capital that will be available to Iran as a result of the agreement could allow the regime to fast track the force buildup of its regional partners that pose a threat to Israel
• Iran will enjoy the unrestricted freedom to accelerate the development of its missile and UCAV technology.
• The agreement will signify Iran’s success in forcing the US’s hand, further boosting its status in the Middle East.
• Such an agreement is tantamount to a thumbs-up to Iran to upgrade its centrifuge plants with more advanced models, enabling it to achieve high-grade uranium enrichment due to the expiration of critical sunset clauses – and the agreement itself – in 2031.
• The agreement denies the IAEA the means with which to effectively supervise Iran’s nuclear activity, while Iran continues to withhold information regarding suspected sites believed to be part of the Iranian nuclear program, discovered in the Iranian Nuclear Archive obtained by the Mossad.
• Furthermore, such an agreement – or Iran’s attempt to achieve nuclear capabilities without one – might encourage other countries in the region to follow suit and strive toward nuclear abilities, posing a detrimental threat to Israel’s military supremacy in the region.
• Throughout the talks between Iran and the US, it was more than evident that the Biden administration is endeavoring to reinstate the nuclear agreement at any cost, including the complete withdrawal of basic demands that were put in place to prevent Iran from attaining short breakout times.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, a nuclear agreement would merely accelerate a scenario of a regional war rather than counteract it. As a result of this eventuality, and with no real agreement with binding jurisdiction such that imposes inexorable supervision mechanisms, sets open ended objectives that are not time limited and stipulates sanction snapbacks in response to violations – it is left to Israel’s political ranks to charge the military ranks with the objective of system-wide readiness for an independent offensive operation against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Israel must pose a credible military threat for Iran that its strategical value against Iran’s nuclear program  outweighs any agreement that aim to buy time or to turn a blind eye to Iran’s activities. At the same time, however, Israel must strive to unite with Jordan, Egypt and the Abraham Accords states as well as with the pragmatic Arab axis, around their common interests, to forge a regional coalition of aligned countries that can act as an effective strategic bloc counterposing Iran’s nuclear scheme.

As effective is it may be, Israel’s military campaign between the wars (CBW) cannot completely prevent Iran from reinforcing its allies and tightening its grasp on the region – especially in Syria. Israel does not operate on the Iranian playfield in many aspects,  and this compromise its full military superiority in the region and might prove to be a real threat to its national security.

On a regional level, the “Iranian Octopus” is extending its tentacles in a bid to bring the region into its clutches. It does so by destabilizing its neighboring countries and building up its proxies in the area, notably Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Houthis in Yemen, and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, aiming to attain Iranian strategic depth and place nooses around Israel. This network of pressure fulcrums surrounding Israel is armed with a substantial military infrastructure of missiles, rockets and UAVs designed to deliver a fatal blow to Israel’s home front and is thus another variable in the equation of threat against Israel.

This document presents a comprehensive and exhaustive strategic assessment, by IDSF military researchers and former high ranking military commanders of the Iranian nuclear program and the threat it poses to the very existence of the State of Israel. It includes the following chapters:

• Introduction to the Iranian nuclear program, its underpinning rationale and its current situation
• Review of the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA): the West’s eagerness to attain a diplomatic achievement produced an agreement that was ineffective and inadequate, which ultimately paves the way for Iran to becoming a nuclear-weapon state (NWP) with full international legitimization, while at the same time enjoying economic prosperity
• Review of the West’s appeasement and containment policy that is in contradiction to Israel’s defence doctrine, which relies on a foiling and credible threat approach
• Three tables illustrating:
  • The main drawbacks the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement poses for Israel
  • Iran’s violations of the agreement in 2016-2018 – prior to the Trump administration’s end of term, debunking allegations that the administration withdrew from the agreement despite Iran’s compliance
  • The central points of contention regarding the reinstation of the agreement at present
• Iran’s real map – the regime’s “strategic depth” policy
• Iran’s conventional arms threat to Israel – long-range missiles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)

IDSF-Habithonistim’s recommendations for tackling Iran’s nuclear program, from a viewpoint of a regional operative-offensive strategic deterrent

הפוסט Nuclear Weapon in the First Act: Iran’s Ambition to Annihilate Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Read the full executive summary: IDSF-Habithonistim – Strategic Assessment for Israel 2022-5782

The Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF-Habithonistim) is laying on the table a Strategic Assessment for Israel: the Integrated Campaign Against Zionism, which presents a hybrid analysis of the threat circles in and around the country, asking the essential questions regarding Israel’s short-medium -term as well as long-term national security, alongside recommended modus operandi.

The assessment was and is being presented to senior officials in Israel’s security apparatus, political system, and decision-makers. In these meetings, IDSF-Habithonistim’s officers and commanders are laying out a national security-oriented worldview with no partisan dependence or affiliation, with only Israel’s best national interests in mind.

Facing Israel currently are powerful and coordinated forces that are operating in a multi-vector, concerted effort and at full throttle toward a common goal: the undermining, attrition, and eventually downfall of the State of Israel. These strategic centers of gravity are positioned in multi-theatre and multi-collaborative circles, which are moving toward their epicenter into a single, integrated campaign against Israel. These are massive force building processes that are aimed toward a consolidated strike which, in the absence of a suitable counteraction, may occur in a short to medium term.

Israel will not be able to operate against this constellation of threats from a position of decentralized logic. It is imperative that decision-makers adopt a counterstrategy, such that suitably corresponds to the integrated characteristics of the threat, places the nation’s systems on a war-footing and prepares them for a multilayered emergency under a single unifying principle: cessation followed by a multi-theater reversal of momentum. Such a strategy can allow Israel to systematically neutralize the aforementioned centers of gravity.

In the current state of affairs, Israel is losing battle after battle, and if it continues in this vein, it might end up losing the war – an option that cannot be entertained no matter the cost.

This could be the point of no return for the Zionist enterprise.

The moves and strategies that have been designed against Israel for years are now culminating, poised to eradicate Zionism.

• Iran is closer than ever to military nuclear capabilities dedicated to the express purpose of annihilating the state of Israel. These capabilities would also provide it with a “nuclear umbrella” that would spread its octopus tentacles throughout the region. Iran has been building a multi-theater system around and within Israel which includes proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Hamas in Gaza and elsewhere. Hezbollah is currently equipped with 150,000 rockets, precision guided missiles, mortar shells and combat drones – with the number of the latter rising from 50 to 2,000 within a decade.
• Hamas continues to rear its head, contriving to merge the internal theater of Judea and Samaria, Gaza and even Lebanon, in recent years increasing carving itself swaths of influence over Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians at the expense of Fatah’s power. Hamas aspires to become a key player that yields control over Jerusalem, and is amassing progressively stronger support among the Palestinians, Arabs and Bedouins alike. The organization has demonstrated significantly improved artillery capability during Israel’s Operation “Guardian of the Walls” (the May 2021 conflict), so much so that it was able to disrupt the daily lives of Israelis in ever larger parts of Israel.
• Throughout Israel – Judea and Samaria included – we are witnessing a convergence of Israeli Arabs, Bedouins and the Palestinians around an ideological platform that champions sympathy toward Palestinian nationalism and particularly with Hamas. The riots during Operation “Guardian of the Walls”, the unrest surrounding the tree plantings in the Negev, the rioting on Temple Mount and the increasingly bold demonstrations throughout the country, wherein Hamas and PLO flags were raised, all reflect deep-seated processes of disengagement and isolationism among a significant swath of the Arab-Bedouin sector.
• The “conflict management” policy collaboration with the Palestinian Authority has reached its limit, due to the growing influence of other players in the theater, Hamas in particular, the acceleration of “political encroachment” construction, the increasing political brazenness of the Palestinian Authority (evident in its lawsuits at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and bolstered by the tailwind it received by its acceptance to international forums), the rampant incitement in its education system and the ongoing policy of support of the armed conflict against Israel, not the least of which is evident in its “Pay for Slay” monetary compensation plan for terrorists, which puts in place a standing legal framework to turn citizens into killers.
• The synchronized and coordinated “political encroachment” construction all across the country – The “Fayyad Plan” in Area C, illegal construction by Bedouins in the Negev, and illegal construction of Arabs in the Triangle area, Jerusalem and northern Israel – threatens to snag from Israel its hold over its territorial depth and poses a developing potential existential threat.
• Personal security is increasingly undermined through tactics such as rock throwing and use of Molotov cocktails against vehicles on the country’s routes; stabbing and shooting attacks in the heart of Israel’s cities; the intensification of subversive Jihad activity such as protection racketeering; shootings on main roads and in populated areas; wildfire arson; and the imposition of a dominant Islamist presence in mixed cities under heavy incitement on the part of local Arab leaders, with neither legal countermeasures nor operational deterrence applied by Israel.
• The orchestrated delegitimization campaign reflects a fully synchronized “closed circuit” involving organizations within Israel, foreign organizations, anarchistic elements, financing and influential entities such as the European Union and the UN, the “legal” stronghold provided by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the publicity buzz created by global media and the BDS movement – all following the lead of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas and other terrorist entities.

There is a national need for decision-makers to devise an exit strategy from its stalemate in the face of the cluster of integrated threats. At the heart of every strategy is stratagem. In order to affect a reversal of momentum, the integrated map of threats must firstly be internalized on a systemic level; the nation’s systems must be positioned on a war-footing, prepared for all mentioned threats and focused on emergency preparedness. Once these preliminary measures are put into place, Israel must then initiate preemptive multi-theatre action. This type of process demands considerable resources, preparation and a systemic force buildup – civilian, legal and military – but most of all, it requires a substantive paradigm shift stemming from an understanding of the gravity of the situation.

With these existential threats looming over its head, Israel is slow to take to the playfield. However, it must choose between a crippling blow or a charge to victory of Zionism.

Israel must switch from a “troubleshooting mode” to preemptive initiative!

הפוסט Strategic Assessment for Israel: The Integrated Campaign Against Zionism הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

• Stone and Molotov cocktail throwing in Judea and Samaria has evolved from a nuisance to a strategic challenge that undermines the safety of the civil population and contributes to the stability and motivation of Palestinian Jihad. As such, this challenge requires a comprehensive, multilayered systemic response.
• The extent of this phenomenon indicates that these are not merely isolated incidents, but the tip of the iceberg, and indicate systemic institutional incitement for Jihad against Israel, led by the Palestinian Authority, Hamas,
• These are the most common forms of terrorism based on the availability of weapons, daily interaction with the population, alongside the absence of operational and legal deterrence.
• There are currently about 20 known hotspots of stone-throwing, mostly along the main routes, as well as specific locations of persistent rioting along the separation barrier (“West Bank Barrier”). The perpetrators are typically aged 10-20, attack IDF units, at times encouraged by local inciters and radical militant organizations.
• 2020 saw 1,884 stone-throwing incidents and 496 Molotov cocktail throwing incidents, causing injury to 154 soldiers and civilians. On average, in 2021, stone throwing incidents increased by 210%, and Molotov Cocktail throwing incidents increased by 156% year on year.
• The IDF and the Israeli Police are responding to this threat by ambushing and dispersing these terrorists’ gangs, and placing them in detention. The main challenges in tackling this problem include the density of the areas from which the terror attacks are carried out, local assistance to the perpetrators, the profusion of hotspots where the security forces are required to operate, the operational ineffectiveness of the IDF’s tools in dealing with this phenomenon, non-detention or release from detention of the perpetrators, cumbersome rules of engagement, and judicial procedures that lead to lenient sentences.
• A review of all cases opened against perpetrators from 2019 to 2020 showed a clear picture of significant leniency in the civil and military courts, with much lighter penalties than what the law calls for, to the extent that prison sentences are 95% shorter than the sentences provided by law. In some cases, sentences are dispensed for only several days to several months of incarceration.11% of the stone-throwing cases do not end in incarceration at all. The circumstances of the verdicts are unknown and require a case-by-case review.
• The average sentence is 3 months for stone throwing and 13 months for Molotov cocktails, in contrast to the maximum sentence stipulated by law – 10-25 years, depending on the circumstances.
• Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the data revealed that a significant portion of reported incidents does not end with an indictment. During the first half of 2020, only 21% of the reported stone-throwing incidents and 33% of the Molotov cocktail incidents have ended with an indictment.
• The obstacles in addressing this challenge include a lack of coordination between units, a shortage of investigators and combat soldiers, intelligence gaps, and a “widely-accepted penalty range” culture in courts that is not in line with the dictates of the law.
• Our recommendations include the following: Defining specific areas as high-risk areas for stone and Molotov cocktail casualties., where this constitutes a life-risking terror attack which justifies defensive actions such as shooting for the purpose of neutralizing; concentrated efforts to detain the recruiters, inciters, and instructors of perpetrators; A computerized system with a database that enables improved coordination; and formulating legislation that enables more severe and just penalties for those involved in terror activities.

The IDSF has had a security briefing webinar with 27 representatives from foreign embassies in Israel based on this position paper, exposing them to the truth on the unbearable everyday reality in the Judea and Samaria roads.

הפוסט “Deadly Stones”: Undeterred Terrorists Throwing Stones and Molotov Cocktails הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), which has crafted an image for itself as a bureaucratic, moderate, pragmatic and civilian-led Palestinian government, certainly when compared to its rival Palestinian organization, Hamas, plays an active role in the armed struggle against Israel in multiple ways, including the administration of a well-oiled and well budgeted economic apparatus designed to incentivize organized as well as random acts of terror perpetrated by Palestinians against innocent Israelis. This is the “Pay for Slay” apparatus.

➢ According to Palestinian law, which designates the terrorists as “the Palestinian people’s combat wing”, imprisoned terrorists are rewarded on a sliding scale, based on the number of years they are serving in prison. Upon their 30th year in prison, their salaries reach $3,750 USD per month, equivalent to the salary of the President of the Palestinian Supreme Court, and eight times the average minimum salary in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria (“the West Bank”). It is also 4 times the per capita average monthly salary earned by Palestinians. This annual per capita salary is surpassed by only 17 countries.

➢ Incarcerated terrorists who were released after having served more than 5 years in prison continue receiving a salary, even after their release, as well as a one-time release payout ranging from $5,000 to $25,000.

➢ PA law mandates employing released terrorists in government agencies in order to provide them with permanent financial security, including fully subsidized healthcare and education. It also confers to them priority employment placements across government ministries.

➢ Furthermore, the PA provides compensation, in the form of monthly allowances, through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to the families of the “martyrs” (terrorists, who were killed during terror operations).

➢ On average, the PA spends about $300 million USD every year on this, an amount equivalent to about 7% of its annual budget during most of the surveyed years, and almost half of the foreign financial aid it receives from donor countries and other contributors.

➢ Approximately 5,000 prisoners, 7,200 released prisoners, as well as 37,500 families of the
“martyrs” and wounded terrorists, benefit from the cash allowances and employment opportunities provided through this policy.

➢ To appreciate the gross incongruity in priorities, in 2018, the budget of the Palestinian Ministry of Health, which is budgeted for 5 million inhabitants, stood at $530 million USD ($112 USD per capita per year), while the terror apparatus budget, which serves 12,200 5 Terrorists in the Civil Service incarcerated and released prisoners, and 37,500 family members of “martyrs” and wounded terrorists, that constitute a fraction of the population, stands at $370 million USD ($8,820 USD per capita per year).

➢ Among the terrorists receiving these benefits are Omar Abu Jalal, who murdered three members of the Solomon family and is expected to receive about $2.04 million USD throughout his lifetime; Abdel Hakim Asi, who murdered Rabbi Itamar Ben Gal, and is expected to receive a similar amount; and Amjad and Hakim Awad who murdered the five members of the Fogel family and sentenced to 5 life sentences and another 7 years in prison, and each is expected to receive a combined $4.26 million USD over the course of their lives.

➢ Terrorism is considered a legitimate and primary tool in fulfilling the PLO’s and PA’s ultimate goal of establishing a Palestinian state while eliminating the State of Israel. In this context, the PA views the cash incentives and employment preferences as constituting an important element in institutionalizing its terror apparatus.

➢ This is the Palestinian Authority’s explicitly, defined policy as expressed by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who called the “martyrs” “stars in the sky of the Palestinian nation’s struggle,” who are the “top Palestinian priority,” and who stressed, on several occasions including to the UN General Assembly, that “even if we were left with just one penny, we would pay it to the families of the martyrs and prisoners.”

הפוסט Terrorists in the Civil Service הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Over the past few years, and considerably during 2020, we have witnessed the reshaping of the Middle East’s traditional axes of power into four new distinct coalitions:

The Israeli – Moderate Sunni Coalition, an unprecedented overt strategic cooperation recently reaffirmed by the Abraham Accords, 2. The Shi’ite Iranian Coalition that includes Iran and its militias all across the region, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, 3. The Radical Realistic Sunni Coalition led by Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood, and 4. The Ultra-Radical Sunni Organizations, the most prominent of which are ISIS and Al Qaeda. The Moderate Sunni Arab World is now facing two existential security threats: the Iranian regime’s aggression, most notably its military nuclear program and military interventions around the region; and a growing menace posed by radical Sunni elements.

The historic détente between Israel and a large number of moderate Sunni countries, as well as the reconciliation between the Gulf States and Qatar, has been significantly stimulated by these two security threats, in addition to other common challenges such as the covid-19 pandemic and the strive for economic prosperity. Formed around an unprecedented convergence of interests, it underscores the imminence of the danger a nuclear Iran poses to the region and the international community.

In our view, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its prompt lifting of economic and military pressure have proven that appeasement and containment are counter-productive in mitigating the Iranian regime’s aggression and malign activities. The limited and partial verification mechanism, the ambiguous wording, and the lack of reference to the ballistic missiles program have all led regional countries, already excluded from the negotiation process, to suspect world powers are taking the wrong path in meaningfully and sustainably encountering the Iranian threat. We underline the centrality of an efficient maximum pressure strategy in order to signal the Iranian regime that all options are on the table, including risking its domestic legitimacy, thereby obtaining peace through strength.

The Abraham Accords have also highlighted the irrelevance of past paradigms with respect to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, preconditioning any Arab-Israeli normalization by forcing Israel into far-reaching and unsustainable security and land concessions. By circumventing this precondition and deprioritizing the Palestinian issue, moderate Sunni countries, previously instrumentalizing the Palestinian cause to put military, economic and diplomatic pressure on Israel, are now striving to leverage relations with Israel in order to strengthen their national sovereignty and security. This proves the validity of our paradigm as per the desirable path to proceed with the Palestinian-Israeli issue:

The premise that the Land of Israel, including Judea and Samaria (“the West Bank”) and the Holy Sites, is the historic and eternal homeland of the Jewish people, a place that is inseparable from Jewish identity as a religion and as a nationality.

The recognition of the necessity to strive for a sensible arrangement vis-à-vis the Palestinians, which is a continuation of the path already concluded, set, and executed in the framework of the Oslo Accords and still valid today, signed by the
Israeli Rabin Government and Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority. That agreement gave the Palestinians full civil control over their population centers, setting forth a vision of a demilitarized Palestinian entity alongside the Jewish and Democratic State of Israel, with Jerusalem being its undivided capital.

The assertion, adopted by both Rabin’s government and the present-day Israeli government, that Israel has the right to defend itself by itself, along a defensible eastern border, retain control of the Jordan Valley in the broadest sense, and keep full security and military control over Judea and Samaria, based among other things on the massive civil presence of Jewish Israeli communities in the territory.

In this new Middle East, the U.S. has an important role in further promoting and consolidating the Israeli – Moderate Sunni Coalition while taking firm actions vis-à-vis Iran and the other radical forces who seek to destabilize the region and build a global network of terrorism. Now energy-independent, the U.S. has a greater margin for maneuver to lead a like-minded, interest-based coalition of regional allies to obtain sustainable peace and prosperity in the region.

הפוסט How to Navigate the New Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.