Israel’s economy stands predominantly on the country’s prolific high-tech industry.

Some 14% of the country’s economy is made up of the high-tech sector, which is one of the economy’s main engines of growth, and responsible for a major share of government revenues. However, the war in Gaza saw vast numbers of that sector’s employees serve in reserves duty, meaning they were absent from their jobs for prolonged periods of time.

A country’s economy is one of the main pillars of its national security, and thus Israel’s economy is an inalienable link in the very existence of the State of Israel. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement set out to gain better understanding of the implications of the ongoing war on the economy of Israel.

For this end we interviewed senior member of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement – former Director General of the Ministry of Communications and IDF Chief Communications Officer, Brigadier General (res.) Nati Cohen on his views on this matter.

Although Israel is entrenched in a long-term multi-arena war, “we are viewing the return of investor confidence in the Israeli economy, especially because the country is at war”, asserts Cohen.

The economy plays a crucial role in creating optimal conditions for funding the costs of the war as well as in the continued existence of the State of Israel. The necessity to allocate financial support to the reservists and their families, both who bear the main brunt of the fighting, alongside the costs of rehabilitation of the individual in Israeli society are done through the reallocation of budgets from their usual purpose in times of peace, to the emergency channels that have been imposed upon Israel.

It is important to stress that it is only natural for a country dealing with a prolonged acute state of emergency, to experience economic trials. The effect of the economy on a country’s national security and vice versa is not mutually exclusive as the state of a country’s national security and its economy are tied in an interlinked cycle.  One manifestation of this correlation is the steep costs of manufacturing of armaments, which meet higher demand in times of war.

As Israel’s high-tech industry draws heavily on foreign investors, its economy leans on high-tech, and its national security is dependent on the state of its economy – it follows that foreign investment plays a crucial role in Israel’s national security.

The reality at the moment is that by natural cause and effect, Israel’s economy sustained a hit from the war with large budgets allocated to war-related causes such as military activity, financial remunerations for fighters and their families in lieu of lost salaries, and medical and emotional support for the war’s victims. Yet on the other hand, data from the past year show that there is also potential for leveraging the war to sustain economic balance.

Does the war have any positive effect at all on Israel’s economy?

In sharp contrast to all of the negative economic outlooks and the credit downgrade Israel had sustained, it was actually the year of the war that saw a rise of 77% in foreign investments. “This stems from the understanding among investors that every war has a day after the war”, says Cohen. “On the one hand, Israel is in a state of war, but on the other – war is also an opportunity for creativity, innovation, thinking out of the box. Start-ups are born from unanswered needs, and the war in Israel had bred such needs, offering numerous opportunities to entrepreneurs”.

It is important to mention that the above said does not in any manner suggest that war is positive and desired, nor is it a choice made to create opportunities; however, one must not ignore the larger picture that includes a silver lining that should be considered.

Events the likes of war serve as an important test for a country’s capabilities, one which if Israel learns the right lessons could serve to boost its economy, no matter how chaotic and difficult the current situation is.

One engine for such an opportunity for growth is Israel’s world-renowned technology industry.

When and how had Israel become a high-tech superpower?

“The foundation for Israel as a platform for becoming a startup nation , starting 25 years ago, had been laid when Bill Gates visited the country. At the time I was serving in the IDF as a young officer (Major) and was selected to give Gates a tour of the IDF’s school of computer science”.

What was Bill Gates’ impression of the IDF’s technology unites?

Cohen remembers Bill Gate’s impression of the visit as a definitive moment in Israel’s high-tech industry: “The day I visited the IDF I understood why Israel is a start-up nation. When I see these young 18-year-olds learning in about a half a year what takes us four years to learn in university, and then serve another three to four years as they sign on to serve longer, they gain considerable experience which they then bring to the civilian market”.

What is the role of the IDF in Israel’s economy?

“The IDF is a factory of sorts that is like an assembly line for its people. The army provides these people with the knowledge and ability to become future entrepreneurs, found start-up companies and acquire technological prowess while developing creativity, initiative and the ability to think out-of-the-box. This is in fact Israel’s atomic mass and relative advantage”, explains Cohen.

What do foreign investors see as unique to the Israeli market?

“Israel holds favorable objective conditions specifically in terms of start-up entrepreneurship and investments. It is a greenhouse for innovation and academia that nurtures the conditions for the growth and thriving of start-up companies”.

What are the main magnets for investors in Israel?

“Trust and the demonstration of ability”.

What does that mean?

In terms of trust, Cohen says that “since the Second Lebanon War, where the decision was made to develop the Iron Dome air-defense system – four years were needed to create an adequate response. Since the present war is a prolonged campaign, there is the need for quick solutions which are developed on the fly. This is the advantage of the trust in Israel’s military high-tech industry in that context”.

On the one hand, it would appear that a prolonged war taxes Israel’s stability and economy over time. On the other – it produces a slew of opportunities, and hence these fields of development enjoy investor confidence. One example are the reservists, who after months on the battlefield, come back to their technological greenhouses full of creative ideas, and present them in their respective companies. This process elicits the confidence of investors, who understand the unique opportunities that lie in this cycle.

In regards to the demonstration of ability, Cohen cites several cases in point: “Wiz, for example, is an engine of imitation. Investors copy the Wiz investment model in their own investments. Wiz investors had not started to invest in the company a month or two ago, but four or five years ago. A potential investor of Israeli high-tech sees profits only within three to five years and investors understand that cycle all too well”.

Do you have data that supports that claim?

“In 2020 Israel had about 3,000 startups. By 2021 that number grew exponentially to some 6,500. If you compare the size of Israel to Germany and England, although Israel is only about one quarter the size of Germany – that means that withing a year, investments have quadrupled themselves!”

Which companies express the greatest confidence in Israeli high-tech?

“Facebook, Google and Intel have considerable investments in the Israeli market. They establish greenhouses in Israel and invest large amounts of money in the development of R&D centers in the country, which are responsible for the impressive growth over the past years”.

Where there years in which investments ebbed?

“We witnessed a sharp drop in foreign investments, VC funds, banking and other foreign activity in Israel’s financial market during the years of the social protest against the judicial reform that raged up to the war; however, we are currently witnessing an impressive return of confidence during the year and a half of the war”.

How do you explain this?

“The fact that Israeli society as a whole is mobilized to the war effort, and that investors see that at the end of the day, there is a strong sense of solidarity and mutual aid in Israeli society, boosts confidence in Israel’s high-tech industry as a result. It was when investors thought that the country is on route to becoming a non-democratic society according to western standards that they drew their activity from the Israeli market”.

What is important for investors in 2025?

“Regardless of being Jewish or non-Jewish, investors look for a stable government. The protests around the judicial reform [up to the outbreak of the Gaza War] led eventually to the destabilization of Israel’s high-tech ecosystem and in turn – of Israel’s economic stability. This manifested in the choices the investors themselves made. In other words, when we look at the war, it seems that it is actually the years of security instability in Israel that bring in the highest rate of investments in Israeli high-tech. In years of apparent instability of the democracy – investor confidence wavers because at the end of the day, they want to invest in a stable, democratic environment. That is why investments ebbed during the social protest and rose during the war”.

What is the reputation of the IDF among other militaries in terms of technology?

“Case in point: military systems that in the past, in times of relative quiet, have been updated once a year, have been updated no less than 60 times within four months during the war due to demands arising in the ongoing fighting. This is a definitive occurrence as far as the trust on part of foreign militaries towards the IDF. If the Polish army for example, wants to purchase a command and control system, or a drone system, and it has the choice of Israel’s military industry as oppose to other military industries – it would choose a system that had been updated some 40 times, and is at peak performance, even if it is more expensive, as compared with a cheaper system, which can only perform on the bases of preset models, experiments and trials, as oppose to real time data input”.

How do you explain the marked positive change on part of investors’ attitude toward Israel’s defense industry?

“This occurred in light of Israel’s force buildup during the war as well as the fact that Israel had proven its mettle on the battlefield. Israel’s military industry is highly creative and rolls solutions for the battlefield off its production line in real time – this serves as a relative advantage over other military industries. The UCAV and drone attacks, for example, caused considerable damage to Israel, `which was caught without an adequate response in the start of the war. But thanks to the industry’s prowess, it is now only a matter of months until military giants RAFAEL and Elbit will provide laser systems that can terminate that threat”.

The “proof of ability” that Cohen talks about is a very lucrative growth engine for Israel’s economy

Since the start of the war, Israel’s defense industry recorded a steep growth rate, with 2024 marking a record year, with peak revenues amounting to a staggering 70 billion dollars.

The unprecedented arms race forced upon Europe is eying Israel’s battlefield tested and proven military industry.

Many countries in Europe had already acquired Israeli missile systems worth hundreds of millions of dollars and it seems like this is only the beginning for Israel’s economy.

Hence, on the one hand, the war poses difficult challenges for the Israeli economy but on the other – it presents very lucrative opportunities that Israel would be wise to capitalize upon, through which it could expedite its recovery.

But an economy stands not only on its investors, but also on the human capital of its society. In Israel, the majority of society enlisted in the security forces over the past year and a half to protect the country.

How does a large-scale enlistment of reservists affect high-tech?

“The larger companies accept the situation and support those of their employees who serve in reserves’ duty. I myself had to let employees go to serve in combat units as part of their reserves’ duty”.

Who paid the price?

“The small startup companies were the ones who bore the heaviest brunt of their employees’ reserves’ duties– some of them serving as much as four tours. It did not hurt the critical mass, as most employees returned to their jobs sharper and more creative. Since Israeli high-tech has a mixture of populations, it is pretty balanced socially, which compensated for the absence of the reservists”.

In conclusion, Israel has what it takes to manage the required balances to maintain economic growth in order to minimize and recover from the damage sustained by small businesses and the country’s civilians who were hurt financially, emotionally and medically as a result of the war.

This balance can be achieved through the contribution of Israel’s high-tech and military industries, which are yielding very high profits despite the war. Captains of the industry’s large-cap companies have a crucial role in the rehabilitation of the State of Israel through its economy, support and contribution to the general good.

הפוסט The Effects of the Gaza War on Israel’s Economy – Snapshot הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Amid one of the most dramatic years for Israel’s security and future since its founding, the country’s third Security Conference convened under the banner “The Year of Opportunity.” The main message was clear: this is no time for hesitation – but a time for action.

The conference, organized annually by the IDSF movement, featured prominent figures from Israel’s political and defense leadership. Among the speakers were Minister of Economy and Industry Nir Barkat, Minister of Education Yoav Kisch, Gilad Erdan (Israel’s former Ambassador to the UN and the US), and David Friedman (former US Ambassador to Israel). President Isaac Herzog, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar, and Defense Minister Israel Katz addressed the conference via recorded messages.

True to the broad approach that characterizes the IDSF movement’s work since its establishment, the conference focused on Israel’s national security in the broadest sense. A significant portion of the event was devoted to ways to bolster national resilience, social cohesion, and education toward Zionist values, recognizing these as the foundation on which the nation’s military and diplomatic strength is built.

In addition to lectures and interviews, the conference offered three panel discussions addressing the main opportunities facing Israel at present:

• A diplomatic opportunity panel on “the day after Gaza,” alongside considerations regarding Judea and Samaria.

• A regional opportunity panel dealing with the Trump administration’s policies, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East.

• A social opportunity panel asking how best to seize the potential for victory through settlement efforts and by revitalizing the Gaza border region and Israel’s north.

Participants on these panels included former senior security officials who are also members of IDSF, leading academic researchers and think-tank directors, high-ranking government and local authority officials, social entrepreneurs, and civic activists.

President Herzog: “We Must Emerge from the War Stronger”

President Isaac “Buzi” Herzog welcomed conference attendees, stating:

“We are in a critical period that calls for in-depth rethinking of the security frameworks we have relied upon and the security paradigms that we urgently need to adopt. As part of that, we must also delve into the current state of our society and nation and figure out how to emerge from this war stronger – not only in terms of security and diplomacy, but above all as a stronger Israeli society.”

Herzog also stressed the importance of turning the war imposed on Israel into an “opportunity not only to decisively repel threats posed by Iran and its proxies, but also to develop alliances and agreements across the region – particularly moving toward normalization with Saudi Arabia and extending relationships as far as India – thus reshaping realities for generations to come, integrating us further into the region. Not naively or blindly, but as a cornerstone of fortifying our security.”

He then praised IDSF’s contribution to public dialogue: “We do need not agree on everything – and indeed, I do not always agree with all positions – but I believe it is crucial to have a voice that acknowledges and speaks to Israel’s diversity. And unlike many in the TV studios, that voice is presented with statesmanship and respect, seeking to speak, to engage in discussion, to unite rather than to polarize.”

Defense Minister: “We Will Keep Striking Hard Anyone Who Threatens Us”

Defense Minister Israel Katz summed up a year and a half of sustained fighting on multiple fronts: “There is no doubt our adversaries now receive a loud and clear message: whoever raises a hand against Israel will have that hand cut off.”

Katz reiterated that the IDF and the Israeli defense establishment have inflicted substantial damage on Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian “axis of evil,” thereby undermining Assad’s regime in Syria. He added that they would also deal a decisive blow to the Houthi terror organization in Yemen, “just as we have done in Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and other arenas.”

Katz informed the audience that the defense establishment is currently creating a directorate responsible for facilitating voluntary emigration for Gaza residents who wish to leave, in line with the vision of President Trump. Katz concluded his remarks by expressing appreciation for the IDSF movement.

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, Chair of the IDSF movement, began his talk with a forceful statement: “We are living in a historic, almost biblical era of immense opportunities. Let’s start talking about a vision for the day after the war, and make the most of these wartime opportunities to create a better future for Israel.”

He argued that in the coming months, Israel has an opportunity to secure a clear victory on all fronts – bringing down Hamas’ regime in Gaza, recovering the hostages, and striking a decisive blow (in tandem with the United States) against Iran’s nuclear program.

Avivi also warned about the growth of a radical Sunni axis – Turkey, Qatar, and ISIS – amid Iran’s potential weakening. He believes the solution lies in forming an American–Israeli–Sunni front that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, and other countries. “We want to see Russia and China drawn closer to the West and to us – not to Iran’s side.”

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila: From Collapse to Growth

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila, CEO of IDSF, opened his remarks by quoting from “In the City of Slaughter,” a poem by Haim Nahman Bialik depicting the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, and drawing parallels to the massacre on October 7.

He noted the crucial difference between the two tragedies was our collective reaction:

“We are no longer the same Jews, no longer a persecuted people hiding behind barrels of oil. We are a people who enlist in an army, who band together, who overcome adversity and gather the strength to fight for our land. We are a people who go to battle to bring back our hostages, and we are also sovereign in our land – free to decide to pay a price for their liberation. Yes, friends, we face problems – but these are the problems of a nation within its homeland. They are the trials and hardships of a growing, developing people – one that argues, but ultimately prevails.”

Or Yissachar: “Israelis no longer chase illusions of a quick fix – they demand action”

Or Yissachar, Deputy Director for Research and Content at IDSF, presented the “IDSF Index” for the first quarter of 2025. The survey explored what the public sees as the top priorities for the nation, comparing the results to a similar poll carried out by the movement’s research department in 2022.

The findings reveal that 51% of Israelis view the Iranian threat as the most urgent challenge today – a sharp increase from 35% in 2022. Only 10% of Jewish Israelis consider peace with the Palestinians feasible, with 80% of Israel’s Jewish population and 68% of the general public opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital. On the other hand, a significant majority – 78% – favor expanding the Abraham Accords and bolstering ties between Israel and other moderate states in the region.

“These numbers,” Yissachar concluded, “reflect not just a shift in public opinion but also a deeper change in mindset: Israelis are no longer chasing illusions of easy solutions – they want action, stability, strength, and security.”

Merav Leshem Gonen: “National resilience is built when it is allowed to hear other opinions”

The conference included panel discussions, lectures, and one-on-one interviews covering a range of topics, with emphasis on the security, diplomatic, and social opportunities that Israel can pursue in the wake of the devastating events of October 7.

Particularly emotional moments came when Merav Leshem Gonen, mother of Romi Gonen – released after 471 days in Hamas captivity – took the stage, alongside entrepreneur and media professional Orit Mark Ettinger, who lost many family members to terror attacks and in the current war over the years, yet in her grief never abandoned hope and faith.

The participants’ personal accounts and expert commentary merged into an overarching vision resting on one core insight: this is the historic moment in which Israel can solidify its position as a regional and global power, deepen its national resilience, and carve from the shock and turmoil of war not only new strength – but genuine hope.

A “Year of Opportunity”: “The nation of Israel needs a rebirth narrative”

Israel’s Third Security Conference differed from its predecessors. The first conference, held several months before October 7, spotlighted IDSF’s clear warning that multiple fronts – stretching from Gaza to Iran – were coalescing against Israel. The second conference took place under the shadow of the war that followed, triggered in part by ignoring IDSF’s alerts about the approaching conflict. The current conference has begun to glimpse rays of light and hope at the end of war.

“It’s no coincidence that we titled this conference ‘The Year of Opportunity.’ Yes, we took severe hits on October 7, and the war continues more than a year and a half later. But we can also see achievements,” noted Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi at the conference’s conclusion. “I keep saying we stand at a historic juncture – ranging from fully dismantling the Iranian threat, through broad regional peace agreements, to the prosperity that lies ahead once Israel takes firm hold of itself. The scale of these opportunities is still hard for us to fathom.”

The conference closed with the singing of Hatikvah – “The Hope”, Israel’s anthem – which perfectly captured the spirit of the event: a profound belief that soon we will see the hostages return home, and that Israeli society will reunite around a shared vision that will propel it into a new and brighter future.

Photo credits: Omri Abuhatzira, Channel 14

הפוסט From Crisis to Opportunity: Israel’s Third Security Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On Saturday morning, October 7, the last day of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot when thousands of terrorists breached the parameter fence around the Gaza Strip and broke into the Gaza envelope communities – they encountered probably the last thing they expected – police men and women of the Israel Police. These police officers, whose daily jobs encompass traffic enforcement, investigations of criminal activity, and handling civilian complaints, found themselves unexpectedly at the forefront of a war against terrorists, armed only with their personal side arms, risking their lives to stem a massive flow of terrorist armed to the teeth with automatic rifles, hand grenades and RPGs.

“Policemen and policewomen alike – ran into the fire without hesitation, risked their lives fighting the terrorists and contained their advance towards additional communities in the area”, says retired Sub-Superintendent Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Uri Engelhard, member of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “Police officers, who are not so young anymore and hardly participate in firearm and physical training, demonstrated unbelievable courage under fire. At their side, the brave fighters of the Special Operations Units, the Special Undercover Unit, the Special Patrol Unit and the Border Police – all who ran headfirst to the fighting in all arenas. The police leadership commanded in an effective level-headed manner, delegated command to fighters in the field and led by example and with remarkable determination”.

However, it is exactly those inspiring moments, when the Israel Police spearheaded the battle against the thousands of terrorists, that brings into the limelight the paradox with which the organization has to contend these days: it is the last organization that can be the target of accusations regarding the systemic failure that led to the October 7 massacre, yet it has to contend with difficult and complex issues of national security that far exceed the accepted scope of police work – this without the required tools and resources. This is a state of affairs that Engelhard, who has a rich past in Israel’s national security establishment as well as with international high-tech companies – seeks to change.

High-Tech, law and this week’s Torah portion

As one who had a prolific career in the high-tech industry, served in the IDF operational technology units, and headed successful technology firms – Engelhard’s decision to join the police force at the height of the second Intifada raised quite a few eyebrows.

“I felt it was a mission of a Zionism”, he explains. “I saw that the Police not only suffered from a severe shortage of officers and personnel, but also from poor communications systems, insufficient computer systems and the lack of advanced technologies – all this in a time when Israel was under a horrible deluge of terror attacks, which claimed a large number of victims and sewed fear in the hearts of Israel’s civilians”.

Thus, Engelhard chose to leave a promising and lucrative career behind and step up to the flag to lead a technological revolution in the Israel Police. He established the technology administration in the Police, now a technology division, which he currently heads. Through this division, Engelhard unified all of the Police’s technology activity, that was decentralized and suffered from a lack of a central coordinating body, and marched the entire organization into the 21st century. This was done by successfully implementing over one hundred large and complex simultaneous technology projects, Maj. Gen. Yitzhak (Khaki) Harel, Head of the IDF ICT Directorate, referred to this overhaul in the Israel Police in 2003: “Take for example the technological revolution in the Israel Police – this is something of which I could only dream”.

I’ve rejected out of hand more than a few very attractive offers from leading companies to be part of the sale of amazing proprietary technologies we’ve developed at the Police to foreign states

After retiring from the police, did you – like many former senior members of the defense establishment – capitalize on your expertise in security technologies abroad?

“Absolutely not. I’ve rejected out of hand more than a few very attractive offers from leading companies to be part – even passively – of the sale of amazing proprietary technologies we’ve developed at the Police to foreign states. I strongly opposed this, among other reasons, because these technologies make their way into the hands of Israel’s enemies and directly hurt Israel. Israel’s Department of Production and Procurement in the Defense Ministry must establish a new policy on this matter”.

Rather, Engelhard decided to seek his fortune elsewhere and pursued a life-long dream – to become an attorney and notary dealing in intergenerational transference, i.e. wills, estates and durable power of attorney. In stark contrast to his former positions, where he managed thousands of employees and budgets in the billions of shekels, here he can take a personal approach to help people, and deal with issues pertinent to their future. “I feel a sense of purpose with every case I conclude successfully”’ he says. Since the October 7 attack, he has been helping, among others, in dealing with the digital assets left behind by the casualties of the Gaza War.

In addition to serving on various boards of directors, Engelhard taught management and decision making at the Tel-Aviv University. His experience led him to write “The Secrets of Management in The Torah Weekly Portion”, which sought to fill a void in the area of management in the academia, which exclusively relies on foreign speakers, and shed light on management principles that can be found in the most ancient book the Jewish people gave the world – the bible.

The Jewish and Zionistic ideological motivation for Engelhard throughout his professional career propelled him to join the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “Through research, connections in the government, media and education, the Movement is able to contribute to the advancement of the Jewish nation’s liberty and sovereignty in its land, for generations to come”, he says. “Joining the Movement adds meaning to my life, as a partner – albeit one with a small role – to the strengthening of Israel’s national security”.

The complexity of the national security challenge

Engelhard’s rich and unique background, that spans the fields of management security, technology, law and Judaism, affords him a perspective that is multi-dimensional, fresh, and original, and allows him to offer out-of-the-box solutions, that are not restricted by the normative paradigms in the world of policing.

“National security is not measured only in the context of wars against other countries and terror”, he stresses. “It includes the security of the individual, economy and industry. The Police deals with criminal and security threats in tandem: from the war on accidents – which had caused Israel more casualties since its establishment than all its wars put together – through the rife agricultural crime that is threatening national security – to the elimination of organized crime, that costs billions in damages each year”.

The fact that Israel’s national security spans many varied areas and places immense responsibility on the shoulders of Israel Police that stretcher way beyond its capabilities and resources. The most prominent example is the war against the assassinations in the Arab society, which have ballooned into a national security threat for all intents and purposes.

“The Israel Police has excellent officers and commanders”, explains Engelhard, “who do their duty with a sense of purpose, for the people and the State of Israel. These police men and women labor around the clock without extra pay for their significant overtime, with thankless work, come sun or rain, while having to contend with harsh scenes. The force has people who’ve developed incredible technologies that have won international awards; however, the police force is way too small to deal with the magnitude of missions with which it is tasked. And at the end of the day, it is the Israel Police that has to contend with Israel’s systemic shortfalls; When the welfare system fails to do its job in helping the needy, when the Transportation Ministry’s Road maintenance is poor, when security forces fail to identify a terrorist – it all funnels down to the Israel Police, which finds itself out of its traditional policing depth”.

The solution: reenforcing the blue police and the border patrol

Engelhard proposes a list of practical solutions that could reinforce the Police and enable it to carry out its complex tasks to their fullest. “The key here is a bigger budget and human resources”, he asserts. “Any bill or massive development plan that lay extra work loads on the police must be conditioned on additional job placements and the additional budget their enforcement and execution demand”.

For the Israel Police to be able to respond to the growing challenges it is facing, says Engelhard, it needs young blood. For this end, he suggests a reform in the ranks of mandatory service police i.e. military recruits who are sent to serve in blue uniforms instead of the IDF.

What would you do to change the existing state of affairs, where mandatory service police comprises mainly recruits that the IDF is willing to transfer to Israel Police just to become dispatchers or patrol officers?

“The number of 18-year-old recruits in the police should be increased dramatically”, he explains. “The Police should be able to select its candidates, rather than being dependent on the recruits the IDF sends it, and allow new recruits to choose themselves whether they prefer to serve in the blue police, the border patrol – or even in the IDF. Quality mandatory police officers who serve in the police’s various units would markedly improve the operational performance of the Israel Police”.

In addition, Engelhard believes that Israel Police should reenforce itself with retired policemen and policewomen, who can greatly contribute to the organization with their knowledge, experience and soaring motivation.

“With that said”, Engelhard stresses, “a state of ongoing preparedness should be ensured for all members of the police force to face the enemy, ensuring that each policeman and policewoman be at a sufficient combat level. This requires more training, advanced equipment, and technological means and abilities currently only in the hands of the General Security Service, and better preparedness for emergency situations. The commanding spirit that should pervade all ranks of the police is that of integrity, professionalism, and commitment to the mission. This is the ethos that should be the guiding principle for the organization”.

The changes proposed by Engelhard are not aimed at the Israel Police alone. “The Israel Border Patrol needs a significant boost to its ranks, an upgrade of equipment and systems, and it must be present in every single spark point with the Arab population”, he claims. “The Border Patrol is the most professionally skilled force for security policing, and it should spearhead the effort to ensure ongoing security, thereby freeing the IDF’s other units to focus on their main purpose, which is to be prepared to respond to any attack and vanquish the enemy”.

From Reaction to Initiative

The plan presented by Engelhard for the reinforcement of the Israel Police and its ability to deal with criminal and security challenges is in fact part of a deep and comprehensive perceptional overhaul, that aims to take the Israel Police from an organization that is caught up in a race of trouble shooting to one that is charged with the long-term responsibility over the national security of Israel.

What should Israel do to ensure its ability to deal with threats on many fronts at the same time?

“Israel’s leadership must do what it takes to ensure the existence of a thriving nation in the Land of Israel for posterity and eliminate any emerging threat – from within and without the country, and not put on hold what must be done today just for the sake of an appearance of quiet”.

Among the steps that would affect this change, Engelhard mentions the formulation of a relevant national security strategy, based among others on a change of the response doctrine to initiative, and on the acknowledgement of the enemy’s proven capabilities and not on its posited intentions; the encouragement of social values like military enlistment and the ethos of “a nation which is a front”; and an educational and ideological reform that reenforces the commitment to the group over individualism and will instill the spiritual, Zionist and cultural values that unify us as a nation.

“Rather of espousing a diaspora Jewish attitude of appeasement, Israel must adopt a Zionist mentality – acting in a spirit of proud nationalism such that exercises Israel’s sovereignty”, says Engelhard. “Instead of always being reactive, Israel must initiate. This is the only way it can stronghold its national security for future generations and ensure that another October 7 can ever occur once more”.

הפוסט Israel Police – Last Line of Defense הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A mysterious stone circle believed to be the tomb of Og, King of the Giants; Hebrew warriors bravely confronting Roman legions and Syrian tanks; and some of the world’s oldest synagogues – these are part of the rich tapestry of the Golan Heights. This beautiful and historically significant region is far more than just a vital strategic asset.

Jewish settlement in the Golan has existed almost continuously since biblical times – spanning more than two millennia. Moses conquered it from Og, king of Bashan; the fighters of Gamla sacrificed their lives defending it against the Romans during the Great Revolt; and Avigdor Kahalani led a heroic tank battle crucial to Israel’s victory over Syria during the Yom Kippur War. The Golan is deeply woven into Jewish history, not merely a region of strategic and security value.

Here are some of the pivotal chapters in its story.

Kingdom of Israel and a Thriving Jewish Center

One of Israel’s most enigmatic sites lies in the Golan – Rujm el-Hiri (“Gilgal Refaim”), an enormous stone-circle structure from about 5,000 years ago, visible clearly only from the air. Although its purpose – perhaps a calendar or place of worship or burial – remains unclear, Jewish tradition identifies it as the tomb of the biblical giant Goliath or Og, king of Bashan.

Indeed, the Bible itself links Og, the last of the giants, to the Golan Heights. The Book of Numbers recounts how the Israelites, journeying to the Promised Land after the Exodus from Egypt, decisively defeated Og, his sons, and his people, subsequently allocating the land to the tribe of Manasseh. During the united kingdom of Israel, King Solomon appointed regional governors in the Golan, integrating it fully into his realm.

For centuries afterward, control of the Golan was fiercely contested. The Arameans controlled it for extended periods, their conflicts with Israel echoing in biblical narratives. Under King Ahab, Israelite forces decisively defeated the Arameans near the city of Aphek.

In Roman times, the Golan became a vibrant Jewish center, with numerous settlements and communities. Ancient synagogues uncovered at Gamla, Katzrin, Ein Nashut, and Ein Keshatot (Umm el-Kanatir) attest to a thriving Jewish life, prosperous economy, and flourishing culture.

Gamla: A Symbol of Heroism and Sacrifice

During the Great Revolt against Rome (66–73 CE), the city of Gamla, perched on a camel-shaped mountain ridge (hence its name), became a symbol of Jewish resilience and courage.

The Mishnah mentions Gamla as a fortified city dating to Joshua ben Nun’s time. Its strategic location, accessible only via a narrow path, led Josephus Flavius – then commander of Galilee during the revolt and later a noted historian – to fortify Gamla as a rebel stronghold in the Golan.

Besieged by Roman legions commanded by the future emperor Vespasian, Gamla resisted heroically despite shortages of food and water, thanks to its natural defenses and sturdy walls. Eventually, the Romans breached the walls, yet in a dramatic reversal, Jewish defenders pushed them back, inflicting heavy casualties. However, the Romans reorganized and, in a subsequent assault, ultimately overcame the city.

According to Josephus, about 5,000 inhabitants chose death by leaping from the cliffs rather than fall into Roman hands. Today, visitors can explore Gamla’s impressive ruins, site of one of Jewish history’s greatest stories of heroism. The ancient synagogue discovered there is among the world’s earliest, tangible evidence of a rich and enduring Jewish presence.

Six Days That Changed History

After Gamla’s fall, nearly two millennia passed before Jewish sovereignty returned. In 1948, Syria seized the Golan Heights, using it as a platform for aggression against Israel, regularly shelling communities in the Hula Valley and eastern Galilee.

In the 1967 Six-Day War, after years of Syrian provocations, the IDF launched a daring assault to reclaim the Golan. Syrian defenses – featuring fortified anti-tank and machine-gun positions amid steep terrain – posed immense challenges. Intense, fierce battles ensued; Golani Brigade famously stormed Tel Faher, among one of the war’s toughest confrontations. Simultaneously, armored divisions commanded by Generals Avraham Yoffe and Elad Peled penetrated Syrian defenses, rapidly advancing northward. On June 10, Quneitra fell, completing the Golan’s liberation.

Valley of Tears: The Battle That Saved Israel

The ultimate test came six years later, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. On October 6, Syria launched a massive surprise assault on the Golan, simultaneously with Egypt’s attack in Sinai – a moment of existential peril for Israel.

Facing the Syrian onslaught stood a tiny Israeli defense force – around 170 tanks against approximately 1,200–1,400 Syrian tanks. IDF units under Northern Command’s General Yitzhak Hofi endured relentless waves of Syrian armored forces. Lieutenant Colonel Avigdor Kahalani led a small tank battalion against vastly superior numbers, battling extreme conditions: poor visibility, exhaustion, ammunition shortages, and overwhelming enemy assaults.

Despite severe numerical inferiority, Israeli tank crews skillfully utilized terrain advantages and tactical maneuvers, destroying hundreds of enemy tanks. Understanding that failure meant existential threat, they fought to their last shells, ultimately halting the Syrian advance. After initial defense, the IDF launched a successful counteroffensive, pushing Syrian forces back nearly 40 kilometers from Damascus. The Valley of Tears battle remains an iconic testament to the Golan’s critical strategic value.

Sovereignty Affirmed: International Recognition

In 1981, Israel’s Knesset enacted the Golan Heights Law, applying Israeli sovereignty to the area, recognizing it not only as strategic asset but also as an integral to Israel’s heritage. In March 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a historic proclamation officially recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan – the first global power to do so. Acknowledging its strategic importance for Israel’s security and regional stability, the community of Ramat Trump was established in the Golan to honor his courageous support.

New Security Challenges After Assad’s Fall

Syria’s civil war, erupting in 2011, created new security challenges. Chaos allowed extremist groups, including ISIS and Iran-backed Hezbollah, to seek footholds near Israel’s border. Israel responded by providing humanitarian aid (“Operation Good Neighbor”) while executing military actions to prevent Iranian entrenchment and arms transfers to Hezbollah.

The fall of Assad’s regime in late 2024 renewed regional volatility, compelling Israel to intensify diplomatic and military activities to ensure border stability and thwart emerging threats.

Strategic and National Importance

Repeated battles underscore the Golan’s irreplaceable strategic significance – overlooking northern Israel, forming a natural defense barrier against Syria. Control of the Golan has consistently proven vital for safeguarding northern Israeli communities and national security, especially amid growing regional threats from Iran expansionism and other terror groups.

Thriving Israeli Settlement Today

Modern Israeli settlement began soon after 1967. Kibbutz Merom Golan was established first, followed by many communities, notably Katzrin. Since 1981, development accelerated. Today, about 53,000 residents live across 33 Israeli communities and four Druze villages (Majdal Shams, Buqata, Mas’ade, and Ein Qiniyye).

Under Israeli sovereignty, the Golan has blossomed agriculturally – producing renowned wines like Golan Heights Winery and Pelter Winery, international destinations for wine enthusiasts. Tourism thrives amid spectacular waterfalls, nature reserves, archaeological sites, and scenic trails.

A Mosaic of Nature, Heritage, and Security

The Golan transcends mere strategic value. Beyond breathtaking landscapes, celebrated wineries, and remarkable tourist attractions, it symbolizes Jewish courage, determination, and historic roots. History teaches unequivocally that Israel lacks the luxury of relinquishing the Golan – not merely due to its security and strategic importance, but primarily due to our profound historical connection since our nation’s earliest days.

As Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared in the Knesset in 1981 when the Golan was annexed: “No serious person in Israel could deny that the Golan Heights has always been an integral part of the Land of Israel.”

הפוסט The Golan: From the Roots of Jewish Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Very few, if any, elite counter-terrorism units worldwide can compete with it. Its professional skill, operational prowess, experience, volume of activity, and achievements have made it a legend. Its fighters are the first to hunt down terrorists en route to carry out a terrorist attack or who have fled the scene. It conducts hundreds of operations every year, the vast majority of which are classified. But even the handful of operations that have been publicized is enough to establish its undisputed status as the spearhead of the Israeli security forces.

And it doesn’t even belong to the IDF.

Come discover seven fascinating facts you didn’t know about Yamam – Israel’s national counter-terrorism unit.

1. It is one of the top SWAT units in the world.

Yamam is considered one of the best units in the world for combating terrorism, rescuing hostages, and foiling terror attacks. A delegation from the unit won the “Urban Shields” competition for elite police units two years in a row (in 2010 and 2011), defeating a large number of SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) units from across the US and elite international counter-terrorism teams (from Bahrain and Jordan). The delegation even achieved the highest score ever achieved by a participant in this competition.

2. It’s not military – it’s police.

Although the Yamam fighters closely resemble soldiers from elite military units, Yamam is not subordinate to the IDF but to the central command of the Border Guard. And this means? More freedom of operation within Israel’s borders, policing authority, and the ability to maneuver in a way that the army cannot. The reason for its establishment was one of the most tragic events in the country’s history – the Ma’alot massacre in 1974, in which Israeli pupils were murdered due to a failed handling of a hostage incident. This was the moment when decision-makers realized that Israel needed a designated force to combat terrorism within a friendly and built-up territory, that is, inside the actual country.

3. It has one of the toughest training courses there is.

Did you think that courses in the IDF were difficult? The training course for the Yamam fighters is one of the most demanding in the world: urban warfare, sniping, breaching, hand-to-hand combat, and dealing with extreme scenarios. Only the strongest manage to pass. These are not just physical fitness tests – candidates are also tested for composure, intuition, and the ability to make and execute critical decisions in a split second.

4. It is an entire commando “army” in one unit.

When the Yamam fighters go on a mission, they don’t wait for anyone – they are a completely independent force. The unit has its own breaching teams, snipers, commandos, paratroopers, undercover officers, “monkeys” (combatants who specialize in climbing, surfing, and rescue), technological teams – and even a K-9 team. One of the unit’s most famous dogs is Rambo, a Malinois attack dog that has been specially trained to locate terrorists and assist in taking control of terrorist scenes. Yes, even the dogs in Yamam are trained at the level of a commando combat soldier.

5. It has the most advanced technologies – far ahead of everyone else.

The unit develops and orders special equipment that cannot be found anywhere else. Customized weapons, next-generation night vision devices, shoulder-launched rocket launchers, “rhinos” (drones armed with grenade launchers), and robots used to breach buildings and dispose of explosives – everything that makes operations more precise, more deadly, and safer for the fighters.

6. “Arnon” – the operation that restored our hope.

Yamam has conducted thousands of daring heroic operations over the years, but one of the most dramatic occurred only recently – Operation Arnon. On June 8, 2024, in a joint operation with the Israel Security Agency and additional forces, Yamam broke into the Nuseirat refugee camp in Gaza and, under heavy fire, rescued and freed four Israelis who had been kidnapped during the Nova Music Festival massacre on October 7: Noa Argamani, Andrei Kozlov, Shlomi Ziv, and Almog Meir Jan. During the exchange of fire, Yamam squadron commander and combat soldier Commander Arnon Zmora was fatally wounded. After succumbing to his wounds in the hospital, Arnon was promoted to the rank of superintendent and the operation (originally called “Operation Summer Seeds”) was named after him.

7. You don’t retire from it so quickly.

While in other elite units in Israel and around the world combatants tend to retire around the age of 40, Yamam continues to utilize its fighters until the age of 57 – enabling them to gain unparalleled operational experience. This is a huge advantage, because there is no substitute for years of dealing with extreme situations and countless covert operations.

The legacy continues

On October 7, Yamam lost nine fighters who were the first to reach the main intersections in an attempt to stop the murderous Hamas attack. Two more combatants died in the “Swords of Iron” war. In their memory, a special stamp was issued commemorating the Yamam heroes.

For the courage of its fighters, Yamam was awarded the IDF Chief of the General Staff’s Citation, and the Israel Police Commissioner’s Citation at least five times. Among the numerous unit fighters who received medals and decorations are the recipients of the Medal of Courage, Major General Assaf Hefetz, Major General David Tzur, and Major General Boaz Goldberg; the recipient of the Medal of Excellence, Major General Nachshon Nagler; and the recipient of the Commander-in-Chief’s Citation, Major General Noam Raz.

The Yamam continues to fight, strengthen its capabilities and, most importantly, protect us, whether we are aware of it or not. So the next time you hear about a foiled terrorist attack, a spectacular rescue, or a hunt for terrorists that ended in their elimination, know that behind the scenes stands a unit of people who know no fear – only a sense of mission.

הפוסט Seven Facts you Didn’t Know about Yamam (Israel’s National Counter-Terrorism Unit) הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s mission is to engage in a comprehensive effort on numerous levels aiming to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations to come. This goal is governed by two guiding principles: first is the acknowledgement of the unique diplomatic, economic and social environments in which Israel exists.  The second is the understanding that informed decisions must lean on a broad strategy that draws it insights from lessons of the past and aims its decisions to the very long term.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. The present installment of the Ideally series, IDSF HaBithonistim member, orientalist and expert on cyber terror Assaf Yishai explores Israel-Jordan relations and the ?? between their outward appearance and their true nature.

Disputes and interests: background of Israel-Jordan relations

To truly understand the relations between Israeli and Jordan, one must go back to 1921 – the year of the inception of the Kingdom of Jordan. The foundation of the Kingdon was put down already in 1916 when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the head of the royal Hashemite dynasty of Hejaz, led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This revolt was one of the catalysts of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the Middel East and the rise of the British occupation of the area, and the British promised to reward the Hashemite family for its part.

And reward the British did. Hussein’s sons were crowned over two new ??? entities created artificially by the British:  The Transjordan area was given to Abdullah bin Hussein while his brother Faisal received control of Iraq. This arrangement, dubbed “The Hashemite Arrangement”, served Britain well since it allowed it to control its territories through its Arab allies. However, the populations of those areas were loath to accept the ?? of rulers that were not kith and kin.

The Hashemite rule of Iraq was short-lived and ended within 36 years with a revolt and the assassination of the king. Many expected the fate of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan to be more of the same, and even then, Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion said in 1956 “Jordan is an artificial state with no future”.

But despite the somber forecasts, the Hashemite family was able to keep its place on the Jordanian throne for over 100 years now. Protecting the throne is paramount for the Hashemite royal family not only in terms of its own survival but also to ensure the longevity of the entire dynasty. Once the king falls in Jordan – it will spell the end of the Hashemite dynasty.

Milestones in Israel-Jordan relations

Some years after the foundation of the Kingdom of Jordan, the government began establishing relations with the Zionist leaders that were active in pre-state Israel.  After the establishment of the State of Israel, its leadership conveyed to King Abdullah not to wage war against the new state, however, he did not heed their warning and Jordan joined the coalition of Arab states that ganged up on Israel in the War of Independence.

In 1952, grandson of King Abdulla, Hussein, ascended the throne from which he ruled the Hashemite Kingdon for 46 years. During his reign, Hussien was able to maintain stability and prevent the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), which was ousted from Israel, to gain a stronghold in Jordan. Hussein cultivated relations with the US and the West and even had secret relations with the State of Israel. Ben Gurion, despite having doubts about the longevity of the Jordanian entity, thought the Hashemite Kingdom could be a strategic asset to Israel and had no problem openly saying so. Other Israeli leaders as well, such as Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, understood the importance of maintaining warm relations with the Jordanian administration, and diplomatic and security sources in Israel proposed viewing Jordan as Israel’s “little sister”.

However, despite the covert relations between Hussien and Israeli administrations, formally the two countries remained enemies and even fought each other in the Six Day War, in which Israel defeated the Jordanian military, and took the Temple Mount from Jordan. This cost the Hashemite family the last holy Muslim asset under its control.

It was only in 1994 that an official peace accord was signed between the two neighbors. As part of the agreement, the relations and the borders between the two were established, and Israel committed to supply Jordan with 50 million metric cubes of water annually. Over the years, Israel has doubled that quantity and to date it still provides 100 metric cubes of water a year to Jordan. Furthermore, both countries have various military and intelligence collaborations, most of which have been secretly established.

Since 1995, Jordan has been ruled by Hussien’s son, King Abdullah the Second. King Abdullah, like his father, maintained good relations with the US, the West and Israel. However, he cannot seem to gain the popularity and legitimacy in the same manner that his father had. He is perceived as disconnected from the people, and someone who lacks the historical roots to the land, being the son of a British mother, and educated in Britain with Western values. He commands the English language better than Arabic – not to mention the local Jordanian dialect, and the Jordanian public frown upon this. Abdullah’s rule once again raised doubts regarding the ability of the Hashemite dynasty to persevere.

Relations with Jordan since the outbreak of the Gaza War

The relations between Israel and Jordan have always been complicated, and the Jordanian public has always been hostile to Israel. After the October 7 attack and massacre, the already volatile relations have further deteriorated. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, there have been ongoing riots on the streets of Amman, and the Jordanian administration is overtly hostile towards Israel. Already in November 23 Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel – a move that was aimed – according to Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi “to emphasize Jordan’s opposition and condemnation of Israel’s war against Gaza, and the killing of innocents and the creation of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that could lead to a regional conflict”.

In Israel there was an expectation for Jordan to publicly condemn the massacre of October 7, but to no avail. Moreover, King Abdullah’s wife, Rania, had publicly attacked Israel on numerous occasions. The Jordanian administration also condemned Israel’s attack in Iran and said that it was “a violation of international law, an attack on Iran’s sovereignty and a dangerous escalation that further intensifies tensions in the region”. Jordan even called on the international community to take responsibility and take measures against Israel that “end Israel’s attacks against Gaza, the [West] Bank and Lebanon, as a first step to dial back the escalation”.

September 2024 saw further escalation in the relations of the two countries, when a Jordanian truck driver crossed the border illegally and murdered three Israelis working in the Alenbi border checkpoint. The Jordanian government appointed an inquiry committee to investigate the affair but the public – including members of parliament – celebrated the attack on the streets of Amman.

Despite the open hostility and condemnations, many claim that the situation behind the scenes is quite different. Various sources report that Jordan actually helped Israel intercept both Iranian missile attacks in April and October 2024. Some sources close to the matter claim that King Abdullah’s remarks in public are in stark contrast to what he says behind closed doors.

This discrepancy reflects the complex relations Israel has had with Jordan from the onset. On the one hand, the two countries have deep ideological disputes and clashes. On the other hand, both share common interests. When viewing the relations between both countries over the past decades and its frequent changes, it would appear that this duality is the only constant in these relations.

Assaf Yishai: A Vision for Israeli-Jordanian Relations

Aid in maintaining the stability of the Jordanian government

Current situation:

Since its inception, the Jordanian administration has been plagued by instability stemming, among others, from the varied demographic composition of the Jordanian people. Only a minority of these are loyal to King Abdullah II, while the majority perceives the king as a foreign element who does not belong in Jordan in the first place.

Furthermore, Jordan is plagued by a slew of internal problems – predominantly a serious water shortage – that threaten its internal stability. If that were not enough, the king has recently reformed the method of elections aiming to benefit his own interests but in reality, this played out against him. The reform, the purpose of which was to block the election of local leaders that serve only the interests of their clans, had resulted in a rise in the power of the Muslim Brotherhood movement which poses a major threat to the Hashemite rule.

The recent regional changes have also influenced Jordan’s internal stability. The Gaza War, which ostensibly has no relation to Jordan, caused a 40% decline in tourism to the Kingdom – a main engine of the country’s economy. The revolt in Syria, which toppled the Assad regime, is a Damocles sword hanging over the head of King Abdullah, who fears a similar outcome for his own country.

In light of the above mentioned, the main interest of the King is to ensure that he and the entire Hashemite dynasty survive. A king in a survival state of mind is willing to take irrational measures, like a drowning person grasping at straws. For Israel, this makes him an unpredictable leader and places a question mark on any possibility of stability of the Jordanian government.

Ideal situation:

• Placing more focus on Jordan: Israel must not become complacent and think that simply because it has a peace agreement with Jordan, it can enjoy quiet and stability on its eastern border. Already in the immediate term, Israel must allocate intelligence resources toward the Jordanian issue and keep its finger on the pulse to identify any change that could threaten Israel’s interests in the area.

• Continued support of King Abdullah – to a point: Israel should continue aiding the King, as it has always done, out of the understanding that any alternative regime would be far worse for Israel. At the same time, Israel should be clear about what it is willing to accept and what it is not. It cannot continue protecting the King at any cost, even if his regime no longer serves Israel’s interests.

• Prepare for the fall of the Jordanian regime: the State of Israel must prepare a contingency plan and formulate long-term strategies for the day after the fall of the Hashemite dynasty. These plans must be far-reaching, such as the seizure of the eastern face of the hills of Samaria bordering with Jordan, to prevent the capture by hostile Iranian and ISIS forces of this important strategic asset.

Securing the border with Jordan

Current situation:

The border with Jordan is Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country, stretching over 309 kilometers (192 miles). Due to the peace accord between the two countries and the relative quiet between them, the border is ostensibly calm – but in reality, it is far from it. The border with Jordan had always been troublesome, among others due to the lack of a regular security force. Throughout the years, this border has become a hotbed of drug and weapon-smuggling as well as infiltration of terrorist into the territory of Israel – much of this under the auspices of Iran, and ever since the smuggling routes through Syria were closed in the wake of the revolt, the incidents on the Jordanian border are increasing. Furthermore, the closing of the border with Egypt due to the Gaza War, places more criminal and terror demand on the Jordanian border, which remains one of Israel’s last unsecured borders.

Over the past years dozens of arms-smuggling attempts into Israel have been made on this border. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 2023, when a Jordanian MK attempted to smuggle 200 guns into Israel. Aside from the rife smuggling activity, the terror incidents are on the rise as well – the Jordanian truck driver, who crossed the border and murdered three Israelis and a month later – two other terrorists crossed the border illegally in the Dead Sea area and shot and wounded two Israeli soldiers.

To date, Israel’s border with Jordan is full of breaches and not sufficiently secured. Part of the border is fenced but other areas, such as the Negev Desert valley – have no physical barrier. Furthermore, Israel does not allocate sufficient forces to secure the border. It is possible that this laxity stems from complacency and a false trust of the Jordanian peacekeeping abilities and willingness, or it may be pure negligence. Whatever the reason, the current strategy represents a real strategic threat to Israel. Even if most of the illegal activity across the border is criminal, it is important to remember that terror characteristically rides on criminal activity to achieve its ends.

Ideal situation:

• Hermetically sealing the border: The Israel-Jordan border must be hermetically sealed for its entire length to ensure zero breaches. Furthermore, electronic surveillance should not be seen as the only security solution, rather the border must have a physical barrier such as a fence or a wall.

• Reinforcement of the border forces: the IDF should deploy a division to act as a security force on the Jordanian border, creating large-scale surveillance and establishing quick response capabilities.  Naturally, the IDF will have to considerably boost its ranks in order to have the manpower for said division.

Keeping Iran out of Jordan

Current situation:

One of Iran’s common stratagems in the Middle East in service of its global-Islamic vision, is to meddle in the affairs of other countries – especially the unstable among them – and identify the cracks through which it can cause chaos and wield its influence. This is what it had done until recently in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. This is what it had done in the Gaza Strip. Now, having lost most of its hold in the area, it may very well try to reclaim it by taking over Jordan.

Iran may do so with force, for example with pro-Iranian militias operating in neighboring Iraq. However, the King himself might opt to cooperate with Iran, if he believes that Iran would be more conducive to the survival of his reign more than Israel. The connection between Jordan and Iran is not self-evident to say the least, but even Saudia Arabia, Iran’s bitter enemy, chose to sign in March 2023 an agreement for the renewal of diplomatic relations, once it realized that the western axis is growing weak.

Ideal situation:

• Display of power and military prowess: The Middle East is a place that sets great store by strength; hence it behooves the State of Israel to demonstrate its military prowess and impress upon the King of Jordan that he can lean on Israel. If the King feels that Israel cannot guarantee his safety, he might seek another ally to do so, which most likely would be Iran.

• Preparation for an Iranian takeover of Jordan: Israel must prepare for any scenario wherein Iran will try to install its control in Jordan and summarily and decisively thwart any threat on part of pro-Iranian elements in Jordan.

Settlement of the Jordan Valley

Current situation:

The Jordan Valley is a territory under dispute in terms of international law. Many in Israel and the world see the area as an integral part of Israel while others claim it to be an occupied territory that is not part of Israel’s sovereign state.

The Jordan Valley has great security and strategic importance as it is the only stretch of land that protects Israel’s eastern border. Since the establishment of the State, most of Israel’s leadership acknowledged its significance, and even late PM Yitzhak Rabin in his last speech before the Knesset declared that the security protective border of Israel will be charted in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of the term.

Beyond its significance to Israel’s security, the Valley also has a geographic and economic importance, as it is a large swath of land that can be populated and developed. Furthermore, it carries great historic and cultural significance as it is home to numerous Jewish heritage sites.

Currently, the Jordan Valley is not included in Israel sovereign territory, thus Israeli law does not apply in the area as it does in the rest of the country. This sets an obstacle to the settlement and development of the Valley area, and ties Israel’s hands in dealing with violations in the area such as illegal Palestinian construction.

Ideal situation:

• Encouragement of Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley: Over the years Israel has proven that anywhere it creates Jewish settlements – security is higher, whereas areas with no or sparse Jewish population terror hotbeds germinate. Hence, the Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley is a sine qua none for ensuring the security in that area. Beyond that, the development of the Valley could serve as a response to high housing demands that many families in Israel are contending with, and can deepen the connection of Israelis to some of the most important Jewish heritage sites that are in that locale. For this end, Israel must encourage young people and new immigrants to make their homes in the Jordan Valley, among others by way of favorable terms for land acquisition and housing, and the development of local communities.

• Action towards securing Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley: For years there have been many attempts by Israel to gain sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, similarly to what it had achieved in the Golan Hights. This move first and foremost sends out a clear message that Israel is here to stay. Furthermore, once Israel gains sovereignty over the area it will be able to develop it as it sees fit, and establish institutes and infrastructures. Gaining sovereignty may pose a diplomatic issue for Israel, mainly vis a vis Europe, however as it has been proven time and time again – when Israel presents a united and unyielding front, the world remains silent. If Israel can gain consensus in Israeli society for such a move, making it clear that this is a security imperative and not occupation for the sake of occupation, it is highly likely that the international community will fall into line as well.

Condemnation of the Condemnations

Current situation:

Despite the Israel-Jordan peace accord, many people in Jordan openly condemn Israel. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, this state of affairs has only grown worse, until now, there are many anti-Israel protests throughout Jordan.

Even the Jordanian administration, despite its cooperation with Israel and its dependance on its neighbor to the west, exhibits an anti-Israeli front. The King failed to condemn the October 7 massacre, and his wife Rania even disputed it had even truly happened and attacked Israel from every global platform. In an interview to CNN, she spoke of the pain of the babies and children of Gaza, not once mentioning the dozens of innocent Jewish children Hamas heinously butchered. In another interview to CNN she insinuated that the massacre was not on the scale Israel and the US claim, saying that “President Biden did not witness with his own eyes the harsh things that had occurred in Israel, as he himself said”.

A short while after the Gaza War broke out, King Abdullah II sent two air shipments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. He also sent a third plane, whose cargo was deployed by his daughter, Princess Salma of Jordan, as a symbolic gesture to the children of Gaza.

Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, a close associate of the King, has also attacked Israel more than once since the outbreak of the war. Safadi also tried to promote anti-Israel measures at the United Nations, and recommended that Jordan join in the prosecution of Israel at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Even though the Jordanian King’s statements are merely lip service, as apparently, he sings a completely different tune behind closed doors –nevertheless, his statements and those of his family influence the mood on the streets of Jordan as well as the relations between the two countries.

Ideal situation:

• Demand the King moderate his rhetoric: although it is understandable to an extent that the ruler of an Arab state would have to display animosity toward Israel, his current condemnations are beyond the pale. The State of Israel must use the leverages it has on the King and the Jordanian administration – e.g. water supply and military aid – and demand he moderate his and his family’s statements, and halt the anti-Israel measure undertaken and the UN.

There is a lot more than meets the eye: conclusions

The relations between Israel and Jordan can be sketched with a single word: contrast. Contrast between the attitude of the Jordanian administration and the public; contrast between its public statements and what it says behind closed doors; and most importantly – contrast between the quiet on the surface and the threats brewing underneath. Israel must understand that its border with Jordan is not secure and the stability of the government there is not ensured. In the immediate-term, Israel must employ whatever leverages it has on the Jordanian administration – namely the water supply and military aid – to solidify its relations with the Kingdom. In the long term, Israel must create a contingency plan that charts courses of action for possible scenarios such as the ousting of the ruling Hashemite family and a takeover of Jordan by radical elements such as extremist Sunni militias or pro-Iranian forces.

Above all – Israel must populate the Jordan Valley and place it on par with the rest of its geographic strategic assets, both in terms of national security and development.

The state of affairs between Israel and Jordan, wherein the two are at loggerheads on the one hand, but cooperate on the other, can hold only to a certain point. What with the recent changes washing over the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder whether this point has now been reached, and if so – what is in store from now on.

הפוסט Ideally – Vision of the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“The movement currently has over 40,000 members, including women and men in their teens to age 80 and older, and this diversity cannot be ignored. That’s why the connection with the movement’s members is, for me, one of the most important tools of Israel’s Defense and Security Forum (IDSF)”, says Itzik Lev, VP of Development at IDSF, who is in charge of the movement’s community relations.

What do you do to connect with your base?

“Many mistakenly think that IDSF includes only military personnel and senior officers, but in fact it is open to anyone with our worldview and anyone who shares our values. We grew by more than 70 percent this year, and the goal is to continue growing at the same rate next year. We offer members of the movement a wide range of unique activities, such as lectures given by senior security officials, and tours given by IDSF experts that take place throughout the country – in the north, in the Gaza Envelope, in Judea and Samaria, and in Jerusalem. The movement has silent WhatsApp groups for receiving updates from the field, each of which has over 1,000 members. Until now, mainly news stories have been posted in these groups, but following surveys we conducted, we realized that the public wanted more than that, and we began disseminating dynamic webinars, event tickets, tours, and unique business benefits in these groups. We treat these groups like a members club”.

A community that is attentive to the public

Lev, who came to IDSF from the field of project management in the municipal context, set a goal for himself to not only increase the number of members in the movement, but also to create a community that would be attentive to its members’ opinions, even those who are not senior military people. Subsequently, he initiated the establishment of the Arena of Insights, a digital system that enables the movement’s members to exchange opinions and raise ideas on current affairs. This is a special system that is also used by local authorities and the military, capable of analyzing large amounts of information.

When did you launch the new public participation system?

“In the second half of 2024. Before that, we used to post open questions on social media, and since there was a very good response from the movement’s members, we started working with the new Arena of Insights system. Every month we pose a different current affairs question. For example, recently: ‘Should we establish a state commission of inquiry or a national commission of inquiry?’ So far, over 1,000 people have responded to each of the questions we asked”.

“A question that was recently posed among the movement’s members through the new system, regarding an investigative committee into the events of October 7, received a large number of responses whose analysis results surprised the movement’s leaders”.

What was the rationale behind the Arena of Insights?

“The idea was to develop the system as a tool through which opinions and ideas could be shared from the bottom up – meaning not only from the senior military officials at the head of the movement to the non-expert public, but also in the opposite direction”. The system analyzes the responses and derives some basic insights from them, which we incorporate in our documents. The goal is to incorporate the movement members’ feelings into the movement’s research and position papers that are conveyed to decision-makers. “The movement sees great importance in public participation and in connecting the grassroots with the professional knowledge of military personnel”.

The wisdom of crowds

A question that was recently circulated among the movement’s members regarding a commission of inquiry into the events of October 7 received a large number of responses – over 700 responses in the actual system and another 326 responses on Facebook. When the content of the responses was analyzed, the movement leaders were surprised to discover that most of them did not lean in one direction but rather toward a compromise between the two poles. “The discussion was very lively, and not unequivocal”, says Lev. “It turns out that aside from the extremists, who express extreme positions, the majority wants a merger between a state committee and a national committee. In other words, most of the public thinks that the commission of inquiry should be state-run with aspects of a national commission of inquiry, in terms of its management and authorities”.

When it comes to a large amount of responses that are so complex and ambiguous, doesn’t that make it very difficult to process the information?

“We know that the more Israelis there are, the more opinions there are. The very connection between the two options we proposed was an innovation that came from the public – it did not emerge as a main option before we circulated the question. This opened another window for us: We realized that there is a majority in the public that is looking for the middle ground. Now the IDSF’s research department will have to process these insights and look for the right integrated model that we will offer to decision-makers”.

How is the information processed?

“First of all, the actual system analyzes the information using AI and extracts insights from it, and then we review its conclusions and test them. After our analysis, a summary of the discussion is published for all movement members who participated in the discussion – for each member regarding what they wrote. Then we send the results to the research department, which processes the information and incorporates it into its reports”.

Does this mean that you learn from the public?

“We are attentive to the movement’s members and want them to be part of our thought process”. Although issues related to Israel’s security still remain the domain of professionals, on other issues we want to hear what the movement’s members feel, and we want to incorporate them in the position papers that our professionals in the research department write. This enables us to combine professional knowledge with the “wisdom of crowds”.

Is there another example of public reactions that caused the movement to change its positions?

“It definitely happened. For example, in response to a question about recruiting Haredi soldiers, we received answers that were more complex than we expected, and they influenced and touched us. When we submitted the ‘8000 Plan’ to the government that dealt with this, there were several points that changed thanks to ideas from the public – for example, the understanding that the frameworks would have to be unique, that the uniqueness of Haredi society must be recognized, that there is importance in outreach within Haredi society and in cooperation with Haredi leaders, and that there is a need for benefits and incentives and a need to change the perception of military service – from a burden to a privilege and an opportunity to contribute to the country”.

In your opinion, does the system actually strengthen the democracy in the movement?

“During the discussion of the open question, all participants see the comments that are written, so you can also see the response to the comment. A kind of round table was created between people, one who could be in Kiryat Shmona, one in Jerusalem, and one in the Gaza Envelope. I think this has a lot of power. The system not only strengthens the senior officials’ familiarity with the voices on the ground, but also strengthens the sense of partnership and diversity among the movement’s members”.

Promoting women to the forefront of the movement

Lev did not complete his military service as a senior officer, but after his discharge from the Border Guard, he continued to work in the security field and acquired in-depth knowledge of domestic security issues. Over the years, he has gained significant experience in managing complex systems and leading operations, mainly in the municipal arena, where he specialized in a variety of fields, including education, security, and project management. He previously served as CEO of the “Merkazei HaTzeirim BeIsrael” [Youth Centers in Israel] network and currently serves as a volunteer member of the Harish City Council.

He also brings the same public spirit – of partnership, transparency, and commitment – to IDSF, where he works to promote a broad and in-depth security discourse. “It’s important to me that people get to know the movement’s diverse activities”, he says. “Alongside security, I also promote housing benefits for reservists, the business community, the senior officers community, managing and increasing the movement’s membership, and the IDSF women’s forum, with the goal of placing women more at the forefront.”

How can non-professional voices in the public contribute to the security discourse in the movement?

“Even in the security discourse, there are many elements that are not necessarily military. Amir Avivi often says that it is impossible to compromise on security – but there are dozens of diplomatic ways that may offer solutions that address the issue of security: in education, the economy, settlement, etc. Security is not just about tanks and planes, but also benefits for reservists, agriculture, community, and history. The movement is not only concerned with war and the army, but also with the question of how to remain strong and with an independent National Security Doctrine without compromising our Zionism. In these areas, I believe that ideas from the public can and should be used, and I hope that this trend continues”.

הפוסט “The IDSF also wants to listen to ideas that come from below” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

What comes to mind when you hear the words “lone farm” or “a farm in Judea and Samaria”? It may elicit an image of a subversive complex with a not-so-normative family. But that’s not the case.

Contrary to popular belief, not only are the farms not subversive, but they are part of a vital security, social, and educational enterprise of the State of Israel, as part of a proper strategy. This project thwarts the Palestinian Authority’s scheme to unilaterally establish a state in Area C, all while educating young people to be Zionists, work the land, and love their country. To get to know the project better, let’s go back to its origins.

The farms paved the way for the establishment of the state.

As early as 1908, the Palestine Office (the executive arm of the Zionist Organization in Israel), headed by Arthur Ruppin, decided to establish agricultural farms throughout the country that would train laborers to settle the land. Among other places, farms were established in Sejera, Um Juni, Hulda, Kfar Uriya, Be’er Tuvia, Beit Arif (Ben Shemen), and Hittin, and agronomists and agricultural experts helped them to grow and develop.

The role that the farms played in realizing the Zionist vision and establishing the state far exceeded their official mission. The Hebrew Defense Force (in its first incarnation, as the “Bar Giora” defense organization), the first agricultural collective in the country, and the Labor Legion were established on the Sejera farm, whose most famous laborer was David Ben-Gurion. The first kibbutzim and moshavim grew from the Kinneret Farm, and the foundations for the future state were laid in the form of institutions such as the Haganah organization, Solel Boneh, Tnuva, and the Mashbir.

Agricultural farms: An appropriate Zionist response to the Fayyad Plan

After the establishment of the state, many additional farms were established on vast, uncultivated territories suitable for Jewish settlement. After the Six-Day War, cattle farms were also established in the Golan. In the Negev, over ten lone farms (a farm established and run by a single person, family, or small group) have also been established since the 1990s. However, the most important development in recent decades with regard to the agricultural farms and their contribution to Zionism was in Judea and Samaria.

In 2009, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad published a plan to take over Israeli-controlled Area C and unilaterally establish a de facto Palestinian state by 2011. This plan, known as the Fayyad Plan, posed a significant threat to the Jewish communities across Judea and Samaria and to their security and strategic interests. The appropriate Zionist response to this was the agricultural farm movement.

Maximum territory using minimum resources

What makes farms a particularly effective way to occupy land?

The farms are small and therefore require little investment from the state in terms of resources and infrastructure.

Despite the small area of the actual farm, it grants control over much larger areas, since not only do farmers work the land adjacent to the farm, but the farm’s activities also involve the daily use of extensive grazing areas. In this way, the farm’s ongoing activities thwart attempts by hostile elements to take over the land, and assist in countering agricultural crime and smuggling. The constant presence on site strengthens the rule of law and the state’s sovereignty in the frontier areas, since it facilitates alerting of any illegal construction or suspicious changes in the area. Furthermore, the constant presence of the farmers in the fields and pastures prevents the creation of no man’s land, which may become security-related points of friction.

Another advantage lies in the fact that the farm requires almost no built-up area, and therefore it blends in well, and does not jeopardize military firing ranges or green spaces whose continuity is important from an ecological perspective.

By comparison, establishing a town or city requires a complex planning, legal, and administrative process, which can take years, to approve the plan and precise location in accordance with the Planning and Building Law and the National Outline Plan. This is followed by a construction process and the creation of water, electricity, and drainage infrastructures, as well as other municipal services. This means that a large investment over many years is required by the state for residents to be able to inhabit a relatively small area.

On farms, however, a minimal investment in resources and infrastructure is enough for a small number of conscientious and determined farmers to be able to hold extremely large areas for the state, work the land or graze herds on it, and protect the borders.

In this respect, the farms proved to be an ideal, effective, and economical way for the state to spread over vast areas and create territorial continuity that is strategically vital to its ability to maintain the security of its citizens within defensible borders – all with minimal investment on its part.

A strategic and security Israeli enterprise

The achievements speak for themselves.

There are currently over a hundred agricultural farms, which are protecting over six hundred thousand dunams of state land in Judea and Samaria. The farm enterprise spans vast areas and holds more than twice as much land as all the towns and cities in Judea and Samaria combined, including Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim, Beitar Illit, and Modi’in Illit. The construction boom is continuing, and already since the Swords of Iron War broke out, at least 15 new farms have been established in the area.

A decade and a half after their establishment gained momentum, it can already be stated that the agricultural farms play a crucial role in protecting Israel from the threat posed by the Fayyad Plan, in maintaining security in the region, and in creating a defensible Israeli demographic continuity in Area C.

In November 2021, the government determined that any of its ministries, not just the Ministry of Agriculture, can support voluntary agricultural activity in areas of national priority. In December 2024, we learned that Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter had instructed his ministry to begin granting farms the pasture grants that farmers in every other region of the country have been receiving for years. Dichter defined the move as “tremendous news for farms in Judea and Samaria,” and said that “after decades of being discriminated against, farmers in Judea and Samaria have begun to receive the pasture grants they deserve”.

Unity is Strength

The large number of farms in Judea and Samaria, and the fact that they span vast areas, posed security, economic, logistic, and bureaucratic challenges to their owners that needed to be handled in an organized and coordinated manner. In 2024, farm owners in Judea and Samaria established the Farm Association, whose role is to represent them vis-a-vis the authorities, assist in the requisite coordination vis-a-vis the defense establishment and government agencies, and assist in raising resources and obtaining grants that will support the farms financially.

The establishment of the Farm Association constitutes an important development of the agricultural farm enterprise. The association enables the numerous farms in Judea and Samaria to operate in a more efficient and organized manner, and significantly strengthens the entire movement. The Farm Association currently works to support the farmers and expand the farm enterprise in Judea and Samaria, out of a commitment to the vision behind it – preserving the nation’s lands and ensuring continuous Israeli control over the region.

The association intends, among other things, to provide financial incentives to farms that generate additional sources of income, such as tourism and vineyards, which will boost their stability and economic success, as well as to set up new farms, which requires the construction of infrastructures, security, and a preliminary herd that involve high initial costs. Concurrently, the association plans to operate an educational program for youth and volunteers at the farms, which will include practical training in carpentry, welding, and riding. The plow line is the border line for Israel’s other borders as well

The struggle to thwart the Fayyad Plan to take over Judea and Samaria is still in full swing. Only the establishment of dozens of additional farms will ensure that the Palestinian Authority does not take over Area C and fatally harm Jewish settlement in areas that are essential to maintaining national security and that constitute the cradle of our identity.

However, the momentum of fulfilling the settlement vision through agricultural farms must not stop in Judea and Samaria. In recent years, the number of Jews in the Galilee has been in continuous decline, and as of 2023, it was less than 15% of all residents (compared to about 25% in the past). Meanwhile, in the Negev, the illegal expansion of the unrecognized Bedouin villages and the increased rise of Palestinian nationalism and even involvement in terrorism within it are turning it into a “state within a state” that threatens the southern towns.

In our time, the long-standing Zionist settlement system of agricultural farms, which enables a small population to own large territory in a manner that requires relatively few infrastructures and resources, has become not only more relevant than ever but also a prerequisite for Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state.

As the HaShomer HaChadash (The New Watchman) organization rightly claims, the agricultural farm is the settlement model of the 21st century. Only extensive investment by the State of Israel in establishing dozens of farms in the coming years, not only in Judea and Samaria but also in the Negev and Galilee, as a project of national priority, will allow us to protect all parts of the Land of Israel, and not lose the south and the north again.

More than a century ago, Joseph Trumpeldor said: “Wherever the Jewish plow plows its last furrow, that is where the border will run”. This insight is more relevant than ever. This makes the agricultural farm enterprise the most important security and strategic mission of our time.

To participate in the Farm Association project

הפוסט The Farms: Zionism of the Future הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Nowadays, one would be hard pressed to come up with slurs that have not been hurled already at Generation Tik Tok. It is said that that it is shallow, selfish and mentally feeble; That it lacks true connection to nation and country; that it wants for ethics and morals, and has no purpose and aspirations.

Then came October 7, and shattered that impression of Israeli youth.

“Suddenly, it became evident that Israeli youth is not the problem, but rather the solution”, says Major Matuko Alamu, head of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program. “Our youth isn’t vapid and morally weak. On the contrary – it seeks meaning, purpose and the realization of its potential. In one moment, it understood that Israel is back in 1948 and we are once again facing a war of independence that calls on all of us to step up to the flag, and protect the very existence of the Jewish national home. It was able to put aside differences of opinions, and it united to carry on its shoulders the protection of national security. The current [security] system suffers from issues that had cultivated a general misconception regarding the superiority of Israel’s military and intelligence and the deterred state of Hamas. The ideological youth, which exhibited a strong sense of purpose and mission that arose in the wake of October 7, is the key to change”.

From under the veneer of materialism and “Me–ism”, explains Alamu, rose a generation that responded to the call to the flag and shined in the most brilliant light it could – committed and willing to sacrifice itself for the protection of Israel, united above any sectoral or political divide and with a strong and deep sense of belonging to the Jewish nation and country.

“In one of the most difficult times in the history of the State of Israel, we have been discovering what a fabulous future the Zionist cause can have, if only we enable it and help it grow. This is exactly the reasoning behind the Tkuma preparatory program”.

Cultivating the next generation – aimed at the defense of state, united, committed

The Tkuma pre-military preparatory program named after Sergent Major Omer Smadga May his Memory be Blessed, is one of the flagship initiatives of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement and was created with the aim of cultivating the IDF’s future generation of commanders – proactive, determined, ready to be on the offense, ideological and committed to Zionist security values, to ensure that the worst failure in the history of the State of Israel will never happen again. The choice of the location – the Tkuma moshav – is far from coincidental, as it is one of the communities that was attacked by the Hamas terrorists on October 7 and its members consequently evacuated.

“It was very important for us to educate and encourage the young generation to come live in the Gaza envelope communities”, says Alamu, “to boost agriculture in the moshav and the area and play a role in the rebuilding of Israel’s border communities”.

The directorship of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is just one in a long track-record of positions Alamu (40) has filled in non-formal education. Alamu had immigrated to Israel by walking from Ethiopia to Israel by way of Sudan, in an arduous journey that began when he was just three years old and ended when he was seven. In Israel, he grew up in the town of Ofakim and went to the religious school – yeshiva – in Hebron.

In the army Alamu served as a fighter and commander in the Paratroopers Brigade, now a Major in reserves in the airborne evacuation unit, also serving as a counselor and evaluator in special forces tests. He has a BA in management and public policy and has over ten years’ experience in non-formal education, as a counselor and coordinator in the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement and director of a number of pre-military preparatory and leadership programs. He lives in Ofakim with his wife Anat and their five children.

Against this background, Alamu’s appointment as the Director of the Tkuma program was almost inevitable. Not only has he dedicated his life to security and education – the interconnectivity of which the program focuses on – but he also personifies the three unique aspects of the program: a clear security perception, the interconnection of all parts of Israeli society, and deep commitment and dedication to the Israeli people and country.

The First IDSF Habithonistim Preparatory Program in Israel

The Tkuma program is the only one of its kind that offers the involvement of senior officers from the security establishment. The members of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, which served in the high ranks of the security apparatus, in commanding, combat and management capacities, will be part of a unique mentorship track. They will cultivate the deep comprehension of the military occupation and the Zionist aspect of Israel’s security doctrine, preparing the cadets to meaningful service in the IDF’s spearhead units and positions.

What is special about this mentorship?

“The IDSF HaBithonistim mentors will provide each cadet with an envelope of mentoring and guidance that will be personally tailored, not only during the term of the program but also later, during her or his military service. They will be there to guide, advise and help achieve the goals each cadet sets for themselves, while assisting to fulfill military duties in the optimal manner, including courses, selection of the desired officers’ training, and more. The cadets will be able to continue benefitting from the mentoring and guidance of the movement throughout their lives – even years after they end their military career.”

What kind of focus will the issue of security get in the program?

“Our curriculum includes an in-depth introduction to the national security doctrine of the State of Israel, the defense establishment and the defense industries, and will also place special emphasis on physical fitness and physical and mental preparation for assuming leadership roles and achieving meaningful military service. Whether they join elite forces, in combat roles in the infantry or in the 8200-intelligence service, the goal for them will always be to make the most of their abilities and contribute as much as possible to people, society and the country“.

How actually was the initiative born to found a preparatory program that would focus equally on education and security?

“Education is the central pillar of our existence as a nation, and in turn – of Israel’s security. Therefore, since the establishment of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement five years ago, it has been investing a considerable portion of its enterprise in education, among others in participating in various pre-military preparatory programs, and conducting pre-military talks in high-schools across Israel, in collaboration with the Education Ministry and the government. The establishment of the Tkuma preparatory program is the natural evolution of this involvement. October 7 made it clear that time is of essence in putting this into action”.

Part of the program’s stated vision is teaching security in the broadest sense. What does that mean?

“The military aspect is only one pillar of strong and lasting security. Our security is also based on an independent economy, diplomacy, the settlement of population in strategic areas of the country, social cohesion and education for Zionism. The preparatory program aspires to provide the students with the deep understanding of the interdependence between all these areas and their vitality for the future of the country.”

Reuniting Israeli society

An additional aspect of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is its rich and divers human tapestry, which makes it a microcosmos of Israeli society.

“Many such programs do much good”, says Alamu. “But unintentionally they produce a cookie-cutter type of graduates. Our program, on the other hand, will truly encompass all walks of Israeli society – men and women, religious and non-religious, residents of affluent central Israel and from its geoeconomic periphery. This is one of the most important lessons from the state of affairs in our society on October 6 – that a way must be found to reunite Israel’s fragmented society, finding that which unites us in order to strengthen our social cohesion and eliminate the polarization and social discord. It’s clear to me that our rebirth as a strong united nation will grow from the cultivation of values and unity, which are inalienable elements of our national security, as is the connection to the land and working the land – and this is the path of the Tkuma program. For me this is a great honor to be part of the effort to shape the collective national perception among the young generation and to instill in them the belief in our right to live in this land”.

The Tkuma preparatory program: Omer’s legacy

The ideological vision of the Tkuma program reflects the jolting crucial wakeup call that Israeli society received on October 7.

“We witnessed a sudden mass mobilization of the entire nation. People who’ve found a way to shirk their reserves service for years had suddenly showed up to volunteer for duty, and the rate of enlistment was so high that the base supply stores couldn’t keep up with demand for gear and uniforms. We suddenly remembered that we’re part of a nation, of a society, of a bigger story, and not just a random group of individuals, but a collective, and that true self realization demands the contribution to the collective to which we belong”.

The Tkuma program is named after Lt. Col. (res.) Omer Smadja, the son of the famous judoka Oren Smadja, who was killed in battle in the Gaza Strip in June 2024. How did his character and the legacy he left behind reflect these values?

“One of the amazing and inspiring things about Omer’s story is that despite his difficult struggle with attention and concentration deficits, as a result of which he studied in special education, not only did he not give up on realizing his aspirations – but he also chose to do everything in his power to contribute to others – country and society. Not only did he overcome his difficulties, but he also chose to volunteer at the Magen David Adom emergency medical services, to be a cadet in a pre-military preparatory program, to volunteer to service in the IDF, to donate bone marrow, and all the time to give, in more and more ways. In other words, he was always a champion.”

Is that really your slogan – “Program for Champions”? What does that mean?

“Omer, may he be in blessed memory, was an example that in order to be a champion, you don’t need the rank, but rather the strength and perseverance to set goals and objectives every day and strive to meet them, no matter what age and stage of life we are at. It was enough to hear his father, Oren Smadja, eulogize him at the funeral and call on IDF soldiers to continue moving forward and stick to the goal, in order to understand what kind of upbringing Omer had. At the same time, it must be remembered that these goals must be realized within the community, society, and country. A champion is someone who not only excels in everything he or she does, but also someone who chooses to take on leadership positions and contribute to the common good. In the communal living at the Tkuma program, in which the students are together 24 hours a day, this can also materialize in the smallest everyday actions – taking care of your friends, taking responsibility without being asked and stepping up to take on tasks, for example – washing dishes for everyone – rather than trying to shirk responsibility”.

And this is only the beginning

The Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is far from the end of the line of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s initiatives. The movement’s educational vision stretches far beyond this single enterprise: “We want the program to have an influence on our graduates for the rest of their lives. It is imperative that they continue playing an active role in the settlement of Israel, by founding more communities and boosting existing ones across Israel. Wherever the need arises for helping hands for security or settlement – we’ll be there”.

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim’s Tkuma Pre-Military Program – Cultivating the Future Generation of IDF Leadership הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The campaign for the eradication of the murderous Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip had placed the IDF in a humanitarian conundrum: on one hand, there are over a million displaced who are in need of aid and housing. On the other hand, Hamas pillaged the humanitarian aid and is fortifying itself in areas of dense population.

At present, Israel is facing a triple challenge: it is demanded to provide the population with humanitarian aid, but must do so without the unintended consequence of boosting Hamas in the Strip. Is there a way to ensure the population has a roof over its head without having to rehabilitate the stronghold of terror in the Strip? How can Israel install the future civil leadership that would replace Hamas and the Palestinian Authority?

The Humanitarian Islands Plan, authored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement research department, led by researchers Adv. Yifa Segal, Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid, and contributing researcher Mrs. Jennifer Thiel, provides an answer to all these questions, which could change the face of Gaza.

A dangerous problem – Hamas takes advantage of humanitarian aid

The humanitarian aid predicament is a direct result of the October 7 massacre, that had brought Israel to launch the war in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has instructed the civilian population to evacuate the areas of fighting to eliminate the risk of hurting innocents, and allow the army to conduct operational activities against terror infrastructures that Hamas operated from within these areas. As a result of this activity, large areas were left either razed to the ground or unfit for habitation. To date, there are over one million Gazans that are considered displaced after having evacuated the battle areas.

Naturally, these displace are in need of humanitarian aid. And indeed, since the outbreak of the war, large-scale aid has been continuously shipped into the Gaza Strip, totaling as of now some one million tons. However, the displaced also need proper housing as well.

With that said, there are two prominent obstacles for the supply of this aid and housing. The first is that Hamas pillages huge amounts of food and equipment that arrive into the Strip for its own survival, on the expense of the lives of its own people.  The other challenge is that the people cannot return to their homes and rehabilitate the pre-war centers of population because here too, Hamas – concerned solely with its own preservation at whatever cost – had established its terror network above and underground in these areas.

The question is: how may Israel help the displaced citizens of the Strip while refraining to indirectly aid the terrorists?

The humanitarian islands – no entrance for terrorism

In order to untangle this predicament, a solution is called for, such that will allow for the flow of aid to the citizens to prevent a full-fledged humanitarian crisis in the strip, while ensuring Hamas does not gain control over the population centers and the aid, and expediting its eradication.

The most effective manner of achieving the aforementioned is by the establishment of displaced cities only in the Strip’s open areas rather than in the populace centers controlled by Hamas. Each city would be under Israeli supervision, without access by UNRWA or Hamas. This can be instrumental in the eradication of the pernicious presence of these two organizations in the Strip. The authority to distribute the aid would be in the hands of a new body that would be established in the Gaza Strip – the Humanitarian Administration of the Gaza Strip.

The role of that body will be the close supervision over the distribution of aid and ensuring these cities are clean of Hamas – or any other organization – terrorist. The displaced cities and the aid they receive will be managed autonomously, with the involvement of local public and aid organizations, without Israeli intervention in their daily operation.

How does it work?

Each displaced city will collaborate with the General Humanitarian Coordination Administration. The Administration’s role will be to ensure that the IDF has cleared the area of underground and other terrorist infrastructures even before the establishment of the new cities, to supervise their construction and lists of eligible residents, to ensure they remain clean of Hamas members, and to coordinate the arrival of supplies.

Entry to cities will be possible only with biometric entry documents specific to each city, and through security checks and metal detectors, which will prevent terrorists or gangs from infiltrating the cities or bringing in weapons.

At the same time, the IDF’s perimeter security force in the area and a system of routes and crossings will enable Israel to dissect the Gaza Strip into separate units, and will increase Israel’s control over the Strip and its ability to prevent Hamas from regaining control of the territory.

The goal – creating an alternative government to Hamas

The proximity to the population and control over aid supply will make it easier for Israel to cultivate a positive and peace-oriented local leadership that will assume only civilian powers. This leadership will be an alternative to both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which has proved to be a weak, corrupt and terror-supporting body that must not rule Gaza again.

To ensure that the local administration does not undermine Israel, it will be given only civil and humanitarian powers – not political or policy-making authorities. Although the IDF will not have a role inside the cities, it will have the full freedom to operate within them when the need arises in order to cleanse them of terrorists and terrorist infrastructure.

The best solution – safe, efficient and cost-effective

The “Humanitarian Islands” program has distinct advantages over other solutions – it is based on a well-known international model of creating displaced persons cities, which has been successfully implemented many times over the years across the world, e.g. in Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as on the experience gathered from the creation of improvised displaced cities in the Gaza Strip today.

In light of the extensive and successful experience with similar initiatives, it is possible to implement the program already in an efficient and gradual manner. It is worthwhile to start by establishing displaced towns in the northern Gaza Strip, where Hamas has relatively little military and civilian control, and later to establish additional cities in other parts of the Strip.

Another significant advantage of this plan is that the cost will not fall on the Israeli taxpayer. As is already the case in Gaza today and in similar situations around the world, funding will come only from international sources and will be budgeted for the various aid agencies.

In contrast to military rule or any form of Israeli control, a temporary humanitarian administration, which will hold no political authority and is operated by the local population, will encourage cooperation and reduce resistance.

The bottom line: The Humanitarian Island Plan will allow Israel to isolate Hamas, deny it access to aid and population centers, and eradicate it as a governing force, while at the same time cultivating local representation in the cities as an alternative leadership for the day after the war. All of this makes its implementation a necessary condition for the Gaza War to end with a real and decisive victory for Israel over Hamas.

For the full study >>

הפוסט Aid Displace, Cripple Hamas: A Humanitarian Solution that Could Change the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 27, 2024, the day the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect, the Syrian rebels took advantage of the opportunity and launched an attack against Bashar al-Assad’s army. After only 11 days, their forces had taken control of Damascus and completed the conquest of Syria. Assad himself fled to Russia.

Many were amazed at the dizzying speed with which the Syrian regime fell, and at the depth of hatred among the enraged crowd that wrecked the statue of the elder Assad and dragged it through Damascus.

The person least surprised was Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a member of the IDSF movement and one of the leading experts in Middle East studies. His analysis seems to imply that the Baath regime in Syria could have come to no different end.

Greater infidels than Jews and Christians

“The rebels succeeded in taking control of Syria so quickly because Syria is a hollow country. The people don’t believe in it and the army isn’t willing to die for it,” Kedar said in a special conversation with Or Yissachar, head of the IDSF research department, after the dramatic developments in Syria. “My book ‘Assad in Search of Legitimacy’ (2005) proves what other Orientalists have tried to deny or ignore,” claims Kedar, “which is that Hafez Assad, and later his son Bashar, tried in vain all these years to become legitimate rulers in the eyes of the public. They never succeeded. They didn’t have a nickel’s worth of legitimacy. Nothing, zero, nada. They ruled by force. Everything was phony, and that’s why it fell apart so quickly.”

Kedar explains that this is a chronicle of a collapse foretold. “Syria’s biggest problem is that in 1966 it was taken over by members of the Alawite religion, a minority who are considered by the country’s Sunni Muslim majority to be infidels – idolaters whose fate is to either convert to Islam or be slaughtered. The renowned medieval Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyyah called the Alawites ‘greater infidels than the Jews and Christians.’ Therefore, from the perspective of Muslims, an Alawite cannot be a ruler.”

Brutal repression and strategic surprise

“To deal with the hostility of the Muslim majority towards them,” says Kedar, “the Alawite leaders from the Marxist faction of the Baath Party – the secular nationalist party that has ruled Syria since taking over in 1966 – established a terrible dictatorial regime. It suppressed rebellions brutally. In 1976, the Muslim Brotherhood mounted an uprising in Syria and thousands of Sunni rebels fought against the government. The uprising ended in February 1982 with the Great Hama Massacre, where between 20,000 and 40,000 people were murdered. Military forces under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother, blew up houses with the residents inside – including old people, women, and children – and they killed other victims with gas. About 20,000 more people, who were taken into custody, were murdered in Palmyra prison.

“The next round began in March 2011, with a wave of anti-government protests that erupted as part of what was then called the ‘Arab Spring.’ Then too, in various regions, the rebellion was suppressed with deadly force. Many Syrian Muslims fled north to the Idlib region, close to Turkiye. The Turks helped them arm and equip themselves, organize, train, and prepare for the great day when they would break out and liberate the country from the rule of the Assad family.”

For 14 years, the rebels in the Idlib region waited, gathered strength, armed themselves, and watched for the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow to the Assad regime. “The turning point,” explains Kedar, “came with the end of Hezbollah’s war against Israel, which left the regime especially weakened.”

How did the rebels mount their surprise attack?

“Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – an Islamist organization formerly called Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated with al-Qaeda – was the first to attack, under the command of Muhammad al-Julani. The other rebel organizations quickly followed suit, to take advantage of the strategic surprise that wound up costing the Assad regime its life.”

Kedar describes the course of the battles: “First the rebel forces attacked in Aleppo, and a few days later they proceeded south to Hama and later to Homs. After that area was conquered, the Druze in As-Suwayda and the Bedouin in Daraa also joined the rebellion against the government. Then it was a short path to the conquest of Damascus and the final defeat of Assad.”

We will have won when Israeli flags are hoisted over former Iranian embassies

Although the rebels fought as a single front in the recent campaign, in reality they are a variety of organizations and their agendas differ and sometimes clash. “In the Idlib region, refugees from Daesh, Al Qaeda, and other organizations have accumulated over the years, especially after 2018. In contrast, there were also secular and multi-ethnic organizations without any religious agenda. They included Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawites, and members of other groups. These organizations appear more moderate and pragmatic, and at least two of them accept Israel. I know this because I’m in contact with their leaders,” Kedar reveals.

Does the agenda of most rebels actually appear to be relatively moderate?

“The statements that most organizations are issuing are quite positive. Some even say that Israel has nothing to fear. One of the organizations I’m in contact with wrote to me that for them the great victory over Assad, the Iranians, and Hezbollah will be when the Iranian embassies in Damascus and Amman have Israeli flags flying, meaning those buildings have become the Israeli embassies.”

It would be better for the rebels to establish a liberal regime

“There is no unified Syrian people,” explains Kedar. “Syria is an artificial state. It’s deeply divided ethnically, into Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Armenians – and religiously, into Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Alawites – and tribally, into powerful clans and extended families, many of them armed and valuing their internal loyalties and their own agendas. Those groups were together only because of the arbitrary border that France established when it concluded its mandate in the region. The gaps and tensions along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines have prevented a true Syrian people from forming.” According to Kedar, this is precisely the reason that it would be beneficial for al-Julani to establish a relatively liberal regime.

“If Syria becomes an Islamist state like Daesh or a dictatorship that tries to impose a unified national identity, it could fall apart – because the Druze, Kurds, and other minorities would not want to live in such a state.” On the other hand, if Syria were a pluralistic state as it was in the 1950s, intervening less harshly in the lives of its citizens, then all sorts of forces that want independence – such as the Alawites in the coastal region – could very possibly be content with what they have and not try to dismantle the country.”

If the alternative is Iran – I prefer Daesh

When asked whether the disintegration of countries like Iran or Syria will negatively affect stability in the Middle East, Kedar replies surprisingly that on the contrary, it will only improve stability.

“Only the Emirates, which are homogeneous countries, have remained stable over many years in this region. In contrast, countries made of several groups, heterogeneous countries, are very unstable. Consider, for example, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. They each include ethnic, religious, and tribal groups that don’t associate with each other, so why force them to live in a single framework?

If an extremist Islamist state like Daesh is established, is it still good for Israel that the Assad regime has fallen?

“Even the worst militias in Syria pose a threat that is primarily tactical – automatic weapons and heavy machine guns mounted on Toyotas. If I have to choose between that and a strategic threat from Iran in the form of ballistic missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons soon, then I prefer to deal with Daesh. Of course I really want to avoid that. But if the alternative is Iran, I prefer Daesh.”

Israel is ready for any scenario

Is uncertainty about the nature of Syria’s emerging regime the reason for the preventive measures that Israel has taken in recent weeks?

“Exactly. Israel is preparing for the worst-case scenario, in which extremist Islamists have control of Syria. That’s why we’re seeing a very large concentration of forces in the Golan. For the meantime, until it becomes clear where the new government is headed, the IDF has captured the Syrian side of Mount Hermon – which is higher than the Israeli side – and has also improved the Israeli positions on the Golan itself. These steps are important and it’s good that they were taken as a way of warding off danger and ensuring that we don’t relive October 7th – this time on the Golan – with military forces entering the State of Israel because it fell asleep on the watch.

“It’s impossible to know what will happen in Syria,” concludes Kedar. “It could be an Islamist terrorist state like Daesh, or an open, modern, liberal state like Syria was in the past. We have to wait and see. We can only hope that a reasonable, normal government will be established there that Israel can reach a dialogue with, so that we all can feel calmer about what’s happening across the border.”

הפוסט “Syria was always a fake – that’s why it fell apart so quickly” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the last three months, the center of gravity of the Swords of Iron war has shifted northward, but according to journalist Yair Kraus, the story of the northern sector began unfolding as early as October 7, 2023. As someone who lives in Acre and covers the northern region for Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, he discerned from the beginning that his region was an integral part of the war.

“When we saw the terrible attack on the southern communities, we realized that such an attack could have happened here too, and in much more monstrous proportions,” he relates. “This completely changed our perception of security as residents of the north. It created a deep crisis in our trust for the state and the IDF. Today, when we hear statements like ‘Hezbollah is deterred,’ for us it’s a warning that the situation on the ground is probably the opposite.”

The days of a “sense of security” are over

Yair Kraus lives in Acre, so he and his family were not evacuated. But they certainly felt the echoes of the war. His eldest daughter, for example, had to leave home for an entire month to go to school in the center of the country, and his three younger children had no educational framework for about three months. Kraus also personally knows many families who were displaced from their homes, and has seen firsthand the difficulties they faced and are still facing. He is aware of many residents – mainly elderly – who are waiting for the moment when they can return home. Moreover, there are quite a few others who are not at all sure they wish to return, and some have already decided to leave the north for good. The trend toward relocating permanently is especially noticeable among young families whose children have already settled into new frameworks in central Israel. Those families do not want to uproot them again.

However, even if we focus on residents who are waiting to return – and even on exceptional individuals who decide to move to the north of the country now of all times – there is still a serious problem in that most of them are not yet able to do so.

According to Kraus, who has been covering the northern region since the Second Lebanon War, several conditions must be met before the north can be repopulated. The first involves security and survival. “The residents in the north, especially the evacuees, will carefully examine what conditions the state and the army want to return them to,” he says. “I hear from many friends that they will not return to a situation where they will see Hezbollah terrorists and their families settling again in the villages where attacks were launched, or go back to being on the front line with the army behind them.”

The residents of the north have had enough of promises, Kraus adds, and they will now demand to see changes on the ground. “The security establishment’s usual boasting and lying will no longer work, and there’s no use for more of their statements that have repeatedly turned out to be unfounded,” he concludes. “The days of ‘a sense of security’ are also over. The issue here is no longer what people feel. It’s what people see with their own eyes – and when you see the villages where attacks were launched being rebuilt, and when there’s no buffer zone, it doesn’t look like security. Remember, we didn’t defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. And Hezbollah’s stated goal is still to conquer the northern settlements. It’s time for us to start believing Hezbollah and stop underestimating its buildup. We also need to wean ourselves from the addiction to respite – and from methods of action such as the kind we used in the so-called war between the wars. There is a major lesson here for the leadership, the army officers, and the northern residents, and it is that the peace and quiet we long for can be bought only with determination and the force of arms.”

So what will security on the northern border look like?

“We constantly hear about weapons being seized and terrorist infrastructure being destroyed, even now during the ceasefire, but what will change the reality the day after the war is not how many weapons we removed, but whether the weapons will return to those places. As long as the army and government show no willingness to hold on to the areas where Hezbollah operated, we should be worried. It’s clear to me and many other residents that for security in the north, we must create a buffer zone like the ones at the Gaza border and the Syrian border. Besides keeping security threats away from the communities at the fence, a buffer zone would also deliver humiliation. The Lebanese will see abandoned villages standing as monuments that proclaim what happens to those who try to harm us.”

Don’t say “rehabilitation,” say “development”

Besides restoring security, another condition that must be met in order to return the residents of the north to their homes is the restoration of the damaged infrastructure, including the ruined drainage systems, the destroyed roads, the wrecked buildings, and the many homes that suffer from abandonment. Of course, we also need repairs at public institutions such as health funds and schools, and at businesses, because they are all integral to a reasonable lifestyle.

However, alongside physical restoration, there is another aspect, less talked about, which is the development aspect. “We hear all the time about ‘rehabilitating the north,’ but in my opinion, rehabilitation is the wrong concept because it implies restoring the conditions of October 6,” says Yair Kraus. The situation in the north has been shaky for many years, and it is impossible to prop something back up that has long been falling apart. There is an issue of attitude here, and it is time for us to replace the term ‘rehabilitation’ with the terms ‘momentum’ and ‘development.'”

Kraus expresses a feeling that many northern residents share – especially now, after they have glimpsed the lifestyle of the center’s residents. “Exposure to life in the center of the country made the residents of the north realize how far behind they were. The rift strongly affected their perception,” he explains. “After a few months of living in the center, residents of the north began to get used to conditions that residents of the center have long taken for granted, such as accessible public transportation, advanced health services, well-paying jobs, and a variety of leisure activities. It’s enough to notice how many movie theaters an average city has in central Israel and then look at the Upper Galilee. There isn’t a single movie theater in that entire region. But the problem is much deeper than that, of course. Such gaps exist in every field and influence every aspect of the residents’ daily lives. So if the state wants those residents to return to the north, it cannot be satisfied with merely restoring what they had before. It must assure them that they will receive the same conditions that exist in the center. People say that you don’t cry out for what you don’t notice the lack of – but now the residents of the north know what they lack and they will cry out.”

What should the development plan for the north include?

“We need to start improving public transportation and expanding railroad lines, build advanced medical centers, and place an emphasis on employment, education, and leisure. Beyond that, we need to work on reducing land prices in the decaying rural communities at the heart of the Galilee – because currently the prices are exorbitant, to the point where they harm the entire Jewish settlement enterprise in the Galilee. But above all, a new point of view is needed. Currently the state treats the north as an unwelcome assignment and not as an asset. For that reason, it develops the north according to economic and administrative considerations, and not considerations of Zionism and societal values.”

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north.

The people of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem aren’t wiser than we are

It is impossible discuss the rehabilitation and development of the north without addressing the question of responsibility. Currently there are various bodies trying to drive the process, and they are roughly divided into two groups – outsiders and insiders. The first group includes mainly government bodies and regulatory officials. The second group includes local leaders, residents, and private associations. Synchronization among the various bodies is not always successful, and sometimes it does not exist at all. Currently the reins are held by those external offices.

According to Yair Kraus, this trend is not new. “For years, the people in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem decided what was right for us, and how we should live, and even now there is a feeling that do-gooders are coming from outside again to save and heal us,” he says. “This criminal policy may derive from good intentions, but in practice it weakens the local leadership and the community’s resilience. It sends the message that the residents can’t take care of themselves.”

Kraus compares the situation in the north to national disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes. In such disasters too, we see delegations from elsewhere arriving to save the locals. The missions operate out of good will, and their assistance is indeed needed, but when they operate without the cooperation of the local population, their benefit is only partial.

“All the studies in the world prove that sustainable reconstruction after a national disaster is possible only when the community is part of the reconstruction and part of the action,” he explains. “We need to create a situation where we exert ourselves not merely for the community but together with it. Not only do the locals know best what they need. In addition, by taking responsibility for themselves they can achieve a sense of triumph and restore their own resilience, which is no less important than physical rehabilitation.”

Why, in your opinion, are the people of the north excluded from the reconstruction and development processes?

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north. Billions have been invested in the region over the years and have given back almost no profit. In my opinion, a solution needs to be found that will provide for supervision but also give the north a certain freedom of action. I don’t know what the solution is, but I know we must try to find it.”

No “state,” no “army,” only people

One of the clearest conclusions that Yair Kraus draws from the last year of the war is that we need to discard amorphous terms like “state” and “army,” and instead start talking about the people who make up these bodies.

He harks back to the period when he covered Operation Guardian of the Walls and many media outlets reported on various decisions made by the court. He, as a journalist, opposed that unspecific term and made sure to mention the name of the judge who made each decision. In today’s context, Kraus emphasizes that there is no army, but rather a Chief of Staff, a head of the Northern Command, a divisional commander, and so on. Similarly, there is no state. There are ministers, there are members of Knesset, there are advisors. “This precision is important because when you attribute the responsibility to the body, then no one is responsible,” he explains. “In contrast, when you say who has the authority, by name and position, and indicate what decision or what action that person took – then immediately an individual is responsible.”

His hope is that those in authority, from the most senior to the most junior, will take responsibility and truly fulfill their roles. Only in this way, he believes, will it be possible to influence the future of the country and its development.

Another conclusion that Kraus has retained is that we must no longer be captivated by promises. “In the last year and a quarter, we have received a very big lesson in realism, and I can no longer look at the future through a prism,” he says. “In my lifetime, I’ve heard enough exciting announcements that ultimately led to nothing. I hope that now, with the reality of the north finally on the public agenda, we will see real change. It’s a very harsh thing to say, but this terrible war could be a blessing for the north. If it weren’t for a game-changing event of this magnitude, I doubt we would be talking about the importance of the north and recognizing how acute the need is to take care of this region of the country and improve its conditions. In my view, we must leverage this event into development, so that out of the fearsome comes forth sweetness.”

הפוסט The North Needs a New Story: An Interview with Journalist Yair Kraus הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Major (res.) Yossi Levi testifies that he has been an Israeli for 15 years. As far as he is concerned, this count of “national years” began the day he enlisted in the IDF. “Before I joined the army, I identified exclusively as ultra-Orthodox,” he says. “To me, concepts such as ‘Israeli’ or ‘Zionist’ belonged purely to the secular world and were strictly off-limits. There was nothing to talk about serving in the IDF at all – it was completely not in my plans. But today I can say with all my heart that the decision to enlist was the best step I took in my life.”

First of all, a security imperative: the importance of enlisting ultra-Orthodox in the IDF

Yossi practically stumbled on his enlistment. Exactly at a time when he was beginning to feel that studying in yeshivot (religious colleges) did not allow him to reach his full potential, he met a recruit from the Netzah Yehuda battalion, and was persuaded to give the military option a chance. Once in the army, he began climbing the ranks, reaching command and officer positions. Today, he is an infantry officer in active reserve duty. Levi is about to complete the battalion commander program, after which he is expected to attain the rank of lieutenant colonel and be given the command over a combat reserve battalion. At the same time, he serves as the Director General of Netzah Yehuda, an NGO that is dedicated to the support of ultra-Orthodox soldiers serving in the IDF, and helps ultra-Orthodox who have completed their service integrate into civil society.

As one who has served in the IDF for many years, and is even authoring a doctorate on ultra-Orthodox conscription, he can attest to the fact that the army provides young ultra-Orthodox with important tools for life – from instilling values such as work ethics and personal responsibility, to professional knowledge and practical experience. It is equally clear to him that the army has also benefited greatly from the integration of ultra-Orthodox into its ranks, especially in the current period in which the shortage of combat personnel has become a major security issue.

“The integration of the ultra-Orthodox into the IDF has two chief aspects: social and security,” he explains. “In recent years, the IDF has been mustering out many units, scaling down its manpower, and it has become very difficult to advocate security demands. There was a sense that there is really no operational justification for the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox, and the demand thereof stems mainly from the desire to establish a more egalitarian society. All of this was true until the Gaza War. Today, every member of the ultra-Orthodox community understands all too well that there is a significant need to boost the IDF’s rank and file, and that this is a national imperative of the highest order. This doesn’t mean there can be an en mass enlistment of the ultra-Orthodox, but they do understand that this is a real security demand, which is something that couldn’t really be argued before the war.”

Kashrut is just an excuse: the barriers that turn the ultra-Orthodox against conscription

Maj. (res.) Yossi Levi’s claims indicate that, for the most part, the ultra-Orthodox community understands the importance of the military service, but nevertheless, there are various obstacles to the expansion of conscription to this sector.

According to Levi, one of the main obstacles is related to the manner in which the discourse on ultra-Orthodox conscription is conducted. “The current public discourse on the subject is such that does not understand the intricacies of ultra-Orthodox society,” Levi states. “This is especially evident when we talk about equality. Israelis think that this is a universal value, but this value is simply irrelevant in ultra-Orthodox society. This is a society that is not governed by the value of equality – not between men and women, or between rabbi and student – so it was never a notion that we had to uphold. Therefore, when you mention to the ultra-Orthodox the need of ‘sharing the burden,’ it only deters them. Similarly, it is also incorrect to talk to them about the importance of protecting the State of Israel, because they do not see themselves as part of the State to begin with. On the other hand, if we talk to them about the importance of protecting the people of Israel – this is something they can get behind.”

Another major obstacle, according to Levi, is the fear of losing the ultra-Orthodox identity. “The biggest fear is that young people will adopt secular or Western values, and replace their ultra-Orthodox identity with an Israeli identity,” he explains. “You have to understand that the ultra-Orthodox see themselves as the keepers of the flame. As far as they are concerned, the overall purpose of the Jewish people is to preserve tradition down the generation line, and this is done with the help of those who dedicate their lives to the study of Torah. In the ultra-Orthodox view, in order to keep the flame burning, we must first keep the young people within the sector, and that is why we are so afraid of dropping out of religion. When we see the various sectors, such as the national religious or the national ultra-Orthodox, which are more involved in general society, we see that dropout rates among the ultra-Orthodox are indeed the lowest. The conclusion that many draw from this is that in order to preserve tradition, one must distance oneself from any external influence, and this is one of the reasons for the strong objection to enlistment in the IDF.”

Another barrier concerns the negative attitude that has become entrenched in ultra-Orthodox society toward enlistment in the IDF, so much so that oftentimes even when a young ultra-Orthodox man does wish to enlist, he will not do so simply because he fears repercussions – excommunication for one – from the Ultra-Orthodox society and even his family. “When you grow up in ultra-Orthodox society, you are instilled with one central value: the study of Torah,” Levi explains. “As far as the ultra-Orthodox community is concerned, anyone who doesn’t study Torah is second class members of the community. One of our struggles is to turn ultra-Orthodox soldiers into ‘first class’ members. The way to do this is only by expanding the number of ultra-Orthodox soldiers. This will normalize military service and turn it into a matter that is not only legitimate but even appreciated. If today only about 1,000 ultra-Orthodox men enlist each year, it means that the average ultra-Orthodox person knows perhaps one soldier, and probably not someone close. On the other hand, if we succeed in recruiting even just a third of the ultra-Orthodox population that is eligible for enlistment, this will mean that every ultra-Orthodox home will have a soldier. When that happens, the entire attitude in the ultra-Orthodox society toward soldiers will change, and we will see both an increase in enlistment and a decrease in the unfortunate phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox soldiers becoming excommunicated.”

What about objective obstacles such as the need to observe the kashrut laws or separation of men and women?

“People tend to think that these are the reasons that deter the ultra-Orthodox from enlisting, but that’s not really the case. Let’s start with kashrut (Jewish Orthodox dietary laws) – all units in the army maintain kashrut, and units designated for ultra-Orthodox maintain strict (Mehadrin) kashrut at the most exacting levels, so, for the most part, there really shouldn’t be a problem. Regarding gender separation – it is indeed a complex issue because an ultra-Orthodox Jew will not serve in a place where women serve. However, there are units that are designated for men only, so this should not constitute a problem either. When we examine all these excuses in depth, we see that they can all be shelved. The ultra-Orthodox can and should serve, but the army, for its part, is obligated to provide them with all the necessary accommodations.”

Such as?

“We insist on five main principles: Mehadrin (strict) kashrut, gender separation, prayer time, study time and an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle – that is, a non-explicit environment, devoid of topics of conversation that are considered inappropriate in the ultra-Orthodox culture. In order for an ultra-Orthodox to feel comfortable in the IDF, he has to receive this whole package.”

Can these adjustments hurt other demographics that serve in the army, namely women?

“The IDF is the largest organization in Israel, with the ability to make adjustments to one sector without infringing the rights of another. That is why we encourage the establishment of dedicated homogeneous ultra-Orthodox units. There is a tendency to see sectoral and single-gender units as a negative thing, but in practice, such units allow the ultra-Orthodox to integrate into the army without causing the exclusion of other serving populations.”

The goal: the recruitment of 22,000 ultra-Orthodox

Recently, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement published Plan 8000 – a proposal for the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox society in the security service. This plan addresses the need to recruit 8,000 ultra-Orthodox men to serve in the IDF, the police and additional security bodies as early as the upcoming year. To implement this, the IDSF offers four main service programs: service in the IDF, service in the Israel Police or Border Patrol, service in the search and rescue forces, and service in the armaments industry.

Maj. (res.) Yossi Levi had read the plan in depth and supports most of the points it touches upon, but he also has some reservations – the first relates to the number of ultra-Orthodox soldiers that must be recruited. “Security experts are talking about 8,000 soldiers, I’m talking about 22,000,” he says. “Today, there are 66,000 ultra-Orthodox men aged 18-24 who do not serve in the IDF, and at least a third of them are suitable for enlistment even in the eyes of the great leaders of the Orthodox communities, and that third is the target audience as far as I’m concerned.”

In Levi’s opinion, one way to encourage ultra-Orthodox recruitment is to expand the IDF’s service offerings. This understanding is also at the basis of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s proposal, Thus, each of the recruitment tracks presented in the proposal also includes several sub-tracks. The IDF enlistment program for ultra-Orthodox men, for example, includes designated combat units such as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion. In addition, it was suggested to establish the first ultra-Orthodox brigade that would operate as a dedicated security force along the Seam Line – the security separation zone between Palestinian and Jewish population areas in the Jordan Valley and Judea and Samaria. “Such a border enforcing division offers two main advantages,” Yossi Levi elaborates. “First of all, it allows for a softer integration into the IDF, because the operational training there can be shorter and less taxing physically. Beyond that, an important matter of perception figures into this option – ultra-Orthodox Jews who serve in the Jordan Valley or Judea and Samaria will de facto be protecting their home because many of them live in the area, and that alone connects them emotionally to the mission.”

Another sub-track proposed for the IDF Ultra-Orthodox enlistment plan is service options in the Home-Front forces, in a format of staggered weeks of service and religious studies. According to Levi, this idea is actually not very advisable simply because a week-long absence from military duty might compromise continuity and performance. As far as he is concerned, the preferred alternative is to allow a format of half a day of service and a half-day of study. “This format,” he explains, “can allow the soldiers to still get a lot of study time, while at the same time – remain in the system and maintain continuity of service.”

Another proposal included in Plan 8000 is the recruitment of Ultra-Orthodox into Israel Police, Border Police or the National Guard. According to Yossi Levi, the great advantage of this track lies in the fact that many ultra-Orthodox communities hold a better opinion of the civilian enforcement forces than the IDF, hence, integration in those forces could be more comfortable for some ultra-Orthodox.

Similarly, he supports a recruitment initiative of ultra-Orthodox men to munitions factories that are expected to be built as part of the lessons of the Gaza War. According to Levi, such a service will both connect the ultra-Orthodox to operational activity while enabling them to acquire a profession. His hope is that this kind of service will be done in uniform, in order to normalize the use of uniforms in ultra-Orthodox society.

The only track in the 8000 plan that Yossi Levi has reservations about is the recruitment track for rescue organizations the likes of as ZAKA disaster response search and rescue NGO and United Hatzala emergency medical response NGO. In his view, this volunteering is welcome and worthy of recognition, but it cannot be an alternative to military service. According to Levi, young people up to the age of 22 should enlist in a security body such as the IDF or the police, and perform full-time service there. However, since ultra-Orthodox Jews who have already passed this age will probably not enlist at all, he agrees that they could be appropriate candidates for recognized national service in one of the rescue organizations.

Beyond the public discourse: Conscription of Ultra-Orthodox in practice

Major Levi has been active in the military system for a decade and a half. Over the years, he has seen the issue of the integration of the ultra-Orthodox into the IDF take form – not only in public discourse but also on the ground. His conclusion is that it is possible – and indeed necessary – to integrate ultra-Orthodox into the IDF, and that such a move – if done correctly – could contribute to both the state and ultra-Orthodox society.

In order to promote the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox men in the IDF, or any other national security service, Yossi Levi emphasizes the need for an authorized civilian body to oversee the process. “The army is constantly changing and there is a high churn rate of commanders, so you can’t rely on the IDF alone to upkeep the know-how and maintain the processes,” he explains. “In order to carry out long-term support for ultra-Orthodox recruitment, you need a civilian body that knows that society from the inside out, and can provide support to ultra-Orthodox soldiers even after their discharge.”

Another conclusion Levi had drawn from his many years of enterprise is that in ultra-Orthodox society, there is no second chance. “When establishing a conscription program for the ultra-Orthodox, it is very important that it be perceived from the onset as a program that is tailored to the specific needs of the ultra-Orthodox way of life, such that allows them to preserve their religious identity,” he explains. “If we succeed in correctly branding the program from the very beginning, and establish trust with the ultra-Orthodox community, that’s where our victory will lie.”

הפוסט The Notion of Equality is Irrelevant”: Netzah Yehuda Director General Yossi Levi Believes Ultra-Orthodox Can be Conscripted הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. In formulating the national vision, the IDSF HaBithonistim research department examines the security threats on Israel through a magnifying glass, to obtain a comprehensive understanding thereof and yield recommendations for the most effective method of addressing them. Recently an IDSF HaBithonistim research team spoke before the Nagel Commission on Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Building, and presented a detailed opinion paper to the decision makers.

This paper was written with the assistance of six key researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik, Lt. Col. (res.) Shosh Raban, Dr. Yaakov Rimmer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Or Issachar. They elaborate on the current challenges and perceptions that govern the IDF, and detail the steps that must be taken to ensure that the IDF’s force buildup fully responds to the reference scenarios facing the State of Israel.

Reference scenarios as the basis for the IDF’s force buildup

Israel is a small country with little strategic depth, surrounded by a choke ring of enemies and a slew of threats. Many of these threats have existed from the very first moment of Israel’s existence. However, the past decades have seen processes and changes that had bred new trends. If the formative years of Israel saw the young state surrounded by enemy countries, then today, after 75 years of fighting against many of them for its mere existence, Israel is now contending with a pernicious remote enemy in the form of Iran, and with terror militias operating on its borders and in its very midst. Nowadays, Israel is contending with a convergence of theaters, meaning that any conflagration of one almost inevitably sparks a flare-up in another. In this current map of challenges, Israel exists in a permanent state of security volatility that may see unexpected attacks from foreign entities and from hostile elements from within.

In order to optimally deal with such threats, as well as with many others, the IDF’s force buildup must be carefully designed and executed. Traditionally, the Israeli army’s force buildup had stood on six pillars: doctrine, armaments, training, professional advancement, organization and infrastructure. Force buildup has long-term implications on Israel’s military readiness, and demands careful consideration of the current reference scenarios and threats, as well as projections thereof for the future.

Paramount security threats:

• Iran: although almost 1,000 miles from Israel, Tehran operates a vast proxy-terror mechanism across the Middle East, and has succeeded in sending its tentacles into the heart of Israel, into the Palestinian arena. Iran sits on a huge stockpile of missile and drones, developed and dedicated solely to target the civilian heart of Israel. And on top of it all – Iran is now a nuclear threshold state that is dedicated to the development of weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with Iran’s aspirations for instilling global Shi’ite Islam, this places it not only as a major threat to Israel, but indeed a threat to the rest of the world.

• Syria and Lebanon: the conflict on Israel’s northern border is a clear and present danger to Israel as Syria and Lebanon, its neighbors to the north, are enemy states. Syria had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war, and its outcome is not yet clear in terms of the new regime’s stability or long-term intentions towards Israel. Lebanon is for all intents and purposes, ruled by Hezbollah and by proxy – Iran. This state of affairs renders Israel’s northern border highly volatile and demands the constant presence of Israeli forces along that border and a high level of military readiness.

• Egypt and Jordan: the State of Israel does have peace agreements with these two countries. However, they are extremely precarious, and with more than a few inherent vulnerabilities. One is the fact that these accords do not really render redundant the IDF’s activity along the borders with these countries. But they do limit it to a great extent, simply due to the fact that one country cannot operate militarily against an ally in the same manner it can against an enemy. Furthermore, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan do not reflect the current sentiment on the streets of Cairo and Amman. Most of their citizens are openly hostile towards Israel. In the event of a change of governments – a very plausible scenario in both highly unstable countries – their relations with Israel may in all likelihood be impacted. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a reversal of alliances wherein either or both countries become once again enemies of Israel.

• Gaza: the destiny of Gaza in the day after the Gaza War is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, Israel must be prepared for a long period of instability in the Strip. Once the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia of Gaza is completed, the IDF will have to remain deployed in the area to act as a bulwark and ensure the safety of the population along the Gaza border, while crushing further attempts from within the Strip to reignite terror activity against Israe.

• Terror militias: during the past several years, due mainly to misguided concepts, Israel had allowed the terror organizations on its borders to build up their force and stockpile weapons to staggering levels, with the help of Iran. Thus, these organizations – namely Hezbollah and Hamas – have grown to become highly trained and armed terror militaries. The October 7 massacre had made it clear beyond any shred of doubt that Israel cannot allow terror and terror militias to germinate on its borders or anywhere near them, and it must adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards any such attempts.

• The Palestinian arena: this is a pressing challenge for Israel. the Stability achieved by the security forces in Judea and Samaria in the wake of Operation Defensive Shield is wearing thin, and the area has become a hornet’s nest of renewed terror activity, inspired by the October 7 events. The Palestinian Authority is failing – if indeed it even wishes to – conduct effective counter-terror activity in the area against the mounting Islamic terror in its jurisdiction, forcing Israeli security forces to undertake this task in these areas as well.

• Internal arena: the multi-front conflagration is pouring over into the Israeli Arab population. Since the outset of the Gaza War, there has been an awakening of terror activity among the Arab population living within the Green Line and holding a full Israeli citizenship. To contend with this problem without further drawing on the already buckling IDF, Israel must form a national guard to reenforce the civil guard system.

The sad truth of the matter is that the IDF does not have the numbers to address the entire spectrum of threats and reference scenarios with which Israel is currently contending. Therefore, the IDF must build up its force in terms of manpower as well as its operational and firepower capabilities. Some of these changes, such as higher recruitment rates must be executed on a systemic level while others, such as the buildup of new divisions or the incorporation of advance technologies that better enable the designated units to achieve their mission, should be delivered in a manner tailored to the specific needs of each of these units, as detailed below.

The Vision for IDF Force Buildup – A Systemic Point of View

Upscaling manpower

Over the past decades, certain processes have been put in place to downscale the IDF’s manpower, mainly in the ground forces. This led among others to the mustering out of entire divisions, the reduction of mandatory service duration, and increased cuts in mandatory and reserves personnel. These processes were undertaken with the notion that the “army of the people”, as the IDF is perceived in Israel, could be downsized and shaped into a “small and smart army”. However, the outbreak of the Gaza War proved the fallacy of this approach, and has led to the detrimental shortage of regular and reserve manpower with which the IDF is currently struggling.

An additional manpower crisis, dubbed “The Captain Crisis”, referring to the phenomenon in which low raking officers opt to end their military career at the rank of captain, mostly due to better conditions waiting for them in the civilian labor market. This creates a shortage of officers that could have been designated to be the next generation of the IDF’s leadership.

The personnel shortage in the IDF consequent of these cuts, is a significant operational constraint for the IDF, in particular when it must juggle a number of fronts at the same time. Compounding this problem, is the erosion of those of the forces that bear most of the operational brunt due to an unbalanced assignment of the operational load.

Ideal situation:

• Extension of service: in June 2015, the length of the men’s mandatory service – and some of the women’s – was cut from 36 to 12 months. The mandatory three-year term must be reinstated as was the standard for decades – a move that will boost the ranks of the regular army.

• Extension of the reserve service: the increase in the number of reservists is an indispensable element of the buildup of the IDF, such that responds effectively to the current security realities. Recently, the age of discharge from reserves duty was upped by a year, and it may have to be further extended, at least until the army’s manpower had sufficiently been boosted and service exemption policies tightened.
• Expansion of mandatory service to additional demographics: for decades, there have been in Israel’s society entire demographics, which for numerous reasons are automatically exempt from military service – some under the dictates of law and policy, while others slip “under the radar”. This means that there are tens of thousands of able individuals, who are not part of the IDF’s service cycle. In order to address this issue, there are steps that the army can adopt, such as expansion of female induction and the extension of the mandatory induction to “special” demographics such as the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab populations. An additional course of action would be to have soldiers sign on for a short – salaried – extension of their service once their mandatory term is done.

• Improved officer retention: The army must improve the retention of its officers and boost the attractivity of the military careers it can offer young officers, with the aim of keeping them in the system for long-term careers. For this end the military must overhaul and modernize its HR practices and offer terms and conditions of service that can parallel with comparable jobs on the civilian labor market.

• Modernization of the organizational operation: As a hierarchal structure, the IDF is weighted down by a uniformity of approach and thought and its resistance to creative ways of thought that challenge deep seated conceptions. The IDF must adopt organizational cultures that accept diverse ways of thought and are open to a diversity of opinions and concepts.
• Establishment of an auxiliary national guard force: in tandem with the expansion of the military ranks, the IDF’s areas of responsibility must be streamlined. Currently, beyond its border security and defense of the country, the army is also burdened with the task of internal security, which hinders its capacity to prioritize missions and assign sufficient manpower to this and other tasks. To alleviate this burden and allow the army to focus on the missions for which it exists, a national guard that is subordinate to Israel Police should be formed, responsible for all matters pertaining to internal security threats and sharing the army’s workload.

Optimization of logistic readiness

Current situation:

The IDF’s logistic readiness is part and parcel of its operational readiness, but sadly, it is plagued by various problems mainly in the areas of armaments, maintenance and infrastructure.

In terms of armaments, Israel has been developing an increasing dependance on the import of technology and weapons from foreign countries, mainly the US. The Gaza War made it clear to what extent Israel’s deep dependance on foreign munition supplies is to the detriment of the IDF’s operational flexibility and its freedom of action.

In terms of maintenance, many of the army’s bases and headquarters are in dilapidated condition, and are not fully prepared for internal threats and ballistic attacks. This state of affairs poses a risk factor to IDF’s operational capability. Furthermore, most of the IDF’s infrastructures are above ground, and exposed to threats in scenarios of surface-to-surface rocket and missile attacks.

Ideal situation:

• Upscaling inventory and supervising its integrity: Inventories should be assigned minimal stock threshold as per standardized operational requirements, with mechanisms of timely restocking in times of emergency. Furthermore, munitions and weapons should be inspected regularly to maintain integrity and immediate usability.

• Reinforcement of the security industry: Israel’s security industry must be allotted further investment and developed to reduce Israel’s dependance on imported weapons, lower costs of ammunition, and develop dedicated technologies and systems, while allowing for fast restocking in times of war. A positive by-product of this kind of policy would be the creation of new jobs and a boost to the economy.

• Expansion of international arms supply relations: Alongside the development of a more robust local industry, Israel must establish procurement deals with as many countries as possible, to free it from the shackles of dependency on a handful of leading countries for weapons and ammunitions supply.

• Upscaling and optimization of military infrastructures: The IDSF bases and headquarters are a strategic asset for the State of Israel, and as such they must be maintained and secured to the highest level. The bases should be inspected to determine their level of regular operation and their readiness for a state of war.

• Introduction of underground infrastructures: Important strategic assets must be relocated to underground premises to ensure their protection in the event of missile and rocket attack. Additionally, Israel must be prepared for a contingency wherein it must use underground routes to deploy forces. Alongside the planning of dedicated underground spaces, it is advisable to turn existing civilian infrastructures such as tunnels and public parking lots into dual-use infrastructures that can serve military purposes in emergency times.

Technology & Cyber

Current situation:

Alongside the traditional battlefield exists an emerging crucial theater of battle – the technological arena. Over the past several decades, technology – and war technology – has advanced by leaps and bounds, introducing new weapons and widely used cyber warfare.  Recently, with the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), new, highly sophisticated systems have been introduced that pose even a greater challenge for Israel security establishment.

Israel’s security technology and cyber warfare are some of the most advanced in the world, but there are still significant barriers to the incorporation of these technologies on the battlefield. These are related, among others, to the organization’s resistance to changes, the need to work exclusively with large vendors and the limited access to such technologies for commanders in the field.

Even though technology is by no means a complete substitute for human capabilities and for the value of the national contribution of a people’s army, Israel must ensure technological superiority over its enemies, and remain at the forefront of technological development and progress.

Ideal situation:

• After-action review: the shortcomings that arose during the Gaza War must be studied, such as the shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and uncrewed vehicles, the lack of technologies that would allow the forces to deal with the Hamas tunnels and shortcomings in quick and effective responses to anti-tank rockets.

• Investment in technology: Israel must allocate considerable budgets and manpower for the development of defense technology while at the same time boost existing local industry, with an emphasis on dedicated weapons and systems for the use specified by the IDF.

• Incorporation of robotics: robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive motorboats, can bring a significant advantage on the battle field and considerably reduce the cost in human lives. Therefore, robotics should be incorporated in all of the IDF branches.

• Cyber warfare and AI: the cyber arena is getting more sophisticated by the moment, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is on the increase, posing yet new security threats. In order to ensure it maintains the upper hand in this arena, Israel must continue to invest in research and development of offensive and defensive cyber, and begin incorporating AI in its security needs.

• Tech training: The forces in the field must be trained to use the advanced tech tools that are and will become available to them. This calls for the installation of a whole new training array across all IDF branches and units, and the professional training of all the professional personnel allocated to this end.

• Diversification of tech acquisition portfolio: Israel’s security establishment currently deals with only a handful of large tech vendors, with which it has trade relations for decades. In order to introduce sophisticated tech systems, it must be open to doing business with smaller tech vendors and entrepreneurs.

The Vision of IDF Force Buildup According to Branches and Corps

Ground forces

Current situation:

The State of Israel is often forced to engage in multiple combat arenas, wherein the escalation in one often leads immediately to a domino effect conflagration of others. As demonstrated throughout the Gaza War, the battle of order of the IDF’s ground forces proved too short to cover more than one broad campaign in a single arena, while holding a defensive position in others. This also means that in the event of unexpected developments, the army does not have enough reserves to deploy.

In light of existing and projected threats outlined by reference scenarios, the State of Israel must boost its capabilities such that it can engage in high intensity combat in at least two fronts simultaneously, while assuming a broad defensive position in others.

Ideal situation:

• Overhaul of readiness protocols: the IDF must ensure that regular and reserve forces incorporate improved readiness protocols –in terms of quantity and quality of combat gear and weaponry, and in terms of the professional and physical operational readiness of troops and commanders, in order to allow short response times in a reality where surprise terror attacks have become part and parcel of daily life.

• Augmentation of forces by one regular service division and several reserves’ divisions: The IDF should add at least one more regular army division and two more reserves maneuver enhancement divisions to its personnel headcount. These divisions will include a full divisional structure and auxiliary units including tanks, artillery, engineering and logistics. One should be deployed at Israel’s northern border and the other in the Jordan Valley. This is a necessity in order to deal with the operative shortcomings in some arenas, and will additionally serve as reserve forces when needed.

• Establishment of a dedicated standalone combat auxiliary force: a reserve force at the level of at least a division, under the command of General HQ, should be formed to provide operational flexibility and provide relief to forces in the event of unexpected or prolonged events. The reserve force may be kept at a lower level of readiness and mid-level operational fitness, ensuring that these can be brought up to par quickly in times of need.

• Formation of a tunnel capture-and-destroy combat unit: In light of the growing tunnel warfare threat on Israel’s borders, the security establishment must seriously consider the formation of a new dedicated army corps specializing in the detection and destruction of tunnels and subterranean warfare.

• General internal audit of IDF units: The IDF must conduct an in-depth audit of relevant units to asses manpower, equipment and armament needs and shortages. For example, it has become clear in the current conflict that there is a pressing need to increase the numbers of tank in the armored units. Also, in the current climate in Israel’s multiple arena reality, special units such as the Oketz canine unit and the Yahalom combat engineering unit, must be augmented.

• Improvement of mobilization and deployment mechanisms and procedures: The convergence and interconnectivity of arenas in Israel demand that the army install a streamlined mobilization and deployment system and procedures to enable the swift reallocation of forces from one front to another. For this purpose, the army would have to create a dedicated road and rail infrastructure as an alternative to the congested civilian routes, and upscale its fleet of heavy carriers to included armored vehicles. To streamline quick force deployment and movement, civilian infrastructure, such as railways, should be considered for use as supplementary systems.

The Air Force: Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles

Current situation:

The Israeli Air Force is charged with three main missions: The protection of Israel’s areal space, offensives in enemy territories, and the support of ground campaigns. In order to accomplish these missions to their fullest, the IAF is required to have extremely complex and resource-intensive capabilities. It must be understood that no matter how supreme an army’s air force is – it cannot compensate for inadequate ground forces. It can, however, provide operational flexibility to its counterparts on the ground and in the ocean. This can be further boosted by newer advanced drone technology, which aside from expanding military capabilities, help reduce the cost in human lives.

Over the past years, significant changes have been occurring in the map of the areal threats. Israel’s enemies on its borders and remotely understand that they cannot contend with the superiority of Israel’s Air Force and thus abandoned the use of fighter jets, instead opting for the development of ballistic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, steep trajectory surface-to-surface missiles, and low-tech warfare i.e. glider terror attacks, and improvised explosive kites and balloons. These new threats demand the IAF to recalculate its offensive and defensive tactics and set in place procedures for force and resource deployment and means and weapons it uses.

Ideal situation:

• Increase of drone warfare: The most important objective for the use of UMAVs is the protection of the lives of soldiers. Even in the event that the use of human forces is unavoidable, drones can support IAF’s strikes in the heart of enemy territory. UMAV’s can assist in the protection of ground sectors and lend significant aid to ground campaigns. It is highly recommended that the IDF invest resources in increasing the use of this means of war.

• Incorporation of a steep trajectory array: the IDF should examine the incorporation of a steep trajectory array with rocket and attack glider capabilities.

• Streamlining Israel’s air defense system: In order to ensure the protection of the Home Front, the IDF’s air defense must undergo a comprehensive inspection to ensure it is able to contend with scenarios of attacks of thousands of rockets and missiles a day. Furthermore, Israel should consider forging regional alliances for the protection of Israel’s areal space.

Navy: Defense as a Priority

Current situation:

Israel’s naval arena is important on a number of levels: security-wise, Israel has expansive maritime borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Egypt. Economically, Israel has prolific maritime trade activities; strategically, the most substantial source of energy in the country comes from the natural gas fields within the country’s territorial waters.

Therefore, the State of Israel must maintain superiority in all naval arenas, securing its maritime supply routes, protect its shores, protect free passage of vessels and maritime trade, and protect its gas fields. However, as the most pressing threats are ground-based and since the military is struggling with manpower deficits, coupled with traditionally high costs of maintaining and operating naval vessels, the IDF must plan how to prioritize the Navy’s needs.

Ideal situation:

• Prioritization of defensive capabilities: Controlling the maritime territory demands superior offensive capabilities from the Navy, however, due to current constraints abovementioned the focus on the IDF’s Navy must be the development of defensive capabilities.

• Integration of unmanned platforms: It is possible, and necessary, to integrate unmanned surface and underwater vessels, which would be deployed primarily for patrolling, guarding Israel’s maritime borders, routine security, allowing the IDF forces to deal with more complex threats.

Home Front Command: Delegating responsibilities effectively

Current situation:

The Home Front plays a crucial role in the protection of the citizens of Israel, but the delegation of responsibilities between the body and the civil defense and rescue forces remains unclear. This unclarity leads to overlapping of responsibilities in some cases, and in others – tasks that fall between the cracks and remain unattended.

Furthermore, the Home Front Command has been red flagging its personnel shortage for some time. Over the recent years this demanded the allocation of IDF combat forces to supplement the Home Front’s search and rescue activities – forces that should have been serving in other critical ground-force missions. This demands the rethinking of the allocation of resources between the Home Front Command and the IDF operational units.

Another issue that demands attention is the auxiliary Territorial Defense array. Nowadays the territorial defense’s main area of operation is centered around the defense against external threats and search and rescue missions. The area of territorial defense that deals with internal threats such as terror attacks remains nearly untreated by the Home Front Command and this requires revisiting to consider including this task in the Home Front’s responsibilities.

Ideal situation:

• Assignation of areas of responsibilities: The responsibilities of the Home Front and the civil rescue bodies must be assigned and delineated in a clear manner, with consideration of the capabilities each body brings to the table, to allow for the most effective fulfillment of each responsibility.

• Improvement of protection of civil structures: In order to improve the protection of the civil Home Front and reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the wake of attacks against civilians, the Home Front must identify the public structures which lack protective areas and spaces, especially those near and in conflict areas.

• Balanced distribution of recruits: Since there are certain units in the Home Front Command that are in need of recruits with the same profile as the IDF’s other ground force units, the assignment of recruits must be based on considerations of operational priorities of each of the units.

• Reinforcement of the territorial defense array: In light of the terror threats against Israel from within the Arab-Israeli population, it is worth examining the integration of Home Front forces in the protection of the communities in conflict areas and border zones.

The Intelligence Directorate: Collaboration with Civil Bodies

Current situation:

The security intelligence establishment is a critical component in Israel’s security, strategically and tactically. However, Israel had developed over the recent years a dangerous dependence on its intelligence deterrence – the full implication of which was revealed in the October 7 disaster.

Therefore, the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence establishment must be further expanded and maintained but at the same time the security establishment’s other capabilities – especially in the operational field – must be boosted. Furthermore, the intelligence apparatus is currently plagued with some deeply engrained problems that pose a challenge to Israel’ superiority in the field, such as inadequate investment in diverse fields of intelligence, and the brain drain of the system due to much more economically gratifying jobs in the civilian job market.

The ideal:

• Recruitment of speakers of foreign languages: In order to respond to the current operational needs, the Intelligence Corps must augment the ranks of its foreign language speakers through a specially tailored recruitment and training program.

• Reinstatement of an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) array: The Israeli Intelligence OSINT array plays a critical role in the understanding of the broad political landscape in Israel and is indispensable for monitoring unforeseen sudden events, identifying information leaks, producing projections and for influencing public opinion. Therefore, the OSINT array in the intelligence establishment must be rehabilitated and further cultivated.

• Social networks as a viable source of intelligence (SOCMINT): Intelligence gathering from social networks should be increased as it is an indispensable source of intel yielding platform.

• Collaboration with civilian market: It is worth examining the integration of capabilities from Israeli high-tech and local industry. This kind of collaboration can allow the IDF Intelligence Corps to adopt advanced civilian technologies to maintain superiority in the field. Furthermore, it is worth considering opening some of the career military jobs in the Intelligence Corp to the civilian job market to obtain additional professional expert manpower from outside of the military system.

IDF Force Buildup Vision – Decision Making Processes

Improvement of decision-making processes

Current situation:

The security and strategic decision-making processes, including those that pertain to the IDF force buildup and budget allocation, mostly happen in the military executive branch, and are not always transparent to the relevant political and public factors. The limited number of participants in these processes often lead to perceptual shortcomings in the absence of broad perspectives and different points of view.

Another issue regarding decision making processes is related to control and monitoring processes. Currently, most if the control and monitoring of the Israel’s security establishment and the IDF’s activity are internal and are not transparent to the political system, not to mention to the public, which subjects them to a risk of partiality and bias.

Ideal situation:

• Transparent decision-making: The IDF must incorporate non-military professionals, such as public representatives and suitable professionals from each relevant field in its strategic decision-making processes, such that allows for decision-making that is based on multiple opinions and perspectives through organizational processes such as brainstorming sessions.

• Introduction of “red teams”: The intelligence analysis process often uses “red teams” – which simulates hostile attacks with the aim of detecting vulnerabilities and flaws in existing systems and responses. Many times, these teams comprise non-military professionals who bring knowledge and perspectives from outside of the military system. To improve decision-making across the entire security system, red teams should be incorporated in every branch and arm of the IDF.

• Bi-annual Cabinet updates: The Cabinet should hold bi-annual briefings focusing on various aspects of the IDF’s force buildup – including threat assessments, manpower allocations, operational readiness, procurement and armament. These meetings should be anchored in appropriate legislation, and the consequent decisions should be shared with the public. Furthermore, the security establishment should be required to present to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee all information pertaining to changes in the IDF force buildup.

• Establishment of independent supervisory committees: Independent supervisory committees comprising public and civilian representatives are needed to examine the IDF force buildup and report to the government and official control bodies. The government’s security cabinet will be obligated to discuss the committee’s findings and include civilian representatives to partake in discussions on unclassified findings.

Thought on Israel’s security: conclusion

The dynamic map of the security challenges characteristic to Israel and the Middle East region demands constant scrutiny of the present and future threats. Only with a broad understanding of the reference scenarios Israel faces, its military force can be built up in a proper and informed manner.

Nowadays, Israel is forced to contend with a long list of threats, spearheaded by Iran, which can turn into a nuclear state at any moment. Additionally, the current reference scenarios point to a multi-arena war placing Israel on several fronts at the same time, as well as a surprise attack that could be launched by any one of the terror organizations operating on Israel’s borders.

The Gaza War has proven that Israel and its security establishment must recalculate its route forward and methodically and skillfully plan the force buildup across the system. This is the only way to ensure a strong army that could protect Israel security now and in the future.

הפוסט Ideally – IDSF HaBithonistim National Security Vision. The Force buildup of the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Assistant Commissioner, Brigadier General Betty Lahat served in the Israel Prison Service for 35 years, during which she filled senior positions and headed several prisons, among them the Neveh Tirtza women’s prison, the Sharon Prison and the Hadarim detention center which has been housing many high-profile Palestinian security prisoners. Her last position with the IPS was head of the Service’s intelligence department, in the capacity of which she had met many of the Palestinian security prisoners, Yahya Sinwar among them.

During her years in various positions, Lahat had worked with inmates from many demographics – from youths and women to heads of crime and arch-terrorists. “I’ve experienced a fair share of heartache during my career, and witnessed time and time again our inability to break the cycles of crime and terror”, she says. “I’ve raised generations of inmates – I had female inmates that gave birth while serving prison sentences, and later met their children in juvenile prisons, some of which even remembered me, and how I would throw them birthday parties in the prison cafeteria when they would visit their mothers. I would look at them and think to myself – they’re my children’s age, why did they have to end up in a place like this? It’s a huge heartache. On the other extreme, I have met some of the bloodiest terrorists and had to watch them as they walk around the prison yard, chatting away, laughing and enjoying themselves, while I  had to ensure they received appropriate care. There were times when I would get home and say to myself ‘good lord, what kind of a world am I living in?’”

We knew that his word was the law: the prisoner Yahya Sinwar

Over the years, Betty Lahat had seen some of the most dangerous prisoners Israel’s prisons had known. She had met murderers and heads of crime, and she had met some of the highest profile terrorists. Under her wardenship she had seen the likes of Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin, head of the Hamas military wing Salah Shehade, and head of izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria Ibrahim Hamed, who orchestrated most of the terror attacks during the Second Intifada. However, one of the most memorable inmates for Lahat – mainly due to his nefarious intelligence and shocking cruelty – is Yahya Sinwar.

What was your impression of Sinwar?

“I remember him as a very dominant figure who was very cruel. The prisoners elected him time after time as their prison leader. As such, he put together inmate terror cells and a telecommunications reconnaissance team that was tasked with gathering intel within and outside of the prison. He also commanded special units that interrogated new prisoners. Any prisoner suspected of collaborating with Israel was cruelly tortured. Naturally, Sinwar never did any of the dirty work himself, but it was clear that he was the one pulling the strings. He also took under his wing the most murderous terrorist that would arrive at the prison, and promoted them up the ranks. For example, he took under his wing Abdel-Aziz Salha, a West Bank Hamas militant jailed for life for his part in the lynching of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah, famously depicted standing at a window holding up blood-stained hands, and made him head of the telecommunications units in the prison.  He also added to his ranks the murderers of the Fogel family and the perpetrator of the deadly bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya. Later, during negotiations for the release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Sinwar was involved in the selection of the terrorists to be released. He made sure that he and his cronies were on the list, and left out prisoners that were at odds with him. That was the kind of power he had”.

Would you have believed that Sinwar was able to orchestrate an attack on the scale of the October 7 massacre?

“Absolutely. Sinwar had no interest in coexistence and had always proclaimed he would never be resigned to the ‘Zionist settlers’ living on what he saw as the land of Palestine. I listened to him a lot, both in direct conversations I had with him as well as conversations with his prison associates we tapped. I had never witnessed him stray from his way of thought and staunch ideology. He had grand schemes and he truly believed that by 2027, he would lead a brutal attack that would result in the victory of Hamas over Israel – so whoever tries to claim that Sinwar held a pragmatic approach toward Israel has no idea what he is talking about”.

To what extent was Sinwar involved in events outside of prison?

“In my time, we had designated Sinwar as a national target prisoner, in other words, a prisoner that demands constant surveillance, as his sphere of influence extended beyond prison walls. He was extremely involved with what was happening in other security prisons and was very knowledgeable about current affairs in Israel. You must understand that Sinwar was deviously intelligent. He got to know Israeli society like the back of his hand and could analyze it brilliantly. It was clear from an early stage that he had set his mind on fragmenting Israeli society from within, and he knew just how to do it. His objective of fomenting discord in Israel was clearly evident even during the Gaza war, and it is clear to me that when he emerged from the tunnels and saw Gaza in ruins, he got the tailwind to carry on his fight from seeing the discord in Israel’s society  and he believed he would eventually prevail”.

You participated in the discussions on the list of terrorists to be released as part of the Shalit deal. Where did you stand on the release of Sinwar?

“I had a very hard time with Sinwar’s release, and I had warned them that this is not a terrorist that should be set free. At one point, one of the negotiation team members asked me ‘what do you have against Sinwar? He didn’t kill any Jews, he only killed Palestinian collaborators’, to which I responded – ‘Just wait. He’ll have plenty of Jewish blood on his hands’. I don’t know  exactly what I meant when I said this, but it was clear to me that once he sees an opportunity to commit heinous attacks against Jews – he’ll seize it. Whoever gets to know terrorists like Sinwar, and spends so much time with them as I did, knows what they’re capable of. And whoever was surprised by the sheer cruelty of the terrorist in the October 7 attack didn’t really know them at all”.

It is not a prison. It is summer camp for terrorists

Betty Lahat is very familiar with the situation in Israeli prisons and knows the conditions under which various classes of prisoners are held. She has a hard time accepting the manner in which prisoners – particularly security prisoners – manipulate public opinion in Israel and its justice system to gain unjustified amenities.

“The Palestinian security prisoners know that the Israeli justice system will always take care of them and that the doors of the High Court of Justice are always open to them”, says Lahat. “We are under the impression that when the prisons are quiet, and we give them what they want, we can rehabilitate them and change their ways. But what we fail to understand is that this humane approach is to our detriment. The better the conditions we give them are, the more they perceive us as weak. Even saving their lives has no effect on them. I spoke to Sinwar after he underwent surgery to remove a malignant tumor from his brain in an Israeli hospital. I asked him whether he now has some gratitude toward Israel, to which he replied that he has nothing to be grateful for as we simply did our job. We need to forgo this illusion that if we give them favorable conditions in prison, we can remove them from the path of terror. In all my years with the Israeli Prison Service, I’ve not once encountered a Hamas prisoner that had forsaken his ideology. It just doesn’t happen”.

What does the life of a security inmate look like?

“Each inmate must participate in a mandatory educational program. They also get to study for academic degrees through the Open University. In fact, the Palestinian Authority actually encourages them to earn an education in prison. The higher their academic achievement – the more money they get. In addition, they have a large library and there is not one book that reaches the book stores in Israel that is not added to their library immediately. I’ve seen with my own eyes Palestinian inmates reading canonic Jewish literature such as Jabotinsky’s ‘Iron Wall’ and Yehuda Ha’Levi’s ‘Kuzari’. They also regularly receive Israeli newspapers, their favorite being Ha’aretz – they have a permanent subscription and have a fit when it fails to arrive. In addition to the enrichment programs they’re entitled to from the system, the terror cells within the prisons cultivate education among their members – every member is required to learn Hebrew and serve a period as their spokesman.  They are also taught to gather intel, follow their guards, and follow commentary on Israeli news. They listen to the news and read the papers, and then they sit together and analyze the news and commentary. In particular they pay close attention to the social discord in Israel, to assess how fatigued Israeli society is and thus willing to make concessions. You have to understand that the Palestinian security inmate lives under iron discipline – especially those of them who are members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They waste no time and utilize their prison time to acquire education and skills that will come in handy for their terror activity and long-term plan execution”.

What is your opinion on the criticism on the living conditions of the security inmates?

“Security prisoners are not supposed to have the same conditions that criminal prisoners have, and this is also supported by international law. Whoever murders Jews just for being Jews should be held under completely different conditions. But in practice, the security prisons have long become a summer camp for terrorists. This happens, among others because of the justice system and the High Court of Justice, that hand down phantasmagoric rulings that are utterly out of touch with the reality in the prisons. One day, we were told that we cannot search under the prisoners’ prayer mats because it is disrespectful to their faith – do they even know what prisoners can hide or dig under their mats? As a matter of fact, there are Palestinian security prisoners whose sole job is to sit and compose petitions to the High Court of Justice. That is their job, to send petition after petition, and drive the system crazy. And if that were not enough, they also use lawyers and politicians to help them send out messages to associates on the outside and coordinate plans, and the General Security Service and the Attorney General’s office allow this to happen. If you ask me, the responsibility for the living conditions of security inmates should rest solely in the hands of the IPS, which is the suitable professional body for this, and my vast experience with the IPS teaches me that it would ensure that the security prisoners are treated according to what is stipulated by international law – no more, no less”.

“Every intelligence agency thinks they have a monopoly on brains”

Having climbed to key positions in the Israel Prison Service, Brigadier General Lahat has deep insights not only into the reality within prison walls but also on the fashion in which Israel’s entire security and intelligence apparatus works. One of the most material issues that she points to is the lack of collaboration among the various intelligence agencies. “Each agency thinks it has a monopoly on brains and that it knows better”, she says. “There is a lot of patronizing going around in these agencies, especially on part of the GSS and certain units within IDF Intelligence, and they don’t really strive to cooperate with the police and the prison service. When I was head of the IPS intelligence department, I literally begged them to collaborate with us because I knew we at the prison service, engaging with these prisoners on a daily basis, have valuable input. At that time some improvement was made in the relations between the IP and the intelligence agencies, but I think it pretty much went back to what it used to be. Even today, when I look at what is happening  in the Israeli intelligence community, I see nothing has changed”.

What about the deals for the release of prisoners – are they made without the IPS input?

“When they signed the Jibril prisoner exchange agreement (in 1985, when Israel had released 1,500 Palestinian prisoners – some of them very high profile – in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured in the First Lebanon War), we were not consulted at all, and in the Shalit deal – our involvement was just for appearances. Only after insisting on the presence of the Prison Service in the negotiations on the release of the terrorists, I was invited to the meetings. But even then, my role amounted to presenting background information on the terrorists. After all, the GSS is sure it knows everything, so why should it consult in the IPS?”

Sounds like you have a bellyful of grievances on the GSS. What is your opinion on its work in the past year?

“There are outstanding people in the GSS who do invaluable work, but personally I think that the GSS is a body that takes on responsibilities that are not within its scope of duty  – and often this comes at the expense of tasks that are”.

Generally speaking, do you get the impression that the policy of releasing prisoners in exchange for hostages influences the state of mind of the Palestinian prisoners?

“Very much so. The Palestinian prisoners truly believe that it’s only a matter of time till they are released and this keeps their spirits high. They don’t care how many years they’re sentenced to. Even prisoners who are sentenced to 60 years will say ‘Walla Ishi – “that’s nothing” – because they know that at one point or another, Israelis will be kidnapped and they’ll just be released in an exchange deal. Factually, they are not wrong”.

Are there any prisoners that will never be released with any deal?

“Aside from Yigal Amir (who is serving a life sentence for the assassination of PM Yitzhak Rabin) I know of no such prisoner. In the Jibreal deal and the Shalit deal we’ve released the worst of the terrorists, and I see the names of the terrorist that are on the table for release in the current exchange negotiations  for the Israeli hostages in Gaza and I’m absolutely appalled. When it comes to security prisoners, sooner or later they all get a chance to be released in an exchange deal”.

My family and I received threats, but I was never afraid

Retired Assistant Commissioner Betty Lahat is not just a former senior officer of the Israeli Prison Service – she is one of the first women in the organization to have scaled the ranks and chalk up such an impressive track record. “I don’t wave a feminist banner, but I have opened the doors to many women that followed in my footsteps and I’ve proved that we are every bit as good as the men in the IPS”, she admits. “I was a strong woman in a masculine environment and that wasn’t easy. When I was appointed head of the Sharon Prison,  which is one of Israel’s highest security prisons, there was big drama. Some had a hard time accepting a woman at the head of a men’s prison. When I first arrived, I was the target of scorning looks and remarks. But I didn’t let it affect me. I gathered everyone and proclaimed that I will not apologize for being a woman. Very soon, they all came to see my vast knowledge and experience, coupled with a deep familiarity with the brass tacks. They also saw how motivated I was and the important changes I effected, and no one dared act behind my back or try to sabotage me”.

Your job entailed daily dealings with the most dangerous prisoners in Israel. Weren’t you afraid?

“I had sat in the same room as heads of crime; I’ve sent terrorists to solitary confinement, and there was even a time when I would travel to Gaza by myself – I never felt scared. Even when our intelligence department notified me that there is intel about threats against me, I insisted to go into the wards and meet the prisoners. My family had also received dozens of threats. Marwan Barghouti’s people, for example, threatened to come after me for months because I took away some of their amenities in prison. I had to have a police detail on my house, but even then, I was not afraid. That was my job and that was part of the risk I had assumed with the job”.

What have you learned after 35 years with the IPS?

“One of the most painful insights that I’ve gained from my years with the IPS is that we cannot eradicate the incitement of terror in Palestinian society, and in truth – we really aren’t trying. Many of the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs are weaned from a very young age on hatred toward Jews, and then they go to school – some of them funded by the State of Israel – and are fed yet more false narratives. And if that weren’t enough, young boys are offered incentives for committing terror attacks. There are adolescents that are at the fringe of society, but after committing attacks against Israel, they are suddenly accepted, their families are provided for and they receive a salary. Also, in Israeli prisons, they are required to get their high school diploma, which is something that they could never have hoped to achieve on the outside. So what interest do they have to change their ways?  From what I saw, we do not really have the wherewithal to prevent these boys from becoming heinous terrorists in the future. Just like we cannot prevent the released terrorists from returning  to terrorism, nor from female prisoners from raising future generations of terrorists. These are unbreakable cycles”.

How had your career shape your outlook today as a citizen of Israel?

“I think my work taught me that there is no such thing as black and white. The reality in Israel is very complex and it is about time we stop trying to pull the country to one extreme or another. This is also one of the reasons I had joined the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. To me it is a hate-free movement that comes from a pragmatic stand point. The movement places the well-being of Israel above all and gives serious consideration to every issue related to the country’s security. This gives me the hope that it can lead us and the country to a better place”.

הפוסט “Whoever Was Surprised By the Cruelty of The Terrorists – Did not Really Know Them”, Interview with former Israel Prison Service Assistant Commissioner Brigadier General Betty Lahat הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, is turning 89 this month. Even before the open and pressing question of his successor as the chairman of the PA, his rule is already leaving the Authority in disarray. “The PA is in a state of collapse and dilapidation,” says Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid. “It doesn’t pay salaries to its employees; the entire Samaria region is no longer under its control; it doesn’t manage to operate as a political entity, and in regards to the Authority’s future – that’s the big question”.

The Lost Generation of the PA

Baruch, in an article you published last April, you mention a survey according to which most Palestinians view the PA as dead weight and demand its dismantling. Is that still true?

“True. But not a single survey – but a series of poles that found that a significantly high number of Palestinians – sometimes as high as 60 or 80 percent of them – view the Authority as a burden and do not perceive it as a historical achievement. They understand that aside from security coordination that serves mainly the IDF – the Palestinian Authority does not serve the Palestinian dream. It is on the background of this unrest that Hamas was able to garner such widespread sympathy”.

Even today, after the war, the organization enjoys such broad support?

“It’s hard and perhaps even impossible to know how much support Hamas currently has in Gaza, however, in Judea and Samaria it is very well supported. The buildup of Hamas in Judea and Samaria on the expense of the PA is a trend that was evident in all of the surveys on the topic from the past five-six years, although one must take Palestinian surveys with a grain of salt as they often distort the data. At any rate, these surveys clearly show what the world already knows: the Palestinian public harshly criticizes Abu Mazen, who originally was elected for a term of only five years, but after nearly 20 years is still in power, without ever having held elections for the presidency of the PA or its parliament”.

Who will step in to fill the vacuum left by the PA?

“At the present, there are some 40 organizations of Hamas, PIJ and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, particularly in the Samaria region and further north. These are young people, the group of 15–30-year-olds, which in regards to the PA are a lost generation. They were born after the Oslo Accords and hate the Authority because nothing in their lives had improved. They view Hamas and the military path as the realization of their ideological aspirations. Add to that the money that Hamas and Hezbollah pour into the region”.

How can the PA restore the public’s trust?

“Fatah members as well as Abu Mazen know that that in the 2006 elections, Fatah got more votes than Hamas, but the votes were distributed among the factions that comprise Fatah – nowadays it has three and a half leaders and several organizations and this is its greatest problem and the reason Hamas won the elections at the time with a landslide. So the solution is a reform, and everyone is pressuring Abu Mazen to introduce reforms; The Egyptians and Saudis also demanded that the PA undergo reform, but Abu Mazen has not complied due to fatigue and conservatism and his unwillingness to open the government to additional players”.

Why has he not complied with the demands?

“Most likely he hasn’t the energy to make reforms and open up the system and prefers to lean of the current situation. He prefers to preserve the current state rather than take risks. Everyone surrounding him is waiting for him to leave. He is more a token leader that a leader in effect. However, it is unclear what the day after will bring in the PA – whether he will be succeeded by another element in Fatah, if his moderate line will remain, or whether his successor will be Marwan Barghouti, who is very close to Hamas and very militant, or another leader that would collaborate with Hamas, and if elections will be held – in the event that Hamas takes over the Authority”.

The Return of the Saudis to the Abraham Accords

So many open questions. And what are the implications for Israel?

“The conclusion is that, in my opinion, Israel cannot rely on the PA as a viable factor.  I believe that the Egyptians and Saudis also realize this. Everyone – including the Americans and Emiratis – are demanding that Abbas carry out the reforms in order to prepare the ground for his successor, and after he steps down, everything will be open to a new reality,  and not necessarily a positive one.”

How should Israel act at the moment?

“It should maintain full security control of Judea and Samaria and Gaza, while at the same time cultivating a Palestinian civilian apparatus that will undertake the care of the population. For the time, under Abbas, this is happening, but there is no guarantee that it will be so in the future, and certainly there is no guarantee that it will be so in the long term. Israel should also try to expand the Abraham Accords, including interim agreements regarding the Palestinian Authority.”

That means agreeing to a Palestinian State, right?

“It will be necessary to give the Sunni states a horizon of some two-state solution, but this doesn’t have to happen at this moment, and is the biggest political challenge, since the Saudis, for example, declare morning, noon and night that without a Palestinian state, there will be no normalization. Although the messages Israel is receiving are different, this is the general direction”.

“At this stage, the model should be one in which Israel does not forgo the two-state option – i.e. does not annex Judea and Samaria and does not dismantle the Palestinian Authority. This would allow Saudi Arabia to enter an agreement. But the implementation of the solution itself will depend on a long-term agreement and will also be subject to changes. We’re talking about a period of 10 to 20 years, during which the Palestinian street will have to undergo significant change, and it also depends on the decline of Iran’s influence. Some sources in the Gulf states say it’s possible.”

Will the PA Return to Gaza?

In  order to understand the relations between the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, we need to go back to 2007, when Hamas deposed Fatah and seized control of Gaza in a series of violent clashes. Until that point, the PA had a bureaucratic apparatus set up in Gaza with its own officials. “Until today the PA claims it still has 18 thousand civil servants and 18 thousand security personnel in the Gaza Strip. In other words – over 30 thousand people that have remained in their positions, even under Hamas rule”.

Is this true?

“It’s unclear, and it is highly unlikely in the case of the security apparatus. Hamas did keep some Fatah members in professional positions withing Gaza’s civil service, and in many cases chose to place its own people in executive positions alone. However, it remains unclear how many Fatah members have actually remained in Gaza after Hamas’ takeover”.

And now the PA is planning its return to Gaza?

“As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned – and this it had stated even before the outbreak of the war – it is still the boss in Gaza. The Authority views its demand for a return to control in Gaza as only natural, thus it endeavored dozens of reconciliation attempts with Hamas. Two months ago, the Authority sent the Americans a 101-page document, in which it claims that it is the governing body of Gaza and that it has a plan for the reinstatement of its governance, such as reopening the hospitals, schools, government offices, and more. The Americans – it must be said – were not convinced”.

What is the position of the Arab states?

“Here things start getting complicated. Naturally the Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis all publicly support the control of the PA in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, as it serves the two-state vision. But under the surface the Egyptians and Saudis have a lot of criticism against the Authority and they are appalled by the corruption and its dysfunction and from the fact that Abu Mazen hasn’t held elections for the chairmanship of the Authority and for its parliament for nearly 20 years. But this is under the surface, and the Saudis still continue to transfer broad financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Only recently Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with the Saudi ambassador to Jodan, who transferred him aid money”.

In other words – the Arab world does not publicly criticize the PA?

“Public criticism of the Palestinian Authority is heard mainly in the Emirates. Two months ago, a proposal was made according to which the UAE undertakes financial support to the Authority, but the UAE rejected the suggestion out of hand, because they object to Abu Mazen heading the PA. This is why in an interview to The New York Times,  Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan proclaimed ‘no Abbas and no Hamas’. I’ve encountered this position on part of many sources in the Authority even before Dahlan. There are other sources that would like to see a governing body in Gaza as well as Judea and Samaria that is neither Abu Mazen nor Hamas”.

Abu Mazen’s Condition: Hamas Acknowledges the Oslo Accords

What is the position of the Sunni Arab states on Gaza?

“Egypt, Jordan and Saudia view Hamas as a terror organization. The UAE has plans for Gaza which designates as Chairman of the PA Dr. Salam Fayyad, former PM of the Authority under Abu Mazen more than a decade ago. Dr. Fayyad is not a member of Fatah or the PLO. He is an expert on economics. The moderate Arab world and the US wish to see him as head of the Palestinian Authority. However, Qatar has a long-standing vision of political Islam, which they hoped Hamas would realize. Already in 2019, the Qataris met with Hamas in Judea and Samaria and offered to fund them in the elections, but they would rather see Khaled Mashal as head of Hamas, They don’t favor Sinwar, who had detested and insulted them. There was no love lost between them– Qatar and Sinwar. Some claim that now the Qataris have the opportunity to try and reassert their influence with the Hamas leadership that resides overseas, but the Iranian’s and Hezbollah also want to maintain close ties with Hamas”.

What kind of relations would Qatar have between Hamas and the PA?

“Qatar would like to see Hamas as part of the PLO, as it would legitimize Hamas, and make it less militant. But Abu Mazen set a condition for this: if you want to be part of the PLO – you have to accept the Oslo Accords, which means the implied recognition in the State of Israel.  Meanwhile, Hamas is led by a council in lieu of a new leader, and it there appears to be a power struggle between the more moderate camp – the Muslim Brotherhood supported by Qatar – and the militant camp, which is close to Iran”.

In April you wrote that Mohammad Dahlan – the Fata leader living in Abu Dabi – is promoting a plan for leadership of the Gaza Strip, with the backing of a Arab Sunni force. Is this still true?

“Yes, he’s still working on it. But he also understands that forming the Arab force he’s talking about can only happen as part of a diplomatic process, and he understands that for the time being, Israel is not seeking any diplomatic arrangement, He understands that he’ll be forced to find a solution in collaboration with the Palestinian Authority. According to my sources, Dahlan’s people have recently  spoke on numerous occasions with Abu Mazen’s people to find a path to reconciliation and unite the forces in Gaza,. Also Israeli Defense Minister Galant’s ‘Security Island Plan’ for concentrating Gaza’s population in ‘humanitarian bubbles’ with a civil apparatus for each such bubble comprising locals that will be armed with light arms – is very acceptable on part of the Emiratis”.

הפוסט Lt. Col. (Res.) Baruch Yedid: “The Palestinian Authority Is In A State Of Collapse” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the past year, anyone who has given even a cursory glimpse at the newspapers knows that Israel has been fighting a multi-theater war on its borders in Gaza and Lebanon, and overseas against Iran and Yemen, but many are not aware of the fact that this is a multi-dimensional war, says Yishai Gelb. “We’re fighting in a number of theaters, but also in several dimensions”, he clarifies. “Aside from the battles in the field, the State of Israel is also waging battle in international courts, and also over public opinion in the international community. It’s important to understand that a positive public opinion is critical for the overall war effort, as Israel is in the midst of a prolonged campaign and needs diplomatic and economic support from the countries of the world”.

Since the outbreak of the Iron Swords war (Gaza war), Yishai Gelb has been spearheading the War in Israel initiative, which is part of the IDSF HaBithonistim website. This is a comprehensive data base, updated on a daily basis, which provides reliable data on the war and its casualties. The website was founded and sponsored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, after it had become clear that the Foreign Ministry and the IDF spokesman unit are overloaded with the public diplomacy demands. The website hit the air already in November 2023, in Hebrew and English, becoming a pioneer in the private sector of Israeli public diplomacy.

“Our enemies are sharing information through a host of platforms, and a very large portion of this information is false and is contrived for the purpose of establishing and promoting an anti-Israel narrative”, says Gelb. “Our aim is to provide an alternative source of information that is based on credible and verified facts, and to mobilize the international public opinion to support Israel, advocate the justness of Israel’s actions, and afford the world access to reliable information on which they could base their support of Israel”.

Debunking disinformation begins with hard, cold facts

Yishai Gelb and his team of data workers collect large volumes of information, some is basic, statistical data such as numbers of casualties on both sides, numbers of wounded and the number of hostages still held in Hamas tunnels; other information is operational – the Israeli cities and villages targeted, the number of shells fired into Israeli territory and the number of targets that the IDF had eliminated in Gaza. Additional data provides a broader outlook with which the current war can be compared with other conflicts around the world, both current and from modern history e.g. the Cambodian Civil War, and the ongoing armed conflict in Darfur. This data examines among others the ratio of soldiers to casualties recorded during various wars and armed conflicts.

“We’ve created a database of figures from many wars and conflicts across the world that have occurred since the establishment of the ‘New World Order’ in 1945, and are comparing these figures to those of the Gaza war”, explains Gelb. “Our goal is to project a broad and clear picture that reflects Israel’s status as oppose to other conflict zones and prove beyond doubt just how groundless the accusations hurled at Israel are”.

The data collected in the IDSF HaBithonistim database shows among others that the current war in Gaza has claimed the lives of 22,000 civilians – both on Israel’s side and the reported casualties in Gaza. This admittedly, is a regretfully high number; however, a comparison with the numbers of casualties in other recent conflicts casts this figure in a rather different light. Case in point: The ongoing civil war in Yemen has claimed to date some 150,000 casualties; the Nigerian civil war – claimed the lives of about 225,000 civilians, and in Syria – approximately 206,000 civilians had lost their lives in the civil war there. These figures are instrumental in fighting the false allegations, such as the claim that Israel is committing genocide.

Similarly, the figures in the database irrefutably disprove the claim that the State of Israel is deliberately causing  mass starvation of the Gaza population. A look at starvation casualties of other conflicts shows that in Yemen, 85,000 died of starvation; in Somalia – 260,000, and in Congo – four million. In Gaza, according to the highest end of estimates – 33 people have died of starvation, hence debunking the claim of deliberate mass starvation by the hands of Israel.

Furthermore, claims of humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip due to insufficient aid – whether on Israel’s part of the international community – take on a different perspective when comparing the two-billion-dollar aid sent into the Gaza Strip for its 2 million citizens, to the Ukraine – which had received humanitarian aid in the value of two billion dollars as well – for a population of over 40 million people.

“The debunking of myths is one of the most important tools in the shaping of public opinion”, explains Gelb. “When you see the figures relating to Israel as oppose to the global numbers, it’s plain to see that the war in Gaza is certainly nearly not as horrific as some are attempting to portray it. Moreover, it shows the world’s hypocrisy that is all too happy to hurl accusations at Israel while remaining silent about the horrible war crimes other countries are committing”.

Credibility above all: challenges in the age of fake news

In the current digital age, we are all constantly inundated with information, and it is hard to tell what is true and reliable and what is biased, false, or downright lies. This challenge is keeping the War in Israel research team busy at their desks. In order to tackle this issue and ensure that the data in the database is reliable, they check and recheck every piece of information, and cross-reference the data with different sources. The main sources of information that are used to glean data are the official reports of Israel’s General Security Service and the IDF, authorized research institutes such as Israel’s Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the broad proprietary IDSF HaBithonistim database, which also collects discrete data such as every fallen Israeli soldier and every senior terrorist operative eliminated. Furthermore, the researchers themselves engage in data collection, diligently laboring for long hours each day.

On the other side of the divide are information sources that the  IDSF HaBithonistim research team steer clear of, like the media and social platforms and of course information published by Palestinian sources or platforms such as  Al-Jazeera, since they tend to propagate mis- or disinformation. Furthermore, the team will not use data from classified sources as it cannot be revealed and therefor verified. They are able to verify to a high degree a large majority of the data they collect, and in the few cases in which the information could not be fully validated – it is mentioned. Furthermore, each data that is presented with references to its sources and explanations on how the research was done, to allow the reader to independently determine whether they view the information as reliable or not.

“Sadly, it’s very easy to fabricate information today”, says Yishai Gelb. “There are many sites, such as the “Betzelem” organization website, that operate huge databases, but refrain from referencing their sources of information, thus, it is virtually impossible to determine how they obtain the data they publish. Additionally, there are reputed bodies that albeit a credible reputation at first glance, are found upon a more circumspect examination to rely on biased sources. One prominent example is the UN, which adopts resolutions and decisions based on data published by the Gaza Ministry of Health, which is in reality controlled by no other than Hamas – in other words, even data published by the UN’s official bodies must be taken with a grain of salt, and such data published on the War in Israel is accompanied by a disclaimer mentioning this. An additional issue in this field is the problem of cyclic requoting, when for example, the UN quotes a certain organization that had quoted the UN to begin with, creating a closed circuit of sorts, making it hard to discern the original source”.

Artificial intelligence (AI) tools, which are multiplying and becoming increasingly sophisticated by the day, do significantly contribute to the work of data-gathering, but also open the door to  irresponsible and even intentionally malicious use of information, and at times actually make it even harder to corroborate information.  “We use AI tools quite a lot, mainly for cross-referencing information”, explains Gelb. “Until these tools were introduced, we would have to first find the information, determine the source and then cross-reference it with other data and sources. AI tools actually reverse the process by starting with cross-referencing, thereby considerably streamlining the work. Nonetheless, these tools must be used with circumspection because as tempting as it may be to use them, the information they present must be carefully inspected”.

Not a lie, but not exactly true: crafty methods of misrepresenting information

The credibility of sources and figures is a complicated issue, but the validity of the information in itself is hardly an assurance to the overall integrity of the report, as even true facts can be introduced in a biased manner to serve agendas. According to Yishai Gelb, there is no shortage of website that do in fact present verified and true information, yet manage to portray a biased picture.

One method often employed by such sites is selectively presenting certain facts while omitting others. Many niche sites do exactly that. A prime example is the website called “Israel Palestine Timeline”, which shows a timeline of the figures of casualties in each side of the Gaza war, however, the information in the site shows a much higher casualty-count of Palestinians as compared to Israelis. Hence, when such information is presented without any context or background, it immediately achieves the impression of injustices committed on part of Israel.

Another method of misrepresentation of  true facts to convey a one-sided and skewed impression is optics. Yishai explains that any body that engages in data collection knows that presentation is everything, and not the facts themselves. Terminology is also a tool that is used deliberately and discerningly in support of the presentation. For this reason, databases put a lot of effort into planning the presentation of the facts. Information appearing at the head of the page, or presented through graphics, for example, carries more weight, while information that appears in small letters in text form, or at the bottom of the page – is often overlooked or ignored. Additionally, the segmentation of the information, i.e. the breakdown of a information into smaller units according to specific criteria, is another method with which to formulate intentional messages and create desired  impressions.

Not only with tanks: Israel’a all-out campaign

The data Gelb and his research team use, are posted in the website on a regular basis, with an exposure of some 30-30 thousand views a month, in addition to exposure on various social networks. Furthermore, they are published on the IDSF HaBithonistim weekly report, which is submitted to diplomats and members of government across the world, and presented in the movement’s various conferences and events. Oftentimes, the data is used for research purposes, and researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department and from other research institutes, such as the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), rely on them regularly for their research. Much of this data is also often used by leading media outlets in Israel, such as Ynet and Channel 14, and appears in newspaper articles and investigative stories.

Gelb welcomes any publicity the information receives but expresses his desire to gain even more exposure. “It makes me very happy to read reports that are based on data we’ve collected, and I feel especially pleased to see researchers using this data because it lends them validity and credibility”, he says. “Now our challenge is to connect this data to other bodies that present data on Israel, and expand to additional platforms such as more research institutions and social networks”.

The waves that the information in Gelb’s website created, reinforce his sense of mission that comes with his job. “All my activity is centered around supporting the Israeli narrative, and with that, the collection of data stems from my desire to promote the interests of the State of Israel”, he says. “It’s true that data collection is a very technical endeavor, but it’s not the be all and end all of the work. A lot of marketing skills and psychology are needed  to optimally determine how to present each piece of data, how to turn data into infographics or articles. In a nutshell – my job is to take numbers and use then to support Israel in the campaign over the local and international public opinion  – and viewed through that lens, the entire endeavor takes on a whole new meaning”.

Yishai Gelb is determined to collect data so long as the Gaza war is raging, and plans to continue maintaining the website after the war ends, and to make it into a vast and rich database with information pertaining to Israel’s security situation. However, it is clear to him that his activity and that of other similar NGO websites is not enough. “Israel’s war is not restricted to the use of tanks, planes and submarines”, he states. “To win this campaign, the State must take the war over public opinion seriously, as it directly affects the support and legitimacy Israel gains. It cannot be that Israel’s public diplomacy has become the task of the private sector alone, and the government and its official agencies must take this matter seriously and invest the appropriate resources and effort into it”.

Iron Swords War (Gaza War) database

הפוסט Through the Statistics: The “Dry” Figures that Promote Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dr. Moshe Yegar’s home, in Jerusalem, tells a story. There are photos from diplomatic occasions around the world. There are certificates of appreciation and prizes relating to his diplomatic and academic work, including the Jabotinsky Prize for Literature and Research and a special prize for his part in establishing Israeli–Indian relations. In his rich library, 20 books may be found that he wrote in Hebrew. Several of them have been translated into other languages, and four more were written originally in English. Most of them deal with history and with the diplomatic side of Israel’s international relations.

A new immigrant who spoke Hebrew better than the sabras

Dr. Moshe Yegar was born in 1930, and at age 94 he still has his vim. We met him at his home to hear about his 40 years of service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about his perspective on the present situation. It was a special interview with a special person who had occasion to work under such figures as Golda Meir, Abba Eban, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yitzhak Shamir, among others. But we should start at the beginning.

Moshe, let’s go back to 1935. You arrived in Israel from — where?

We came from Argentina when I wasn’t yet five. My father was a Hebrew teacher, and he was sent to teach in Zichron Yaakov. I started kindergarten as a new immigrant, but my Hebrew was correct and graceful thanks to my father. From the day I was born, he’d spoken only Hebrew to me, even before we came to Israel. We lived in Zichron Yaakov for five years, and those years left a deep impression on me.

Did you join the Haganah?

I was a member of the youth brigades in the Haganah for two years. When the War of Independence began as soon as independence was declared, my fellow members and I were recruited into the IDF. I was one of the trainers for the scouts movement, and we were among the founders of the Nahal — together with the United Nahal Movement. We also founded Kibbutz Tel Katzir.

Did you consider continuing into a military career?

At a certain point I left Tel Katzir and went back to being an enlisted man in the IDF. I was in the Nahal’s first NCO course. I also took a Master Sergeant course and I was appointed master sergeant for the Nahal’s first company of privates. I was also sent for paratrooper training, and then to the eighth round of the officer training course. Afterward I was discharged from the IDF and I went to study at the Hebrew University.

And then it was straight out of the university into a diplomatic career?

After my bachelor’s degree in modern Middle Eastern history, political science, and general history, I went on to study for a master’s. But I wanted to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the end, I passed the qualifying exam for cadets. That was the third time it was given, in 1956. In the next 40 years, I held various positions in Israel and in Israeli missions abroad. I finished up my master’s while I was an emissary in Burma.

So was it your time in Burma that prompted you to become an expert in Asian Islam?

Because the Hebrew University wasn’t teaching Asian Islam at that time, I received special permission to write a thesis on Burma’s Muslim minority. Afterward, I researched Islam in British Malaya, which is Malaysia today. That was my doctorate. I worked for about twenty years, in my spare time, on a comparative study of Muslim uprisings in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The Bible as key to diplomatic ties

During his 40 years of diplomatic service, Dr. Yegar filled significant roles around the world. After his service in Malaysia, he was a consul in Los Angeles and consul general in Philadelphia. Among his various assignments in Israel, he was head of public diplomacy and of the Asian division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He participated in Operation Solomon (the airlift of Ethiopian Jews) and played a central role in establishing Israel’s relations with India and other Asian and African nations, besides serving terms as ambassador to Sweden and to the Czech Republic.

You held positions under several Foreign Ministers. What are the specifics?

When I was deputy head of the Asian division and Abba Eban was Foreign Minister, he appointed me to head the training department. When Yigal Alon was Foreign Minister, he appointed me department head for public diplomacy, and when Yitzhak Shamir was Foreign Minister, he appointed me division head for public diplomacy. I held that job for five years.

You developed a special cultural project in the Czech Republic. Tell us about it.

After the communist regime collapsed, the Czech Republic was very friendly toward Israel. I dreamed up a large festival focusing on the Bible as it’s reflected in various art forms. The festival was a year and a half or so in the making, and in the end it included 71 musical events, theatrical performances, art exhibits, academic seminars, and art competitions for schoolchildren — all based on biblical topics. It was a large display of culture in Prague and it made a significant contribution to Israel’s reputation. Everyone understood that the Bible was the gift of the Jewish people to human civilization.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, why are artistic and cultural ties important?

After World War II, technology surged forward and brought a complete change in the diplomatic profession. It’s no longer merely negotiations between the leaders of different countries, but also a means of creating broad-based ties between populations that had lived for generations without caring about their countries’ foreign relations.

Today’s communications media have given very large sectors of the public an interest in the diplomatic relations between countries and peoples. For that reason, there’s a new diplomacy with a new face. Today various countries engage in presenting their culture and their language to other populations in an effort to make friends with them. That’s a different kind of diplomacy, and a very interesting kind. It brings many challenges and it requires appointing diplomats who fit such a job. For example, diplomats today need a wider-ranging education — far beyond what was expected from them in past generations.

When other countries receive more extensive knowledge and understanding of the diplomat’s home country, a friendly atmosphere is created. That atmosphere can contribute directly to deeper economic ties, to security, and to all the other factors that mutually benefit the countries involved.

So there’s special importance to Israel’s integration of the Bible into public and cultural diplomacy in Christian regions, which recognize the Bible as an element of their own culture — the USA, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and even Asia’s sole Christian country, the Philippines.

Zionism should free itself of illusions and think straight

What’s your opinion on Israel’s current diplomatic and security situation?

We need to break free from illusions. At first, Zionism was looking for ways to come to an agreement with the Arabs. We hoped they would yield a little piece of their vast territory and allow the Jewish nation return to its historic homeland. The various streams of the Zionist movement made countless attempts to reach an understanding, an agreed compromise with the Arabs — including partition proposals — but they all failed. Now, after October 7, it’s clearer to us than ever. Likely not many of us still suffer from the illusions of the past. Zionism tried to win the understanding and consent of the Arabs by offering various suggestions, such as territorial compromise, or by advancing the idea that the homecoming of the Jews would bring benefits to the Arabs’ economy, their health system, their educational system, and so on. Nothing helped.

The Arabs received proposals for establishing their own “Palestinian” state, but they showed no interest in those proposals. The most prominent proposals that come to mind are those from the Peel Commission in 1938, the UN in 1947, and Oslo in 1993. There were other attempts as well, but the Arabs, the “Palestinians,” never showed interest in setting up a state of their own. Instead, they were determined and consistent in their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, be it big or small. They used every violent means at their disposal to prevent the birth of the State of Israel and they sank to inconceivable levels of barbarous, monstrous cruelty. Their determination has continued for almost 120 years now, coming to expression in what we call terrorist movements. The Arabs see them differently.

We’re at war now with two cruel terrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah. They both are managed and supported by our great enemy Iran. How do you expect this to end?

This war has gone on too long but it can be expected to end eventually with the destruction of those two movements. Still, we shouldn’t suffer any further illusions. The Arabs can be expected with some certainty to continue their violence and terrorism against us. They can set up new organizations, and many members of Hamas and Hezbollah will continue their activity against us as individuals or small squads. They’re not short of weapons.

In practical terms, what should be the final objective regarding Hamas and Gaza?

As a lesson to other Arab states, Israel should destroy Hamas, wipe out every trace of its presence, and complete the job by taking over the entire Gaza Strip. Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, but despite all its superiority, it hasn’t managed to defeat a terrorist organization like Hamas.

But what’s the definition of defeating Hamas?

We and the other side conceive of victory quite differently. The difference has reappeared in each round of conflict. Each time, I felt afterward that we hadn’t achieved much. From their point of view, they’ve won if their leadership survived and they have the ability to regroup. The loss of life, the destruction of Gaza, the civilian distress aren’t a consideration for them. There’s no deterrence. They believe they have a holy mission to exterminate Israel. As long as we leave them the ability to regroup, even if it takes them years, and as long as they have outside support, they’ll persist. Their ability to regroup needs to be rooted out completely.

Is your outlook, with the benefit of such age and experience, optimistic?

October 7 was a severe event, but yes, I’m optimistic despite our current situation. Throughout history, our enemies have always risen up against us and the Jewish nation has a special resilience even after suffering the greatest damage, such as the loss of six million lives in World War II when European Jewry was slaughtered by the Germans and their accomplices. We need to understand that our presence here is not to be taken for granted, and to remember at the same time that despite the difficulties, the Jewish nation has a certain internal energy, a rare self-healing power. We shall win out.

הפוסט “The nation of Israel has self-healing power. We shall win out.” An interview with Dr. Moshe Yegar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In recent years new concepts have been emerging in the global discourse, relating to the psychological warfare both within the cyberspace and beyond. Concepts such as Fake News, Disinformation, and Deep Space have entered popular jargon and brought to light  the gargantuan influence games raging between various global forces. One of those is Iran.

Iran has been waging ongoing sophisticated disinformation campaigns, aiming to sway public opinion against its enemies – namely Israel and the US. But Teheran can take a page out of the playbook of an old hand in sowing disinformation to influence public opinion – Russia.

For instance, Iran is attempting to intervene and influence the results of the upcoming presidential elections in the US. The Washington Post reported that the artificial intelligence (AI) developer OpenAI, announced in August 2024 that it had intercepted attempts by Iranian sources to use its famous chatbot ChatGP to manufacture online content to sow discord and widen the polarization in US society to influence the results of the elections this November. The network disseminated disinformation regarding both candidates – Democratic Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. The fake news aimed to increase the social discord in the United States by stoking social controversy. The Iranian network produced content mainly in the topic of the war in Gaza, LGBTQ rights and of course, the two presidential candidates.

According to intel in the US, the Iranian network, known as “2035-storm” operated a number of new websites and social networks. Iran’s primary objective in the information ecosystem is to stoke existing controversy in American society on particularly sensitive issues, propagate social chaos and undermine America’s political and social order from within. Presumably, even if the Iranians are able to foment discord even on a small scale, they will have considered this testimony to the long-standing claim championed by Iran that democracy is a flawed Western concept.

It seems that one popular topic utilized by the Iranian network is the current war in Gaza, which it frequently addresses. Thus for instance, it operates a website under the name Even Politics.com in which it publishes content on the ongoing Gaza war, the influence of religious groups and threats against American democracy. It is evident that most of the content of the site is biased against Donald Trump.

According to many experts in the field,  this method of disseminating disinformation is not the domain of Iran, and its attempts to sway the elections in the US seems to reflect the methodology employed by Russia, which operated a troll farm – an organized group engaging in the dissemination of disinformation – to flood the social networks with divisive content, ladened with disinformation. The telltale characteristic of the Russian methodology  apparent in the Iranian activity in the cyber ecosystem is the targeting of groups on both sides of the political divide in the US. The disinformation Iran uses aims to radicalize the political discourse, deepen the social discord and undermine the fabric of society in America.

Iranian efforts to influence the presidential elections in the US were evident already in 2018, when they set up a sophisticated system of fake accounts supposedly belonging to US House candidates and journalists. The Iranian campaign, which began in 2018, scaled up following the elimination of Qassem Soleimani, former Qods Force commander in Iraq in January 2020, under the order of then President, Donal Trump. Thus for instance, two Iranian nationals were charged in the US of involvement in the cybernetic disinformation  campaign targeting American voters ahead of the 2020 elections. Iranian perpetrators also sent threatening emails to voters during the 2020 campaign. Iran also used websites such as Even Politics to try and sway the 2022 midterm elections as well.

In addition to its use of social platforms, Iran utilizes other cyber instruments such as hacking and phishing, to try and throw the November elections into disarray. On August 10, officials in Trump’s campaign accused Teheran of hacking parts of its internal communications, leading to a federal investigation in the US. On August 19, the American federal Intelligence officials released an assessment confirming that there was “increasingly aggressive Iranian activity during this elections cycle”, which included “the recently reported activities targeting former President Trump’s campaign”. The intelligence assessment came after U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines suggested that Tehran’s efforts to influence the U.S. election were likely “because Iran’s leaders want to avoid an outcome that they believe would increase tensions with the United States,” i.e. Trump.

Iranian disinformation targeting Israel

Iran’s hostile interference activity in the cyberspace targets Israel as well. In the wake of October 7, Iran stepped up its activity aimed at spreading disinformation among the Israeli public. It was also recently revealed that a Telegram channel disguised as pro-Israel, “Tears of War”, has published dozens of messages since the beginning of the war, including heartbreaking posts pushing for the return of the hostages from Hamas captivity in Gaza. The posts were designed to convey a clear message: the Israeli government is to blame for the ongoing suffering of the hostages, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions were to blame for undermining prospects of a ceasefire. These are just a few examples of how this channel, along with others, is trying to deepen the discord in Israels’ political-social discourse on loaded issues that concern the Israeli public, such as the hostages and the ceasefire.

In all likelihood, the Tears of War account is operated by someone connected to Teheran and is used as a bellow with which to inflame tensions in Israel’s public. Through this and other channels, the Iranians are undermining the official Israeli narrative regarding the issue of the hostages and the war in Gaza in order to influence and manoeuvre the campaign according to Iranian interests. However, this devious campaign is just part of the picture of Iran’s network of activity in the information ecosystem against Israel.

From 2021 to date, Iran has been operating a widespread campaign in the digital ecosystem aiming to psychologically manipulate the Israeli public and further tear at the social and ideological conflict, particularly evident following Israel’s Operation Guardian of the Walls that year. Tehran’s ultimate goal is to turn the public in Israel against the government, to undermine the government and affect anarchy that would serve to weaken Israel.

To this end, Iran employs advanced tactics and methods, such as digital email campaigns, social media landing pages, and the dissemination of deep fake AI-generated content designed to reach more accurately segmented audiences and increase engagement.

The Iranian activity in the cyberspace has three discrete phases, each with specific objectives:

The escalation of tensions between the various groups from all sides of the social divides in Israel, e.g. religious groups and the LGBTQ community; religion and non-religious etc. The next step is fomenting pollical discord between the right and left of the political map. The third stage, of which Iran is presently engaged in, is to saw discontent in the Israeli public with regards to the Israeli government’s response to the actions of Hamas.

Teheran’s expansive use of the digital ecosystem is intended to create a skewed perception of reality among Israel’s public to the extent that they cannot discern between fact and fiction; victim and aggressor. Thus, the Iranians try to swamp the web with disinformation and distorted intentional narratives by exploiting – often unwitting – local resources to spread this content, amplified by of local content in leading channels.

Case in point: last May, the abovementioned “Tears of War” telegram channel paid for sponsored promotion on a Telegram channel of an Israeli blogger, Daniel Amram,  called “Uncensored Daniel Amram”, which has 378 thousand followers. The posts on Daniel Amram’s  channel gave the Iranian’s access to the mobile devices of thousands of Israeli followers and disseminate content calling for the cessation of the war. The use of local channels to promote fake narrative through such content is one instrument Tehran utilizes to saw confusion in the Israel’s public, obscuring the boundaries between what is in effect occurring and cyberspace. The disparity between the misguided perception and reality provides a convenient platform for mind engineering and influencing campaigns and for collecting data on followers, even for the recruitment of civilians for their cause. Iranian cyber networks use fake accounts to contact Israeli civilians by sending them private messages on social networks such as Telegram, WhatsApp etc. The use of content-intensive networks, which are full of fake accounts the respond to or upload posts lend a veneer  of credibility that allowד spreading messages to users, who are contacted through private messages, unaware that they are being recruited.

On January 2024, the Israeli General Security Services announce that fake accounts operated by an Iranian network posted fake job offers and surveys to recruit Israelis to carry out various tasks. These privately-sent requests included, among others, prompts to hang signs with slogans phrased by the Iranians, surveys, photographing protesters and so on. The Iranian network operated to recruit Israelis by deceit, and to use them for purposes of intelligence collection, such as photographing houses of anti-Iranians and individuals belonging to the Israeli security establishment.

In conclusion, it seems that the Iranian networks operating in the Israeli and American digital ecosystem have a deep understanding of the public discourse of both publics. The use of the various social networks and other means of dissemination, such as emails, is spreading by exploiting the ease with which massive numbers of users can be reached privately to deceitfully collect intelligence.

Furthermore, it seems that the Iranian methods of operations are becoming increasingly streamlined and Tehran’s influencing campaigns are able to hit upon exposed nerves in the social rift both in America and Israel. Moreover, the daily interaction with citizens affords Iran with comprehensive social insights, enabling it to analyze the social discourse and accordingly modify the messages it seeks to promote and advance its strategic objectives through instant messaging to users.

The US is heading toward its presidential elections, while Israel is in a state of a multi-theater war, and events are developing at breakneck speed. A  large part of the population uses social networks to stay abreast on current events, mainly on Telegram and -X (Twitter). This increased dissemination of content is a fertile ground for Iran’s frequent disinformation and mind engineering campaigns.

This sophisticated method of spreading messages and content via social networks serves Iran’s long-term strategic goals. The disinformation foments distrust in the governing institution of its enemies and disintegrate their societies – Israeli and American – from within.

Additionally, all this cements Iran’s status as a powerful player in the digital ecosystem and offensive cyber, increasing its ability to collect intelligence and hurt civilians. Teheran’s deep understanding of the main issues of social discourse in Israel, and its ability to influence sentiments in Israel’s public reflect an escalation in its ability to orchestrate influencing campaigns and spark social discord and controversy.

Moreover, the Iranian disinformation campaigns are greatly accelerated with the help of artificial intelligence, which they even use to produce deepfake videos, increase the quality of their fake content and mislead public officials, media outlets and many citizens. Teheran’s use of fake, manipulative content produced by artificial intelligence is expected to further expand, to increase the output and dissemination. The use of artificial intelligence will also contribute to the fine-tuning of messages to increase their influence on the public discourse, in Israel, the United States, or any other country Teheran considers its enemy.

Examples of posts from the “tears of War” Telegram channel

Many of the channel’s posts contain the hashtag #Its All His Fault! referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, aiming to widen the divide in Israel’s society and increase opposition to the government and its system:

This is one of many posts on the ‘Tears of War’ Telegram channel with the hashtag #It’s All His Fault, aiming to increase social controversy and opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government through an image insinuating the situation of the hostages in Gaza, depicting a drawing of the radar operators while being kidnapped from their base on October 7. The post aims to counter balance the shift of attention to the fighting in the northern arena against Hezbollah and Lebanon.

Some posts focus on Iran, suggesting that the channel’s operators are of Iranian source. Below is an example of such two posts published during the 2024 Paris Olympics, emphasizing that Iran has won more medals than Israel:

הפוסט Games of Influence: Iranian Disinformation in Israel and the USA הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Not many people are as strongly connected to the northern region of Israel as Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi. Although she wasn’t born in the Galilee, she spent many years there during her military service, and today she lives in the Galilee with her family. Zehavi is the founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in the security challenges Israel faces on its northern border. “What happens in the North,” Zehavi says, “must be recognized as important by every Israeli citizen. The State of Israel must recognize that the North is a strategic asset that demands investment. The equation is simple: If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us.”

“The state didn’t take the North seriously”

Because Zehavi warned of the Hezbollah forces’ considerable preparations at the northern border long before the war, and because she is well experienced with the results of inattention to those warnings, the past year of warfare has got her goat. “The state didn’t take the North seriously,” she asserts. “The attribution scenarios relating to an attack from the North and a combined attack were well known, yet we did not prepare for them, neither offensively, nor defensively. If there had been any such preparations, maybe matters in the North would have developed differently and we wouldn’t have needed to evacuate 60 thousand people from their homes.”

Despite her anger and frustration, Zehavi acknowledges that the recent progress on the northern front, including the elimination of senior Hezbollah leaders and the significant damage to the organization’s infrastructures, certainly inspires some optimism in her. “The past weeks have given me hope that things will be changing and that we’ll be able to rebuild the North,” she notes. “You could say that we have the color back in our cheeks, after going through a whole year without seeing where this was headed.”

Research and fieldwork at the Alma Research and Education Center

Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi served for close to 15 years in the Intelligence Corps, and many of her positions were in the Northern Command. In 2018, four years after her discharge from the army, she founded the Alma Research and Education Center, which focuses on the security challenges facing the State of Israel at its northern border and how they affect Israel’s home front.

Zehavi grants that her Center didn’t anticipate the current war that broke out from the south, but she and her team of researchers did give plentiful warning that Hezbollah operatives, including the organization’s elite Radwan Force, were coming closer and closer to the fence and that they appeared to be actively preparing for an attack. At the same time, the Center’s researchers were also monitoring global trends, particularly on the Shiite axis; and there too, they saw a growing inclination to attack Israel. “Our main conclusion as a research institute was that the ability to observe at the juncture between tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence is an important ability — and without it, anyone would be hard put to warn of a coming war,” she relates. “Taking the tactical viewpoint, you look at what’s actually happening around the fence, like Hezbollah operatives gathering or patrolling. Taking the strategic viewpoint, you examine the moves that are under way on the Shiite axis, like Iran cultivating militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, or like the detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Only from the combination of both viewpoints, one up close and one at a distance, can you construct a complete intelligence picture and truly understand the scope of the danger we’re facing. Today we can see clearly how various processes that occurred in the Middle East converged eventually in the activities at the Israeli-Lebanese border.”

Since the outbreak of the war, the Alma Research and Education Center has been focusing mainly on creating a database that details all the attacks on the North. “We are monitoring every single incident and cross-checking data from different sources,” Zehavi relates. “Our objective is to understand the attributes of those attacks to assemble the clearest possible picture of the situation. The data we assembled enabled us, for example, to point out that since July the targeting of areas that had not been evacuated has expanded. Similarly, we can also point out increases and decreases in the use of means such as UAVs and anti-tank guided missiles.”

The progress is impressive, but the threat has not yet been removed

Many operations on the northern front during last September weakened Hezbollah significantly. Most of the organization’s senior leaders, foremost among them Hasan Nasrallah, were eliminated already in the initial stages. In parallel, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks not only hit thousands of operatives but also damaged the internal communications of the organization. Additionally, attacks by the Israel Air Force damaged many of the organization’s infrastructures. Although it is still early to talk about the dissolution of Hezbollah, the organization certainly is in a very different place today than only a few weeks ago.

According to Zehavi, the many blows being dealt to Hezbollah are necessary and welcome; but she does not delude herself into thinking that this will restore complete calm to the North. In fact, she expects new problems that may arise at this very moment, when Hezbollah is already not the same powerful, hierarchical organization that it was. “When we take action against an organization that isn’t really organized any longer, new challenges come up and they require different methods of operation,” she explains. “I expect that in the future we’ll see a lot of scattered operations by all kinds of offshoots and squads that are trying to take charge — and in such a situation, prior warning is harder to attain. Besides that, when it’s not clear who the commander is, pushing for negotiations and diplomatic arrangements is harder.”

Nonetheless, she emphasizes that the terrorist threat from squads and individual operatives is less severe than the strategic threat from a well-structured organization backed by a strong state such as Iran. “I’m not saying that the strategic threat that challenged us at the northern border has been completely removed,” she says, “but if we keep up what we’re doing — I believe that we’re approaching the point where that will happen.”

“Without security, we have nothing” — the North’s most urgent problems

Despite the impressive progress in dealing with Hezbollah, many problems on the northern front still require a response. In Zehavi’s opinion, the state and its society will need to mobilize for the rehabilitation of the North and the rebuilding of the communities there, but currently the most urgent of the problems on the table is the security problem because “without security, we have nothing.” Zehavi believes in confronting the remaining security threats on three levels: offensive, defensive, and the quest for a diplomatic arrangement.

On the offensive level, attacks should continue intensely over at least the short term. Afterward, there should be zero tolerance. Hezbollah and all its operatives should be made to understand that for every missile launched toward Israel, hundreds will be launched in return. On the defensive level, Israel should devise a dedicated defense plan for each community. In each community, a civilian emergency squad should be armed and trained. It should be able to rely on reservists who are on alert, without a full-scale mobilization that would require more budgeted personnel. In addition, all homes and institutions in the North must be properly secured, as there are still many private homes, schools, and kindergartens that do not have shelters.

Zehavi explains that progress must be made not only on the offensive and defensive levels but also on processes that will eventually lead to a diplomatic arrangement, since Israel has no interest in dealing with endless guerilla warfare. Zahavi emphasizes that such an arrangement is not intended to replace the military actions currently taking place and that it should occur only after we achieve a sufficient outcome against Hezbollah. A sufficient outcome, according to Zahavi, would be having clear evidence that a high percentage of Hezbollah’s rockets and launchers have been destroyed and that there are no operatives near the border. “Two messages for the decision-makers are important to me in this connection,” she adds. “The first is that we must be prepared for the attribution scenarios already the stage of the military’s force buildup, and the second is that the only way to deter our enemies is to take away as many of their capabilities as possible.”

“Returning civilians to their homes in the North is a national mission”

Beyond the security aspects, returning the residents of the North to their homes requires a comprehensive solution to problems and providing incentives for the residents. Even before the outbreak of the war, many northern communities were suffering from insufficient infrastructure, limited opportunities for work and recreation, and a shortage of basic public services – including health services. Since the war began, that situation has only worsened. Today there is also a need to repair many roads and buildings that were wrecked by missile fire and by various military operations.

According to Zehavi, the approach to that problem must involve first mapping out the various needs of all the communities. “Thought needs to be invested in each type of locality here — moshavim, kibbutzim, community settlements, and cities — because each type of locality has different requirements,” she says. “While the war damage is being repaired, projects need to be resumed that were under way before war broke out. There were lots of initiatives here for setting up centers of employment and frameworks for young people. Improving public services was also discussed a lot because, for example, a city like Kiryat Shmona can’t do without an emergency room.”

Zehavi notes that along with the work of repair and construction, there must be incentives encouraging residents to return to the North, and even attracting new residents to the area. Those incentives, she says, must take the form of financial grants, tax benefits, and preferential housing terms. She also indicates that where demography is concerned, preference should be given to young families with children because the children will be the foundation of the area’s future; and where occupations are concerned, preference should be given to the fields of agriculture and industry. “In recent years, the North has seen investment primarily in tourism, while fields that are no less important, like agriculture, have been badly ignored. It’s important to understand that besides being a profession, agriculture is a major instrument in carrying out the Zionist vision. Trumpeldor said that the plough’s furrow marks the boundaries of the state. It was true a hundred years ago and it’s just as true today.”

The end of the war? It’s not here yet, but it’s coming into sight.

In her professional capacity as a researcher, Sarit Zehavi had an eventful and fascinating year — but in her capacity as a Galilean, she primarily faced difficulties. “During the war’s first weeks, there was real fear that Hezbollah would invade in the way Hamas did. And the fear was backed up by proclamations from Hezbollah and statements by the Foreign Minister of Iran,” she recounts. “Later, a new kind of difficulty set in, and it’s still with us. The children haven’t been to school in a long time, we constantly hear alerts and explosions, and dozens of communities are still evacuated. The beautiful North that we had is burnt and unsafe. But the real difficulty, for sure, was that we could see no end to it all. Even before the strong attack in the northern front began, we were living for months with the feeling that something horrible was about to happen at any moment. And that feeling can drive you crazy.”

Despite all the difficulty, Zehavi stresses that she has never for a moment had second thoughts about living in the North. “We’ve been through a lot recently, but we never thought of leaving,” she says. “I’m happy that I put down stakes in the North. My children have the privilege of growing up in a mixed population, and they’re used to being around people with different lifestyles and different beliefs. This special Galilean atmosphere is something we won’t give up on.”

הפוסט “If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us”: A research-based and personal perspective on the reality of the northern border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A year and a half before October 7, officers of the IDSF movement sat in the living room of Amir Avivi, the movement’s founder and CEO. They understood that something was afoot and that they must warn the security services about what was liable to happen. At the meeting, they discussed a “strategic, tectonic, global, and regional change” that we were experiencing and that would lead, in their view, to immense escalation. “When we connected the dots, we understood that we were heading for war,” Avivi recalls.

At the same meeting, they decided to write a situational assessment. The IDSF movement delivered a 300-page document to Naftali Bennett and Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time were prime minister and opposition leader respectively, and to the head of the Mossad, the National Security Council, and others.

As early as May 2022, Avivi visited the Knesset with the report, which he’d prepared together with some leaders of the security services, and he warned that “today we’re in a situation where processes that have been under way for many years are reaching their culmination.” He expanded on the existential threats against the State of Israel. “There is an Iranian deployment that, in practice, embraces both the drive for nuclearization and the rockets, missiles, and drones. There is a force that will guide Iran toward the understanding that on the one hand they can attack, and on the other hand we’ll be forced to if they don’t.”

Today, a year after the Sabbath that saw the murder of more than 1,200 people, Avivi isn’t brandishing the report and its prophetic conclusions. Instead he is thinking of what comes next. He speaks of the hostages’ return as a matter of central importance, of the need for broad democratic consensus regarding the State’s deep-level processes, and of what the future may hold — a campaign for regional peace agreements.

“There was a belief in holding out a little longer”

On the anniversary of the events that opened the war, Avivi visited the Ynet studio for a special interview with Sharon Kidon. “Israel has been avoiding war, as part of a strategic choice that resembles what the USA chose in the face of the USSR — to wait for everything to settle down on its own,” Avivi said, explaining why Israel hadn’t taken action that would have prevented the massacre. “The Arab Spring gave the security services and the Israeli government a lot of confidence that the strategy was working. That while we were avoiding war, the other Mideastern states were reducing themselves to fragments. Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Syria. There was a belief that if we held out a little longer and then a little longer, eventually Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranians would all collapse. It was just a matter of holding out a bit.”

The IDSF warned of a severe attack impending, but without knowing what the timing would be. “I said, ‘When you see a swarm of rockets flying, you can be sure that’s the beginning of the war,’” Avivi relates. “We’ve learned that when you have a terrorist army at your fence, even the security services won’t necessarily be aware of the timing. For that reason, terrorist armies shouldn’t be at the fence.”

You’ve mentioned victory more than once. What’s your vision of victory?

“The developments we’re currently experiencing will force us to adjust our war objectives. We started out on October 7, a year ago, entering a war really against our will, and we set three objectives: eliminating Hamas as a governmental and military organization, returning all our hostages, and creating conditions in Gaza that will prevent a terrorist army from ever reappearing. We’ve more or less dismantled Hamas as a military organization, but not as a government. This is where the pronouncements of the security services and the prime minister come in, and they’re now getting into the humanitarian issue. We need to finish the work. We need to return our hostages.”

Can you define what victory looks like in this connection?

“Victory doesn’t mean that there’s not a single terrorist in Gaza,” he clarifies. “So what does it mean? That all the hostages are back. That Hamas has lost its hold on Gaza both militarily and governmentally. That everyone with a home in northern Israel is back, is safe, and can live confidently with no threat from Hezbollah. The State of Israel understands that it must add the Iranian nuclear program to its war objectives. Victory will mean that the existential danger from the Iranian nuclear umbrella has been dealt with. I hope that the Americans will open their eyes and understand that we need to handle that one together.”

“No need for uniformity — just unity”

On the issue of internal polarization in Israel, Avivi contends that what’s needed is not uniformity but unity. Differences in outlook should be put aside for the sake of joint decision-making that will make development and growth possible. “We don’t need to be uniform,” he explains. “We have lots of opinions, but we need to converge on the ethos on which the nation was founded. Let’s remember what we are here for, what the Land of Israel means to us, who and what we are as a people — and let’s hold a tolerant discussion. We don’t need to reach agreement on everything. Where we don’t, our democracy decides. But we need to agree on broad issues. Our culture needs a lot of work. A firm majority of Israeli society is tired of the squabbles and wants a safe, thriving, meaningful future.”

Avivi’s expectations for the future are optimistic, including regional peace agreements. “We all feel that within this war, there was a revolution,” he emphasizes. “We’ve all seen now what we’re capable of doing when we’re together in battle. I think that this year will be the decisive one, with us defeating our enemies. From there, we must proceed to peace agreements, a thriving economy, mass immigration, and a discourse among ourselves that makes for togetherness and unity in the spirit of our ethos. We have a tendency to embrace extremes, but we need to converge in the center. I’m optimistic. I think our society’s has wonderful days ahead.”

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט From the unheeded warning to the vision of peace: “This will be the decisive year” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The principal goal of the IDSF movement is to safeguard the security of Israel for the coming generations, but the movement understands that security and economics advance hand in hand. In this article, Dr. Zvi Marom will detail what the State of Israel must do in order to develop its industrial sector and maintain its standing as a “start-up nation.”

Dr. Marom is one of the best-known and most experienced figures in Israel’s technological sector. As an academic, he holds degrees in electronic engineering and industrial electronics as well as a doctorate in dentistry from Tel Aviv University. As a businessman, he founded BATM Ltd. and managed it until December 2022; and for years he chaired the board of directors at the Israeli High-Tech Association (part of the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel). Dr. Marom is also the recipient of important awards including techMARK Personality of the Year and the 2021 Industry Prize from the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel. In March 2024 he was even awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit of Hungary.

Background — Hi-tech and other advanced industries in Israel today

Israelis have come to consider their country a “hi-tech nation,” but in fact it is primarily a “start-up nation.” Israeli entrepreneurs excel at forming small and medium-size companies based on innovation and creativity, but in many cases those companies are sold to large enterprises, or are floated on the stock exchange, so that control passes to new shareholders — primarily American. Figures show that the number of start-ups in Israel is high even in comparison much larger countries, and the reason lies in two factors:

• In the past, the country aided start-ups with government guarantees and conditional grants, for example under the “Yozma” program, and thus the start-ups were better able to raise funds for the critical fledgling stage.
• Israel has skilled and talented workers in the engineering and computer fields. It owes that workforce to a number of factors: immigration of experienced professionals from the former Soviet Union, the release of trained engineering workers upon the halt of the Lavie project, and demobilized soldiers who bring training and experience from the IDF’s technological units.
• The hi-tech sector has gained in strength worldwide, and it set many private venture capital funds scouting in Israel. Those funds established channels of nongovernmental funding and presented start-ups with further opportunities for growth.
• The large number of start-up companies produced an accumulation of managerial knowhow that contributed to the growth of further start-ups, so that a self-nourishing cycle emerged here.

Today we are witness to a new process in which Israel is changing from a “start-up nation” into an “innovation nation.” That is to say, Israel’s economy rests on creative, innovative workers at the forefront of their fields. The objective is to advance Israeli innovativeness while continuing to support the founding of start-ups.

Aside from hi-tech companies and start-ups, the technology sector in Israel also includes advanced industries and security industries that are also considered world leaders in their fields. Those companies have the potential to contribute enormously to Israel’s economy and security, and they can also help by leveraging projects of international cooperation.

However, we must not rest on our laurels. The hi-tech and other advanced industrial sectors, however successful they may be, must constantly innovate in order to retain Israel’s technological advantage in the world. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that those sectors are already suffering today from more than a few difficulties that threaten not only themselves but also the overall Israeli economy and security services, which depend on innovations and technological developments from Israeli industries.

Dr. Zvi Marom: The Economic Vision for the Hi-Tech and Other Advanced Technology Sectors

Advancing education and professional training

The current situation:

Like all other fields, hi-tech and other advanced industries depend strongly on their workforce. Among the measures of a workforce’s quality are education and professional skills — two aspects that require improvement.

Where education is concerned, academia in Israel and worldwide is deteriorating. A portion has turned into a trade guild, and a portion has surrendered to the progressive agenda that prevents it from impartially promoting academic learning. In addition, many universities have become diploma mills where the demands on students — and especially on those considered “less privileged” — constantly decline.

Where professionalism is concerned, certain jobs in technological industry are unjustly considered inferior. Technology in all its aspects is an intrinsic part of industry as a whole, and jobs such as operating industrial machinery, which require higher education, should be properly rewarded.

Ideally:

• Investment in technological education: Technological education in Israel needs to be dramatically strengthened, and young people need to be encouraged to study technical subjects. In that connection, the universities must adapt themselves to the technological demand from the marketplace, update their curricula, and expand the relevant departments such as computer engineering. The students from underprivileged backgrounds should be supported with scholarships and benefits but not by means of academic concessions that reduce their level of education.
• Professional training: Technological workers must be trained, with an emphasis on industrial workers who will command the technological knowledge necessary for operating heavy machinery and for undertaking advanced manufacturing processes. Appropriate education and high standards should be expected from those workers, and at the same time they should be rewarded with good conditions and suitable salaries.

Encouraging competition in the defense industry

The current situation:

Our defense industry is outstanding, but because of excessive bureaucracy and regulatory difficulties, small companies are not managing to enter the defense industry. Thus a situation has evolved in which the defense industry rests primarily on three companies: Elbit, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael. They have become a near-monopoly. Such a situation violates the principle of business competition and brings harm to Israel’s standing as a hi-tech nation.

Furthermore, whereas in the past Israel’s armaments industry was highly developed, over time it has shrunk and today we rely primarily on importing materiel from the USA — thus harming our economy and our self-reliance.

Ideally:

• Total war against monopolies: Entrepreneurship and competition must be nurtured, especially in the defense industries, and small companies must be encouraged to grow alongside the three giant defense corporations.
• Enlarging the armaments industries: A well-developed armaments industry will be very profitable to Israel, in contrast to today when we are paying more for American materiel than we would pay to manufacture our own. Moreover, a well-developed armaments industry will also give Israeli security more independence.

Fighting bureaucracy and wastefulness

The current situation:

Israel’s governmental services are mostly inefficient and rife with obstacles, resulting in delays and in improper usage of workers and of resources. Regrettably, many of the difficulties that the governmental services present are deliberate. The jobs are intended to inflate the staff of one manager or another, and their usefulness is nil.

Similarly, the military suffers from inefficiency and has slipped heavily into wastefulness in terms of resources and staff. Waste in the military takes various forms: Many units, such as the Army Radio, make no contribution to security but use up money and personnel; many bases, including the Kirya in Tel Aviv, are tying up some of Israel’s most valuable real estate; soldiers in the regular army receive outsized financial benefits; IDF delegations travelling overseas are overstaffed; and the list goes on and on.

Both in the civil service and in the security establishment, the wastefulness peaks toward the end of the fiscal year on the understanding that any money remaining unspent will be lost and possibly even excluded from the next year’s budget. Thus as each calendar year nears its end, we witness voluminous unnecessary spending.

The problem of wastefulness is well recognized, but budget cutting is greatly opposed at the highest levels of government. Among the reasons for that opposition is the overly close relationship between security and politics. After all, many security figures in Israel continue almost immediately into a political career — so instead of considering the good of the military, they’re considering mainly their professional future.

Ideally:

• Tackle the government bureaucracy: Israel’s public services must be made more efficient in order to prevent wastage of time, resources, and staff. To that purpose, the way of management at the ministries must be comprehensively improved, from the point of budgeting to the point of implementation.
• Fight wastefulness: Wastefulness, in the public services and in the IDF, must be attacked with full force. First, budget-cutting options must be examined — such as closing departments and units and relocating offices and bases to locations in the periphery. Second, the budget must be managed transparently and there must be certainty that outlays contribute to the nation and to its security.
• Separating security from politics: In order to make budget-cutting possible, the political and military systems must be separated. More precisely, there must be an end to the cycle of Chiefs of Staff who become Ministers of Defense. It was clear to David Ben-Gurion, back in his day, that the army must not be its own regulator. And even the Romans asked: Who will stand watch over the watchmen?

Grant tax relief

The current situation:

A liberal policy of taxation is fundamental to the development of entrepreneurship. If burdened by taxes from the outset, an entrepreneur will have great difficulty achieving growth and may fail to reach take-off. The State must understand that it has an economic interest in encouraging business growth and success. Successful entrepreneurs contribute in due course to increasing the treasury’s tax revenues.

However, as of today Israel’s state support for its growing businesses is insufficient, imposing difficulty on entrepreneurs and harming economic growth.

Ideally:

• Tax benefits: The government must provide significant tax benefits to growing businesses so that they may consolidate a foothold in the early stages of business development.

The defense industry: Two sides of the same coin — Summation and conclusions

It is pleasant and easy to keep viewing Israel as a start-up nation or hi-tech nation, but it is necessary to understand that technology moves ceaselessly forward and if we become complacent we will no longer deserve those titles. For the sake of its economy and security, Israel must strengthen its hi-tech sector and other advanced industrial sectors, with an emphasis on military industry.

To that end, we must examine the existing difficulties — including bureaucratic restrictions, wastage of resources, and insufficiently trained students — and find a way to overcome those difficulties and make Israel not merely a start-up nation worthy of the name but also a nation of innovation one step ahead of all others.

It must be understood that the necessary changes will not come about at a single stroke. Long-term processes must be put into place encompassing all the relevant fields in order to return Israel’s hi-tech and other industries to a stable leading position in the international arena.

הפוסט Ideally — The Economic Vision of the IDSF Movement Featuring: Hi-tech and Other Advanced Industries הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article we shall focus, with the help of Adv. Yifa Segal, on the international legal system and the way Israel’s standing worldwide influences our national security and our very existence here. We shall also examine how to use our leveraging powers and technological advantages to better present ourselves and to improve our standing in the global arena.

Background – rules of war, Anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism: Trends in the world legal and social conversation

The international rules of war began taking shape less than 200 years ago. They were officially delineated only in the past century. The history of rules of war began in 1859. That is when the Battle of Solferino took place in Lombardy (present-day northern Italy), as part of the process of unifying Italy. Jean-Henri Dunant, an Austrian businessman, witnessed the consequences of the battle and was appalled by the way thousands of wounded were abandoned in the field. These spectacles drove him to establish a medical assistance organization to help the war-wounded, better known today as the “Red Cross”. About a year later a convention was held in Geneva, in which 12 countries signed a treaty, or convention, that granted immunity to medical teams and to any civilian assisting medical staff in a war zone. This was the first Geneva Convention.

In the early 20th century, two more Geneva Conventions were signed, which dealt with maritime warfare and with the treatment of prisoners of war. In 1949, following World War 2 and the horrific war crimes committed against civilian population by Nazi Germany, the first three Geneva Conventions were rewritten and another was added, which included rules concerning the treatment of civilians in wars and also concerning civilians within occupied territories, who are subject to the martial law of a hostile army. The Geneva Conventions and the lessons learned from the two World Wars form the basis for the rules of war which nowadays fall under the category of “international humanitarian law”.

Since there has not been another world ware since World War 2, the rules of war have remained unchanged for the most part. This being said, talk about human rights has in recent decades become a more and more key issue in the global social conversation. We see this conversation beginning to trickle down to international law, influencing rulings and decisions made in international courts, in various UN councils and in national parliaments. Using “human rights” as its pretext, the International Court of Justice ruled in 2004 that the Separation Fence, which was intended to provide us with a security defense, constitutes illegal annexation. Similarly, many countries have latched onto, and are still adhering to, the humanitarian excuse for boycotting Israel economically, culturally and academically.

More political, less just: the absurdity behind the international legal system

The international legal system includes two main institutions, both seated in the city of Hague in The Netherlands: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), tasked with adjudicating in disputes between countries, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is tasked with adjudicating the accountability of individuals in crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Besides the differences between their respective tasks, the two courts also have different authorities.

The International Court of Justice can rule only on matters concerning countries that have chosen to accept its authority – whether through advance consent or ad-hoc consent, or due to the signing of one Convention or another. Additionally, it is authorized to issue an advisory opinion on legal issues, at the request of the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

The International Criminal Court, on the other hand, has more far-reaching judicial authority. Since it deals with individuals, it is authorized to issue international arrest warrants against individuals and it is also authorized to impose international sanctions. Until recently the International Criminal Court worked against brutal dictatorships such as Sudan and Libya but, following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel too has found itself in the company of these undesirables. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, an attempt was made to issue arrest warrants against senior Israeli individuals, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. The charge – involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Meanwhile these warrants have not yet been issued, however if they do get issued, then the 124 member-states of the International Criminal Court will be obliged to arrest and extradite each and any defendant entering their territory – meaning that there might well be severe legal implications.

To all intents and purposes, the two international courts are apolitical judicial organs. The process of appointing the serving judges is, however, a decidedly political process and as a result, these two institutions have consistently been exhibiting a glaring anti-Israel attitude. This unfairness is also related to ingrained anti-Semitism – more on that later – and also to the disparity in the expectations, which began taking form already back in the days the rules of international war were written.

When the western powers wrote the rules of war in the early twentieth century, the hope was that these would form the rules that would dictate the global agenda and would apply to every country in the world as well as to non-state entities. In reality they only affect a handful of countries that share similar values. Then and now, most players on the international stage do not share the values of democracy and liberalism. As a result, many of them disregard the international rules and even openly support terrorism.

One might have expected a well-functioning legal system to mete out its judgments equally with any country that violates international law, however what we see is that most countries manage to evade judgment thanks to the close-knit bloc they belong to and to the powerful political influences. This is the case with Muslim countries and with anti-Western countries, which have banded together and shield each other, including in cases where egregious crimes are being committed. In the same vane, this is also what happens with western, democratic countries, which ally themselves with one another or with powers that are powerful enough to defend themselves, like the United States. In this context one such case stands out – in which the international court sought to examine whether the United States committed war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. John Bolton, who at the time was President Trump’s National Security Advisor, attacked the international court and declared that the United States would not cooperate with an illegitimate institution. Bolton went as far as to threaten sanctioning the court in the Hague, which ultimately caused the court to withdraw and the investigation evaporated.

When one looks at the politics behind the international legal system, one realizes that there is no real concern for justice; instead it is simply a power play. If international courts take one course of action against certain countries, and a different course against other countries just because they uphold a different set of values, or because they wield considerable political power – then the inevitable outcome is that they lose credibility, and that the entire raison d’être comes into question.

From Anti-Semitism to Anti-Israelism

The international system’s preoccupation with Israel exceeds the volume of occupation with all the rest of the world’s countries combined. Unfortunately, this disproportionate dealing with Israel is not confined to the halls of justice alone. It spills over into the streets in the form of demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, and even terrorism and violence.

The anti-Israeli sentiments prevalent worldwide are undoubtedly a form of anti-Semitism. Suffice it to listen to the chants and speeches at the various demonstrations to understand that people are not merely condemning Israel, the conversation is about the very delegitimization of the existence of the State. It goes so far as to justify extreme, violent actions such as kidnapping and murder of civilians.

There is no other case in the world in which the very legitimacy of a country is called into question, as is the case with Israel. Even in the most glaring cases of violent, rogue regimes and illegal conduct – including what is happening in Russia, China and Iran – one does not hear claims that these countries should not have existed in the first place and that they should cease to exist without delay. Clearly the conversation about Israel goes far beyond reason, It is driven – at least in part – by a clear hatred of Jews as a people.

Adv. Yifa Segal: The Vision for International Law and Israeli Public Diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Continue Resisting the International Legal System

Current state:

The international courts hide under a thin patina of judicial neutrality, while in reality they are biased political bodies. Suffice it to consider the identity of the judges to understand that a country like Israel has no hope of receiving a fair hearing. The person presently serving (September 2024) as presiding judge in the International Court of Justice is a Lebanese judge – Nawaf Salam, who has a documented history of extreme anti-Israeli statements. He has even voted against Israel several times in the United Nations. According to the rules of that court, when a judge is called upon to adjudicate in matters concerning a country towards which he has an obvious negative attitude, he must recuse himself. Salam did indeed receive requests that he recuse himself from proceedings involving Israel but he refused to do so.

Besides the panel of judges, many of the rulings and legal opinions handed down by the International Court base themselves on distorted facts and ignore international precedents. Thus for example, in July 2024 the International Court of Justice ruled in a non-binding legal opinion that all of the Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, in Judea and Samaria and in the Jordan Valley is illegal. When taking a closer look at the ruling, it transpires that the court is in fact calling for a total ethnic cleansing of all the Jews living in these territories – a completely unprecedented ruling anywhere in the world. The court ignores the deep historic link between Jerusalem and the Jewish People, it completely disregards the right of the Jews to self-determination, and it regards Palestine to be a full-fledged country with full sovereign rights, despite the fact that such a state has never been established.

No less incensing is the discrepancy between the yardstick to which Israel is being held, and the total absence of any yardstick when it comes to our enemies. Ever since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel has been subjected to numerous allegations, while at the same time there is virtually no scrutiny of the legal violations on the part of the Palestinians.

In a properly-functioning international order, one that is not driven by short-sighted political expediency, we would expect a more detailed response from the ICC to Hamas’s horrific crimes, one would hope Israel would be examined under the context of the crimes committed on October 7. Besides that, it would have been desirable that many countries, not just a handful, would be alarmed by this blaming of the victim in the ICJ, that they would submit their objections accordingly.

Israel is also subjected to unjust treatment in the International Criminal Court, the ICC. When the possibility of issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, the possibility of issuing similar arrest warrants against Yahya Sinwar, Muhammad Deiff and Isma’il Haniyah. Make no mistake – this is not about trying to strike a balance – the very idea of placing Israeli leaders in the same dock as the senior Hamas leaders is indicative of the crooked perception of reality and of a dangerous equation of Israel and a murderous terrorist organization.

The line Israel has been following in recent years, in most of the trials and debates held against us is a line of resistance. Realizing we will not be given a fair trial, Israel has deliberately opted not to take part in proceedings being conducted against it, thereby sending the message that it does not recognize the authority of the International Court. Besides this message, non-cooperation on the part of Israel also impedes the court when it attempts to drill down in its investigations since it is barred from accessing all the testimony and data, such that sometimes it is unable to deliver a ruling.

Ideally:

• Work to change the methodology at the international legal system: the international legal system purportedly operates democratically, however so long as most of the players involved are undemocratic, the distortions we are experiencing to our cost are bound to persist. Israel has got to exert Hasbara and diplomatic efforts to expose this injustice, which besets the international legal system. The goal should be to reorganize the method and the balance of power within the international courts.
• Refuse to cooperate with injustice: changing the international legal system will take time but it is also a long, complicated process. We must therefore focus mainly on its conduct. Israel has got to persist with the its policy of non-cooperation with biased legal proceedings. Contrary to what many believe, in most cases there is no point in participating in these proceedings since most of the judges arrive with a “precooked” verdict and we have no real way of influencing their decisions through legal means. The best we can do is repeatedly echo the message that we do not recognize the court’s authority, since it is operating in a manner that contradicts every conceivable principle of law and justice.

Use the leverage we have in the bilateral arena

Current state:

There are two different spheres of activity when it comes to diplomatic relations. The first is the multilateral arena – the domain of international institutions. The second is the bilateral arena – where the focus is on relations between two countries cooperating based on common interests.

In the multilateral arena, Israel is relatively isolated. We do not have a bloc to shield us like the Muslim countries have. On the other hand in the bilateral sphere we have many tools and leverage vis-à-vis individual countries with which we have collaborations. At the moment, however, these are not sufficiently being used.

Ideally:

• Improve our standing in the multilateral arena: Israel has got to invest in forming a bloc with other western countries or in joining an existing bloc, so as not to be isolated in the international arena and to ensure there will be countries that will shield it – as is exactly the case with the Muslim countries.
• Move from defensive to offensive: rather than work within a group of countries and try to stave off threats and sanctions, we ought to go on the offensive vis-à-vis countries where we do have leverage. Thus, will we be able to alter voting patterns in the United Nations and gain advantages in the international arena. One good example is our relationship with Jordan: behind the scenes, Jordan is dependent on us militarily and economically. It needs its cooperation with us but in the international arena it continually condemns us and works against us. We need to use our levers with Jordan, as we ought with other countries, and exact a price for the various anti-Israeli actions taken against us internationally.

Improve Israeli Public diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Current state:

There is an expectation that the State should take responsibility for the entire issue of Hasbara. There are two reasons why this is an unrealistic expectation. First of all, many of the technologies that could be extremely effective in the Hasbara world belong to the private market. Secondly, Israel, being a state, is subject to copious bureaucracy and rules that do not apply to private citizens. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to operate freely.

Another problem with Israeli Hasbara is that Israel is numerically inferior compared to its adversary states. This makes it very difficult for us to counteract our enemies using traditional tools. No matter how much we might demonstrate – our enemies will always be able to outnumber us on the streets. No matter how much information we might release – our enemies will release more. We have therefore got to find a way to neutralize the quantitative element and achieve advantage by other means.

Another problem we face in this respect is that Jewish communities in the diaspora also occasionally turn against us and even inside Israel there are numerous voices that question the entire faith in the righteousness of our ways. It is obviously acceptable that one or another government policy can be criticized, but when Jews and Israelis criticize the State of Israel per se, the Hasbara damage is tremendous. It also results in internal fissures that weaken us as a nation.

Ideally:

• Hasbara is everybody’s responsibility: we need to let go of the state of mind that says that the State is supposed to take care of everything. After all, the State is the collective representing all of us. In the early stages of the war there was widespread engagement by the general public, which mobilized especially in favor of Hasbara and we scored some impressive results. Over time most people resumed their everyday life and the issue was abandoned. Once people realize that it is their responsibility, and that they are able to take part in the Israeli national Hasbara effort, we will be able to engage our best minds, freeing ourselves of the constraints that hobble the state and do wonders for Israel’s international standing.
• Leverage our technological superiority: since we cannot bridge the quantitative gap with our enemies, we have to find our advantages in other areas. Outstanding among these is technology. Israel is a leader in this area. If we concentrate our efforts and adopt new tools, such as AI, we could improve our Hasbara capacity and better echo the messages we want to convey.

Not neglect the domestic Hasbara channels: The Israeli Hasbara efforts need to be directed inwards, not only outwards. We must see to it that the country’s citizens do not fall prey to false information and that they do not take part in propagating these lies to the rest of the world, since this weakens us as a people and is even more detrimental to our international image.

Increase enforcement in Israel and worldwide

Current state:

Around the world, and in Israel as well, there are various organizations that are operating under the umbrella of humanitarian work and human rights while in actual fact they are part of a well-organized terrorist network. These organizations pose a great danger since they create a false picture of the reality and drive processes harmful to Israel in terms of its Hasbara, its legal standing, and sometimes they even result in actual terrorist attacks.

These organizations employ sophisticated modus operandi. In most cases it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the link between them and terrorist organizations of terror-supporting countries. The result is an absurd state of affairs where around the world and in Israel itself, various NGOs are operating, benefitting from tax exemptions and other advantages while in effect calling for the destruction of Israel.

Despite the difficulty, a concerted effort and efficient investigation and interrogation techniques would enable incrimination of the fraudulent organizations and taking effective anti-crime measures against them. Germany has provided one example of this . Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war and the global rise in anti-Semitism, Germany has increased its investigation and enforcement in this area. In July 2024 it managed to shut down an organization that had for many years been operating as an offshoot of Iran.

Ideally:

• Fight terrorism-supporting organizations: Israel has to increase the State’s domestic enforcement and carefully scrutinize suspicious organizations operating within it so as to understand where their financing is coming from and with whom they are in contact. The State has also got to withhold tax benefits from NGOs that condemn it and even call for its destruction.
• Mobilize foreign states: Israel must harness other countries in favor of the fight against terror-supporting organizations and make it clear to them that if there are organizations within them calling for anti-Semitism and genocide, this is a national problem requiring their intervention.

No Quick Fix: Summary and Conclusions

The international institutions, primarily the United Nations and the international courts, have long ago become yet another weapon in Israel’s enemies’ arsenal – a weapon they use skillfully. Even though the international courts have no way of enforcing their rulings against Israel, the damage caused to Israel’s image abroad is considerable. It shapes a false image of Israel and brands it as a rogue state.

It is important to understand that the courts’ rulings affect not only the legal and diplomatic arenas. They filter down into society and influence public opinion, including the opinions of key media personalities and influential global political and security influencers. The courts’ rulings also lend legitimacy to various NGOs and humanitarian organizations worldwide and sometimes lead to sanctions and boycotts being imposed on Israel, causing it economic harm and damaging cultural exchanges. Worse than that, the rulings by the international courts play into the hands of Israel’s enemies. They fan the flames of anti-Semitism around the world and stimulate the calls to delegitimize Israel.

The inherent injustice typical of the international legal system is infuriating and our ability to reshape the system is very limited. This being said, we should not remain idle. Israel has got to exploit its leverage with various countries worldwide, it must augment its control and enforcement capabilities, and it must achieve technological advantages to enable it to counteract its enemies, who far outnumber us. The population at large must also understand that they bear their share of responsibility. They have to seek ways to contribute toward improving Israel’s Hasbara worldwide. They must help silence the voices from outside and from within that call for banishing us from our land and even for our extermination.

At the same time we must realize that we need to take a deep breath, that there is no instant precooked solution for our predicaments. The task of improving Israel’s image and legal standing is going to take a lot of long-term, hard, challenging work. Our enemies have been patiently working to tarnish our image for decades. Now is the time for us to exhibit the same patience.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: International Law, Israel’s Public Diplomacy and Delegitimization הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik will discuss the future of the Israeli educational system and the responsibility it bears regarding the generations yet to come.

Israel’s educational system – Grades instead of Zionism

The education system meets the citizens of Israel during the most formative years of their lives, and has a decisive role in instilling national values, creating a sense of belonging, and forging the fortitude of each person as an individual and of all of us as a society and a nation.

However, from in-depth studies conducted among parents, teachers and students, including a comprehensive study conducted by the IDSF, it appears that everything in Israel’s education system that is related to instilling values, and in particular in instilling the values ​​of heritage, Jewish identity and the national ethos, is steadily eroding. In addition, due to a fear of public pressure and parental criticism, the education system avoids dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, does not discuss in any significant way the security incidents that have taken place here over recent years, and almost never touches on the significance of IDF service and the importance of personal sacrifice for the common good. Furthermore, the system has become a “grades factory” that emphasizes only individual achievements while ignoring the principles of teamwork and cooperation, and with no desire to prepare the male and female students for life in the State of Israel in all its unique characteristics.

Some of the problems mentioned are the product of global social trends that emphasize individualism over collectivism and preach political correctness at any cost and in any situation. Other problems arise from a process of alienation from the heritage of the Jewish people and the history of the State of Israel. In addition, there are also problems related to systemic issues such as inefficiency, the lack of appropriate staff, and the use of outdated educational methodologies.

Below, Dr. Ronen Itzik will lay out his ideas for the future of the education system in Israel, so that it can fulfill its deepest purpose.

Dr. Ronen Itzik: The Vision for the Future of the Israeli Education

The importance of the group and looking at the individual in a group context

Current state: Throughout the Western world, there has been a trend of individualism in recent years that glorifies the individual at the expense of the group. Israel is also affected by this trend, and it can also be seen in its education system, which almost completely neglects its responsibility towards the collective. The system mainly puts an emphasis on individual accomplishments and is busy with incessantly testing the individual student while ignoring group achievements and products of cooperative efforts.

The individual is undoubtedly the cornerstone of the Western world as well as the Jewish one, but Israeli reality, in which the group is a condition for the existence of the individual, dictates a different and more balanced approach.

Ideally:

Besides developing the individual’s abilities and aspirations, the education system should also deal with the responsibility of the individual towards the group, strengthen the students in the group, and instill in them the understanding that what will lead to achievements, national as well as private, is the group and not the individual. The way to accomplish this change is by focusing on two levels:

• Operational: Significant reduction of the weight given to personal achievements while encouraging group achievements, and measuring the individual’s achievements within the group and in connection to it.

• Values: Already in elementary school, the values, shared history, shared Jewish identity and traditions that accompany us as a nation should be instilled in the children, and a common national and group identity should be created for them.

Deliberate and structured engagement in the history of the regional conflict

Current state: The struggle between the State of Israel and the countries that surround it, which includes the national-Palestinian conflict, affects the existence of us all, and we do not have the luxury of not understanding its roots, the reasons why we are here in Israel, and the values that form the basis of our belief in the righteousness of our path. And yet, the education system systematically avoids dealing with the national struggle and political matters. This avoidance leaves the students with completely unreasonable gaps in their knowledge of the security reality and the national challenges connected to the State of Israel. So, for example, according to an IDSF survey, 45% of young adults in Israel do not know anything about Operation Defensive Shield– a significant and formative military campaign that took place only some twenty years ago.

As long as the education system continues to avoid discussing these important topics, we are exposed to two fundamental problems: The first is that many students will not understand Israeli reality at all and will lose their attachment to the land and the values of protecting the homeland. The second – and much more serious one – is that some of the students will search for information in other, unreliable and biased places, and will construct a world view that is far from their national and self-identity.

Ideally:

• The education system should strengthen the curriculum on the subject of the history of the Jewish people in general and the roots of the regional conflict in particular. To preserve balance and prevent a situation in which deviations of one kind or another occur, it is advisable to combine the contents in one organized and approved set of lesson plans that will be created by a representatives of diverse sectors of Israeli society and focus first and foremost on research, facts, and knowledge.

• The education system should outline a way to put the history of the national struggle onto the agenda, and convey politically complex ideas to the students by providing time for open discussions in the classrooms and their conducting guided research work, among other ways. The basic concept required to achieve this is that “Zionism” is not a political issue.

Changing teaching methodologies

Current state: The prevailing methodologies in most schools are outdated and do not lead to the full exploitation of students’ learning potential. According to an IDSF survey, most teachers claim that working in groups is more effective than the “teacher-centered” method, where the students sit and listen to the teacher speak. Nevertheless, most concede that they practically never allow learning in groups due to the lack of time, the difficulty in controlling the class, and the lack of cooperation both on the part of the students and the staff.

Moreover, there is almost no learning taking place outside the classroom, even though during the COVID-19 epidemic we saw that classes held out of doors provide students with experiential learning, and help them maintain concentration and interest. Similarly, there are almost no extracurricular activities such as tours and tutorials, which reinforce the social aspect of education, give students an opportunity to broaden their horizons, and connect them to sites in the country.

Another problem is that every subject is learned separately, as a discipline unto itself, and there is no understanding of its broader context. Thus most students do not know how to connect topics they have studied in the Bible, for example, with topics they have studied in other fields, such as history and geography.

Ideally:

• Teachers should be encouraged to minimize the “teacher-centered” educational method, and incorporate during the lesson as much group work as possible, which encourages the students to be active and cooperate with each other.

• Time should be dedicated to extra-curricular activities and teachers’ private initiatives to teach outside the classroom walls and even outside the school building should be supported.

• We should strive for integrative and multidisciplinary learning that enables creative connections between several subjects and thus contributes to understanding the whole picture.

Preparation for life, not for academia

Current state: The education system regards higher education as an anchor, and busies itself with preparing students for academia rather than preparing them for life. This approach leads to the system putting the main emphasis on the high schools, and tends to neglect the elementary schools that actually play a more central role in shaping the students’ personalities. On top of that, the system is engaged in the non-stop calculation of subject-oriented grades.

Another product of the academic-oriented approach is that in most schools the curriculum includes only theoretical subjects and does not integrate practical subjects at all. Furthermore, the vocational schools, which were prevalent in Israel until the Nineties, have been almost completely erased from the educational landscape.

This is how the sad situation was created in which students in Israel finish 12 years of study without being ready for life or having any professional training. Many of the students who are not suited for academia but rather for other professions, lose interest in their studies and even drop out of the system.

Ideally:

• The education system must change its approach and understand that academia is not the be-all and end-all, and that it is much more important to prepare the students for life. To this end, it must shift the center of gravity away from high schools and recognize the importance of the elementary school years as those that are the most formative.

• Evaluation methods must be found that are not based on dry grades alone, but rather look at all of the students’ abilities. Such methods will enable more students to express their abilities, and will save a great deal of frustration for those who do not manage to attain high grades.

• Along with the theoretical studies, subjects and majors that will give students practical tools and life skills must be integrated into the educational system. In addition, it is worthwhile rebuilding vocational schools and allowing students interested in acquiring a profession already during their school years to do so. It is worth noting that vocational training will not only help the students but also the country, which will gain a skilled workforce that will contribute to the development of local industry.

The education system should take on the task of preparing students for meaningful service

Current state: Just as the schools in Israel do not prepare the students for life, they also do not prepare them for service in the IDF. According to IDSF research, 65% of teachers believe that it is very important to deal with the subject. However, fewer than 30% of them believe that this involvement is taking place at the required level.

Since the students – and as a result, the teachers and administrators as well – are measured by their grade scores, the interest of the system is to devote as much time as possible to augmenting study and preparation for the matriculation exams, and not “waste” it on other activities, such as preparation for the IDF. We have seen in recent years that fewer and fewer schools are sending students out for the week of “Gadna” (where teens experience military training on army bases), and other preparatory activities for IDF service, such as lectures and tours of bases, have also been reduced and downgraded.

Since preparation for IDF service in high schools is lacking, many young men and women feel the need to enroll in a year-long preparatory program. From the point of view of the education system, this is a wonderful solution because there is an alternate body that is dealing with getting ready for the IDF, but it does not make sense that students should be required to use a year of their lives to compensate for the fact that their schools did not prepare them properly for military service.

Ideally:

• The education system has a responsibility to prepare both male and female students for the military service that awaits them immediately upon graduation from high school. To this end, it should recognize the importance of integrating contents related to IDF service, and encourage collaborations with nonprofits and organizations that specialize in this subject.

• The education system should devote time dedicated to activities that will prepare their students for army duty. One option is to allocate time slots during grades 11-12 that will be devoted exclusively to such activities. Another option is to shorten twelfth grade by several months and devote the remaining time until the end of the school year to focused preparation for military service.

Longer classes, shorter days

Current state: The way in which the school day is structured is fundamentally wrong. In many schools, the day lasts from 8AM until 4PM. Many studies in education and psychology show that it is impossible to keep children and youth for so many hours and expect them to be focused.

Another problem is linked to the length of the class. We are stuck to the idea that a lesson should be 45 minutes long, but when looking at it from a practical point of view, we see that it is impossible to teach almost anything in such a short amount of time. It is certainly impossible to conduct any in-depth discussions in a classroom situation.

Ideally:

• The length of the school day should be re-evaluated and verified that it conforms to the capabilities of the students. We recommend that the school day should end no later than 1PM, and then the students should be released to their homes or provided with extracurricular activities within the class setting.

• We must free ourselves of the concept that a lesson has to be an academic hour long, and extend its duration from 45 minutes to a full hour. Only in this way will the teachers be able to convey the material effectively, and encourage the students to take an active part in the lesson.

Improving the education system

Current state: It is accepted to claim that the education system is not functioning properly because of a lack of money, but in practice this system receives a huge annual budget of approximately NIS75 billion. The problem, then, is not the money but what is done with it.

Ideally:

• The education budget should be managed in an intelligent and transparent manner, and the financial investment should focus on the school and the teachers – where the education actually takes place.

Excellence and innovation above all else

Current state: Leaders are needed for any process of change, but in the State of Israel there are almost no visionary leaders anymore who would be willing to push the education system forward. This is related, among other things, to the fact that the role of education in Israel is not important enough. In addition, the teachers’ organizations are very powerful bodies that stick spokes in the wheels of any process that seeks to optimize the system, thereby weaking the hands of the few who try to bring about change.

Moreover, the staff – including teachers, coordinators, and administrators – are not always qualified enough to fulfill their roles properly. Today, almost anyone who wants to obtain a teaching certificate can do so, since the threshold requirements are very low.

Thus, when the educational leadership does not come from a place of vision and lacks the ability to lead, when teachers’ unions do not cooperate with processes of change, and when many educators do not possess the required abilities, the results are predictable.

Ideally:

• The status of the education system should be improved, both in the eyes of the government and those of the public. If the Minister of Education is perceived as one of the three most important ministers in government, the entire system will attract visionary leaders.

• In order to carry out in-depth processes and bring about real changes, the teachers’ organizations must be put in their place and we cannot succumb to their whims and threats.

• The minimum requirements for issuing a teaching certificate should be raised, and quality personnel with a sense of mission should be recruited. At the same time, the teachers and administrators must be rewarded with an adequate salary, and they should be provided with working conditions that will allow them to feel professional satisfaction, and encourage them to choose the profession and persevere in it.

Evolution, not Revolution: Summary and Conclusions

From the dawn of history Israeli society has lived under threat. In order to survive and thrive here, we must recognize what the local reality is, understand what dangers and challenges face us, and learn how to deal with them. All these things, as a concept, simply do not exist in the education system. We tend to look to Western and European countries and try to adopt educational models that are successful in other parts of the world, but do are not suitable for the nature of the State of Israel and Israeli society. If we continue to look for solutions in foreign places, it will only lead to frustration. The State of Israel has unique cultural elements, and the challenges of the education system must be derived from our national challenges.

Unfortunately, the results on the ground prove again and again that the education system – despite enjoying a very high budget – is not run effectively. It uses outdated and uncreative teaching methodologies, prefers high grade scores over any other value, and neglects all involvement with the national ethos. As a result, the system fails to prepare the younger generation for life in the State of Israel.

One thing is clear about the education system and that is that the situation as it is cannot continue. A fundamental, vision-based reform is required here, which includes a change in personnel, educational methodologies and contents. However, it is important to understand that processes of this type take time, and therefore we must forget about a revolution and prepare for a long evolutionary process. The goal is not to dismantle the framework and rebuild it, but to bring about measured and intelligent changes that will gradually and persistently improve the system.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Future of Israeli Education הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, IDSF researcher Shahar Citron will discuss the relationship between Israel and the important country that borders it to the south: Egypt. Based on past experience and political and security assessments, he will explain why both sides have interests in preserving the peace treaty, what will happen if the agreement is canceled anyway, and whether there will come a day when Israelis will be able to stroll relaxedly among the pyramids.

Background – Cold, Cold, Getting Colder: The Israel-Egypt Relationship

The relationship between Israel and Egypt has experienced many ups and downs since the establishment of the State. During the first three decades of the State of Israel, the two were bitter enemies and fought each other in five different wars. The process of change began in 1977, with the visit to Israel of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, which signaled a warming of relations and opened the door to a peace initiative.  Two years later, the two countries indeed signed a historic peace agreement, and since then they have cooperated on various economic, political and security issues.

When examining the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, one can clearly see that both countries have an interest in preserving it.

The Egyptian Interest:

Egypt borders on Libya and Sudan – two countries in deep internal turmoil. It is therefore convenient that at least there is quiet on its northern border with Israel.

Furthermore, the peace treaty with Israel contains an element of reaching out a hand to the West. Thanks to the agreement and to American interests, the Egyptians receive very significant economic support from the USA.

Egypt also enjoys military cooperation with Israel – for example, when the two worked together against ISIS forces in the Sinai Desert. In addition, Egypt used Israel’s good relations with Ethiopia to try to resolve the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which threatens the Nile River.

Beyond the political and security interests, over recent years Egypt has also derived considerable economic benefit from its relations with Israel, as Israel exports natural gas to Egypt on a large scale, which helps Cairo deal with the country’s energy crisis.

The Israeli Interest:

For its part, Israel also enjoys the fruits of the peace treaty with Egypt. Above all else, it benefits from the quiet on the southern border, and instead of dealing with a strong enemy it has a strong partner. In addition, it has allies on the border with Gaza that at least on the theoretical level can help it fight the terror organizations there.

Beyond that, Egypt serves as a liaison with the Muslim world – a role that has reached its peak in the current war, in which it mediates extensively between Israel and Hamas.

From the economic point of view, Israel also benefits from the gas export agreement with Egypt, and does not want to jeopardize it.

When one understands what each country gains from the peace agreement, one can assume with high probability that they will make sure to preserve it. However, one must not forget that peace with Egypt is a “cold peace,” as the two countries are not really friendly with each other, and the Egyptian population is mostly hostile to Israel.

Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, and due to its geographic location and diplomatic status, Egypt has become the natural mediator between Israel and Hamas. This role creates new opportunities for the relationship between Israel and Egypt, although it also presents challenges that could threaten their peace agreement. At the same time, various developments are taking place in Egypt in both domestic and foreign policy that also make it clear that the partnership between it and Israel cannot be taken for granted.

So what will be the deciding factor – common interests or the growing pressures? In order to assess what the relationship between Israel and Egypt will look like in the future, one needs to know the main factors that threaten it, as well as the opportunities that the State of Israel can take advantage of for its own benefit.

Shahar Citron: The Vision for the Israel-Egypt relationship

Swords of Iron: Harnessing the Egyptians for the war effort

Current state: The Swords of Iron War is challenging the relationship between Israel and Egypt. First, Egypt’s role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas naturally creates a situation in which it finds itself in a conflict of interests. Second, since Egypt borders on Gaza and controls part of the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel’s actions in the war have a direct impact on its national security. Above all, Egypt is concerned that Israel’s military operations will cause a wave of immigration of Gazan refugees into Egyptian territory, which is why it opposes many actions of the IDF. Third, the Egyptian government is under heavy pressure from its citizens, who demand that it stand firm on the side of the Palestinians.

Ideally:

• Israel should act in Gaza according to the war goals it defined, but it must show sensitivity to the Egyptians’ interests, strive to reach agreements with Egypt as much as possible, and make it clear to Egypt that the operations in Gaza do not endanger them.

• In order to reach agreements with Egypt, Israel can use its economic, military and political levers.

• Economically, Israel can limit or ease the export of gas to Egypt.

• Politically, Israel has two main levers: It can influence the relationship between Egypt and the United States, and it can use its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia to help Egypt deal with the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that threatens to damage the water supply of the Nile River.

• Militarily, Israel can support Egypt in its fight against the Houthis, who are attacking vessels in the Red Sea, thereby causing the loss of dozens of percentage points in Egyptian income from the Suez Canal.

Stopping Egypt from drawing closer to the “Axis of Evil”

Current state: Over recent years, there has been a decline in American support for Egypt – both in terms of financial aid and in terms of military supplies. This decline led Egypt to look for other sources of support, and to team up with countries such as Russia and China. Egypt currently purchases billions of dollars’ worth of arms and weaponry from these countries. At the same time, it has become clear that a certain thawing of relations between Egypt and Iran has taken place, and there is even a warming of relations between it and countries associated with the “Muslim Brotherhood,” such as Qatar and Turkey. The Egyptian rapprochement with the countries of the “Axis of Evil” and extremist Muslim countries could lead to a strategic change in Egyptian policy, a change that will damage the sphere of influence of the Western world as well as relations with the State of Israel.

Ideally:

• On the political level: The State of Israel is the bridge between the West and East, and as such, it should take advantage of its ties with the United States to encourage it to support Egypt, and ease the sanctions that were imposed upon it.

• On the public diplomacy level: Israel must invest effort in the public diplomacy effort and clarify to Western countries that if they won’t be there for Egypt, Egypt won’t be there for them.

Keep an eye on the growing strength of the Egyptian army

Current state: In recent years, the Egyptian army has undergone modernization and has significantly improved in the aspects of force building, arming itself, upgrading infrastructure and upgrading its training. These processes are making it one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East, and even in the entire world. According to the GFP ranking for 2024, the Egyptian army ranks 15th among the strongest militaries in the world, while the IDF is only 17th. If so, the Egyptians’ military capabilities are a threat to Israel’s security, especially since Israel is not seriously preparing for the possibility of an Egyptian attack.

Ideally:

• Israel must become familiar with Egypt’s power and prepare for a situation in which in turns against the Jewish state. Instead of developing complacency in the face of the calm on the Egyptian front, Israel should take advantage of it to gather intelligence, study the Egyptian army, and plan an adequate military response right now.

• At the same time, as long as Israel and Egypt are at peace with each other, Israel can be helped by the power of the Egyptian army by cooperating together against common enemies such as the Houthis.

Influencing public opinion in Egypt

Current state: With 34% inflation, 7% unemployment, and a national debt of $165 billion, Egpyt is in a deep economic crisis. Nevertheless, President el-Sisi is initiating grandiose projects such as the establishment of the “New Administrative City” and the expansion of the “Nile Delta” area, which have no immediate benefit to the citizens. This reality generates great anger among Egyptian citizens, and leads to many protests.

Parallel to the economic protests, since the Swords of Iron War began, many Egyptians have come out against the government with the claim that it does not offer enough support to the residents of Gaza.

The strong public opposition in both these arenas could affect the government’s decision-making process and perhaps even bring about its downfall – exactly as occurred in the 2011 protests that caused President Hosni Mubarak to resign. If Egypt’s government should fall, it’s possible that the new one who would arise would be more hostile to Israel, which would put the countries’ peace agreement in real danger.

The Ideal Situation

• Israel should prove the importance of the peace treaty not only to Egypt’s government but also to its people. To do this, Israel must try to help Egypt’s economy, among other ways by exporting gas and drumming up support from the U.S. and other Western countries.

• Israel should try to involve Egypt as much as possible in the decisions regarding the fighting in Gaza, in order to quieten public opinion and reduce the pressure that the public is applying to the regime.

• It is worthwhile trying to reshape Egyptian public opinion, through activity on social networks and through social initiatives that will mobilize the younger generation. As soon as Israel has a toehold in the Egyptian consciousness, it will be able to expand its influence, and hopefully it will also succeed in creating a real perceptual change among the Egyptian public.

Hope for the Good, Expect the Bad: This is How the State of Israel Must Approach Its Relationship with Egypt

Since the Swords of Iron War began, there have been numerous claims that the war endangers the relations between Israel and Egypt. In practice, the war only brings out problems that have existed under the surface for many years. In a certain sense, the war is actually good for the relationship between the two countries because it caused some sobering reflections and now requires both sides to see reality as it truly exists.

As demonstrated above, the relationship between Israel and Egypt is a complex one. On the one hand, the countries have been reinforcing their peace agreement for nearly fifty years, conducting many collaborations together, and benefiting greatly from the mutual ties. On the other hand, there is hostility between the countries, and in recent years there have been many processes that threaten to create a deep rift between them and damage all stability in the region.

In their essence, Israel and Egypt are both pragmatic countries, and there are many reasons to believe that they will keep the peace agreement between them, and perhaps even manage to warm their relations by a degree or two. However, in a reality where Egypt is growing closer to the countries of the “Axis of Evil,” getting stronger militarily and suffering from public protests, the peace agreement cannot be taken for granted.

If so, the State of Israel must act on two seemingly contradictory levels – on one level, it must ensure the preservation and improvement of relations with Egypt, but on the other level it must keep one observant eye open and prepare intelligence-wise and militarily for a situation in which the current reality will change.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Relationship with Egypt הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Dr. Omer Dostri looks at Israel’s security doctrine — a doctrine that took form when the state was founded and has not been updated since.

Background — Deterring, alerting, defeating: The current security doctrine of the State of Israel

In the 1950s, David Ben-Gurion formulated Israel’s security doctrine. Ben-Gurion is generally assumed to have based his doctrine on principles that appeared in Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s essay “The Iron Wall.” Ben-Gurion believed that, as the essay says, a strong army must be established, and national power developed, in order to halt the enemy’s attempts to attack until, understanding that we cannot be expelled or exterminated, the enemy finally accepts our existence. Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine, also known as the “security triangle,” included three key components:

• Deterring: The State of Israel must display military superiority in order to deter its enemies and convince them that attacking Israel is not worthwhile. Because Israel is at a geographic and demographic disadvantage, Israeli deterrence is built primarily on significant alliances, a strong economy, and a technological advantage.

• Alerting: The State of Israel must develop intelligence capabilities and use methods of early warning in order to be able to prepare itself in advance of any attack.

• Defeating: Once an attack has taken place or a palpable threat has been discovered, the enemy must be confronted and overcome.

That doctrine, including the sequence that it dictates — first deterring, then alerting, then defeating — may have suited the geopolitical and military situation of the State’s early years, a situation in which we confronted hostile states such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq; but today, aside from Iran, we are hardly obliged at all to deal with hostile states as such. Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with us, Syria and Iraq have been exhausted by civil wars, and Lebanon has fallen to Hezbollah. Thus our enemies today are not states but rather terrorist organizations — and such enemies require a completely different security doctrine.

Over the years, there have been a few attempts to change Israel’s security doctrine. Thus, for example, in 2006 the Meridor Committee expanded the security doctrine, adding the element of protection. But no other significant changes came about in doctrine or in operations, and the State of Israel continues to rely on an erroneous doctrine. The direct result of that error was the disaster of October 7.

In order to prevent an additional disaster, the State of Israel must impose the necessary revisions right away and formulate a new security doctrine that suits today’s reality and can provide a response to the threats currently at our doorstep.

Dr. Omer Dostri: The vision of a new security doctrine for Israel

Deterrence will derive from victory

Current state: The State of Israel has become addicted to the element of deterrence. In recent years, most of our military operations in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have been intended to deter our enemies, not to defeat them. Even in the Second Lebanon War, Israel did not try to defeat Hezbollah decisively and destroy it as a military and governmental factor, but contented itself with instilling fear.

Those operations and rounds of fighting have not proven themselves, for the simple reason that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to deter an extremist Islamic enemy. States and organizations with a Western mentality may somehow be susceptible to influence, but enemies such as Hamas and Hezbollah speak a completely different language and cannot easily be deterred, if at all.

Ideally:

• Reverse the sequence: History shows that the best deterrence is obtained by a clear military victory. Thus the sequence of matters must be reversed. First aim for victory, and after victory the deterrence will emerge automatically.

• Defeat Hamas and Hezbollah: The most urgent objective of the State of Israel is the defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah. Such a defeat will not only leave us in the dominant position but also provide us with deterrent power in the region for the next two decades.

Deterrence based solely on intentions is not deterrence

Current state: In order to achieve prior deterrence against attacks, the State of Israel has focused mainly on the enemy’s intentions and tried to assess how likely an attack is. Our enemies’ intentions are indeed important, but it is unreasonable to ignore their capabilities. Over the years, we have seen Hamas grow stronger and stronger, and instead of nipping that process in the bud, we allowed it to continue because we believed that Hamas would not dare attack Israel.

If we continue to base our system of deterrence on the enemy’s supposed intentions, we are likely to overlook many further items of importance.

Ideally:

• Base deterrence on abilities: The State of Israel and the IDF must strongly emphasize intelligence gathering, in order to learn the enemy’s abilities and discern any buildup of strength in advance.

• Take the initiatives: Rather than waiting for the enemy to express the intent to inflict harm on us, Israel should go into action as soon as it sees that the enemy’s strength is sufficient to do so.

Above all else, victory

Current state: Currently the element of victory ranks at the bottom of the national security doctrine. In recent years the State of Israel has stopped short of true victory over the enemy and been satisfied with tightly targeted operations against local threats. That approach enabled our enemies to gather strength and created the circumstances that beset us today.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel should aim for true victory over its enemies. First and foremost, we must defeat Hamas. We must not halt the war in Gaza before we have completely demolished the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, because otherwise Hamas will bounce back.

• The next stage is to defeat Hezbollah at the northern border. A long spell of quiet, such as followed the Second Lebanon War, is not enough. This time we must put an end to the entity known as Hezbollah, even at the cost of an arduous all-out war in Lebanon. If we do not neutralize Hezbollah now, then in another five or ten years we will face an October 7 on steroids.

• After we have finished with Gaza and Lebanon, we must completely clear Judea and Samaria of terrorism. Tightly targeted operations of two or three days will not suffice. A comprehensive operation, a Defensive Shield 2, must expunge all the terrorist nests that have sprung up there. Only complete victory on all fronts will provide us with quiet and safety for years to come.

Giving the geographic component its place

Current state: As soon as the state was founded, its leaders — both left-wing and right-wing — saw clearly that Jewish settlement is the foundation for everything. However, the current security doctrine gives no consideration to the geographic or settlement component. Moreover, in recent decades Israel has taken various steps of withdrawal from territories in the naïve hope that calm and quiet would result.

As history teaches, every retreat from the Jewish settlements exacts a heavy price. We saw it under the Oslo Accords when we left parts of Judea and Samaria, we saw it when we left the Lebanese security zone behind and it turned immediately into a zone of terror, and we are seeing it now in Gaza. Obviously if there had been Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip — as there was before the Disengagement — October 7, in the sickening form that it took, could not have occurred.

Ideally:

• Jewish settlement is the foundation for security, because wherever we are not present, our enemies will be and they will foment terror. We must encourage settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel, with wisdom, with understanding, and with an emphasis on the north, the south, the Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza.

Civilians too have their role

Current state: Before the War of Iron Swords, most of Israel’s citizens were not actively taking part in the national defense effort. There was not enough of a hold on the periphery and on the agricultural expanses at the border. The emergency squads in the border communities were not properly trained and equipped, and only a few civilians carried small arms.

Ideally:

• Extensive occupancy of land: We must firm up our control, and our agriculture, in the outlying areas as part of the extensive occupancy of the land.

• Outlying communities as part of the border security system: We must establish more emergency squads, train them properly, and provide them with weapons and ammunition.

• National guard: A national guard must be established, and it must receive extensive powers and ample budgets in order to assume a significant defensive role in the outlying communities and the mixed cities.

• New gun licensing policy: The process of obtaining a gun license must be made simpler for Israeli citizens. Terrorism is not a problem located across the border, it is happening inside Israel and we see many cases in which armed civilians have taken charge in the face of terrorism and saved fellow civilians.

Reducing military dependency

Current state: Israeli military industry has shrunken in recent years, while the State of Israel has increasingly relied on weapons and other materiel imported from foreign countries. In such circumstances Israel, needing other countries to arm it, loses a great deal of its independence and freedom of action in security matters. It needs to submit explanations that will satisfy the countries on which it depends.

Ideally:

• Independent manufacturing ability: One of the most significant lessons from October 7 is that Israel must base its warfare as thoroughly as possible on its own weapons manufacturing. Granted, the State of Israel is a small country with a limited workforce and apparently we will never fill all our military needs ourselves — but the more we reduce our dependency on other countries, the more we increase our bargaining power and our ability to act independently.

New doctrine — new security: Summary and conclusions

Security is an end, not a means, and its preservation is of paramount importance. However, the State of Israel observes a 75-year-old security doctrine that may have been wise in its early days but has long since lost its applicability. The disaster of October 7 is painful, decisive proof.

In order to successfully answer today’s threats, we must develop a new security doctrine. Whereas the old doctrine included only three components — deterring, alerting, and defeating — the new doctrine must also consider Jewish settlement, the role of the civilians in defense, and Israel’s security independence. In addition, we must not overvalue the component of deterrence, certainly not to the point of ignoring the most important component of all: victory. We must also understand that in order to attain lasting security and stability, we will be paying a heavy price, particularly at the present fateful juncture which may be determining the country’s future for decades to come.

The author is solely responsible for the content of this article, and it does not necessarily reflect the position of the IDSF movement.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The national security doctrine הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Colonel (Res.) Ilan Dikstein focuses on establishing a national guard – an idea that has been around for a long time but which has not yet materialized.

Background – From Ordinary Criminality to Governability Issues

The State of Israel has for many years now been coping with internal security issues. These include criminal activity, terrorism, agricultural terrorism and so forth. Officialdom has shied away from naming it explicitly, for political correctness reasons, but it is common knowledge that it is the Arab and Bedouin population that has been at the heart of these activities. Quite often the motives are purely of a terrorist nature.

This trend saw a major uptick, which the country endured painfully in the events that preceded Operation Guardian of the Walls. In May 2021, riots broke out in hundreds of locations nationwide. These included arson, stone-throwing and public order violations. Three people lost their lives in these riots. Hundreds were injured and property damage was estimated at tens of millions of Shekels. According to the security authorities, some 90% of those involved in the riots were Israeli citizens from the Arab community.

These riots shook the establishment, which realized that there is a severe governability issue – that this was a security issue for all intents and purposes requiring a targeted response. This is when the idea was raised of setting up a national guard, which would be based primarily on volunteer citizens, and which would serve as an additional defensive layer on a regular basis and in emergencies.

Since 2021, this notion of a national guard has been taking shape, but it has not yet been acted upon. The delay is due, among other things, to various disagreements as to the exact nature of the guard. Such questions as: will the guard be comprised primarily of volunteers or will it be based on serving personnel? Will the guard replace the Border Police or will it operate alongside it? Will the guard be accountable to the Israel Police or to the Minister of the Interior? And also: where will it operate? What will be its mandate? How much authority will it be given?

Despite the disagreements, most decision-makers are already convinced that one way or another, such a national guard has to be established to be charged with internal security with special emphasis on incidents of a terrorist nature. Should another outbreak like Guardian of the Walls occur, and in particular these days when we are engaged in a war on our southern border and also on our northern border – we might find ourselves facing a scenario for which we are simply unprepared.

Colonel (Res.) Ilan Dikstein: The Vision for a National Guard

Stare the Problem in the Eye

Current state:

The State of Israel and the police balk at outlining the root of the problem, even though it is common knowledge that there is one sector here that systematically harms another sector of the population. In many cases, cases of theft, harassment or sabotage are committed not purely in the criminal realm. They frequently have a terrorist dimension, reinforced by a Jihadist ideology. Moreover, the perpetrators of the criminal activities could subsequently, just as easily, repurpose their acts in support of terrorist objectives. Similarly, the weapons used in criminal offenses can be redirected toward the Jewish population in a terrorist incident, meaning there is a dangerous escalatory trajectory here.

We have got to realize that Israel’s Arabs are living inside our country without a fence to restrict their movements, while among them there are many groups which identify with the Palestinian nationalist ideology and are hostile toward the Zionist endeavor. Our enemies from outside are fully aware of this and are therefore supporting these groups materially and financially in an effort to subvert them against Israel. Thus, a new battle front has formed in Israel – only this time the front is internal. Whether in peaceful times or in emergencies, this front could transform into an active battlefront in its own right, as was the case in Operation Guardian of the Walls, and during wartime it could also become yet another theater of combat in addition to the rest of the battlefronts. Despite these dangers, we still persist in skirting the issue rather than seeking a real solution for it.

Ideally:

• Define the issue: The time has come to stop hiding behind political correctness and state outright that there is a serious problem of criminality and terrorism coming from substantial groups within the Israeli Arab population. This being said, we are fully aware that a large proportion of Israel’s Arabs are loyal, productive citizens. These activities cause an acute governability issue across large swathes of the country.
• Define the specific attack scenarios: the homeland front within the State of Israel is a battle front for all intents and purposes and has to be treated that way. These specific attack scenarios along this front have to be outlined, and the threats we are facing have to be understood. These threats include sabotaging bases deep inside the country, loss of governance within the Arab sector, sabotaging of national infrastructures, blocking of critical traffic arteries, attacks against Jewish settlements, rioting inside mixed-population cities, and more. Besides this, one must take into consideration that this front can heat up on its own or concurrent with other fronts as part of a multi-theater war.
• Operate during peaceful times, prepare for emergencies: The national guard has got to prepare itself and maintain readiness for a wartime scenario, although the bulk of its work would be done during peaceful times. This routine work serves two important goals: training the forces for an emergency or for war, such that when needed they can be called upon and will be sufficiently well-trained. The second goal is to nip in the bud the threats in the field, thereby reducing and even preventing the problems that might erupt in emergencies or during a war.

Establish a professional, specially-trained force

Current state:

Internal Security is currently assigned to the Israel Police, however in emergencies the police is not always prepared in terms of capabilities and manpower, in which case the IDF has to intervene as well. An IDF intervention in internal security issues raises two main issues. First of all, this is an immense burden on the IDF, which in any case has multiple fronts to attend to. Secondly, if the IDF fights against our own citizens, a complicated balance is struck, which might jeopardize our democracy.

It is worth noting that IDF intervention in matters of internal security is due not only to the need to protect public security, it is also due to the need to facilitate the continued proper functioning of the military itself. Israel is a small country with a small army. Therefore the very same forces are needed for operations along various sectors. Redeployment of IDF forces from one theater to another is done along internal routes in the country’s heartland. Should there be civil unrest leading to routes being blocked or barricaded, or should access to military bases be obstructed – as was the case with the Nevatim base during Operation Guardian of the Walls – the IDF will have difficulties in carrying out its missions. This reality is a major concern for the IDF. It forces the IDF to allocate forces and resources for dealing with a situation that should not be part of its responsibilities.

Ideally:

• Free the IDF of internal security: the IDF should be freed from any involvement in internal security so as to enable it to focus on its other responsibilities and to prevent friction between the military and the civilians.
• Find a proper solution for all internal security issues: in order to enable the IDF to completely disengage from dealing with homeland front issues, organs need to be created, which will be ready, both in terms of capabilities and in terms of order of battle, for any criminal or terrorist scenario that might destabilize the home front.
• Professional national guard: since the Israel Police alone cannot cope with all of the internal security specific attack scenarios, a professional national guard must be established, which will be comprised of skilled soldiers in the regular army and reservists. It is important to understand that the original suggestion to set up a volunteer-based guard is inadequate. First of all, professionalism and commitment are better when an organization is not based on volunteer manpower. And since this is a highly-sensitive arena, in which any miscalculation could result in injury, one cannot compromise on unskilled forces. Secondly, in an emergency, most of the volunteers would be going to their army units, leaving the National Guard short-staffed.

The Border Police as a National Guard – Redefining the mission, the sector and the nature of its work

Current state:

Besides the IDF and Israel Police, the Border Police is also a force operating inside the country. On the one hand this is a semi-military force but on the other hand it is under the command of the police and its main occupations are on issues of internal security. The Border Police’s status makes it a reserve force, operating in a “twilight zone”, where it is called in to help with a wide range of missions without having a clear zone of authority and without specializing in any particular sector or in any specific mission.

Ideally:

One of the ways in which the issue can be dealt with efficiently is to turn the Border Police into a National Guard. Such a move would require a few changes:

• Rename the Border Police: the name this force has been given – Border Police – is antiquated, since it has long ago ceased to reflect this organization’s role. The IDF is the force that effectively polices our borders. For this reason, the name “National Guard” is more appropriate.
• Define responsibilities: A national guard force needs to have clearly-defined responsibilities with a list of missions and goals according to which it is measured. According to the job description, the Guard would attend to matters of internal security, focusing on terrorist crime and criminality committed within Arabic society. Among its occupations would be counter-terrorism, weapons smuggling, agricultural terrorism and racketeering. This definition would also be significant in the fight against crime within the Arab sector. This is an issue the State of Israel is committed to dealing with, first and foremost for the sake of the well-being of the Arab sector itself.
• Define a clear sphere of activity: The new Guard’s operations would be confined only to the territory of the State of Israel, leaving the Judea and Samaria or Gaza territories completely out of scope. Furthermore, the forces should be trained in accordance with specific regions of activity. The division into regions, or sectors, will serve as a force multiplier, since the moment the forces specialize in a specific sector and in a specific type of activity, they will be much better prepared for dealing with the challenges as they arise, with a smaller order of battle.
• Proactive rather than reactive: The Israel Police is mostly reactive – a problem arises, it steps in to solve it. The IDF, on the other hand, engages more in proactive and preventive action so as to strengthen deterrence and prevent escalation. The National Guard will also have to adopt this practice and it will need to take proactive measures to strengthen internal governability.

Solving the issue of the National Guard’s allegiance

Current state:

One of the factors delaying the establishment of a national guard is the issue of whom it will belong to. Some believe the national guard should come under the Israel Police just as the Border Police is today. Others believe it should operate as a separate entity answerable directly to the Minister of Public Security. Both approaches have their merits, however so long as this issue is not resolved, it is impossible to move ahead and set it up.

Ideally:

• In the beginning – place the National Guard under the Israel Police: at least in the first few years, the National Guard would best function under the police the way the Border Police does at the moment. This would avoid political pushback and would expedite the setting up of the Guard. It would also make sure the police remains in charge of internal security issues.
• Hedging and differentiating the National Guard: despite its assignment to the police, the National Guard ought also to be hedged in terms of its missions and in terms of the manpower and resources allocated to it. Such hedging would prevent the police from using it as a reserve force that can be deployed at the police’s discretion. It would enable the Guard to operate freely within its purview.
• Later on – consider reassigning the Guard to the Ministry of Public Security: after several years, it will be possible to re-evaluate the situation and consider whether to break the National Guard away from the Police and place it under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security. It is important to emphasize that also in such a situation, the Israel Police would remain in charge of internal security.

Force-building – gradually and wisely

Current state:

Considering the Border Police, the force out of which the National Guard would probably be coming – one can see several problems. First of all the Border Police staff is short on power, its intelligence capabilities are inadequate, and it lacks a recruitment organization commensurate with its needs. Secondly, the Border Police operates in company formations. It is unaccustomed to working in battalions or brigades. Thirdly, manpower utilization in the Border Police is not optimal – this applies both to the regular force and to its reservists: nowadays there are many Border Police reserve companies, but these hardly ever show up for reserve military service days and are therefore inadequately trained. Moreover, the Reserve Military Service Law is not applied to the Border Police reserve force the same way it is applied to the IDF reserve military service force.

Ideally:

• Strengthening the staff: The goal is to turn the Border Police headquarters – which will eventually become the National Guard headquarters – into a body that is not only a force builder, it should also apply the force. In other words, it should be a body with clear responsibilities and it should be amply capable of carrying out its missions. To achieve this, the Guard’s headquarters should be reinforced through allocation of resources such as information systems and Command & Control systems; its intelligence gathering capabilities must be improved, including through arranging collaboration with the GSS, and a recruitment organization must be set up to enable large-scale recruitment of high-quality manpower.
• Scaling up the order of battle: manpower is the most important resource. It will take a cross-system thinking process to scale up the order of battle serving in the National Guard. For example: to extend conscript service back to three full years, thereby enabling allocation of more soldiers to the National Guard. Another measure could be to recruit populations that are currently outside the circles of recruitment for various reasons – for example the Haredi community, assuming they would be more comfortable serving in a Border Police-styled force, and in a force that would make it easier for them to maintain their specific lifestyle. Besides that, reservists from IDF combat units could be brought in for service in the National Guard. Besides these measures, it is also important to ramp up the National Guard’s image among the general public, to offer preferential terms for their service so as to attract high-quality, highly-motivated manpower.
• Planning for force multipliers: besides scaling up the order of battle, the brigades and battalions that will make up the National Guard must also have additional force multipliers, which would enable even a relatively small force to achieve a lot. Part of the force multipliers have already been mentioned here. These include recruitment of high-quality manpower, a comprehensive training program, specialization in a specific sector, improvement of the surveillance capabilities and of the Command & Control capabilities, strengthening of the intelligence network etc.
• Stepwise progression: this force must be built up gradually, in three main phases – short-term (one year), intermediate-term (three years) and long-term (five to seven years). It is advisable to begin with a single region, to settle in and only then to expand to the rest of the regions. The intention is that at the end of the process, each region will have its own specialized brigade made up of a regular-army battalion and several reserve battalions.
• Optimal utilization of the manpower: the Border Police reserve companies should be converted into reserve companies of the National Guard. Besides that, the Border Police’s reserve companies should be consolidated, they should be armed and trained, exactly the way this is done in the IDF.
• Volunteer layer: the regular units and the reserve units in the National Guard can be augmented by volunteer civilians, who will be able to reinforce the units during peacetime and in emergencies. The volunteers must also be organized in proper units and they have to be well-trained. It should also be possible to place the volunteers by their residential address, such that they will be positioned to promptly respond to a call within their region. This being said, one should bear in mind that in an emergency and also in wartime, most of the volunteers will contact the regular units to which they are assigned, such that this force can only be regarded as a complementary force. When setting up the volunteer network, one can rely on existing networks such as the alert squads that defend settlements, intervention units and various urban battalions.

Set up an interministerial committee

Current state:

As mentioned earlier, the idea of setting up a national guard arose already in 2021 and, since 2023 it has been worked on in government committees – however the force has yet to materialize. Currently the idea is under discussion mainly in the Ministry of Public Security although it is important to understand that this is a cross-systemic issue requiring a multidisciplinary policy.

Ideally:

• An interministerial committee should be set up, which would include representatives of the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Minister of Justice and any other relevant stakeholder. This is the only way to form a holistic policy and to succeed in realizing this plan.

Don’t ignore, take action: summary and conclusions

Internal Security is officially the responsibility of the Israel Police, however as we often see, the actual solution is provided by the IDF. This is because there are criminal activities taking place which are of a terrorist nature, requiring a military-style response. This is not something the Israel Police can provide.

The current state of affairs, in which the IDF is virtually the only executive body in Israel, is untenable. It is wrong from the operational standpoint, from the legal standpoint and from a democracy standpoint. Ideally, the IDF should be unburdened of any responsibilities related to solving internal domestic problems. Responsibility for this should be assigned to the police and the National Guard, for which the appropriate resources and tools should be provided. Such a move would relieve the IDF of a considerable load and would enable the IDF to focus on its real mission – coping with enemies from beyond our borders.

The most effective, most efficient way to set up a national guard is to base it on an already-existing Border Police force, which is structured similarly, but to upgrade it and fine-tune its missions. As opposed to the Border Police, which currently serves as a reserve force for the police and for the IDF, the National Guard would have clear authorities with clearly-demarcated sector boundaries. Its mission will be to deal with terrorist-based criminality while focusing on the Arab sector, which is the source of the majority of such criminality.

Also, as opposed to the Border Police, the National Guard will operate within geographic regions, it will be trained to combat in large orders of battle – battalions and brigades – and it will maintain a well-formed, well-trained reserve force. Besides the regular soldiers and the reservists, volunteers can also be included in the National Guard. These will help reinforce the units on an as-needed basis. As mentioned earlier, initially the National Guard will come under the Israel Police, however over time it will be possible to split it off as a separate organization with a clear identity and with its own unique capabilities.

The concept of setting up a national guard has been around for many years but now, with Israel in the midst of a war on multiple fronts, it has taken on an added urgency to the extent that it is imperative that it be implemented without any further delay.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Establishing of a National Guard הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“Israel’s economic policy over the past 15 years has been endangering the nation’s security. When I said so in the past, people answered back “Think you’re so wise?” says Prof. Yaron Zelekha, former Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance. “By now it’s no stroke of genius to propose that such an economic policy contributed to the situation on October 7, but there were indications far earlier.”

Zelekha is currently a professor of accountancy and economics and he heads the School of Accountancy, Economics, and Financial Management at Ono Academic College. He served as Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance between 2003 and 2007, when Benjamin Netanyahu was Finance Minister. In this interview, he speaks about the destructive influence of the many years of reductions in the defense budget, and about the inefficiency of the public sector — including the security services. But he begins by explaining how Israel reached its current pass in the first place.

“The GDP in Israel — the gross domestic product — comes to something like 2 trillion shekels and it’s built from 5 factors: private consumption, private investment, government outlays, exports, and imports. In a normal situation, exports and imports more or less balance out and the rest are responsible for the level of the GDP. But in Israel today, private consumption amounts to about 50 percent of the pie, and that’s very low as compared to a country like the USA where it’s 68 percent, or the UK where it’s 63 percent, or as compared to Israel in the past.”

What about other countries in Europe, where private consumption is relatively low?

“It’s true that in countries like Germany and Sweden, private consumption is lower than in the USA and the UK, but their governments are very efficient so that the factor of government outlays compensates for the limited private consumption. In contrast, Israel falls short on both counts. On the one hand, private consumption isn’t allowed to grow into an engine big enough to propel the GDP. And on the other hand we don’t have a government of Germans and Swedes to propel the economy. We lose on the swings and lose on the roundabouts. No private consumption and no governmental efficiency.”

So the main problem is simply low consumption?

“The low private consumption is a result of unsuccessful policy. One of the main factors restraining private consumption in Israel is that the trillion shekels of private consumption are channeled into our own country of thievery, where competition suffers from many problems. If I let you choose where to shop with a trillion shekels, you wouldn’t shop here. You’d shop somewhere much cheaper, in Europe or in the USA. But we’re forced to spend the trillion shekels here in our beloved land of robbers. As a result, the consumers’ money — instead of driving the economy — lines the pockets of monopolists, sole licensed importers. bankers, and an inefficient government.”

It’s no wonder, then, that so many Israelis make purchases overseas for shipment to Israel.

“Israel is under-importing. When consumption rises, imports should rise. But in Israel, that doesn’t happen. Although everything you might want is priced lower by tens of percent a few hours away by plane, imports are blocked. Ideally when exports rise there are more dollars circulating, the dollar weakens, and imports become cheaper, raising the consumers’ standard of living. But in Israel the surplus from exports doesn’t trickle down to raise the consumers’ standard of living. In our lopsided economy, it’s impossible to extract the full benefit from the export engine. Our economy is repressing private consumption by means of distorted prices and high taxation, while the government is large and dysfunctional.”

So what economic policy would help Israel out of this predicament?

“The main point is to liberate the consumers and enable them to freely drive the wheels of the economy, without having the banks and the big importers slice themselves an unnecessarily large share at the expense of the consumers and small businesses. When I came to the Finance Ministry at the start of 2003, the national debt had reached almost 100% of the GDP, the deficit was 10% of the GDP, and the income per capita in real terms had sunk to 49% of the income per capita in the USA — a drop that put us back at the 1960s level — while the price of housing had risen to 96 monthly salaries for an average apartment. That situation was an all-time low for our economy, worse even then 1985. But after 5 years of a policy that stopped repressing private consumption, the real income per capita had risen to 62% of the income per capita in the USA. In 2007 prices were 5% to 10% lower than in the USA, and housing prices dropped to a level of 80 monthly salaries for an average apartment. And prices could have dropped farther if the policy that I’d set out had continued. Today apartment prices have risen to 170 monthly salaries on the average and prices overall are higher by 35% than in the USA.”

What are the implications of that economic predicament for our security?

“The powerful growth during my term enabled us to channel 7% of the GDP to security. But in the 15 years since then, the economic policy has been entirely different under Netanyahu, Gantz, Bennett, and Lapid. As a result, the economy was in trouble even before the war. Real income per capita in Israel, with purchasing power factored in, dropped to less than 50% of the income per capita in the USA. In that situation, it’s impossible to keep channeling 7% of the GDP to security as we’d been doing before, and so all those prime ministers and ministers of defense and finance were forced to cut back on security. Before the war hit, the defense budget stood at 5% of the GDP as against the former 7% that I mentioned. The difference amounts to 40 billion shekels per year. But that’s not all. The defense budget includes two elements: salaries and operations. The salary part has increased in the meantime, meaning that the part for operations — that is, the money available for weaponry, training, and so on — suffers twice over. There’s a smaller pie to divide up, and operations receives a smaller fraction of it.”

You’re saying that economics is the key to security.

“Yes. Everyone knows about the Battle of Waterloo, where the British and Prussian armies fought Napoleon to his final defeat and ended the Napoleonic Wars. Who was the most important participant in the battle? None of the commanders. It was Rothschild, the funder of that carnival, and without him the British and the Prussians couldn’t have advanced a single step toward the enemy. In Israel, our distorted economy is unable to support the army and therefore downsizes it. Divisions and air squadrons are closed down, training is reduced, and less ammunition is manufactured. The 40 billion shekels missing from the budget make a dent that the security services feel strongly — not to mention the similar effect on health, education, and infrastructure.”

Fighting against monopolies just as against the (not comparable) Hamas terrorists

Zelekha believes that the core crisis in Israel’s economy is the cost of living and the government’s unwillingness to deal with it. The high cost of living is caused by the hampering of free competition, by corruption and intermingling of the power of capital and the power of government through the agency of public servants and politicians who favor the wealthy, and by the monopolies, sole importers, and banks that dominate the economy. Under that banner, Zelekha founded the New Economic Party, which ran in two elections — for the 24th and 25th Knessets — but did not pass the electoral threshold.

The million-dollar question is how to fight the cost of living and the housing crisis.

“In fighting the cost of living, there are three fronts to address. The first is against the monopolies and the sole importers, and most of it is rather easy to tackle. Cancel all the customs duties and all the local standards, and most importantly ֮— break up the interlocking ownership of the import companies. If you’re sole importer for a big international player, you shouldn’t also be the sole importer for a competing international player, because then you’re fixing prices for them both. If you’re a local monopoly manufacturing some product, you shouldn’t also be the main importer of the same product because then you’re blocking competition against yourself.”

Is it really that simple to stop the monopolies?

“It won’t be an instant cure. Battling against the tycoons’ practice of centralization, and against their attempts to control the economy, is a ceaseless job because capital always wishes to create centralization. But the government must fight back. Just as it fights terrorism — although those two enemies are obviously not comparable. Even a small change will bring a plentiful return.”

So that’s the first battlefront against the cost of living. What’s the second?

“The second front is our lopsided taxation. Among other things, it adds to the burden not only on consumers, as I mentioned, but also on small businesses. It prevents them from competing properly with large businesses. The tax benefits for large businesses should be cancelled and the small businesses should be free to compete with them on the basis of equal taxation.”

Isn’t there added value for the local economy in the economic activity that big multinationals bring to Israel?

“Yes, there is added value, but there is a price as well and the price outweighs the benefit. In my opinion, they would come to Israel even after cancellation of the benefits — which they don’t receive in the West anyway.”

Let’s go on to the third battlefront against the cost of living.

“The third battlefront concerns the budget. Both the size of the budget and the quality of governmental services. When government services in infrastructure, education, and health are inefficient, it doesn’t help to increase the budget. For example, if you add hours to the school day instead of investing your money in reducing class sizes, you’re cultivating an absurdity. We have many more class hours than are customary in Europe, but we also have many more children in each classroom. So an hour of school isn’t worth much, because it’s impossible to teach in those conditions. When there are 40 children in the classroom, more hours won’t benefit you because zero plus zero plus another zero is still zero. But progress on the three fronts that I’ve mentioned will reduce housing prices even with no other intervention.”

“I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers.”

After the attack of October 2023, you said no more Palestinian laborers should be admitted into Israel from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza because they come to envy the Israelis and they impede the self-reliance of the Palestinian Authority. Aren’t you worried for the many Palestinian families who depend on work opportunities in Israel?

“First and foremost, I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers because of the distortion caused to the Palestinian economy and to the Israeli construction sector. The Palestinians do receive lots of jobs at better pay than they could earn in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, but they work in low-productivity sectors so we’re actually diverting labor from places where in the long run the productivity could be higher. For example, when a factory opens in the Judea and Samaria area and offers wages lower than in the Israeli construction sector, the best workers will go to Israel instead of to the factory even though the factory has the potential of eventually offering higher wages. So working in Israel raises the standard of living for the Judea and Samaria area in the short run, but it freezes the standard of living at a relatively low level over the long run.”

Don’t you think that letting Palestinian laborers work here promotes peace and quiet on the ground?

“On the contrary, I think that the Palestinian economy’s dependence on the Israeli economy made the intifadas and other confrontations possible. Confrontations like those do wreck the economy, but if you have no local economy anyway, you have nothing to lose. Furthermore, it aggravates the conflict when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians come and see what our own standard of living is. They envy us. Envy is human. They can be replaced by Chinese, Thai, and Indian workers. Is it hard to find laborers whose families don’t live two meters from us?”

Then what about the Israeli construction sector? It depends on cheap labor.

“But the problem is that if you bring cheap labor in, the contractors have no reason to invest in automation and in modern working methods. What should be replacing the laborers is, above all, equipment and technology. Technology will enable the sector to do well with fewer workers. I mean not only the technology underlying equipment, but also methods of construction and also advanced knowhow. In Israel, the construction methods are labor-intensive whereas elsewhere in the world much more advanced methods are used.”

Let’s move on to agriculture. You said that you believe direct support for the farmers is preferable to raising customs duties on imports. Why?

“Because it’s cheaper and more efficient. Currently we’re trying to help the farmers by impeding imports. We’re paying for the world’s most expensive fruits and vegetables, and how much of the retail price reaches the farmers? Zilch and zero. It’s simpler to give the money directly to the farmers while importing freely and cheaply.”

How vital are the farmers economically?

“There are many reasons for well-developed agriculture. Food security, retention of the border areas, distribution of the populace, environmental quality, and more. But economics isn’t one of them. It would be wrong to say that agriculture is vital to the economy. But not everything is about the economy. The economy needs to be strong enough to support our values.”

In conclusion — if you were appointed Minister of Finance, what would you do first?

“Ultimately, economic policy is intended to affect the public’s expectations. As soon as it starts improving their expectations, it starts to achieve benefits — even before any material change occurs. So the first target is expectations. In taxation, benefits should be cancelled for large companies and VAT should be reduced. For pricing, it’s enough to grab 4 or 5 big monopolies and wipe the floor with them (pardon the expression) to send a clear message that policy toward monopolies and importers has changed. Visibility is an inseparable part of economic policy, because if we want the public to consume more, it needs to believe that we’re going to reduce the cost of living. Then we need to deal with the three biggest gougers, and as soon as the public sees we’re serious, consumption will be spurred.”

הפוסט Prof. Yaron Zelekha: “Israel’s economic policy contributed to October 7.” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Traditionally speaking, the Tul Karem sector was not considered among the most hostile sectors of Judea and Samaria, particularly not when compared with hornets’ nests such as Jenin or Nablus. However, during the years of the Gaza War, we have been witnessing a shift of the fulcrum of terror in Judea and Samaria wherein Tul Karem is becoming a rising hotbed of terror that is extremely challenging for Israel’s security forces.

Almost on a weekly basis, videos are posted to the Telegram app, showing young armed Palestinians, faces covered, firing their weapons in the direction of the Jewish communities of the Hefer Vally on the other side of the Green Line.

In response, Israeli security forces conducted counter-terror activity in Tul Karem, detaining many terrorists and eliminating terror squads. Out of the 600 terrorists eliminated in the Judea and Samaria area since the start of the Gaza War, 125 were from Tul Karem alone. On August 2024 the Israeli security forces launched Operation Summer Camps in northern Judea and Samaria, which targeted terror cells in Jenin, Tul Karem and the Nur a-Shams refugee camp. To date, the ongoing operation has resulted in the capturing of a copious amount of ready-to-use IEDs, the elimination of senior terror operatives and the seizure of large amounts of arms and ammunition.

Despite the security forces’ frequent counter-terror activity in Tul Karem, the terrorists continue expanding their ranks, stepping up their terror activity and sowing fear in the hearts of the communities in the Sharon district and central Israel, with a slew of threat assessment and scenario projections which are reminiscent of the picture on the Gaza border right before the October 7 massacre.

How had Tul Karem become an incendiary terror hotbed?

The October 7 massacre has become a source of inspiration for terrorists and terror organizations in Israel and the world, and accordingly Tul Karen had also taken a page out of the Hamas’ book of terror and the city and its environ refugee camps have become seething  hotbeds of terror.

The geographic location of Tul Karen poses a grave threat to the communities of the Sharon region, most of all to the Bat Hefer community, which is located only a few dozens of meters away. To give one example: the residents of Emek Hefer have been reporting that they have been hearing sounds of digging under their houses for quite a while. And more – there have been numerous incidents of armed men firing automatic rifles from the direction of Tul Karem toward Bat  Hefer and other Jewish communities across the Green Line. In 2024, two terror attacks against IDF soldiers were committed in that area, claiming the lives of a soldier and an officer.

The new terror groups that the area has been breeding draw members predominantly from young terrorists from Tul Karam, the Nur a-Shams refugee camp, Qalqilya and Tubas. These terrorists were weaned on the vehement antisemitic and anti-Israel incitement of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Judea and Samaria, and they certainly  perceive the October 7 attack as inspiration for more of the same attacks.

From Bat Hefer to Tehran: The Iranian connection

The multiplying terror operatives in Judea and Samaria enjoy the support of various types from Iran and its proxies – namely Hamas and the PIJ.

In mid-May 2024, a proxy terror conference was held in Tehran, in which the Iranian and the representatives of their proxies agreed to aim for further escalation vis a vis Israel, as a means for pressuring it into ending the Gaza War, not by means of diplomacy and negotiations for an agreement for the release of the hostages. It is plausible that the firing incidences toward the Bat Hefer community are part of that stratagem.

Iran and its proxies support the terror organizations that operate in Judea and Samaria, particularly those from the Tul Karem area. This support is in the form of financing, smuggling of arms and ammunition, and knowledge-sharing. The numerous shipments of smuggled arms Israel has been apprehending lately in the Judea and Samaria region teaches that Iran is actively swamping the area with weapons and ammunition. Most of these weapons come, most probably, through Jordan and are smuggled successfully into Judea and Samaria due to inadequate border security – both on the Israeli side and the Jordanian side.

It is important to understand that the Iranians, like many other players in the Middle East, view the October 7 attack an achievement that marks the beginning of the end for the Jewish state. The heinous massacre has galvanized them, Hamas and the rest of the “resistance axis” members to plan and attempt more such attacks. This time, believe these terror elements, the attack will come from the Judea and Samaria region, aimed at the soft underbelly of Israel – the Sharon region and the center of the country.

This notion might be an item on Iran’s “unification of the arenas” agenda. The person captaining this strategy is member of Hamas political bureau Zaher Al-Jabarin, who last May hinted “Hamas still has many cards up its sleeve that have not been use yet. Al-Jabarin added that “the West Bank will surprise the enemy sometime soon, and we shall see new chapters in the Palestinian military creativity”.

How do we prevent an October 7 in the Sharon region?

The current reality in Judea and Samaria, where terror organizations are engaged in establishing armed militias and fomenting another active front in the heart of Israel, is unacceptable. Therefore this threat on part of the terror nests from within Arab Judea and Samaria towns and refugee camps, must be eradicated, the area must be demilitarized and cleansed of weapons and ammunition.

To do so, Israel must first drive a wedge among the militias, and fragment their military unity with the entire body of terror organizations, especially in northern Samaria. Additionally, Israel must adopt a change of paradigm and depart from the common conception that the Hamas and Jihad terror organizations are fundamentally different then the FATAH-aligned terror organizations, such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Furthermore, Israel must exact a price from the Palestinian Authority and publicly proclaim the Authority responsible for every and any act of terror coming from Judea and Samaria. In addition, Israel must step up its counter-terror activity and begin planning a broad military campaign to paralyze and eradicate the terror infrastructure that is developing in the region.

Alongside the abovementioned remedies, Israel must boost its forces along the Jordanian border to restore its control over the area and consolidate its supervision and control along that border in order to stem the illegal flow of firearms and other weapons from Jordan into Israel, while at the same time demanding the Jordanians to take measures on its part to seal the border for illegal smuggling on the Jordanian side as well.

There are many who claim that now is not the time to open a new front while the war in Gaza is in full swing, to avoid a multi-theater campaign. However, such opinions fail to understand that Israel is already in the throes of a multi-theater war, and without a well-structured strategy to fight the pernicious terror of Judea and Samaria, that violence will continue claiming victims among the Jewish people living in that region as well as inevitably – in the Sharon area and in the very heart of Israel, becoming a shroud of danger covering the entire country and placing all of its citizens in peril.

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הפוסט A New Terror Hub Called Tul Karem: Summary of IDSF HaBithonistim Position Paper הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, researcher Eran Lahav will focus on the organizations waging global jihad. He will detail the ideological and practical distinctions among the various organizations, explain how the current war influences their activities, and explain why Israel and the western nations must cooperate against the threat in its increasing severity.

Background — The global jihad organizations: An overview

Global jihad is a general term covering the various branches in a network of radical Islamic organizations that call for total war against the infidels and for establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

In order to understand how global jihad emerged, it is necessary to revisit the 1960s. In that decade, Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb published a call to action explaining why western culture must be combatted. Qutb’s opinions strongly influenced the Muslim world — notably including Palestinian Sheikh Abdallah Yousuf Azzam, who today is considered “father of the jihad.” Azzam was a senior figure in the Muslim Brotherhood and subsequently founded Al Qaeda, which today remains one of the most significant jihadi organizations. Azzam is also considered the mentor of Osama bin Laden; he played an important role in nurturing that arch-terrorist.

Since then, the global jihad organizations have multiplied. Today hundreds of organizations fit the definition, and they operate all around the world. Over the past 40 years, those organizations have committed roughly 50 thousand terror attacks, spanning many countries, and brought death to thousands of innocent people.

Most of the global jihad organizations are composed of Salafi Sunni operatives. The Salafi movement, or Salafism, is a radical Islamic movement that venerates the “salaf” — the primal forefather. According to the Salafists, Islam was at its best in the days of the Prophet Muhammad and of the first caliphs, and so the Salafists wish to bring modern Islam as close as possible to the spirit of those times. In order to reach their goal, the organizations embrace jihad — an important concept that comprises two aspects. They believe that there is the greater jihad, which is the spiritual battle within each individual, and there is the lesser jihad, which is the war in defense of Islam against the infidels. From the western world’s point of view, the lesser jihad is in practice the greater jihad, the one that confronts us in the form of murderous terror attacks.

Among the global jihad organizations, despite their ideological similarity and shared objective, there are palpable differences and even rivalries.

The two largest and most significant jihadi organizations active in the world today are Al Qaeda and ISIS (the Islamic State). Although ISIS arose from within Al Qaeda, the two organizations are fiercely hostile and they battle one another.

One reason for their conflict is the desire for primacy, as each organization wishes to be the world’s largest and most significant.

Another reason concerns ideology, and more specifically the way in which the organization interprets the concept of the “infidels.” To ISIS, even the Shiite Muslims fall within the category. In contrast, although Al Qaeda is a Salafi Sunni organization, it is not at war with the Shiites. In fact, during recent decades Al Qaeda has cooperated with Iran, which is very much a Shiite state, and in fact Al Qaeda’s present leader, Saif al-Adel, is widely believed to be currently in hiding inside Iran.

Who versus who?

Both ISIS and Al Qaeda operate under a system of decentralized forces, maintaining branches and cells all over the world. The central branch of ISIS today is ISIS – Khorasan Province. That branch is responsible for the attack at the Moscow concert hall and poses a threat throughout Europe.

In Al Qaeda, one of the main branches is Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, which operates in Somalia. It is a strong organization, the source of many problems. Recently it has started cooperating with the Houthis in Yemen and, by doing so, with Iran as well.

Al Qaeda also enjoys support from various regimes, most prominently the Taliban of Afghanistan. Some members of Al Qaeda also hold various positions in the Taliban administration; thus cooperation between those forces is full and continuous. The cooperation angers ISIS in particular, because ISIS considers the Taliban infidels.

Global jihad and the regional terrorist organizations

A common question is whether Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which operate in Gaza, are also considered global jihad organizations. The short answer is no. The long answer is that rather than being Salafi, Hamas and PIJ follow the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although they hope, like the global jihad organizations, to establish an Islamic caliphate and gain control of all the western nations, they are willing to approach that objective more gradually.

Hamas sees itself, odd though this may seem, as a pragmatic organization, and so it is prepared to negotiate with the “infidels” in order to advance its agenda. Negotiations with the West and with Israel would never be acceptable to organizations of the global jihad.

Moreover, Hamas and PIJ include an element of nationalism stronger than their universalism. Their foremost objective is to destroy Israel as a Jewish state and replace it with a Palestinian state; and only afterward would they find occasion to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

Hamas and PIJ also differ from the global jihad organizations by their affinity to Iran. Although they are Sunni organizations, Hamas — and PIJ even more so — cooperate with Shiite Iran in pursuit of their shared objective: the destruction of Israel. Such cooperation would be unacceptable to most global jihad organizations, and especially to ISIS and its branches.

Which is more dangerous, global jihad or Iran?

To Israel, Iran is definitely the primary threat at the doorstep today. But as evidence below will show, the global jihad organizations too may certainly rise up against Israel.

For the western nations, both threats are matters of life and death. They both need to be removed promptly. But unfortunately, just as the world is hesitant in handling the Iranian threat, the global jihad threat is also being handled far from satisfactorily.

Eran Lahav — The vision for dealing with the threat of global jihad

Understanding the jihadi ideology

The current situation:

The western world has repeatedly suffered harm from the global jihad organizations, but its view of the ideology motivating them remains mistaken. The countries of North America, and more so the countries of Europe, have difficulty understanding why a Somali or Syrian immigrant, having received privileges and resources and a significantly better life, would choose to attack the provider of that good fortune. Even if those countries do understand that a problem exists, they do not deeply grasp the concept of jihad and the implications behind its war against the infidels.

That incomprehension causes the West to retain a policy that has long been failing and thus continue to offer immigrants privileges and money to no avail.

Until recently, even some Israelis believed that by answering humanitarian needs or improving infrastructures, they could bring about a halt to terrorism, but after the disaster of October 7, it is clear to us that the terrorist ideology does not really soften under comfortable living conditions.

Ideally:

• Comprehending the ideology: Having stood for years on the front line against radical Islam, Israel comprehends the jihadi ideology much better than western countries do. We must convey our knowledge and experience to those countries in order to open their eyes and enable them to thoroughly understand the nature of the enemy.
• Recognizing the complexity of immigration: Certainly many of the immigrants from states in distress, and from war zones, are innocent citizens seeking only to improve their quality of life, and they are deserving. However, there must be no ignoring the many who exploit their foothold in the western countries in order to damage them from within. The damage can come not only from the immigrants themselves but also from their children who are born in the West and considered full-fledged American or European citizens. Only with a true understanding of that complex situation can the western nations contend with the dangers that immigration brings.

Recognizing the power of technological media and social networks

The current situation:

From their inception, the global jihad organizations have known how to exploit technology. Even photos of Bin Laden hiding in his cave, after the attack on the World Trade Center, show sophisticated technological equipment in the foreground.

Today, with many of their operatives living in North America and Europe, those organizations can all the more easily adopt western technology; and thus the problem becomes much more difficult.

Over the past decade and a half, the jihadi organizations have made extensive use of the social networks. They know how to leverage those networks effectively for propaganda and incitement. Recently, with the emergence of artificial intelligence, they have succeeded in upgrading their abilities yet further, and they use the various AI tools to create deep fake videos, to design deceptive images, and to spread disinformation. Some even operate chatbots, such as ChatGPT, that help spread slanted and exaggerated information.

Whereas global jihad organizations once distributed videos of someone reading a sermon, today they already can distribute far more attractive and persuasive content. Such content especially influences the young, and it encourages them to join the organizations’ branches, to set up cells on their own, or simply to operate as “lone wolves” and carry out terror attacks at their own initiative. And indeed, since the emergence of social networks and all the more since the development of artificial intelligence, we see that an organizational infrastructure is no longer necessary for terror attacks. One person is enough, if incited by a video to pick up a knife and act out.

Ideally:

• Not underestimating the enemy: We must understand that even while holding attitudes that seem obsolete to us, our enemy can still be clever and advanced in its operations. The global jihad organizations well recognize the power of technology, and they exploit it. Moreover, they also exploit their familiarity with western culture, and with its weaknesses, in order to focus their propaganda efforts.
• Retaining technological superiority: Israel and the western countries must retain technological superiority and make sure that they stay one step ahead of the jihadi organizations rather than vice versa. To that purpose, we must develop a more sophisticated, masterful presence on the social networks. They are an open intelligence medium that carries daily messages encouraging terrorism. Many of those messages are couched in hints between the lines, but enough effort from us can discover them too.

Follow the money

The current situation:

The global jihad organizations are very wealthy, and their wealth fuels their mounting strength. Their funds come from various sources, such as donations from activists and grants from supportive governments. These organizations also manage to pilfer more than a little western aid money intended for civilians in war zones. Some funding also derives from crime. For example, the Taliban gave Al Qaeda access to Afghanistan’s opium fields and thus Al Qaeda can profit from manufacturing illegal drugs.

The organizations also maintain trade relations with one another, buying and selling weapons and other assets — thus running an underground economy.

In recent years, the organizations have been extensively using digital currencies, and much of their money is carried through such channels. Digital currency makes the sources of the organizations’ funding much more difficult to trace, contributing further to their growing wealth and strength.

Ideally:

• Enlisting technology: Following the money can be a way to uncover a great deal of information about terrorist organizations and can even damage them financially. The western countries should continue their efforts to trace these organizations’ sources of funding, on the understanding that the organizations use advanced resources such as digital currencies. Here too, technological superiority is the key to removing the problem.
• Supervising the aid money: Just as Hamas appropriates the humanitarian supplies sent into the Gaza Strip, the global jihad organizations appropriate the funds sent to civilians in such areas as Iraq and Syria. The donor countries must exert better control over the funds that they supply. They must ensure that the funds reach the intended hands.

Remember that a secondary threat can become a leading threat

The current situation:

To the global jihad, Israel and the Jews are an enemy but not at top priority. For most of those organizations, the main objective is to hit at the western powers who, in their eyes, are colonialists who dethroned Islam.

Another reason for Israel’s secondary priority is that the jihadi organizations have difficulty taking root in our region. Besides having to cope with Israel’s security forces and, to an extent, with those of the Palestinian Authority, they also need to elbow the local terrorist organizations aside, primarily Hamas. It is important to understand that in the local arena, the prevailing ideology is the Muslim Brotherhood’s, which means that the global jihad organizations do not find easy acceptance.

As for Israel, just as it is not considered a top priority by global Islamic jihad, it does not rank the global jihad organizations as a top priority of its own. So it has always been, but currently as we wage a multi-front war and are forced to deal with the threat from Iran and its proxies, any confrontation with the global jihadi threat is relegated to yet lower priority.

However, it must be understood that those organizations still do wish to destroy us and that today they already enjoy a certain foothold inside Israeli territory. Although ISIS has no organizational infrastructure inside Israel, it does have operatives among the Israeli Arabs and they have even attempted to organize a ISIS cell in the country’s north. Moreover, a number of attempted terror attacks by ISIS inside Israel have been foiled, such as the April 2024 terror attack intended for Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem.

It is also important to realize that the global jihad organizations are strongly influenced by the Swords of Iron war. They see it as a springboard for a worldwide war of jihad. Since the outbreak of war, we have witnessed widespread calls for attacks against Jews around the world. Some such attacks have been foiled.

Ideally:

• Keeping a steady watch: Of course Israel must focus on its central challenge, which is Iran. But at the same time it must not forget that the global jihad organizations pose a further threat. Regarding the current war, some of those organizations, most prominently Al Qaeda, are cooperating with Iran and could certainly assume a place in Iran’s war effort. Furthermore, we have seen many times that in the unstable Middle East, a secondary threat can turn quickly into a leading threat.

• Protecting Jews worldwide: Even while the State of Israel itself is exposed to an immediate threat from the jihadi organizations, Jews are vulnerable around the world. Spurred by the Swords of Iron war, those organizations are sounding many calls for attacks on synagogues and Jewish communities around the world. We must understand that our local war can develop into a worldwide jihad, and we must take responsibility for our brothers and sisters in the Diaspora.

Building a worldwide coalition

The current situation:

The jihadi organizations are calling for total war against the infidels — including the Jews, the Christians, and even a large portion of the Muslims. This situation exposes many of the world’s citizens to the jihadi threat, and they may fall victim to terror attacks emanating from those organizations. Thus the danger applies not only to Israel and to the western nations but also to moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Those nations are already suffering more than a little from the jihadi organizations, and they see those organizations as a palpable threat that could topple their regimes.

However, no worldwide coalition has yet formed to confront the jihadi threat, and as of now, most nations are trying to cope with that threat independently or in narrow cooperation.

Ideally:

• Forming a stable worldwide coalition: A coalition must be formed including all the states that are threatened by global jihad — including the USA, Canada, Western Europe, Israel, and the moderate Arab states. Only such cooperation can properly respond to the jihadi threat in terms of quantity and of knowhow and skills. The aim is to have all those states represented in a forum that meets regularly and advances the handling of the threat. It is important to understand that each state can contribute. The western states have resources and capabilities, Israel has much experience in intelligence and operations, and the Arab states bring the best understanding of the jihadi ideology and of the forces that motivate those organizations.

Israel and the West in the same boat — Summation and conclusions

Global jihad did not die with the elimination of Osama Bin Laden. In fact, it has only gained further power and intensity since then, and today it includes hundreds of sub-organizations active everywhere in the world. Despite the disputes and rivalries between the organizations, they all share the goal of wiping out the infidels and establishing a global Islamic caliphate.

In order to be tackled, the global jihadi threat must first be understood. Most western nations still have difficulty absorbing an in-depth understanding of jihad as a concept, and they tend to underestimate the enemy who stands before them. Having learned from experience, Israel should help the western nations understand that the jihadi ideology is more powerful than any economic incentive, and Israel should make it clear that this is a clever enemy in possession of the most highly advanced technological abilities.

Thus we must work to create a strong worldwide coalition. After all, the declared objective of the global jihad organizations is to exterminate whoever is not a Salafi Muslim. So Israel, the West, and even some of the Muslim nations are all in the same boat.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Threat of Global Jihad הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, we will be focusing — with the help of Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen — on the topic of settlement. With Hacohen’s remarks as our guidelines, we will examine the geographical traits of the country’s various regions, expand on the connection between settlement and national security, and detail the settlement vision that the State of Israel must adopt in order to ensure its security for generations to come.

Background: From the Crusaders to Yitzhak Rabin — The Land of Israel as a strategic asset

The Land of Israel connects Asia to Africa and is linked to Europe by the Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of its location, it has served since ancient times as an important passageway between continents and between great powers, and for that reason many nations have tried to take control of it.

The various conquerors, and the Crusaders above all others, understood that the Land of Israel cannot be conquered and defended by occupying its coastal plain alone. So the Crusaders deployed a network of fortresses not only in the coastal cities but also in Sinai and on the ridges east of the Jordan, such as the Ajloun Castle in the land of Gilead.

Unfortunately, that important concept of breadth is not expressed in the distribution of communities today. On the contrary, more than 60% of Israel’s Jewish residents live on the coastal plain, a strip no more than 15 km wide. Furthermore, most of Israel’s strategic assets — including Ben Gurion Airport, the power stations, Ashdod Port, an office for supervision of banking, and the national headquarters of the various armed services — are all in that same tight space.

Besides being narrow and crowded, the coastal plain is dominated by the Judean Hills and by the Samarian slopes that overlook it from the east along its entire length. Those hills provide a direct view of the plain — and a convenient base for attacking it, whether by short-range rocket fire or by a ground incursion. Thus whoever controls the hills of Samaria and Judea is, for practical purposes, in control of the entire coastal plain.

Many leaders from across the political spectrum have well understood the connection between control of that area and preservation of security, and they have recognized the importance of maintaining defensible borders. That understanding underlay the “Allon Plan,” which Yigal Allon first presented to Levi Eshkol’s government immediately after the Six Day War. And the same understanding was also embodied in Yitzhak Rabin’s policy approach. Rabin’s last speech to the Knesset, in October 1995, outlined his national security policy and put forward four principles of settlement that he saw as vital:

• The first principle stipulated that in order to ensure Israel’s existence as the Jewish state, its population must be 80% Jewish. That was one of the reasons that Rabin placed all the Palestinian population of Gaza and of areas A and B under the Palestinian Authority.
• Rabin’s second principle was that Jerusalem, with Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev, must be kept united under Israeli sovereignty.
• The third principle stipulates that the Jordan Valley, in the most comprehensive sense, will be the Israeli side of the security border. That is to say, Israel must maintain possession of the Jewish settlements in every part of the Jordan Valley — from Route 90 westward to the line of ridges.
• According to the fourth principle, a Palestinian entity should be created which is “less than a state.” One practical implication of that principle is that Israel must retain control over the airspace of Judea and Samaria.

It should be emphasized that those principles were set out not by some right-wing faction but by leaders of the Labor movement; and they were expressing a broad national consensus. That fact alone reflects the importance of Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel and it makes clear that before settlements became a political issue, they were already a necessity for survival.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen: The settlement vision of the State of Israel

Jerusalem: A metropolis, not a border town

The current situation:

The historical, religious, and cultural importance of Jerusalem is clear, but the city also carries critical strategic importance. Jerusalem sits among hills, dominates central traffic arteries, and is also the only place with a Jewish majority on the watershed.

Possession of the Jerusalem area is essential both for ensuring that Jerusalem remains Israel’s capital and a central Israeli metropolis, and for operational and strategic reasons. Because it is close to a large portion of the sources of terrorism, Jerusalem makes a convenient base for dispatching security forces and a hub for intelligence activities.

Moreover, possession of the Jerusalem area is vital for keeping control over the central traffic arteries and over additional areas. It is Jerusalem that makes possible the retention of the Jordan Valley as a buffer zone between the coastal plain and the threats from the east. And the possession of hillside communities such as Na’aleh and Beit Arieh is what provides for control of the central traffic arteries and the strategic assets of the country’s interior, including Ben Gurion Airport. Thanks to possession of the ridge and of the Yatir region’s communities, the valley lands of Beersheba and Arad can be defended, as can the Nevatim airbase.

Furthermore, any territorial concessions in Jerusalem would be considered an Israeli surrender and would only encourage Arab and Muslim extremists to continue gnawing away at the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and in the rest of Israel.

Ideally:

• Strengthening Jerusalem’s standing as a metropolis: Before the Six Day War, Jerusalem was a remove border town, a marginal satellite of Tel Aviv. But since then, it has become an important metropolis. Jerusalem in the form of a metropolis is key to controlling the Land of Israel, and Jerusalem must retain that form. In order to remain a metropolis, Jerusalem requires all its surrounding communities — the Etzion Bloc to the south, Maale Adumim and Mishor Adumim to the east, and the Benjamin district to the north.
• Ruling out the partitioning of Jerusalem: Partitioning Jerusalem would not only endanger its standing as Israel’s capital but also critically harm Israel’s national security. There is no guarantee that partitioning the city would actually end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Apparently terrorism would still continue, and partitioning would merely provide it with far more dangerous opportunities for action. And all that aside, nowhere else in the world has such a large city been divided. Even on paper, the idea is simply not feasible.

Judea and Samaria: To become Israel’s backbone to the east

The current situation:

In the Oslo Accords, Rabin divided the Judea and Samaria area into areas A. B. and C. Only Area C is fully under the civil and security authority of the State of Israel. Area C currently includes some 120 Jewish communities, with more than 500 thousand residents in all. There are also some 500 Arab communities with roughly 200 to 300 thousand residents.

Although Israeli control over Area C is anchored in the Oslo Accords, many voices around the world are raised against Jewish settlement in that territory. Much is said about the “illegal settlements,” and about the wildcat outposts in Area C, but illegal construction by Palestinians in that territory is in fact immeasurably greater than Jewish construction. As of December 2023, Area C contains roughly 90,000 illegal Palestinian structures; and there is no attempt at removing them.

Another accusation leveled against the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria is that the Jews there burden the Israeli security forces. That accusation is fundamentally erroneous. Above and beyond not being a burden, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria is what provides the IDF with freedom of operation in those territories. The size of the IDF’s deployment in Judea and Samaria is not sufficient in itself to preserve stability in such a complex area. Stability persists only thanks to the weight of half a million Jews who live there.

Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria also provide the security forces with convenient access to areas A and B — a benefit that has served the IDF well in various operations such as the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield.

Furthermore, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria also demonstrates to the Palestinians that our presence there is stable and dominant and that they are obliged to cooperate with us. An Israeli withdrawal of any size would indicate weakness and encourage our enemies’ thoughts of seizing the area and even expanding beyond it.

The settlements in Judea and Samaria also deserve to be credited with contributing to objectives mentioned in the previous section (which dealt with the Jerusalem area), including turning Jerusalem into a metropolis, retaining control over the Jordan Valley, defending the coastal plain and Ben Gurion Airport, defending the valleys of Beersheba and Arad, and keeping constant control over the main traffic arteries. Every settlement and outpost in the Judea and Samaria area is serving at least one of those objectives, and therefore they all are justified on grounds of security.

Ideally:

• World opinion cannot dictate our policy: As even David Ben Gurion understood in his day, Israeli policy cannot address all the objections raised around the world. Cooperating in response to the various rulings handed down by the international court in the Hague would mean a death sentence for all the Jews in Israel, because if we try to survive only inside the Green Line we will not survive at all.
• Driving home the perspective on settlements: As demonstrated, all the territory of Area C is vital to security and must remain in Israel’s hands forever. That understanding must be made clear to all the decision-makers, and preferably to all the country’s residents.
• Development of the settlements in Judea and Samaria: Not only is settlement in Judea and Samaria less than extensive; it is in fact too limited. A backbone of 3–4 million residents is necessary between Arad and the Gilboa, in order to relieve Israel of the crowding in the Dan Bloc. To make that possible, the existing settlements must be enlarged, new ones established, and the system of roadways and trains expanded to connect all those communities to the country’s center.

The Jordan Valley: Apply Israeli sovereignty

The current situation:

The Jordan Valley is Israel’s security border to the east. As of today, the Jordan Valley is under Israeli control but is not officially considered part of the State of Israel. In January 2020, the USA published its “Deal of the Century” peace plan, which gave Israel a historic opportunity to assert its sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and to fully annex the valley and the northern Dead Sea. Unfortunately, Israeli politicians torpedoed the plan and the Jordan Valley remains in a precarious status, exposed to both domestic and international criticism.

To understand the Jordan Valley’s strategic importance, it is first necessary to understand the geography. The Jordan Valley is located 250–400 meters below sea level, while the hills of Samaria and of Hebron rise to an altitude of up to 1,000 meters above sea level. Thus as long as the Jordan Valley remains in Israeli hands, an invasion of Israel from the east is very difficult because there is no easy way to move massive military forces across such steep territory.

Granted, we are at peace with Jordan today and no invasion from there is expected soon. But we must not forget that our eastern border is the most important one for Israel’s defense, both because it is our longest border and because it is the closest to the triangle — defined by Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa — where most of the country’s Jewish residents and its most important infrastructures are located. Moreover, even if relations with Jordan remain stable, it must be understood that without Israeli possession of the Jordan Valley, Iranian militias can quickly move into Qalqilya and Tulkarm to fire artillery at the Dan Bloc. It is not lightly that Rabin called the Jordan Valley, in its most comprehensive sense, the security border of the State of Israel.

Above and beyond its strategic importance, the Jordan Valley also possesses no little residential value. It is a very extensive territory that can, and should, accommodate millions of dwellers. By settling the Jordan Valley, we can balance the geographical distribution of Israel’s citizenry and ease the currently worsening population density of the coastal plain.

Ideally:

• Applying sovereignty to the Jordan Valley: Not only must possession of the Jordan Valley not be waived, but action must be taken to fully annex the area and apply Israeli sovereignty to the valley. Only such action will enable wide-ranging governmental plans to be established, and the valley’s standing as Israel’s security border at the east to be ensured for the long term.
• Expanding the settlements in the Jordan Valley: In order to solve the problem of crowding in central Israel and provide for better geographical distribution of the populace, the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley should be expanded. In addition, new immigrants should be encouraged to settle in the valley rather than in the already crowded coastal cities.

The Galilee: Expand the Jewish communities

The current situation:

In 2005 the Israeli government approved National Master Plan 35, known as Tama 35. In accordance with that plan, it was decided to limit construction and settlement in open areas because of the importance of preserving green spaces. In practice, the plan limited only Jewish settlement and was not applied to Arab communities. In many parts of the country, including the Galilee, it has been impossible to establish new Jewish settlements since the plan’s approval. And it has been very difficult to expand existing communities, because of quotas limiting the number of residents.

Tama 35 created an absurd situation in which Arab communities such as Sakhnin can expand with approval and even double their population whereas a Jewish community such as Yodfat is not allowed to expand beyond the 400 households that it already includes. Furthermore, the land sold to Jews and the land sold to Arabs differ dramatically in valuation. In Karmiel, for example, plots of 350 sq m were marketed in 2021 for 1.2 million shekels. But five minutes’ drive from there, at Deir al-Assad, similar plots were marketed the same year for only 20,000 shekels; and moreover the land development there was subsidized.

Because of those conditions, the Galilean heartland (leaving aside the cities of Nahariya, Safed, Tiberias, and Afula) is only 15% Jewish.

Ideally:

• Change the National Master Plan: The National Master Plan must be promptly changed and a new plan approved that is based on the understanding that an extensive network of Jewish villages must be developed. Thus the Jewish communities must be freed from the limitations imposed only on them and become the basis for an approved expansion.
• Encourage young people to settle in the Galilee: Jewish residents, and especially young families, should be encouraged to settle in the Galilee. To that purpose, they must be offered land at worthwhile prices and with economic benefits; and the vicinity must be developed with convenient roadways, public transportation, workplaces, etc.

The Golan — Hoping for a hundred thousand Jewish residents

The current situation:

The State of Israel wrested the Golan from the Syrians in 1967, and the area has been controversial since then. Many countries around the world see it as “occupied territory,” but most Israelis see it as an integral part of their country. In December 1981 the State of Israel decided to apply Israeli law in the Golan Heights, and that decision remains in force today.

In 1994, in the spirit of the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government took steps toward returning the Golan to Syrian hands as part of an attempt to reach a peace agreement with Syria. The Barak and Olmert governments weighed a similar idea but did not proceed to carry it out.

Meanwhile, over time, the Golan’s standing as Israeli won a degree of acknowledgement in the world; and in 2019 US President Donald Trump signed an executive order declaring that the USA officially recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. However, most of the world’s nations still do not officially consider the Golan a part of the State of Israel, and Israel’s hold on the area is still under threat.

Ideally:

• Quash the idea of retreating from the Golan: International pressures must be withstood, because giving up the Golan Heights would bring terrible consequences. First of all, without the Golan Heights we have no chance of living securely. We would be vulnerable to threats from Syria and Lebanon. Also, giving up the Golan Heights would cost the State of Israel heavily in terms of culture and tourism because the Golan is a beautiful area and one of the country’s few green lungs.
• Enlarge the Jewish population in the Golan: Currently the Golan is home to 23 thousand Jews. In order to anchor our presence in that area, as well as relieving Israel’s overcrowdedness elsewhere, the hope is to settle 100 thousand Jews in the Golan over the next five years. With suitable conditions and proper incentives, such an undertaking is certainly feasible.

The Negev: Extensive rural Jewish settlement

The current situation:

The Negev covers approximately 60% of the State of Israel but it remains one of the country’s least populated regions. David Ben Gurion is remembered as recognizing the importance of developing and settling the Negev. He even called it “a great Zionist asset, with no substitute anywhere in the country.”

Unfortunately, Ben Gurion’s vision has not yet been carried out fully and the Negev still suffers from slow development and scanty Jewish settlement. The volume of settlement no longer depends only on how well motivated the settlers are to move south. It is now also subject to governmental limitations — first and foremost Tama 35, which makes establishing new Jewish communities and expanding existing ones difficult.

The few Jews who already live in the Negev are concentrated in Beersheba and in urban settlements such as Ofakim and Sderot, where they live in apartment buildings. Thus we have no truly extensive presence in the area and consequently no control over the main traffic arteries. The Bedouin population, in contrast, is distributed over broad tracts of land and thus enjoys control over the grounds and over the traffic arteries.

The Negev, it must be understood, is important to the State of Israel not only because of its size. It is home to a number of critical military and strategic assets, including the Nevatim airbase. Because control over the area was lacking, Bedouin rioters during Operation Guardian of the Walls, in 2019, managed to block access to the airbase and thus interfered with the IDF’s freedom of action. That was a severe security incident, and lessons must be learned.

Ideally:

• Extensive rural Jewish settlement: Development of Jewish settlements in the Negev must be encouraged, with an emphasis on rural settlements with single-family houses, in order to cover broad tracts. That is the only way to create balance in the area and ensure security along the traffic arteries. To that purpose, settlement planning in the Negev must be revolutionized to reduce land prices, create proper conditions for settling, and provide incentives for those who will come settle the Negev.

The Gaza Strip: Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities

The current situation:

The Gaza Strip has known many vicissitudes in recent decades. In the 1970s, Israel’s government established Jewish communities inside the Gaza Strip under the “Five Fingers Plan” put forward by Ariel Sharon. However, in 1982, Israel withdrew from the Yamit district and later the Oslo Accords obliged Israel to abandon further implementation of the Five Fingers Plan and waive control over the Philadelphi Corridor as well. In 2005, it will be recalled, the Jewish communities of the Katif Bloc were all evacuated under the Disengagement plan — and thus Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip came to an end.

Aside from the settlements inside the Gaza Strip itself, the Gaza Envelope communities and those surrounding the Gaza Strip in the northern Negev must be borne in mind. Following the Disengagement, those communities became the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from central Israel; and as such, they suffered many attacks — which climaxed on October 7, 2023.

As of this writing, there is no end yet to the Swords of Iron war that was engendered by that disaster; and most of the Gaza Envelope communities have not yet been repaired and fully repopulated. Despite the security threats, the State of Israel must repopulate the area bordering the Gaza Strip. Some of the veteran residents may not wish to return, but there are enough ideologically motivated citizens who understand the area’s importance and will agree to replace them there.

Ideally:

• Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities: The Gaza Envelope communities must be repopulated, whether by returning residents or by newcomers. The area is vital to Israel’s security and must not be abandoned. Even leaving aside Zionist pioneering ideology, it is a beautiful area suitable for a balanced lifestyle close to the land. The Gaza Envelope communities are actually not far from the center of Israel. Most are an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv and are well connected to public transportation, so that life there is definitely convenient.
• Jewish settlement in Gaza: Although valid in principle, this idea must be weighed against other national priorities and it may be that efforts should concentrate not on settling inside the Gaza Strip but on settling other areas in the Land of Israel.

There is no security without settlements: Summation and conclusions

The country’s first leaders, foremost among them Ben Gurion, appreciated the close connection between possessing and settling the land on the one hand and national strategy and security on the other hand. Subsequent leaders across the political spectrum, including leaders of the left such as Rabin, also understood that territory may be conceded only up to a certain point.

In practice, under cover of “green” programs, a National Master Plan has been adopted that prevents the plan of settlement from being fulfilled. Tama 35 limits the development of the State of Israel and weakens its security. The Master Plan must be revised. Among other things, Judea and Samaria must be regarded as strategic, economic, and security assets for Israel, and their development should be given consideration accordingly. In addition, the Jerusalem metropolis should continue being built extensively; the Jordan Valley, Galilee, and Golan should be settled; and the intolerable concentration of most of Israel’s assets and residents in a certain narrow district.

The drawing of Israel’s boundaries is a decision of concern to future generations, and so it must reflect more than the current situation. Our responsibility is to draw secure boundaries for the State of Israel — borders that can withstand the political upheavals of the Middle East and the changes in technology. Any policy that fails to consider possible threats to Israel’s future security is a policy of irresponsibility toward the nation.

And finally, it must be remembered that programs at the national level are carried out by the citizenry. At the cutting edge of any settlement plan stand the settlers who build the houses, plant the trees, bond with the land and the location, and are ready to fight for them as necessary.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Settlement and Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that national security cannot exist in isolation but depends on a broad system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that making informed decisions requires developing a comprehensive strategy that draws on the past and looks toward the future.

These understandings have led IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Or Yissachar will discuss the relations between Israel and Iran — a pattern of relations that was benign until a few decades ago but has changed to currently threaten our existence.

Background — From a cold peace to a fiery threat: The reversals in Israel-Iran relations

Israel–Iran relations may be divided into two main periods: Before and after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Between those periods, the differences are fathomless.

The reign of the Shah

From 1941 to 1979, Iran was a monarchy ruled by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah pursued a pro-Western policy that envisioned turning Iran into a modern, secular country. During his reign, relations between Iran and Israel were proper and stable. The two countries maintained close relations in various spheres.

Although in 1947 Iran voted against the founding of the State of Israel, it recognized Israel as a state as early as 1950. From that year until the 1970s, relations progressively warmed; and the two nations even maintained extensive economic and security ties. Iran was Israel’s main supplier of oil, and helped Israel lay the Trans-Israel pipeline. Israel, for its part, aided Iran in agriculture and in regional development, sold it military equipment, and even trained its army and helped set up the Iranian secret police.

Diplomatically too, the two countries maintained ties, whether more openly or less openly. Thus, for example, the IDF had military attachés stationed in Tehran and in 1964 even established an Israeli consulate. Today we also know that Iranian legislators secretly visited Israel and that Ben-Gurion himself secretly visited Iran and met its Prime Minister, Ali Amini. Later Israeli visitors to Iran included prime ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, several foreign ministers, the head of the Mossad at the time, and a number of senior IDF commanders. In return, Iranian ministers, commanders, and other senior figures visited Israel.

The upshot is that the two countries were definitely maintaining a cold peace, albeit with no official peace agreement, and they had interests in common. That balance began to teeter in the mid-1970s as the Iranian Revolution showed signs of approaching.

The Iranian Revolution

In the mid-to-late 1970s, religious and political resistance to the Shah’s regime began, emanating primarily from the Shiite Muslims. The Shah had drawn anger for many reasons, including his wasteful lifestyle, the cruelty inflicted on the regime’s opponents by his secret police, his reforms in “surrender” to international pressures to improve the standing of women and minorities, and especially his war against religion and his persistent attempts to turn Iran secular.

The year 1978 saw many protests and other actions against the Shah’s regime. In January 1979 the Shah fled Iran, and two weeks later the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ascended to power. He was a Shiite cleric who had preached for many years against the Shah and had been forced into lengthy exile.

The Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed the transformation of Iran into an Islamic republic. As soon as he took power, he began a purge in the government and army, executing thousands of officers who had supported the Shah as well as people he considered sinners — including homosexuals. Khomeini also lambasted the USA as “the Great Satan,” and Israel as “the Little Satan,” and he called for Islamic revolutions everywhere in the Muslim world. Khomeini formed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, enforced the Sharia law that requires Iranian men and women to abide by the Islamic dress code, forbade Western music, and significantly reduced the rights of women and minorities in the country.

As soon as he took power, it was obvious that relations with Israel would not remain as they were; and within a short time the two countries had become clear enemies.

Today Iran is still a Shiite Islamic republic, led by extremist clerics, disdainful of the West, and constantly calling for Israel’s destruction. In 1989 Khomeini died, and from then until today the present Iran’s supreme leader has been the Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Khamenei has continued in the footsteps of his predecessor and is working to advance the Iranian nuclear program, to expand the Quds Force, and to strengthen the terrorist organizations and pro-Iranian militias throughout the Middle East.

Iran’s extremist regime, its arrival at the nuclear threshold, and the forces of its many proxies have turned it into the number one existential threat against Israel and possibly against the entire western world. However, Iran is also deep in an economic and diplomatic crisis that threatens its regime’s stability, and at the same time it faces many rivals inside the Arab world, the main one being Saudi Arabia.

In order to be handled, the Iranian threat must be understood in its true form. On the one hand, it must not be underestimated; but on the other hand, the limits of its power, and the possibility of exploiting its weaknesses, must be remembered.

Ideally according to Or Yissachar: His vision for Israeli–Iranian relations

Don’t slow it down, stop it short

The current situation:

Since the turn of the millennium, the State of Israel has been waging a war-between-the-wars with Iran. The guiding principle of that policy is to prevent the enemy from gaining strength and to deter the enemy increasingly by means of measured and well-considered actions which fall short of triggering war.

Absurdly, Israel’s persistent attempts to prevent escalation and to avoid a descent into war are the very thing that led to today’s security deficiency. If we had made a point of halting the Iranian threat instead of merely slowing it down, Iran would not have managed to achieve such might, nor to strengthen all the terrorist armies of the region.

The policy of the war between wars works up to a point, but it cannot demolish a buildup of power. That policy also carries the danger that the moment we misjudge the enemy’s intentions and abilities, or overestimate our own deterrent power, we may suffer an event like October 7.

Ideally:

• Israel’s policy must change from reactive to proactive. Only by initiating action at the right time for ourselves can we eliminate the terrorist leaders, damage the missile factories, destroy the smuggler tunnels, and significantly weaken Iran and its accomplices. Israel’s elimination of Isma’il Haniyah was certainly a step in the right direction.

Reverse the nuclearization

The current situation:

After many years of research and development, Iran is now a nuclear threshold state. According to the latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has so far accumulated roughly 136 kg of highly enriched uranium which it can turn, within weeks, into the payload for a nuclear weapon. Moreover, experts believe that Iran has acquired most of the technical knowhow necessary for assembling a simple nuclear weapon and that within one to two years it will be able to develop a nuclear warhead for delivery by missile.

That information proves that the 2015 agreement involving the great powers was not able to stop the Iranian nuclear program, and the reason is simple. Iran will never put aside its nuclear ambitions. The sanctions that the great powers imposed on Iran were not actually enforced, and after being lifted they were not reimposed. The world is currently attempting to ignore the Iranian nuclear threat. It has not risen to the awareness that the threat is existential not only for Israel but for all Iran’s enemies, including the Sunni states and the western states.

Ideally:

• On the international plane: The State of Israel must make clear to the international community that the entire world has a stake in removing the Iranian nuclear threat. Israel must recruit the western nations and the Gulf nations to form a strong coalition led by the USA. Such a coalition can pose a credible military threat to Iran — and can impose strong sanctions as well, such as limiting oil exports to China or disconnecting Iran from SWIFT (the international cooperative for financial communications between banks).
• On the bilateral plane: Israel must assume a much more aggressive stance and make clear to the Iranians that we can attack their nuclear facilities and we can bomb strategic assets without which their economy will shut down. With or without help from other countries, we must exploit the appropriate moments to mount well-considered attacks that will send the Iranian nuclear program a decade backward.

Lop off the tentacles

The current situation:

In recent decades, Iran has developed and enhanced the use of proxy forces — third parties that wage war on its behalf. Thus for example Iran operates Hezbollah in Lebanon, arms the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations in Gaza, supports pro-Iranian militias in Syria, and strengthens the Houthis in Yemen. The proxy forces are tentacles that Iran can send everywhere in the Middle East in order to operate in faraway arenas without being directly involved. Iran helped set up a pro-Iranian Shiite government in Iraq, supported the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, tried to overthrow the governments in Bahrain and Qatar, fielded the Houthis against its great enemy Saudi Arabia, and of course strengthened the terror organizations surrounding Israel and contributed greatly to the sudden October 7 attack.

Israel is well aware of the pro-Iranian proxy forces, but the world at large still has trouble understanding that most of the terrorism in the Middle East is orchestrated by Iran.

Ideally:

• Contextualize the Iranian threat: The State of Israel must understand, and explain to the nations of the world, that Iran is not merely a lone nation but also an entire network active throughout the Middle East and also standing behind the current war against Israel. Only when the world comes to understand that Iran is also Hezbollah and also Hamas and also the Houthis will we be able to turn attention to the Iranian threat as it truly is and find ways to deal with it.
• Begin with the tentacles: The best way to weaken the Iranian octopus is to lop off its tentacles. First of all, the State of Israel must complete its campaign in the Gaza Strip and topple Hamas, thus removing the Iranian threat that comes from that direction. The next step is to significantly weaken Hezbollah in order to remove the threat from the direction of Lebanon. Later, we must proceed to the less nearby tentacles such as the Houthis in Yemen and the militias in Iraq. When Iran loses its proxy forces, the head of the octopus will be much easier to attack.

Remove the Iranian missile threat

The current situation:

Iran’s arsenal of missiles is the largest in the Middle East, with thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs that can attack at various ranges with high precision. Some of the missiles can carry devastating quantities of explosives, and some can even accommodate nuclear warheads.

Most of the missiles are kept in Iran; but some are in the hands of proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Thus Iran can reach faraway targets such as Israel by means of short-range missiles and UAVs.

On the night between April 13 and 14, 2024, Iran demonstrated its ballistic abilities by a massive launch from its turf directly at Israeli territory. That attack included 185 UAVs, 110 ballistic missiles, and 36 cruise missiles, carrying 60 tons of explosives in all. Despite the massiveness of the onslaught, roughly 99% of the hardware was intercepted thanks to the multi-level defenses of the Israel Air Force and to cooperation with Israel’s allies — including the USA and Jordan.

Thus it may be said that the Iranian missile attack exposed both the offensive capacity of Iran and the defensive capacity of Israel. That time, we carried the day. But we must make no mistake: The Iranians are already absorbing the lessons from that episode and improving their abilities for a future attack.

Ideally:

• No more policy of restraint: The State of Israel has invested a great deal in establishing its air defense but has ignored the no less important matter of establishing deterrence. The assault proved, above all else, that Iran is not fearful of confronting Israel; and Iran’s attitude is a problem we must solve. While developing advanced abilities of missile interception, we must also make clear to the Iranians — by assertiveness, military threats, and strong coalitions — that Israel is a country unwilling to tolerate missile attacks on its territory.
• Look into the remaining percent: The Israel Air Force successfully intercepted 99% of the incoming hardware originating in Iran, and that figure is a source of rightful pride. However, we must not forget the one percent that we failed to intercept. If the unintercepted missiles and UAVs had managed to penetrate into the State of Israel, they would have inflicted great harm upon us. And if such missiles had carried nuclear warheads, the damage would have been calamitous. Thus we must not rest on our laurels. Our operational and intelligence forces must remain alert, and we must take action to destroy Iran’s missile system. As long as that threat from Iran remains, the State of Israel faces existential danger.

Keep thwarting the cyber threats

The current situation:

Iran is one of the first states to have formulated a national cyber strategy, and today it is among the world’s most active players in that arena. The Iranians attempt hundreds of cyber attacks a day against the State of Israel. Some originate from units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, and others from independent attack groups. Most of the attacks target governmental organizations, hospitals, universities, and strategically important industries. The various attacks are intended to strengthen Iranian deterrence, to foment conflicts within Israeli society and spread falsehoods, to embarrass Israel globally, to spy and extract sensitive information, to disrupt the public routine, and to damage vital infrastructures.

Israel’s governmental and military cyber defenses block most of the attempted attacks, but some succeed. Thus, for example, Iranian hackers have managed to attack the computer servers of the Israel Police, to deceive Israeli embassies, to damage Israel’s power stations, refineries, and water and sewage systems, and to penetrate into Israeli computer systems in the fields of insurance, medicine, and finance in order to capture sensitive information.

It is important to understand that the Iranian cyber threat — although overshadowed among the public by the nuclear and missile threats — may, if not properly dealt with, result in great harm to the State of Israel.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel must understand that the Iranians are constantly growing stronger, and it must therefore see to preserving its cyber superiority by means of appropriate budgeting, recruitment of professionals, and constant improvement of its technological abilities. At the same time, we must examine the past attacks and analyze the Iranian hackers’ methods of operation in order to better understand how to tackle this threat.

Understanding the Iranian problem: Summation and conclusions

In order to deal with the Iranian threat, it is first of all necessary to bring about a change of thinking — both in the Israeli perspective and in the international perspective.

The State of Israel must understand that in recent years its war-between-the-wars policy enabled the Iranians and their proxies to build more and more strength and to dominate the entire region. The October 7 attack made clear that we must not continue our delaying but must take action now to remove the threats that surround us. Furthermore, we can no longer depend on our assessment of the enemy’s intentions. Instead we must look at the enemy’s capabilities and not allow them to grow stronger.

In the international arena, we must change over from a soft-power approach to a hard-power approach. The USA and the EU proceed from the assumption that if Iran prospers, it will have no reason to complain and it will join the family of nations. That assumption represents deep misunderstanding of the Middle East, and even disdain for Iran and for radical Islam. The Iranians are pursuing a vision: The destruction of the State of Israel and the imposition of Islam on the West. Until it understands that Iranian vision, the world cannot act against Iran with the necessary force.

Once the problem has been identified and the nature of Iran has been understood, Iran’s power must be soberly examined. Although Iran is a significant player, it is not all-powerful and it too has its vulnerabilities. Iran’s Achilles heel is oil. Without oil, its economy does not exist. Moreover, Iran’s regime suffers from domestic non-recognition of its legitimacy; and the multitude of protests threatens to undermine it. Militarily, despite its progress in nuclearization and missile deployment, Iran is not very strong or sophisticated. Its air force is antiquated, authority is scattered, and there are many different branches so that the right hand does not always know what the left hand is doing.

In the long term, the best that Israel can hope for is that the present Iranian regime will fall and be replaced by a moderate, pragmatic one. However, that scenario must be recognized as not very probable. Despite the protests and disputes within Iranian society, most of the Iranian populace wants Iran to remain traditional; and even while criticizing the government, the public is neither truly supportive of regime change nor able to impose it.

Accordingly, a more reasonable ambition is to bring about a weakened regime with no nuclear program, no arsenal of precision missiles, and no proxies. In such a situation, even if deep enmity persists, Israel and Iran could once more conduct proper relations.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Israel–Iran Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Ahiram Levi, a 30-year-old combat engineering soldier, opens our interview with an apology. He has much to say, he explains, but he isn’t quite sure how to phrase his opinions.

And indeed, as we embark on our discussion, the words come tumbling out with passion and pain. However, as the interview progresses, Ahiram gets a better handle on his thoughts and he presents structured and concise messages – sentiments shared by himself and his comrades in the field; messages that must be heard by every decision-maker in Israel.

“I speak for many reservists, all who sanctify life – regardless of their political leanings”, he wishes to clarify. “When I talk about the leadership, I mean all of Israel’s leadership – political, judiciary, military, media. As far as I’m concerned, they all should shoulder the responsibility”.

“No one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to reserves’ service”

Ahiram was summoned to report to duty at the outbreak of the October 7 attack, just eight months after his wedding, and a month after he quit his job. During the long months of fighting he also had to move and found himself contending with a complex series of personal difficulties. Added to this were the challenges from the battle field: the uncertainty, the constant fear, and the loss of comrades, which breaks the heart each and every time.

Ahiram is well aware that he’s not alone in this story. All of his comrade reservists are dealing with similar difficulties. “The reservists in particular are paying a dear price in this war, and this does not receive the attention it deserves”, he says. “I still have a hard time finding a job since no one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to duty. I have friends that because of their [prolonged] reserves’ duty have gotten divorced or have lost their jobs.  There are even some reservists who have committed suicide between tours. And the public – try as it may to be supportive – doesn’t really understand how difficult things are for us”.

Despite the mounting difficulties, and personal costs, Ahiram states that if summoned again he would immediately report, no questions asked. He only has two requests, both of which he wishes to convey to Israel’s decision-makers and to the citizens of the country: respect our lives by giving us your support and letting us win, and take responsibility for the unity of the public in Israel”.

“No more back-and-forth raids”: the reservists want to win

Since October 7, uncertainty has become part and parcel of the daily lives of the Israeli public. But there are those who deal with more uncertainty than the rest. Putting aside uncertainties that are products of being a combat soldier in war, there is the uncertainty that arises from the reservist’ constant transition lately between civilian and military life. “There is a large measure of unclarity regarding the reserves’ service”’ says Ahiram. “It starts already at the moment we get our summons. I’ve repeatedly received summons that were either postponed or called off all together. You must understand that when we receive a call to report for duty, our entire life circles around the upcoming tour. We stop everything, change plans. When we receive a summons out of the blue – it makes us feel that we – and our time – are being taken for granted, because they know that whenever called – we will step up to protect the country”, he shares candidly. “But the lack of clarity doesn’t end here. During fighting we usually are not informed of the objective of our missions. We’re told to go in, get out, fight, desist. This is has become even more prevalent in the recent months of the fighting”.

Can you see any difference between the fighting at the onset of the war as oppose to now?

“Absolutely. When the war began, the troops fought intensively and aggressively, however, lately, the soldiers feel that we’re bogged down in the Gaza mire instead of driving the fighting towards victory. The leadership and the public must understand that the longer we’re in Gaza – the more soldiers die. The troops in the field want to see a return to continuous intensive fighting, coupled with heavy artillery, mopping-up operations, a concerted military effort and a broad seizure of territory; no more back-and-forth raids; no more tours. [we want] warfare that means business and says to us: ‘we brought you here from home to win this war’”.

What in your opinion, is holding back the IDF from victory?

“I don’t intend to address the bringing of politics into the military; however, I would like to touch upon the considerations of international pressure. I understand that this is an important issue – but it’s not more important than our lives. The lives of the soldiers should be treated with reverence. Beyond that, there is a gap between the mindset of the troops in the field and the messages that are sent out by the leadership. As common soldiers we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that our army has everything it takes to tackle a terrorist organization – as complex is it might be – and to crush it. But without the conviction in the imperative of victory on part of the leadership, we can stay entrenched in this fight for another three years with no conclusion in sight.”

What is you view on the possible cessation of the war before all its objectives have been reached?

“As a civilian I would comment on the issue, but as a soldier it is not my place to voice an opinion. The army’s job is to execute decisions and we, as soldiers, are committed to carrying out in the field any decision coming down from the top. The problem is that we see mainly foot-dragging. It’s frustrating. We get up and leave everything – our families, our work, our businesses, and report to duty, but then have to face indecision. I say – if you don’t want to win, then don’t call us in. End the war and let it go at that. But if you do wish to win – let us fight until we do.”

“The lives of the reservists are not even on the public agenda”

On July 1st, Sergeant Major (res.) Nadav Elchanan Noller, an old and good friend of Ahiram’s, fell in battle. This is not the first friend he has lost since the beginning of the war, but Elhanan’s death had rattled him in particular.

“Every person killed is a world onto its own. But seeing such high numbers of casualties leads to indifference. The fallen march by in a long line and most of us aren’t even familiar with their names, don’t know who they are, hurt for their loss for one moment. Unfortunately, it is only when grief comes knocking at your own door you understand its meaning”, he says. “This indifference is displayed by the public as well as by the leadership”.

Ahiram says that as citizens of Israel, it is our duty to take pause to hear and honor every single name of a fallen soldier. But this is only one side of the story. “I want us to be honored and respected while we’re still alive”, he stresses. “We risk our lives and souls for the country and the public, and you don’t have to see the epitaph ‘Rest in Peace’ near our names to call us heroes. We don’t need to be loved as dead heroes”.

How would you have the leadership treat the soldiers and reservists differently?

“I expect the leadership to back us up: in the battles in the field as well as in life outside the battlefield. At the moment the sentiment is that everything is on the table – international relations, the economic situation, the hostages, the evacuees. Everything but us. I’m not underestimating any of these issues; they’re all important. But it is not acceptable that the lives of the reservists are not on the public agenda as well. The day Nadav was killed, the sole issue on everyone’s mind was whether to reconnect Gaza to electricity or not. It feels like were getting stabbed in the back; it’s as if the lives of the Gazans are more important than those of the reservists. You have to understand that the attempts to appease the international community not only divert the limelight from us, but also lead to decision-making that impedes our ability to fight – reconnecting Gaza to the electricity helps Hamas and most of the humanitarian aid reaches the terrorists’ hands and reenforces them. Creative alternatives can be put in place that can protect our international interests but also allow us to engage in continuous aggressive operation. Furthermore, we also want to see an enveloping support system for us and our families. That means real financial aid and not occasional benefits of one sort or another, as the reservists cannot shoulder that burden on top of everything else.”

What do you expect of the Israeli public?

“There are amazing people who have been nonstop supporting the soldiers, the wounded and the families of the victims. Nonetheless, most of the public has returned to routine life, and this manifests in the levels of volunteering and emotional involvement on their part. It’s understandable. I didn’t expect the level of support at the beginning of the war to continue on such a scale, and at the end of the day – we’re out there fighting so that the public can live its routine life, but still, it’s hard for me to deal with the indifference in society now and the obliviousness to the difficulties that the reservists are experiencing”.

What can be done to help the reservists?

“People want to tell us ‘Well done’ and even reach into their pockets and donate. But when they encounter these difficulties in a challenging setting – they don’t really know how to help. I’m not saying that everyone needs to volunteer, but there are other ways to share the burden, like refraining from firing employees that are absent due to reserves duty, despite the difficulties. Similarly, employers should be patient with employees returning from reserves duty and have difficulties readjusting. Furthermore, the families of reservists should be supported, especially the wives, who are alone at home with the children. Generally speaking, society can – and should – be sensitive about seeing how it can help others, even if it’s not clear what difficulties they’re dealing with.”

“The TV studios are like kindergartens”

One of the most common expressions heard since the onslaught of the war is “unity”. We encounter it in almost every junction, on signs proclaim “Together We Shall Win”. We hear it repeatedly in politicians’ speeches. Commanders preach it to their soldiers. Social media posts are replete with it and it appears in musical releases – but as far as Ahiram is concerned, at the moment unity is little more than a catchy slogan.

“I watch what goes on in the TV studios – they’re like kindergartens now”, he says. “It’s hard to watch our leaders go at each other’s throats, and foment intrigue. We’ve reached a state in which the government is identified with the right and the army – with the left. This is unacceptable. I want to call on all levels of the political and military leadership – and to the media as well – be responsible. Think twice before you speak and ask yourself wither your cultivating love or stoking hate; promoting unity or fomenting  discord”.

According to Ahiram, there is a significant gap between the manner in which the Israeli leadership and society manage disputes and how the soldiers and reservists handle them. “There is a very high degree of cohesion among the reservists. We are able to conduct discussions bringing up opinions across the political spectrum and do so in a respectful manner. Sometimes I feel that we have parallel universes here – the universe in which the reservists exist and that of the outside world”.

Still, how can unity be promoted in the “outside world”?

“It is the leadership that must take the responsibility for promoting unity among the people – this should be the number one priority of the Knesset. It starts with the way the politicians themselves talk to each other and continues with the comments we hear in the media. We must shift the idea of unity from a slogan into practice and get it into our heads that if we continue to split into factions and camps, and if we don’t learn how to build a future for us all – we’ll simply no longer be here”.

“I’m needed, so I’m there”

As of now, Ahiram Levi is back at his civilian life, but he knows that at any moment he could be summoned back to reserves’ duty. And it is clear to him that if he is– he will report for duty. Meanwhile, as long as he is home, he is working on his fresh marriage, getting used to his new house, and trying to finally find a job. And in between it all, he visits the troops, but as a volunteer. Beyond Ahiram’s important contribution as a fighter, he has also recently founded the “Unity War Room” – an organization dedicated to helping soldiers, operating under the slogan “Because We Have No Other Country”. Ahiram and his volunteers travel the country, distributing food and gear to soldiers and mainly conveying to them: we see you.

How do you find the motivation to continue to serve and volunteer?

“What gives me the strength is the knowledge that the people of Israel have experienced difficulties throughout history, and prevailed. When you stick to a narrow view – it’s hard to get up in the morning. But adopting a perspective that sees us as a link in a long line of Jewish generations, allows me to rise above the hardships. I also understand that no one else is going to do it for me and my family. I’m needed – so I’m there.”

Now that you’ve expressed such painful thoughts, what is your message to Israel’s leadership?

“My first message is: take responsibility and show us we are important. Put our lives on the scales when you weigh your decisions and give us real support. The second message is: don’t toy with us. If you want to win the war – let us fight properly and bring about its conclusion. Don’t leave us in this limbo because we are sick of sacrificing our lives because of your indecision.”

הפוסט You Called Us to Serve. Now let Us Win הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Italy seems to encounter difficulties in dealing with pro-Hamas hate preachers attacking the Jews and Israel on social media and at public rallies. Some could say that it’s something quite common now in the West; we have all seen hateful demonstrations on US campuses and in central London, but that is exactly the problem, because what we are seeing is a normalization of hateful narrative against the Jews, often disguised as “antizionism”.

But what is Zionism after all, if not the right for the Jews to live in their historical land, to have their nation? How come we haven’t seen such full support, like the one provided to the Palestinian cause, to other ones such as the Kurdish cause, the Tibetan, the Uyghur, the Rohingya, and so on? It seems like the Jews are always the preferred target.

Additionally, some Italy-based preachers did not have an issue verbally attacking the Jewish people for being Jews, for instance, in May 2021, during a street speech in Bologna’s main square, “Piazza Maggiore”, Pakistani preacher Zulfiqar Khan stated that:“…Jews are cruel and they use intelligence to harm others”.

In November 2023, during the Italian mainstream TV show “Dritto e Rovescio”, Khan stated: “The Israelites are terrorists and deceivers according to the Bible,” adding that “deception with the aim of self-interest is part of the Jewish faith.”

Isn’t this antisemitism? It is worth recalling that in Italy the Mancino Law has been in force since 1993 and establishes severe penalties for those who promote racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination. Khan also glorified Hamas and the Houthis on several occasions during his sermons and posted images of Hamas terrorists on his Facebook account.

Khan also defined Joe Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu “the two horns of Satan” on plenty of occasions and in June 2024 he accused Israel of murdering on purpose Palestinian children and pregnant women, of burning them alive and he stated that the only terrorists are the Zionists.

In June 2024, during an interview with local TV, he refused to condemn the October 7th massacre.

In July of 2024, Khan posted two fatwa-like videos on the Islamic Center’s Facebook page where he verbally attacked Italian-Egyptian Allam, accusing him of slandering Islam, apostasy and for speaking at a pro-Israel conference. Allam has been under police protection for many years following his criticism of Islam and his conversion to Christianity.

It is worth noting that on July 9th, during a response to a parliament inquiry on Khan’s activity, the Minister of Interior, Matteo Piantedosi, referred to the preacher’s positions as “intransigent”:

“…he has often expressed intransigent positions regarding issues on the West, on homosexuality, on the role of women and, after the attacks of 7 October, also on the Palestinian people and the Israeli Government, demonstrating appreciation for the actions carried out by Hamas”.

Minister Piantedosi must understand that Khan’s positions are not “intransigent”, they are hateful and extremely dangerous.

In addition, Piantedosi stated that “from 1 January 2023 to 5 July, 22 people linked to religious terrorism/extremism circles were arrested”. It is unclear what the term “religious” means.  If they all were radical Islamists, why not state it clearly?

Let’s move on. On October 10th, 2023, just three days after the October 7th massacre, Palestinian activist Mohammed Hannoun (imam in Genoa and president of the Association of Palestinians in Italy, who was photographed years back with moth, Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal), stated that the attack perpetrated by Hamas was “self-defense”. Such claims were made in an interview with the Italian State TV Rai3.

On January 4th, 2024, Hannoun glorified Yahya Ayyash, Hamas’ notorious bombmaker, sadly known for both developing Hamas’s use of suicide bombings and building many of the explosives used in the attacks, and Saleh al-Arouri, a senior Hamas leader in Lebanon who was killed by Israel in Beirut in a drone strike on January 2nd, 2024.

On March 30th, 2024, during a pro-Palestinian demonstration outside Milan’s Central Station. Hannoun, microphone in hand, concluded his speech inciting to turn all Israeli embassies into centers for Palestinian resistance.

In July 2024, Hannoun praised Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades former commander, Emad Akel, and Mohammad Abu Salmiya, director of the al-Shifa hospital. He also invoked freedom for “all Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons”. On July 19th, during a sermon he held as imam of a mosque in Genoa, he accused Israel of destroying hospitals, schools, and mosques in Gaza.

On July 25th he published a post calling for protests against the upcoming meeting between Italian PM, Giorgia Meloni, and Israeli President, Isaac Herzog.

It is important to recall that in 2021, after several reports to the Anti-Money Laundering Office, Hannoun’s charity ABSPP had its bank accounts frozen due to a series of anomalies. From failure to register in the Revenue Agency register to the massive movement of cash, in some cases to subjects registered in the blacklists of European databases. However, according to the Italian media, the indictment that was launched by the judicial office did not lead anywhere due to the lack of verifiable elements in the Palestinian territories.

In July 0f 2023, the Israeli Ministry of Defense asked the Italian police to seize Hannoun’s money. From the investigation conducted by the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic intelligence agency, it emerged that 500,000 euros were available to the architect who in the past was accused by Israel, without any criminal repercussions, of hiding financial support to Palestinian suicide bombers.

Despite the accounts being frozen, in June 2024, Hannoun opened a new charity named “Golden Dome” and started to collect funds once again.

Despite all this, both individuals are still preaching and active on social media platforms.

Hannoun received support from Italian left-wing political figures such as Laura Boldrini, Nicola Fratoianni, Michele Piras, Alessandro Di Battista, and Stefania Ascari, as indicated on several occasions by the Italian press, but this whole situation does not seem to be exclusively political.

On January 27th, 2024, the Shoah Memorial Day, a pro-Palestinian unauthorized demonstration led by Hannoun and other well-known Palestinian activists, was held in Milan’s via Padova, a street with a high presence of Muslims.

During the demonstration, a resident of the street, 25-year-old Mihael Melnic, opened the window of his apartment and exposed a cardboard sign with the writing “Free Gaza from Hamas”, which immediately caused a wave of insults and threats from the crowd. Incredibly, shortly after, his flat was raided by the plainclothes police who questioned Melnic, tried to confiscate his sign (without success), and attempted to intimidate him. Melnic told his story in an interview with the Times of Israel. Melnic exposed the violent nature of certain “pro-Palestinian” demonstrations and their sympathy for Hamas, and some may not have appreciated this.

Taken singularly, these cases may not seem too significant, but once connected, many questions arise. The impression is that things are being dealt with differently if compared to cases regarding ISIS or al-Qaeda because the Palestinian cause is at stake. While the Italian authorities have been swift and strict in taking measures against ISIS supporters (often through deportations), things seem to be different when it comes to the Palestinian cause, especially Hamas.

Since October 7th, the Meloni-led Italian government has shown support for Israel, unlike other European executives; therefore, could this situation rather originate within the internal mechanisms of timeworn risky agreements with inappropriate interlocutors and perpetrated by deep intel apparatuses that go beyond the governments that come and go?

There are two points to keep in mind: the first one has to do with internal security: in the 1970s Italy set an underground agreement with Palestinian terrorist formations, known as “Lodo Moro”, following the Fiumicino massacre in December 1973, in which Italy guaranteed freedom of passage to Palestinian terrorists on their national territory; in exchange, the Palestinians ensured not to strike on Italian soil. Obviously, this does not mean that the agreement is still in force, but it is fair to ask whether some semblance of an approach like the “Lodo” may be active today with the Palestinians.

It is also important to recall that Italy has been very open and tolerant of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is present and active on Italian soil. The concept could be summarized in the mantra “They are extremists but not terrorists”, which could be translated as “as long as they spread extremism in certain directions, but do not engage in violent actions against us, it is tolerable”.

Hamas is, after all, the Palestinian branch of the MB and it is well-known how Hamas’s electoral victory in 2007 helped the group to transition from a terrorist organization to a recognized political actor. Additionally, the legitimation, during the Arab Spring, of political Islam through the MB only made things worse, since the Islamists have proven to be way far from democracy and the safeguard of political opposition.

The second point has to do with foreign policy, since Italy’s presence in Libya and Somalia has been closely related to the Islamists and those Middle Eastern countries supporting them. For instance, as exposed in November 2020 by Israeli intelligence analyst Oded Berkowitz, Italy provided the Islamist-led GNA government in Tripoli with diplomatic, intelligence, and counter-terror assistance, side to side with Turkey, while Qatar provided the GNA with economic support. The table shared by Berkowitz came from the US AFRICOM data.

Another interesting issue is the one concerning the liberation of Silvia Romano, an Italian charity worker kidnapped in Kenya in 2018 by al-Shabab terrorists and taken to Somalia. In May 2020, Romano was freed under unclear circumstances, and a photo of her wearing a Turkish special forces vest sparked controversies, with some Italian media accusing the government of having relied on Turkey. The Italian authorities claimed that Romano was recovered by their intelligence and that the photo was fake. However, the Turkish media reported otherwise, publishing the photo and stating that its intelligence (MIT), was primarily involved in the operation.

It is well known that Qatar and Turkey are, together with Iran, the main sponsors of Hamas. The declarations of Turkish President Erdogan and the role played by Doha in supporting the Palestinian terrorist organization leave no doubt. The massacre of October 7th upsets the political-strategic balance between the West and the Middle East. Anti-Semitism has emerged, side by side with hatred towards the Jewish state; Hamas showed its real face as a ruthless, Nazi-sympathizer, terrorist organization deserving to be dealt with as such, rather than as a legitimate political interlocutor, just like ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Unfortunately, until now, unlike what happened over the years with ISIS, very few interventions have been seen against Hamas supporters. The only known case is the deportation of 56-year-old Algerian citizen Amor Branes, in April 2024, for sharing pro-Hamas and jihadist content on social media. Therefore, it would be appropriate to see more arrests and expulsions of Hamas supporters, because its ideology and operational activity is not less dangerous than the one carried out by ISIS or al-Qaeda.

It must also be noted that al-Aqsa Brigades member (leader of the “Rapid Response-Tulkarem Unit”), Yaesh Anan, and two accomplices, were arrested in central Italy in January 2024 only after a request for extradition forwarded by Israel. Anan was directly in touch from Italian soil with Al-Aqsa chief commander in Lebanon, Mounir al-Maqdah, with whom he frequently talked on video call using the Whatsapp application. The investigation papers indicate that Anan and his cell were collecting funds and planning a series of attacks against Israeli politicians, the former war cabinet, and an armed assault like the one that occurred in southern Israel on October 7th, 2023, this time against the Israeli settlement in Avnei Hefetz. The judges of the Italian Appeal Court of L’Aquila refused Israel’s request for extradition, “due to the difficult conditions of Israeli prisons”.

The issue of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli narrative and activity being spread on behalf of Islamist preachers and activists involves the whole European continent, and not just Italy.

European authorities have been tightening the net on Islamist extremist groups, with high-profile raids, deportations, financial restrictions, and a crackdown on their online activities. France and Germany seem to be the two countries that have so far taken a tougher stance on this type of activity.

For instance, in February 2024, Mahjoub Mahjoubi, an imam in the small southern French town of Bagnols-sur-Ceze, was deported to Tunisia, less than 12 hours after his arrest. In his sermons, the preacher encouraged discrimination against women, radicalization, and he referred to Jewish people as “the enemy”.

In April 2024, Algerian citizen Mohamad Tatait, who held the role of imam at a mosque in Toulouse, was expelled from France after being accused of incitement to hatred and discrimination against Jews.

In July 2024, a 37-year-old Senegalese citizen was arrested in Aube before being expelled. The individual was known to French authorities for his radical speeches and caused unrest in Troyes mosques and relayed, on his social networks where he was followed by thousands of people, messages inciting intolerance and hatred.

In Germany, authorities have taken strong measures against pro-Hamas and pro-Hezbollah supporters, limiting pro-Palestinian marches, while schools have been granted the power to place bans on Palestinian flags and keffiyeh scarves. Across the country, using the pro-Palestinian slogan “From the river to the sea” is a criminal offense. In addition, recent arrests have also been made against Hezbollah cells, while the Shia Islamic Center in Hamburg was shut down.

It would be desirable to see a tougher hand from Italy towards those who support and flank Palestinian and Islamist terrorism, and against those who spread hate speech towards Jews and Israel, because otherwise the situation will very likely get worse in the coming months.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The timid Italian approach in tackling Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The following essay is not intended to be a comprehensive tour d’horizon of the post-independence evolution of the relations between Israel and India, nor even of the overall scope of defense ties that have developed so rapidly since the early 1990s. Rather, it has a narrower focus: The importance that the maritime theater—i.e. the Indian Ocean and its adjacent waters—has for both countries and the scope of cooperation and potential benefits that could accrue to both from close collaboration in this sphere.

However, some deference to the wider general context cannot be totally avoided.

From a chilly past to a cordial present

Just over a month after the October 7 atrocity, the Washington Post ran an article illustrating the remarkable metamorphosis that has emerged in Indo-Israeli relations over the previous three decades.

Headlined India’s Mideast rethink, it noted: “With war raging in Gaza, India’s embrace of Israel’s security concerns has underscored how dramatically the relationship between the two countries has developed since its chilly beginning…”.

Underlining these frosting beginnings of the bilateral ties, it wrote: For most of independent India’s history, New Delhi had no diplomatic relations with Israel. Just over 40 years ago, India even issued a postage stamp depicting the Indian and Palestinian flags flying side by side and the words “Solidarity with the Palestinian people.”

By contrast, today: “Today, Indian and Israeli flags are displayed together at rallies demonstrating solidarity with Israel after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack. The two countries have developed significant military ties…[Prime Minister]Modi immediately condemned the Hamas attack and later reiterated that the “people of India stand firmly with Israel in this difficult hour.”

The change in the ties between the two countries has indeed been remarkable and over the last two decades, I have written extensively on the strategic rationale for strong ties between a resurgent India and the Jewish state—ties I once dubbed as the bond between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s most beleaguered one.

I identified the areas that, to me, seemed particularly amenable for future (and today, ongoing, cooperation) from agriculture, via water management and rural development to hi-tech and defense collaboration. There was one specific sphere —then rarely discussed—that I raised repeatedly, that of naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

The marine theatre: Predicting future trends

Back in 1999, in a policy paper on Indo-Israeli Strategic Cooperation, I wrote that “Indo-Israeli naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean geared toward the development of a logistic infrastructure that would facilitate sea-borne second strike capability…” is a field that should be given “serious consideration”.  Elsewhere, in the same paper, I reiterated this, proposing: “Spheres which, prima facie, appear particularly amenable for bilateral collaboration between India and Israel and worthy of decisive US support, include activities such as Indo-Israeli naval activity” involving “development of effective second-strike capabilities (particularly sea- and submarine-borne)”.

Almost a decade later (2008), I once again underscored the need and the potential of such bilateral cooperation: “Co-operation in the naval sphere offers particularly intriguing possibilities which could serve both India’s declared aim to develop a blue-water navy and Israel’s increasingly challenging geo-strategic needs. Given its minuscule territorial dimensions, especially after recent withdrawals in its vain quest for peace, Israel is being compelled to turn to the marine theatre for strategic depth allowing dispersal of weapons systems for second strike capability.”

It is thus gratifying to see the growing acceptance of this perspective and its ongoing application on an ever-widening scale—not only by Israelis, but by senior Indian military figures as well.

Shared strategic & security threats

Thus, in 2011, in an article headlined India and Israel Boost Naval Ties, Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand wrote: “India shares some common strategic and security threats with Israel and its desire to get closer to the US has also helped in moving the ties forward”. Among these “common interests”, he mentions “the growing interest of the two states in the Indian Ocean”.

Several years later (2016), Rear Admiral Sushil Ramsay (Retd), in a piece entitled –Indo-Israel Defence Co-operation – Naval Perspective, wrote: “The military business between the two nations has flourished to multi-billion dollar enterprise, giving rise to not just wide ranging acquisitions but several successful state-of-the-art joint ventures on munitions, military hardware, core systems”. Underscoring the extraordinary speed at which the bilateral ties had developed, he observed: “As a result of the growing bilateral relations between the two countries over the past two decades, India has emerged as the largest buyer of Israeli military hardware, equipment and consequently Israel has leapfrogged to being the second-largest defence supplier to India after Russia.”

Significantly, some sources have estimated that in some years, Israel has even surpassed Russia as India’s leading arms supplier[1]. A substantial portion of this burgeoning trade has included billion-dollar contracts for the supply of missiles and radar systems for the Indian Navy’s destroyers and corvettes[2].

Tracing the course of the evolution of the Indo-Israel nexus, a Time magazine article, How India Became Pro-Israel comments: “In recent years, India has purchased about $2 billion worth of weapons annually from Israel. India has bought missiles, drones, bombs, and border-security equipment, and is now the Israeli defense industry’s biggest foreign customer.”

The emerging strategic stature of the Israeli navy

To be sure the list of armaments supplied by Israel to India, or developed with India on the basis of Israeli know-how—including naval-related weapons systems—is long and diverse. But as impressive as the multi-billion catalog might be, I would rather turn the focus less on the technical and more on the conceptual in approaching the discussion of the potential benefits and the pressing need for cooperation between Israel and India.

In this regard, it should be recalled the strategic importance of Israel’s navy has only emerged relatively recently. Indeed for much of the IDF’s history, with the exception of its elite marine commando unit, it was usually considered a service of lesser importance, relative to its ground forces and certainly to its dominant air force. However, in recent years with changes in the nature and capabilities of Israel’s adversaries and the advances in technology, the navy is emerging as a major—indeed, vital—strategic arm for Israel’s defense—particularly regarding the provision of a mobile and elusive platform for second-strike capability in the vast expanses of the ocean,  rather than in static locations on dry land.

Indeed, the enhanced status of the Navy can perhaps be gauged by the fact that the most expensive weapons in the entire IDF—new Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines—are designated for its use. According to several sources, the three new vessels on order are priced at a total of almost 3.5 billion dollars[3] a price tag that dwarfs that of the IAF’s much-vaunted F-35, its most sophisticated and costly aircraft.

The same—only more so

The developments in Israel’s strategic milieu in recent years have done nothing to diminish the validity of the arguments I advanced 25 years ago for naval cooperation between India and Israel. To the contrary, with time, the arguments for such collaboration have only been thrown into sharper relief.

The implications of Israel’s diminutive geographic size have been exacerbated by the acquisition by its non-state adversaries—Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah—of an increasingly menacing array of missiles, rockets, and UAVs, some of them with precision guidance. Virtually all of Israel’s land-based strategic installations are within the range of some form of airborne weaponry. Indeed, this was vividly underscored on April 13, when Iran launched over 300 projectiles at the Jewish state. Although virtually all were intercepted by Israel’s air-defense systems—with some aid from allies—this is no guarantee for the future. Of particular significance is the fact that one of the IAFs largest bases, Nevatim, where three squadrons of the vital F-35 are stationed, was targeted. Although only minor damage was sustained, this again cannot be assumed to be a guarantee for the future. Indeed, one cannot discount the possibility that future attacks may be so intense that they may—at least, partially—overwhelm the air defenses protecting the country, and impair—perhaps even cripple—its ability to retaliate with a devastating second strike launched from static land locations. Indeed, in this regard, it should be recalled that one of the targets in the April 13 attack was the runways at Nevatim air base, which, in fact, were slightly damaged—revealing the focus enemy intentions, and future direction of their efforts.

More so (cont.)

But better, and more abundant, armaments in the hands of old enemies are not the only reason that the marine theater is acquiring growing strategic significance. New adversaries, who had no previous role in the conflict, have entered the battle, endangering both Israeli and Indian interests. These are the Iranian proxies, the Houthis in Yemen who have lately attacked both southern Israel and ships in the waters of the Indian Ocean and the adjoining Red Sea.

The Houthi leadership has already openly proclaimed that their intention is to disrupt international shipping to bring pressure to bear on Israel to halt its military operations against Hamas in Gaza. Indeed in March, the Houthi leaders declared that it was expanding its operations to prevent Israel-linked ships from passing through the Indian Ocean toward the Cape of Good Hope.

As Oshrit Birvadker points out, India too has been adversely impacted by Houthi maritime operations. She notes: “The Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea since November have slowed commerce between Asia and Europe and roused concern in India’s government.”

Warning that, since much of India’s economy “relies on maritime commerce”, India could lose “tens of billions of dollars this year because of a war far from its borders…[as the] Houthi attacks have forced Indian ships to sail around the Cape of Good Hope instead of using the shorter route between Asia and Europe…through the Suez Canal”.

Significantly, on several different occasions, the Indian navy has responded to distress calls from commercial ships attacked by Houthi missiles, underscoring the shared perils to which both nations are subject.[4]

Beyond the horizon, below the surface

The current military confrontation between the Houthis, supported and guided by Iran, and Israel and the US led international maritime coalition highlights the dangerousness of the threat to global and Israeli freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian ocean. It clarifies the importance of the strategic alliance between Israel and the US and of the decision to include Israel in the area of responsibility of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). The American fleet in the region is by far the most powerful and Israel should continue to invest in enhancing the cooperation with the US in this context and build together with the US, other democracies (including India) and the pragmatic Arab states a regional naval security regime that would guarantee safe passage in international waters. This is necessary among other reasons, also to enable the implementation of the grand plan of establishing a maritime and ground route of trade from India to Europe through the Arab peninsula, Jordan and Israel.

But at the same time, as the growing polarization of US politics and commensurate anti-Israel sentiment in vocal sectors of the American public underscore the precariousness of Israel’s almost exclusive strategic reliance on the US—see my 2001 “Diversifying Strategic Reliance”, diminishing US strategic support for Israel because of a widening gap in the perceived national interests of Israel and America is a contingency that must be planned for. In this regard, India should be seen as a vital partner in future strategic enterprises—in which the naval sector should play a crucial role. Of course, none of this is intended that India could replace the US as Israel’s major strategic partner—and the proposal here is that it should play the role of an important strategic supplement rather than an overall strategic alternative.

Of course, as a huge sub-continent, with an almost 8000 km shoreline to secure and protect, India’s maritime requirements are very different from those of Israel. These vast differences do not diminish the scope of potential cooperation in numerous strategically relevant spheres, including the naval sphere.

Indeed, India has embarked on an ambitious initiative of naval construction, including nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers. The Indian Navy currently operates both a domestically produced nuclear submarine and two aircraft carriers, with additional vessels under various stages of development and/or commission. (Significantly, India is the only country outside the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to have built a nuclear-powered submarine.)

Reaching for the moon?

Although these projects have not been entirely without hitches, they have facilitated impressive advancement in the capabilities of the Indian navy, which New Delhi increasingly sees as vital in meeting security challenges from Pakistan and strategic challenges from China. Clearly, with its proven technological capabilities, there is little doubt that Israel is in a unique position to make a far-reaching contribution to these endeavors.

With Joe Biden under intense pressure from the “woke’ left wing of his party, and the support for Israel increasingly partisan, the case for forging closer bonds with India, already the world’s fifth-largest economy (and predicted by some to soon be the third) becomes an evermore compelling prospect.

With the differing strengths and weaknesses of the two countries serving to complement/ supplement each other, it is not beyond the realm of feasibility to envisage Israel acquiring the know-how to co-produce its own nuclear submarine fleet to comprise what would, arguably, be the ultimate second-strike capability. Those, who might raise a skeptical eyebrow and scoff dismissively at such ambitious objectives, should recall that Israel has already proven that it has the ability to manufacture a top-class supersonic fighter, launch satellites, produce unrivaled multi-layer missile defense systems…and even reach the moon.

With a GDP significantly of over US 500 billion dollars (well over double that of 2010) and a GDP per capita above that of the UK, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy)—something inconceivable less than two decades ago—things that seem fanciful today should not be dismissed as such, especially if there is a strong security imperative driving it)

In a recent AP News report, Vice Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla, formerly head of India’s southern naval command addressed India’s growing emphasis on its naval forces and the rationale for the Indian Navy’s operations following the previously mentioned Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. “We are not doing it only out of altruism: he asserted, “Unless you are a maritime power you can never aspire to be a global power”.

This, of course, brings the discussion back to the introductory excerpt and the crucial question it embodies: Who will dominate the Indian Ocean, the eastern approaches to Europe, and south and central Asia–powers committed to the preservation of enlightened values of moderation and restraint, or powers committed to fundamentalism and fanaticism, who would impose their regressive values upon their surroundings…and beyond?

In this respect, Indo-Israel naval cooperation can certainly comprise a sturdy bulwark against the menacing rise of these dark forces.

[1] see here: https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=68&h=A-Friend-In-Deed , https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/israels-arms-sales-to-india , https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/israel-likely-to-become-india-s-largest-arms-supplier/story-tZQFenVzYWzaQFnPqbznqM.html
[2] see here: https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/israel-to-supply-missile-defense-systems-to-indias-navy-for-770-million/ , https://swarajyamag.com/defence/explained-the-indian-navy-new-game-changing-radar
[3] see here: https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/01/20/israel-inks-34-billion-submarine-deal-with-germany/ , https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-signs-scandal-ridden-e3-billion-deal-with-germany-to-buy-new-submarines/ , https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-signs-34-bln-submarines-deal-with-thyssenkrupp-2022-01-20/
[4] see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-M_Ml-WwxY , https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXyK5hBjWkI

הפוסט LET MY PEOPLE KNOW: Israel & India together at sea הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After eight months of war in the Gaza Strip, three kinds of zones have taken shape there, where each one functions differently from the civilian perspective. In parts thereof, civil administration is still in Hamas hands and civilian agents from within the local leadership, which are functioning on its behalf. In other parts, administration is in the hands of local agents with looser links to Hamas. Other areas have become pockets of chaos. Wherever the IDF is absent, the municipalities are the leading factor in managing the civilian life. These bear variable degrees of affinity to Hamas. And also the international aid organizations play a key part in this respect.

The war has proven that degradation of Hamas’ military centers of power has also resulted in gradual degradation of the civilian systems that relied on it, and that Hamas’ strength was due, inter alia, to its control over the aid arriving in the Strip and on its distribution.

This means that elimination of Hamas’ civilian rule over the Strip requires elimination of its military capabilities and taking over the territory for awhile, while at the same time assigning responsibility for distributing the aid to those international organizations which have no link to Hamas.

Local Administrations

Hamas claims that some 200 of its civil administration institutions have been destroyed in the course of the war. Included among these are police and internal security institutions, which Hamas considers a red line. This being said, the local administrations, as well as the health and even civil defense systems, are still partially functional, especially in those areas where the IDF has not operated on the ground.

This is also the finding from following the functioning of the civilian organizations in the Strip. The local administrations have so far proven impressive resiliency – they are present and functioning. Even the Gaza Municipality, which sustained substantial damage due to the ground maneuver, is currently issuing guidelines for safe bathing on the beaches.

The municipalities in the central region of the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, in areas where ground maneuvers of lesser intensity have taken place, are now restoring the water, sewage, electricity, and road infrastructures. The Khan Younis Municipality is even building tent cities for tens of thousands of residents returning to its territory, including from the Rafah areas in which the ground maneuver has begun.

In some of the places, emergency committees are standing in, partly working under Hamas guidance and partly under the Hamas Minister of the Interior, substituting for the central government. This for example, these committees in the Jabaliya Refugee Camp have recently called on the residents not to return to their homes due to the continuing war.

Other committees are dealing with education. Such education committees are even operating in the displaced persons shelters. Others are supervising prices while still others are functioning as policing committees.

At the moment, and ever since the ground offensive has begun and ended in the Jabaliya refugee camp, these committees are less and less seen in the north, while in the camps located in the central Gaza Strip, their presence is greater and more noticeable.

Such committees, for example, have punished a journalist, who came out against Hamas and dismantled the temporary shelter her family built in Nuseirat.

In the north, however, these committees have not totally disappeared. Just recently we have received reports from sources inside the Gaza Strip, that such a committee shot at the legs of 23 juvenile delinquents in the city center, as a lesson for anyone breaking into the homes of displaced persons who have fled south.

The Relationship Between Terrorism and Population Mobility

Eight months of fighting have shown that in the northern Gaza Strip the Hamas governance is in a stage of advanced degradation. Its governance in the central Gaza Strip is in survival mode, while in the southern Strip, primarily in Rafah, Hamas still has impressive civil government capabilities.

Speaking of the situation in northern Gaza, a security source said, “The very fact that there is a population able to move freely is a tremendous advantage in terms of Hamas’ ability to restore its capabilities and to reorganize”. “At the moment a process of disintegration is underway from a brigade level to guerilla groupings”.

And as for Rafah, the source notes, “This is a consequence of the fact that the Rafah Brigade is still fully functional and has three regular battalions. The deeper the Israeli maneuver advances, the nearer it approaches the built-up area, this brigade will find it more difficult to maintain brigade-level battle fitness”.

Hamas has until recently maintained a civilian administrative center at the Rafah Crossing, Palestinian sources report. They add that “At this crossing Hamas has set up interrogation rooms, it has controlled the outgoing traffic toward Egypt and the distribution of the incoming aid from Egypt. However, when the ground operation at the Rafah Crossing began, Hamas shut down this center and apparently relocated it to other places…”

Official sources in Israel believe, based on information and other indications, that “besides movement of the civilian population, movements of terrorist elements are also noticeable, where these remain close to the new population centers in an effort to restore civilian and military infrastructures within them…”

Thus, for example, gave rise to the significant operation in Shifaa Hospital. Hamas attempted to set up a “mini-government” there under its undersecretary of the interior and the senior officers from the Northern Brigade. The entire command and control apparatus in Shifaa Hospital collapsed and top senior commanders were captured in the IDF’s lightning-speed operation in that facility.

This being said, it appears that Hamas currently is not embarking on a force-building drive. Instead it is attempting to adapt its capabilities for its next goals and to reorganize itself. “It’s like a person who has developed gangrene in parts of his body due to frostbite. He sheds those parts to save the rest of his body”, said a security source in response to questions.

“In Khan Younis and in the central camps, one cannot talk about two brigades since the forces have already maneuvered there so there’s no longer a brigade there following orders from a brigade commander”, say Israeli sources, but they add that “some of the militants are still present there in large numbers, which gives the commanders the ability to reorganize”.

In the eastern Khan Younis area, where returning residents can be seen, including others moving away from Rafah, the friction with the IDF forces has increased. This is a consequence of the return of terrorists into densely-populated areas.

Jabaliya, on the other hand, is where at the moment there is limited population movement. The intensity of the fighting there has decreased down to a level that has enabled the IDF to move out of there completely since Hamas has concluded that it is going to be unable to regroup there.

Administrative Territorial Contiguity

Monitoring of the developments shows that the Gaza Strip no longer has an administrative contiguity. Parts of it have descended into pockets of variable degrees of chaos. This situation is a function of the state of the Hamas brigades in the different areas. The Northern Gaza Brigade commander, Izz a-Din Haddad, is on the run. This, according also to sources within the Strip. The Central Brigade commander, Ayman Nawfal, has been killed and the fate of the Rafah Brigade commander, Muhammad Shabbaneh, remains unclear following a recent targeted assassination attempt.

Israel’s security forces have been noticing another trend: Hamas in northern Gaza is losing its governing capabilities. This process is gathering momentum primarily since the Netzarim Corridor – which Hamas demands be dismantled as part of the hostage return negotiations – the corridor isolates the northern Strip from the center and thereby stifles Hamas’ governability. According to that security source, “ – it appears the Netzarim Corridor has become a chokehold on Hamas in Gaza.

The damage wrought by this corridor on Hamas’ governability in the north is tremendous – this is why Hamas is so adamant in its insistence that it be removed, even now, as a precondition to a hostage return deal.

Pockets of Chaos

In other areas the chaos is intensifying. In the Deir al-Balah area Hamas gunmen fired at the Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades commander. He had been part of the terrorist network under Hamas.

A Palestinian source says that in Deir al-Balah, which is sheltering tens of thousands of displaced persons, Hamas is trying to establish a local force. This is causing disputes with Fatah, hence the string of killings by the IDF of Hamas policemen and terrorists.

Sources in Gaza are telling us that “This violent conflict has erupted over power struggles for control over the aid, where it now turns out that whoever controls the aid in the Strip, effectively controls the entire population…”

Controlling the Aid

Israel has detected a highly-significant effort by Hamas to wrest control over the incoming aid from the Rafah Crossing and of late also from the Kerem Shalom Crossing.

In the north there is a plethora of organizations, committees and clans, all vying for control over the aid and its distribution. This is not solely under Hamas’ control. In the center, Hamas dominates a large proportion of the aid through committees it operates or which are operating on its behalf. However, in Rafah, where Hamas still has a functioning regular brigade, control over the aid is tighter.

Another trend noticed in Rafah lately is “distribution lines”.

It appears Hamas is handing out distribution lines to crime families such as the Bureika Family – a kind of local militias under their control. In exchange for control of the distribution routes, these gangs are given a share of the aid plus other benefits.

Hamas has carefully monitored the attempts to find civilian alternatives to its rule in the Gaza Strip. Gunmen have threatened the clans and,cording to some of the sources, they have also murdered the chief of the Dughmush Clan, which does not kowtow to Hamas.

“Hamas has murdered at least two of the Palestinian Authority personnel and arrested a network of 25 Fatah members and Palestinian Authority personnel, who are local Gaza Strip residents. They had been trying to supervise the aid under Ramallah’s guidance,” said a senior Palestinian Authority official.

Where Is This All Going?

In Israel, the situation is described as follows: the IDF is facing an onion. The more it remains at work, the more layers it will be able to pare off Hamas’ military and civilian capacity. Therefore, what we have seen in Jabalia we will soon be seeing in Rafah when the ground maneuver will be completed there”, said an official Israeli source. “If we look at what is happening in the Strip, we can indeed see there is a gradual process of disintegration.”

One hopes that “Only after we take action time and time again, will we be able to see the increasing degradation of all of Hamas’ layers of government”, he added. “In the north,” he says, “Hamas no longer has an organized military apparatus. This has been replaced by guerilla squads – a sign of things to come.”

Quite clearly the reality that will develop going forward depends mainly on Israel’s willingness and ability to deliver an alternative to Hamas’ civil administration.

הפוסט How the Hamas Civil Administration Map Has Changed Following Eight Months of Fighting הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For a long while, Israel has been witnessing an inconceivable contradiction between the fighting spirit of its soldiers and commanders in the field and the image the IDF’s senior command portrays in the television studios.  While the fighters and commanders in the field – regular army and reservists alike – speak about decisive victories in every encounter with the enemy and of the feasibility of the objectives of the war, the nation watches on the evening TV news a deflated military leadership that conveys stagnation and despondency. The famous and so often discussed  “Concept” that the military had adopted decades ago,  still remains a conviction among a significant tier of senior commanders in Israel’s security establishment, as if October 7 had never happened.

There is a clear reason for this and its roots originated years ago.

The concept embedded deep in the IDF modus operandi

For many years now, the IDF senior command has been “syphoned” through various well-sponsored foundations, which offer the army’s commanders leadership programs in collaboration with academic institutes in the US. These institutes hold a very specific world view, which is similar to that at the foundation of the “Concept”. The inculcation of these misguided modes of thought runs deep in the military command, and is done at a long-term and significant investment. The result: a backbone of high command, which cannot seem to depart from the paradigms that might have been true up to the quagmire that had bread October 7th.

“As we’ve been witnessing over the past months, the top command often gives off a lackluster and stagnant air, while the soldiers in the field exude conviction in the justness of their mission and the prowess of the army”, says Ronit Farkash, head of Resource Development and Partnership at the IDSF HaBithonistim  movement. “This dissonance underscores the crucial imperative of raising a new generation of commanders, such that has conviction, connected to the reality on the ground and aware of the challenges in the field; That is driven by a sense of mission to ensure the security of Israel – not just for the next year or two – but for generations to come. If we do not embark on this endeavor now, we’ll see the year 2050 plagued by that same Concept and as a result – by more of the same problems”.

From the onset, it was evident to the IDSF HaBithonistim movement that it must include an educational effort in its activity, if it wishes to shape the future generation of soldiers and citizens in Israel. Indeed, over the past several years, the movement had been undertaking prolific activity in the field of education, wherein it conducts lectures and excursions for high-school students, pre-military programs and higher education institutes. The October 7 attack had heightened the urgency of accelerating this activity. Thus the initiative was born for a new pre-military leadership program, that would be governed by the values of Zionism, Jewish nationalism and identity and would seek to deepen its participants conviction in the justness of the path of Israel, and instill in them a clear national security perception such that places the security of Israel – and that alone – at the top of its priorities.

“I’ll give you a simple example that illustrates why our pre-military program is so unique”, says Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, founder and chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “The underlying question here is whether peace is an end to itself or a means for something else. Those who view Israel’s security for generations to come as the end all, will regard peace accords as a means for achieving security in Israel, and any henceforth agreement will be examined through that prism”. Avivi, who accurately foresaw the events of October 7, delineated at the time, in no uncertain terms, the misguided nature of the “Concept” and demanded an overhaul of Israel’s security strategy, unwilling to witness another calamity the likes of what the country had just been through. “Deterrence and forewarning are basic concepts of Israel’s security strategy. Unfortunately, these  have become irrelevant many years ago”, Avivi says. “Until we form a command backbone which deeply understands this – we shall remain targets for more events the likes of October 7”.

Introducing something new: the unique characteristics of the IDSF HaBithonistim  pre-military leadership program

In 1951, David Ben-Gurion wrote an essay on “the purpose of the [intellectual] spirit and the pioneering enterprise in Israel”, in which he ties the love of Israel to the protection of the country, and the national values to the values of security. This connection had lost ground over the years and sadly, most educational institutes continue to contribute to this decline. Many schools and pre-military programs place emphasis on universal progressive values at the expense of the national, Zionist and Jewish values that were unquestionable and nonnegotiable for the  Ben-Gurion generation, but are now sadly all but obsolete. If the commanding echelon of the army continues in this vein, it is safe to assume that within a mere two decades Israel’s military leadership will be even more detached from the reality on the ground than they are presently, and the little that still exists from Ben-Gurion’s vision will have been relegated to the dustbin of history.

The foundation of the new pre-military program, planned to be located in the Gaza envelope area, is the first step in tacking the ideology ship back to its original course.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement had decided to allocate its resources and efforts to the one-year preparatory program, with the understanding that this is a period in the participants’ lives that has its own unique characteristics. “There is no other point in time in which we could meet these young people for an entire year and afford them an entire toolkit of knowledge and content”, Avivi explains. “Moreover, this is a critical year of their lives. These young men and woman are on the verge of enlistment; thus we have an opportunity to influence their character and values as soldiers and commanders to be”.

There are more than a few pre-military programs that have been operating in Israel for the past decades, however, the IDSF HaBithonistim  movement is determined to imbue this seemingly stagnant arena with new life. The inspiration for this model is the IDF Nachal Brigade, founded by David Ben-Gurion and tasked with combining infantry military service with the establishment of new agricultural communities across the country. Similarly to the nucleus Nachal communities in the early years of the State of Israel, the IDSF HaBithonistim  pre-military programs will support the establishment of new communities, aid agriculture, construction and security in these communities ,and maintain an active alumni community.

Currently, the IDSF HaBithonistim is engaged in executing the pre-military program vision. It is to be located in the agricultural community of Tkuma near the Gaza border and will be called The Tkuma Pre-Military Program. The decision to place the program in this community is far from coincidental, as alongside the cultivation of values of Zionism and national  security, one of the objectives of the program is to help rehabilitate that community and the entire Gaza envelope communities that were ravaged by the October 7 attack. The IDSF HaBithonistim  plans to establish additional programs in conflict areas, namely the Gaza envelope area and along the northern border with Lebanon. Similarly to other pre-military programs, the IDSF HaBithonistim program will include varied content such as history, bible, Zionism, the history of Israel’s wars, alongside activities designed to prepare the participants for their upcoming military service, physical training and excursions to sites of historical and national importance across Israel. However, Avivi emphasizes that this specific program offers a new kind of added value. “Our pre-military program will promote specific values and ideology, and a sound national security doctrine, all which are key to forming the future military command, so that it has the capabilities to ensure Israel’s security and to ensure Israel prevails on future battlefields”, determines Avivi. “But beyond all that, the program participants will engage in the rehabilitation and reinforcement of the Tkuma community through volunteer activity in the community, including agricultural labor, military protection, auxiliary educational activity and assistance to the community’s senior citizens. We aim to bond between the young participants and the Tkuma community and its values in hopes that the day will come when they choose to return to that community and raise their families there”.

As always, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement strives to operate at a large scale in order to drive true change, and is not limiting its pre-military program to the Tkuma area. More such programs are slated for the near future across the country.

Another of the IDSF HaBithonistim  movement’s visions is to found a youth movement in the spirit of its ideology. “The youth movements of today fall very short when it comes to instilling Zionist ideology. Israel’s youth is in dire need of a new youth movement that will cultivate these values”, explains Avivi. This is more than a reverie – it is supported by the findings of a recent new study, conducted by the IDSF HaBithonistim, as part of its quarterly IDSF HaBithonistim Social Index, according to which 54% of the Jews in Israel believe that Israel needs a new youth movement that operates under the banner of Zionism and national security.

Establishing the Pre-Military Program Demands Public Support

The foundation of such a program is a costly endeavor. The Ministry of Defense allocates funds for pre-military programs only in their third year of operation, meaning that the first two years are self-funded. The estimated operational costs per year of such a program is some 1.2 million shekels (323,000 dollars). This is on top of initial investments for construction of the campus, dormitories and safety bunkers demanded by the proximity to the border.

In order to procure the needed funds, the IDSF HaBithonistim  has launched a crowdfunding campaign, which offers an opportunity to anyone who identifies with the ideology and values of the IDSF HaBithonistim to be part of the vision and change by donating towards the foundation of the pre-military program.

“We are now at war for the long-run, and nothing is more important right now than cultivating the IDF’s new generation of soldiers and commanders”, emphasizes Avivi. “This is nothing less than an existential necessity for Israel and Jews around the world. We see the shortcomings of the current leadership of Israel’s military, and we feel it is our responsibility to ensure that the next command backbone will manifest a crucial paradigm shift such that has an unbreakable bound with, and is motivated by the Zionist ethos and our Jewish heritage, upholding a decisive and clear doctrine of national security, and fully acknowledging that the settlement enterprise is a power multiplier for the country’s security; a command that draws clear, unnegotiable lines in the sand and is not deterred from voicing its professional opinion even if it negates current policies or does not fall in line with political considerations; a command that places Israel’s security above all else”.

To support the Tkuma pre-military support, please follow the link>

הפוסט Cultivating the IDF’s Future Command – The IDSF HaBithonistim’s Pre-Military Program Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A survey held by the IDSF HaBithonistim in January 2024 shows that a whopping 91% of the Jewish population in Israel believes that the social discord that has been plaguing the country severely undermined Israel’s military deterrence towards Hamas.  This finding drives home a point that Dr. Ruth Kabbesa Abramzon has been making for a while: without a strong and broad base of a shared Jewish identity, Israeli society is declining and losing its ability to withstand threats from without and within.

Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon had come to this insight back in the Second Lebanon War, when she directed a community center in the small northern township of Hatzor HaGlilit. Having to provide the members of the community with a variety of services and responses, she would often turn to government offices and agencies – many times to no avail, due to various barriers. “The tools that were supposed to be available to me on part of the State were practically useless. I began wondering whether there is a common theme to all the issues I’ve encountered, such that could shed light on these anomalies”, she says. “One possible explanation that came to mind, which at a later point I further explored academically, was that the loss of our uniting value of Zionism, as a society, had gravely impeded the civil services efficacy. In other words, once Zionism departed from Judaism, we seemed to have lost our sense of purpose and guiding principles”.

With this newly acquired understanding in mind, Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon immersed herself in social activism and academic research, driven by her desire to understand how the values of Judaism can tie into Israel’s civil policy. At a later stage she was appointed head of governance at The Joint organization, where she directed the organization’s training program for senior civil servants. She says that the role gave her a broad view of the world of governance, and allowed her to gain a deeper understanding of the ideological lacuna prevalent in Israel’s government systems. Her insights propelled Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon to further pursue the matter in the academia, authoring a doctorate in which she examines how an ethos effects Israel’s governance. Upon graduating, she wished to apply her insights through a host of social initiatives, and among others, founded “Unplugged” – a foundation aiming to expand the value of the Sabbath from its religious connotations to a national value as well.

Currently Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon focuses her efforts on social and public enterprise, with the aim of bolstering  Israel’s social unity and national resilience. As part of this endeavor, she founded the “Mothers for Israel” foundation, which acts to incorporate mothers in decision-making processes in the public service. She also is a member of the IDSF HaBithonistim  movement, where she plays a role in forming research-based policy recommendations and in disseminating important information to the public. She testifies that the deeper she delves into research and public activity, the stronger her conviction that the connection to our Jewish identity is an unalienable asset of our social cohesiveness, Israel’s identity and in turn – its national security paradigm. This is precisely the message Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon strives to convey.

A Jewish State is Much More Than a Jewish Majority

Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon was raised in a masorati – traditional Jewish – family, and had always been connected to Judaism. As a young person, she viewed religion mainly as a spiritual notion, but as the years went by, she had come to realize that Judaism also offers a practical toolkit for living a full and meaningful life. “The most important thing for a Jew is his or her Jewish identity”, she claims. “I absolutely do not subscribe to the notion that everybody has to be an observant Jew, however, I do maintain that one must ‘own’ one’s Judaism, learn it and apply it in a manner which is most suitable to that person. Personally, if I had to choose one value to  impart on my children, beyond doubt that would be their connection to their Jewish identity, since that is their essence and that is what will endow them with the fortitude to deal with life’s challenges. Judaism – as I perceive it – is a relay race wherein each generation is responsible for passing the ‘stick’ to the next generation. Without sufficient ideological ‘fuel’ to drive the momentum – the relay stops”.

According to Ruth, a battle of identities has been raging in Israel for the past decades, and many are turning their backs on their Jewish identity in favor of a “universal” identity. “It is inconceivable that two separate camps of sorts have allegedly risen in Israel: the faith-based camp and the state-based camp”, she asserts. “Theres no such thing as a faith-based camp in the Jewish nation – we’re all people of faith through and through. One may be an atheist but still believe in one’s heritage and act accordingly. In order to reconnect as a nation we must – first and foremost – reconnect to our Jewish identity”.

Ruth explains that this war of identities is  the primary source of discord in Israel’s society, as it strives to pit against each other the two pillars of the State of Israel: Judaism and democracy. “Zionism is cemented in the existence of a Jewish and democratic state in Israel”, she asserts. “It’s crucial to understand that having a Jewish state is much more than having a technical majority of Jews – it demands Jewish values as well. Therefor, when people disconnect from Judaism as a shared identity, and from the collective national feeling, we are unable to conduct a pragmatic discourse on the most vital issues of our existence, and lose the fortitude of spirit that is crucial for us to deal with our enemies who would see us destroyed”.

Unity is Indispensable to the Existence of the Nation of Israel

One of the main propellants that lead Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon to focus on the issues of national unity at the present, was the large protest that raged against the judicial reform. “When the debate on the judicial reform began, I felt obligated to intervene and stop the madness. Like most people, I believed that the judiciary calls for reform, but I also thought that any reform must be done in a manner that includes the public rather than threatens it”, she shares. “I was very active in attempting to mediate between the various groups but came to realize that some of these groups simply have no desire to find common ground. Many had an interest in driving the issue to the extreme and deepen the rift in the nation”. She explains that the slogans that were part of the protest reflect the root cause of the problem. “The first slogan was ‘To be a Free People in Our Land’ – already here, there was a flagrant omission of the next part of this verse from the national anthem – ‘Land of Zion Jerusalem’ – and by doing so, they omitted the purpose, the covenant of our raison d’etre. At a later stage, the slogan grew even shorter, becoming ‘Free in Our Land’, so now even the people were cut out of the picture

According to Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon, turning our backs on Judaism and our identity as a people undermines our most valid claim for the country’s security. “We are not here because of the Holocaust or thanks to the UN resolution – we are here because this land had been promised to us back in the biblical ‘covenant between the parts’, in which god had promised Abraham that his descendants will inherit the land of Israel. One needn’t be an observant Jew to comprehend this. Suffice it to look at our grandparents. Why have they come to Israel from every corner of the earth? What could they possibly have sought here – a Green Card? Economic benefits? No.  All they had waiting for them in this land were cholera, swamp land, crises and wars, but they came because they believed that this is the promised land and the remedy for thousands of years of exile. For good reason Ben Gurion said that the bible is our charter – he also understood that without a sense of belonging to the people of Israel and the bible – we have no justification for being in this land”.

Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon has more than a few grievances towards the protests that had swept the streets of Israel around the debates on the judicial reform, but at the same time she stresses that it is imperative not to get pulled into a blame-game. Firstly, blame impedes improvement and growth, and secondly, because a calamity of such epic proportions such as October 7 is the outcome of many long-existing processes. And yet, she believes that the rift in Israel’s society and the call to refuse to report for reserves duty on part of the protest movement have played a crucial role in propelling Hamas to commit the heinous attack. “Unity is the sine qua non of the Israeli people’s existence, and history shows that every period of discord had brought calamity on the people of Israel”, she says. “Now, too, the terrorists chose to launch an attack because they believed that Israeli society is weak, and acted on the assumption that the reservists would not show up for duty. The division in the country had no doubt led to horrible harm, and the lesson to be learned is that we must not continue allowing discord to get out of hand such as it did before the war”.

We Need Leaders of Great Stature

It seems that one of the most prevalent words floating around Israeli society in recent years is “unity”. Some believe – like Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon – that the notion is the very bedrock of our existence. However, many maintain that a society that is a patchwork of cultures such as Israel, cannot truly achieve unity. Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon is well familiar with these claims, and deems them groundless excuses. “True, we are a nation gathered from 70 languages and the connection among us all is a challenging endeavor, but it would be wrong to claim that Israeli society is structured on sub-cultures. There is one nation here, which is seeking to reconnect. We can each hold different views and beliefs and we don’t have to agree with each other all the time, but at the end of the day – like our enemies persistently remind us – a Jew is a Jew is a Jew”.

According to Ruth’s perception, unity in Israel’s society is absolutely attainable, but is under threat from two main arenas: the media and politics. “These two arenas derive their power from fomenting discord and factionalism and are actually incentivized by the social conflict”, she argues. “To remedy this state of affairs we need leaders of stature who would not hesitate to make big changes, even if it means paying a high personal price, just to put Israel back on a healthy track”.

This was part of Ruth’s motivation for joining the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “The novelty of the IDSF HaBithonistim is its refusal to align itself with any one camp in the identity war”, she explains. “The organization fully comprehends that the security issue is mega-crucial for our existence here, and treat it with a pragmatic approach that is not restricted by a keyhole view of one identity or another”.

As part of her membership in the movement, Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon takes part in the research department’s effort to make crucial information and knowledge accessible to the public. “It’s important for me to give weight to public and media related activity as I realized that detrimental moves the likes of the Oslo Accords and the disengagement from the Gaza strip could have occurred due to the lack of representation of a wider range of stances on these issues in the media at the time, and due to the fact that the public did not have the imperative knowledge pertaining to our existence here. Even now, many citizens in Israel subscribe to cock and bull stories that their being fed, and then on the basis of this misinformation they actually support claims such as the notion that the Palestinian Authority could actually replace Hamas in Gaza. If people truly knew what the PA is, they would never lend their support to this kind of notion”.

Through her prolific activity in the IDSF HaBithonistim  and “Mothers for Israel” movements, as well as her other social initiatives, Dr. Kabbesa Abramzon aspires to assists Israel’s citizens to resolve disputes in a more informed manner, hopefully through  true dialogue with their Jewish identity. “My aspiration is to see a nation that knows who it is, in a country that is strong and that knows how to incorporate its values of Zionism, Judaism and democracy into its cultural and educational systems”, she concludes. “It is time to reconnect Zionism with the mother ship”.

הפוסט “The Jewish Nation is a Relay Race” – Dr. Ruth Kabbesa Abramzon on the relation between a Jewish Identity and the National Security Paradigm הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Calls for a cease-fire are a mistake. For decades to come, October 7 will now shape Israel as the victim of the third-deadliest global terrorist attack since data collection began in 1970[1]. Hamas will not stop and a ceasefire now would send a dangerous message to Iran and its proxies. Hamas have now rejected five ceasefire proposals. At a time of heightened tension in the Middle East, the international community is called to honestly support Israel’s objectives.

The danger of committing to a ceasefire with Hamas

Calls for a permanent cease-fire—as opposed to a short pause in fighting are a mistake. Untold international pressure is put on Israel, by the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and others, unanimous in their determination to see an end to this war without achieving its objectives, and while keeping Hamas the governing entity in Gaza. Calls for a ceasefire fail to appreciate the enormity of what happened on October 7, not just in its barbarity but in its strategic significance. In agreeing to the illusion of a “permanent cease-fire”, that will certainly not be respected by Hamas as history shows, Israel will expose itself, once again, to a deadly security threat metastasizing in the Gaza Strip.

This paper will focus on how historic international pressure on Israel to agree to a cease-fire in Gaza while falling short of eliminating its enemies have led to an unspeakable aggravation of the security threat, and contributed to the forming of the conditions that led to October 7. Despite the Biden administration’s pressure, seasoned with the claim that Hamas “cannot carry out another October 7 at this point”, these deliberately misleading claims aim at luring Israel into going back to square one, and achieving precisely nothing in this war. More dangerously still, it will send a green light to Hezbollah, Iran, and other malign actors whose raison d’être is Israel’s demise, to attack in turn.

Decades of wishful thinking about the meaning of the Hamas charter must come to an end: Hamas is not and never will be a partner for peace, nor a reliable actor for cease-fire. The charter’s call to kill Jews by any means possible has only one meaning: the literal one. Israel has now but one choice: eliminate Hamas, free all hostages, and usher in a new reality in the Gaza Strip that will positively impact Israel’s long-term security.

October 7 has changed Israel’s perspective forever

For decades to come, October 7 will now shape Israel’s character, its politics, the relations with its people, and its neighbors. Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7 was the third-deadliest global terrorist attack since data collection began in 1970[2]. It was the deadliest attack against Israel since the state’s inception in 1948[3] with a rate of slightly over one person killed per every 10,000 Israelis[4]. A massive rocket barrage of more than 3,000 rockets in the first minutes of the war on October 7 that overwhelmed Israeli defenses[5]. At the same time, Hamas’s strike force, led by elite fighters from the Iranian-trained Nukhba unit, penetrated the border fence in tandem with attempts to infiltrate from the sea[6]. More painfully still, the cruelty in which terrorists and everyday Gazan citizens carried out their crimes when invading is blood-chilling: livestreaming beheadings, atrocious sexual violence, egregious scenes of abusing human bodies.

Hamas is widely believed to be holding 124 out of the 250 hostages taken on October 7 in heavily guarded underground tunnels using them as human shields and bargaining tools for the release of Palestinian prisoners. One goal was defined following the attack: the total elimination of the Hamas regime and the return of all hostages. But since October 7, that equation has changed. Because of the sheer savagery of the October 7 attacks, Israel will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to remove the threat. In a society so recently reeling from deep polarization and mass protests, Israelis from across the political spectrum are now fully united in this respect: their desire for the destruction of Hamas.

Hamas care only for the annihilation of Israel, not the people of Gaza

Now that the terror group has demonstrated the failure of Israel’s deterrence, it has insisted that it will not allow any more ceasefires in exchange for hostages, but only a complete end to Israel’s offensive[7], which would leave it in full control of Gaza. This would hand Hamas millions of dollars in aid from Western nations, as well as continuing billions from Qatar, Kuwait and other oil-rich countries in the Middle East[8]. While such funds are supposedly intended for welfare distributions and civilian reconstruction, Hamas will use them to rebuild, regroup and fund its terrorist training, propaganda and political units. Israel’s temporary strategy to hold out restoration of food, fuel, and water in the hope of the release of all hostages, if nothing else, confirmed that Hamas once again places more of a priority on maximizing the number of Gazans who suffer or die according to their rules. Hamas has never pretended to be fighting for the well-being of Gaza’s population, or for Palestine as a national cause. It accepts no responsibility for Gaza’s reconstruction. Hence, if there is a permanent ceasefire, Hamas can start to prepare its next surprise attack, hoping for another October 7 of indiscriminate killings. Nor will the terrorist group ever honor international humanitarian law and the international community needs to be pressed to accept that reality.

A ceasefire would further ignite regional tensions

Any ceasefire now would send a dangerous message, particularly to Hezbollah in Lebanon, that a terrorist organization can commit unimaginable war crimes against Israeli civilians without a decisive recompense, namely a removal from power, beyond the heavy casualty toll that was inflicted on the terrorists and their infrastructure. Hamas has a long track record of breaking ceasefires and seizing the opportunity to rearm and regroup, Hamas leaders have made clear that they will strike again and carry out their goal of annihilating Israel. Indeed, Hamas has used Iranian support to launch several wars against Israel from its base in Gaza, including in 2008 Operation Cast Lead, 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, 2014 Operation Protective Edge, 2021 Operation Guardian of the Walls, and now with the October 7 attacks. Trusting Hamas to abide by a unilateral ceasefire is therefore both naive and dangerous. And one has to remember that until October 6^th 2023 there was a ceasefire.

Israel must stay protected

The IDF did not believe the terror group was capable of mounting such an effort in October. “The army does not prepare itself for things it thinks are impossible”, said former Israeli national security adviser Yaakov Amidror[9]. Israel had a chance to topple Hamas in 2008-2009 during Operation Cast Lead, and in Operation Defensive Shield in 2014, but stopped before doing so both times[10]. At 8 months now, the Israel-Hamas war is one of the longest the country has ever experienced. This current conflict has far outlasted the Yom Kippur War (19 days), the Second Lebanon War (34 days), and Operation Protective Edge (51 days)[11]. The Israeli government did not take military action to prevent the buildup of Hezbollah’s immense arsenal following the Second Lebanon War in 2006[12]. Throughout their history, Hamas and other Gazan armed factions have since drawn the IDF into prolonged guerilla warfare in Gaza in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021[13]. One of the reasons Israel was not willing to eliminate Hamas then was concern about casualties, combined with hesitation in senior leadership to act in full force, and an extremely heavy international pressure. But now Israel’s position is firm, and backed with untold public support: enough is enough. The threat to Israel must definitively stop[14].

Hamas is greatly reinforced by Iran

Iran and Hamas established connections as early as the 1990s and the Iranian regime remains a key part of Hamas’ strength[15]. It learned to adapt irregular terrorist tactics with the help of Iran for combat in conventional warfare. Iran and Hezbollah, Iran’s powerful Lebanese proxy, also taught Hamas how to conduct suicide bombings[16]. Iranian Hezbollah powered Hamas terrorist campaigns in Israel in the 1990s and through the Second Intifada which killed more than 1,000 Israelis[17]. Hezbollah also provides strategic advice: the October 7 assault largely resembled Hezbollah’s “Conquering the Galilee” plan intercepted by Israel in 2012[18].

Hamas’ capabilities remain a sizeable threat to Israel

Such intensive military training and accumulated weapons have allowed Hamas to gradually organize regional units as large as brigades, with 2,500-3,500 fighters each[19]. Material supplied to Hamas by Iran has helped them to build a sizable rocket arsenal, with more than 10,000 rockets and mortar shells fired in the current conflict[20]. With Iran’s help, Hamas has also developed their own robust rocket-making industry[21]. Although Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system has stopped many such rocket attacks with its 90% interception rate, rockets, together with incendiary balloons, fire-bearing kites, and kamikaze drones, have been a central feature of the group’s arsenal[22]. Intercepting rockets with Iron Dome constitutes the moral limit of Israel’s right to defend itself[23].

Israel’s Post-Conflict Security Needs

Israel, fearing a repeat of Oct. 7, will fortify its border with Gaza, turning it into something akin to the Demilitarized Zone in Korea—with more walls, obstacles, and minefields. Reconstruction will become significantly more difficult, as Israel will restrict the aid that enters Gaza, tempered by the fear that Hamas will use everything possible to rebuild its military infrastructure[24]. Israel would also likely ban the 18,000 Gazans who had previously worked in Israel from doing so again, given the fears that some of them could be contributing to Hamas’ intelligence-gathering efforts[25], in turn further stifling the chances that the Gazan economy recovers. Ultimately, these conditions would lay the foundations for yet another, potentially even bloodier Gaza war.

Lack of support for Israel at the UN

In spite of this, pressure has been building on Israel at the UN. In December, an UNGA resolution demanding a ceasefire passed with the support of 153 UN members out of 193[26]. On March 25, the UNSC passed for the first time a resolution for a ceasefire in Gaza[27]. In terms of impact on the ground in Gaza, the resolution had no real immediate effect, however. The United States abstained from the resolution that did not condemn Hamas, which the U.S. has been demanding as a precursor for months[28]. At the start of the conflict, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, initially urged the Israelis to reduce their attacks altogether, in order to “win over” Gaza’s population,[29] while leaving out the observation that populations dominated by brutal extremists cannot be “won over”. The move in March at the UN therefore represented a shift for the U.S. as well, marking a U.S.-Israel divide over not just symbolism but substance too. The United States had largely supported Israel’s goals in the war until recently but the Biden administration has also had a strong interest in winding down a war that has divided American voters in this election year[30].

Historical dominance of superpowers over Israel at the UN

As soon as the first of Israel’s wars started on May 15, 1948, the US and the British, imposed their total arms embargo on everyone involved[31]. But then, the unexpected happened: Israel started winning and so the British wanted to save their collapsing Arab allies. On June 11, 1948, the UN Security Council imposed a total ceasefire, with the backing of the British and Americans, after 26 days of fighting[32]. This set a precedent for all subsequent UN ceasefires in the region: as soon as Israel launches a counteroffensive, the UN General Assembly pressures the Security Council to order an immediate ceasefire.

Israel’s Independent Capabilities Today

Now Israel is a stronger, more self-sufficient military power. Only Israel can incapacitate Hamas, by fighting in one backstreet and tunnel at a time, across the Gaza Strip. The Biden Administration has been asking the Israelis to hurry up with their fighting, instead of prolonging the suffering of Gaza’s civilians[33]. Indeed, only by the regrettable route of ground operations—in terms of Israeli soldiers, Palestinian civilians, and hostages—can Israel likely meet the objective of ending Hamas rule in Gaza.

Hamas’ unrealistic ceasefire demands amidst growing regional uncertainty

Until now, Hamas has insisted on a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, demands which led to the failure of securing a deal before Ramadan. Israel, with unfinished military objectives, was never going to agree to that. The new offer from Hamas indicated the group has softened on that position and was now willing to accept an initial temporary ceasefire during which further talks would be held to extend the truce into something permanent. In March, Hamas offered a two-stage agreement where in the first instance Israeli women — including female soldiers — children, the elderly, and injured held in captivity would be released in exchange for more than 700 Palestinian prisoners, including 100 serving life sentences for convictions on terrorism charges[34]. Israel refused this as a ceasefire that does not address the release of all Israeli hostages remains incomplete.

April marked “the fifth time in a row that we have offered new ceasefire suggestions and Hamas have rejected it[35],” Prime Minister Netanyahu said. “It’s about time that the world realized that Hamas does not want to move into a deal and therefore we have to take necessary action in order to bring the hostages back home[36],” he added. On April 19, Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the G7 summit in Italy said, “The world needs to understand the only thing standing between the Gazan people and a ceasefire is Hamas. Hamas continues to “move the goal post[37],” Blinken added. “The rejection of the latest proposal,” said Prime Minister Netanyahu in a statement “proves that Hamas leader Yayha Sinwar is not interested in a humanitarian deal and in the return of the hostages, and continues to take advantage of tensions with Iran to try to unite the theaters and to achieve a general escalation in the region[38].”

The regional and global impact of the Iran attacks

The direct attack on Israel by Iran left the world fearful of what another regional war could do to an already devastated region. Any regional Iranian-Israeli conflict could pull in the Gulf countries – Qatar has declared that it is now reconsidering its role as key mediator between Israel and Hamas.[39] But tensions with the US, Russia and China, could also potentially create an explosive global confrontation. Those superpowers are reluctant to see an empowered Iran threatening regional stability, so the events of April 13 appeared to have re-positioned Israel somewhat closer to a critical international community.

American ceasefire announcement on May 31st

In a turn of events from the Americans, President Biden said in a surprise announcement on May 31st that he was outlining a proposal for a permanent end of hostilities based on a deal to release the hostages that had been made by Israel and passed by mediators to Hamas[40]. In the same announcement, President Joe Biden said that Hamas was no longer capable of launching an attack on Israel akin to the October 7 attack and that it was time for the war to end[41]. The statement from President Biden came during Jewish Sabbath when Israel’s political class goes largely silent. U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby reiterated on June 2nd the claim on Hamas’ current capabilities, and that Israel had put forward the cease-fire proposal[42]. Needless to say, these claims are deliberately misleading: they do not take into account how Hamas can re-obtain such capability in due course, and carry out, as promised by its leaders, another October 7 once and again.

The proposal did not come from Israel, as suggested

While the White House described the plan as originating from Israel, it was in fact a proposal put forward by mediators to which Israel had made amendments and changes[43]. Israel has not agreed to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip as part of any deal to free the remaining hostages there. Nor has Israel changed its conditions to reach a permanent cease-fire. That will only happen after Israel’s objectives are met to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities.

Hamas still poses a significant danger to Israel

In response to President Biden’s suggestion that Hamas was now significantly depleted, Prime Minister Netanyahu said Israel remains true to its original objectives – that it would not agree to a permanent cease-fire until “the destruction of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities, the release of all hostages and the removal of the threat that Gaza poses to Israel[44].” The eradication of Hamas is incomplete, with battalions of Hamas terrorists remaining in the southernmost city of Rafah, whilst fighting still continues in Gaza’s north. Hamas continues to launch rockets into Israel and the current extent of the group’s governance across the strip is unclear. The full withdrawal of Israeli forces called for in this agreement could therefore well allow Hamas to claim victory and reconstitute itself.

The proposed ‘deal’ has many grey areas and will likely be rejected by Hamas

U.S. officials and President Biden himself have admitted that the deal proposed on May 31^st contains significant gray areas, particularly in the second and third phases of the agreement which call for “a permanent end to hostilities” and “the major reconstruction of Gaza” without imposing strict timetables[45]. The ambiguity in the proposed deal appears to intentionally allow enough interpretation by both sides of the conflict to implement an agreement. Hamas has yet to respond to the deal[46] but has until now spurned all offers that do not ensure their longtime survival inside Gaza — and it is unlikely that they will be persuaded that this proposal is any different.

The American plan is unlikely to work without diplomatic pressure

The goal of the Americans appears to spotlight stonewalling by Hamas and right-wing members of the Israeli government as key roadblocks to a diplomatic settlement. Whether such a strategy ultimately succeeds will depend on the Biden administration’s ability to apply significant, consistent pressure to both sides. For this plan to work will require the U.S. to double down on diplomatic and political efforts in the Middle East, even more so than it already has in the past few months as it is not enough to make one-time public statements and expect results. The likelihood of such sustained diplomatic pressure from the U.S. at election time remains in doubt.

To conclude

It would now be a mistake to apply pre-October 7 rules— the pursuit of an elusive, false calm—to the post-October 7 reality, especially given the heightened tension from the April Iranian attacks. If Israel fails to do so, terrorist attacks will become Israel’s new normal and eliminating invading killers will be the limit of Israel’s internationally acceptable response. The West needs to appreciate that the absence of decisive action by Israel in the weeks following the Iran missile attacks will invite more attempts in the future — attempts that are more sophisticated and lethal. The international community must act decisively and in co-operation. Futile attempts to falsely cajole Israel into action when the threat is still very much active are counterintuitive to our future security. There is only one sustainable trajectory in this war, especially as Iran is becoming bolder and more aggressive, and Hezbollah mounts up its aggression as well: win over Hamas in Gaza, return all the hostages, and usher in a new reality in the Gaza Strip that will guarantee Israel’s long-term security needs, without Hamas in power.

[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:~:text=The%20October%207%20Attack%20in,worst%20mass%20fatality%20terrorist%20attack.
[2] https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:~:text=The%20October%207%20Attack%20in,worst%20mass%20fatality%20terrorist%20attack.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/missile-defense-in-the-israel-hamas-war
[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/27/hamas-attack-israel-october-7-hostages/
[7] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/20/hamas-leaders-arrival-in-egypt-suggests-second-hostage-deal-imminent
[8] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/24/business/hamas-secret-investment-portfolio-israel/index.html
[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/30/world/middleeast/israeli-military-hamas-failures.html
[10] https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-778418
[11] Ibid.
[12] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf
[13] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-built-army
[14] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/7/israels-war-on-gaza-live-israel-pounds-gaza-as-truce-diplomacy-continues
[15] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-built-army
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] https://www.voanews.com/a/is-israel-iron-dome-missile-defense-system-ironclad/7327930.html
[23] https://apnews.com/article/iron-dome-missile-defense-israel-palestinians-rockets-hamas-f57508d0e53945d1071d4582fcdae8d2
[24] https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/22/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-truce-pause-war/
[25] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/12/the-trouble-with-a-cease-fire.html
[26] https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144717
[27] https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931
[28] Ibid.
[29] https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SsI2qA0sv5aTgX5HJNmj-WSJNewsPaper-11-21-2023.pdf
[30] https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/02/06/democracy-policy-under-biden-confronting-changed-world-pub-91540
[31] https://www.jstor.org/stable/2150455
[32] https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-184863/
[33] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/02/politics/biden-administration-warning-israel-gaza-civilians/index.html
[34] https://www.ft.com/content/be12aa70-b105-41ea-ad11-a9621b63d8d7
[35] https://allisrael.com/its-time-the-world-faces-this-empire-of-evil-in-tehran-israeli-president-herzog-tells-sky-news
[36] Ibid.
[37] https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-797937
[38] https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-spurns-latest-hostage-deal-proposal-demands-permanent-ceasefire/
[39] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/18/middleeast/qatar-reconsidering-mediation-role-gaza-hostage-talks-anlysis-mime-intl/index.html#:~:text=The%20Arab%20nation%20of%20Qatar’s,to%20the%20Palestinian%20militant%20group.
[40] https://news.sky.com/story/israel-hamas-gaza-latest-ceasefire-biden-announcement-sky-news-live-blog-12978800
[41] https://apnews.com/article/gaza-hamas-israel-netanyahu-biden-resettlement-war-796948b31c7aa8ed90c51edb41738eef
[42] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/biden-cease-fire-offer-not-accurate-israel-netanyahu-hostages-hamas-rcna155129
[43] https://www.state.gov/?post_type=state_briefing&%3Bp=92333
[44] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/03/gaza-hamas-israel-netanyahu-biden-resettlement-war/99faefd0-21d9-11ef-bc8d-a8ae61b84dde_story.html
[45] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-hamas-stands-cease-fire-questions-israel-remain/story?id=110786109#:~:text=U.S.%20officials%20and%20the%20president,Gaza%22%20without%20imposing%20strict%20timetables.
[46] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-hamas-stands-cease-fire-questions-israel-remain/story?id=110786109

הפוסט History of international pressure proves: Amidst growing uncertainty, appealing to Hamas for a ceasefire won’t work הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

High school and the pre-military prep year provide an opportunity to prepare the next generation for meaningful service in the IDF and, later, to become valuable citizens. Meeting with IDSF members, is designed to supplement the young people with important knowledge, to acquaint them with the country, and to help them understand their personal responsibility as citizens of Israel.

Janusz Korczak, the well-known educator, left us quite a few revolutionary sayings, that have become stepping stones of education, such as “There is no bad child, there is only a child for whom things are bad”. Another quote from Korczak is at the foundation of the educational activity of the IDSF movement: “He who cares for the days, sows wheat, he who cares for the years, sows trees, he who cares for generations, educates people”. As a movement who has made it its goal to maintain Israel’s security for generations, the IDSF works extensively in the field of education, in order to ensure that the next generation of Israelis is raised with a clear Zionist vision, understands the national security challenges the country faces, and recognizes the importance of service in the IDF.

As part of the educational activity of the IDSF, the senior officials of the movement visit high schools and pre-military prep-programs around the country, and give lectures in a variety of fields related to policy, Zionism, security and the military. “The IDSF lectures are always a success”, says the head of the “Shuvu Ahim” (Brothers, Return) pre-military prep-program, Rabbi Tomal Rahamim. “The students are exposed to important knowledge and new points of view, and receive answers to questions that stem from their most personal dilemmas and fears”.

The Educational Activity of the IDSF: An Opportunity to Meet with the Next Generation of Israeli Citizens

In the State of Israel, there are many and diverse active high schools and pre-military programs. Roughly divided, there are secular and religious ones, while in between, there are integrated high schools and pre-military prep-programs in which both worlds meet. Despite their differences, all these institutions are home to young men and women who will constitute the next generation of Israeli citizens.

Due to the realities of life in Israel, the issue of enlistment in the IDF is a prominent topic that shapes both the discourse and extracurricular activities. Some of the principles and teachers even believe that preparation for meaningful service is no less important that preparing students for the Matriculation Exams.

Orin Koreat, a high school English teacher at the Ort secular high school in Naharia, proudly describes how her school educates students towards leadership, Zionism, and meaningful service in the IDF. She herself is not officially a homeroom teacher, but due to her everyday encounter with the students, she believes that she has a great responsibility for their education. This belief causes her to integrate current affairs in the content of her lessons, which are related to Jewish tradition and heritage. “There are students who present amazing knowledge on the topic and there are students who lack basic knowledge, whom I need to work with”, says Orin. “The current reality as individuals and as a society, has placed before us a clear reflection. If, prior to October 7th, many people avoided dealing with the question of their Jewish and Israeli identity, today we understand that this is an issue that we must consider. Long before discussing enlistment in the army, every student in Israel must understand why this country is ours and why we must defend it”.

The Motivation Challenge: The Main Difficulties Involved in Preparing for the IDF

The high schools deal mostly with “why”, but the pre-military prep-programs are required to provide answers to the next stage, which is “how”, and better prepare the young men and women in practical ways, for service in the IDF.

The popular assumption is that the youth who attend the pre-military prep-programs are values-driven and with a strong willingness to serve in the IDF. The reality is that this is not always the case. Some individuals who choose to do a prep-year do so precisely because they harbor numerous questions and fears regarding military service, and they need another year to mature, before they put on the uniform. Some of them are not even sure they wish to serve in the military, and use the prep-year to examine their position on the matter. For this reason, places great importance on meeting with students of prep-years. As far as the movement is concerned, these young men and women are at a significant stage of their civic development, and this is an opportunity to provide them with essential knowledge to bridge the gap, to acquaint them with heritage sites across the country, and to help them understand the importance of serving in the IDF and contributing to the country.

The IDSF works with all types of pre-military prep-programs, all around the country. One of these programs that works closely with the movement, is the social-yeshiva pre-military program “Shuvu Ahim”, which is located in Rehovot. This program was established in 2015, after the kidnapping and murder of the three teenage boys Eyal Ifrach, Gil-Ad Shaer and Naftali Frankl, (May God Avenge Them). Together with the wish to remember the boys, the pre-military program has three main goals: Studying Torah, preparing for the IDF and volunteering in society. “Our pre-military program is diverse in as far as its components”, Rabbi Tomal Rahamim, the head of the program explains. “Young men from various areas and backgrounds join our program, and they differ in their abilities and desires. We aspire to encourage each and every one of them to contribute to Israeli society, whatever he can, in the best way”.

Another pre-military prep-program that the IDSF has close ties to, is the “Ruah Nachon” (True Spirit) pre-military prep-program in Jerusalem. “Ruach Nahon” is a pre-military program that integrates religious as well as secular people, both boys and girls. “The encounter between the secular and religious may seem strange to some people, but to me it is utterly natural”, says the head of the program Meni Pirsel. “One of the guiding lines of this program is to bring a wide prism of all kinds of people to the table, with the perception that only from a place of real acquaintance and friendship, can disagreements between people be resolved”.

At the “Shuvu Ahim” program as well as the “Ruach Nahon” program, enlistment to the IDF is strongly emphasized, but according to the heads of the programs, it seems that there is a basic gap between the perceptions of the students. Meni Pirsle says that most of the young men and women in his program are highly motivated to serve, and wish to have meaningful roles in the IDF. On the other hand, Rabbi Tomal Rahamim shares that not all the students in his program are interested in meaningful service, and some of them even debate whether or not to serve in the military.

Rabbi Tomal says that he encounters two main types of issues that bother the students in his program, when it comes to military service. The first is the uncertainty in regards to the kind of service they will have to do, and the second is the fear of failure in the various challenges that await them in the military.

Rabbi Tomal admits that the educational staff does not always find it easy to address the issue of preparation for the IDF and the accompanying challenges. One of the main challenges is convincing students, who may not be interested in serving or who try to secure a marginal position, to join the army and choose a meaningful position. Another challenge is maintaining the level of enthusiasm among students who are interested in serving and making an impact. “We see many students who start the year boldly aiming for the highest positions there are”, he says “but over time, their motivation dwindles and they need to be encouraged anew”.

Meni from “Ruah Nachon” stresses that in spite of the strong motivation to serve that is typical to students at his pre-military program, he also encounters difficulties and doubts. “The fears are very individual”, he points out. “There are students who aim for brigade units and are worried that they will not be accepted, other hope to obtain cyber and intelligence roles, and there are those who are mainly worried about the conditions they will serve under – it is all very diverse”.

In order to provide answers for every question and issue that bothers them, both pre-military programs make sure to provide the students with as much military knowledge as possible and to prepare them physically for service. Along with physical training, they receive important information through lectures by military and security officers, discussions with graduates of the programs who are currently in military service, and valuable tours of the country. “The lectures and the tours provide the students with a lot of knowledge and understanding. They help them emotionally prepare for military service”, says Rabbi Tomal Rahamim. “I have no doubt that this exposure has an effect on their motivation to serve. I see how students, who stated that they do not wish to join the IDF, change their minds during the year and decide to join and even obtain a significant position”.

To Counter YouTube: The Role of High Schools and Pre-Military Prep-Programs in Building Students’ Knowledge

Preparation for meaningful military service is not the only challenge that faces educators. According to them, the current era also raises much complexity in regards to consuming knowledge. On the one hand, sources of knowledge are plentiful and more accessible compared to the past; on the other hand, it is challenging to select the correct data and construct a comprehensive and accurate picture of reality. In addition to the information overload, there is another issue related to the functioning of the formal educational system. “The educational system is based on a unified system of learning, and when teenagers are so different, there is not chance that this system is suitable to everyone”, states Meni Pirsle. “In addition, the system doesn’t prepare the youth for adult life. I see kids who are wonderful, but do not understand the basics in economy and civics. They are also not exposed to Zionist content, and most of them – both secular and religious – do not know Israel’s heritage or the history of the people of Israel. When I talk to them about the Zionist Movement, at best they know the initials of NILI”.

Rabbi Tomal Rahamim from “Shuvu Ahim” paints a similar picture. “I am always telling students that they have a serious lack of knowledge, but I actually see this as an opportunity to expose them to a new world of terms that they did not know, and that they are supposed to know. Even the students themselves realize that they do not understand, and that encourages them to invest themselves and delve deeper. They conduct research not only on Torah matters but also on topics related to the ancient and recent history of the people of Israel.

The educators also address the influence of social media on the younger generation, noting that one of their main roles is to counter the narratives found in social media and other various sources. “Our students are hungry for knowledge, but it is hard for them to obtain it”, says Rabbi Tomal. “They seek answers in places such as YouTube, and are thus exposed to mistaken or superficial messages that do not reflect the complexity that actually exists. “It is our responsibility to provide the students with tools to select what is right and what is wrong, to build for them a world of Jewish and Israeli values, and to encourage them to stick to these values”.

Meni agrees that social media constitutes quite a challenge, but also brings up another problem. “Social media mostly influences the ability of young people to concentrate”, he deems. “Most of my students are unable to sit through an entire hour-long class and listen attentively. They have to go out, to move, to do something while class is ongoing – these are characteristics of addiction, and most of them also admit to it. However, you cannot blame social media for everything. A person can be addicted to Tik-Tok and still be a person with values.”.

The IDSF Lecture: A Significant Stage Towards Encouraging Enlistment

The educational activity of the IDSF provides answers to all the challenges that were pointed out by the educators and to many other. The IDSF offers high schools and pre-military prep-programs, diversified lectures, heritage tours and meetings with senior officials of the security apparatus.

“We invite many organizations and lecturers to the pre-military program, in order to provide the students with a wide perspective, and the IDSF lectures always stand out for the excellent feedback they receive”, says Meni Pirsle. “The students are so happy with these lectures that we are thinking of allotting two set weekly times slots next year designated to lecturers from the IDSF”.

“The IDSF does such important work”, says Orin Koreat of Ort Shehakim High School. “The movement’s idea is amazing and these people who do the work are special and are only looking to do good. The lecture was very interesting and it was fun to watch the students participate, ask questions and speak from their hearts”. Orin is sure that this lecture had an effect on the students. “Each such activity sharpens the students’ understanding of who we are and what we are doing here”, she says. “Even if they did not listen to the whole lecture, they got some details that strengthened them. True, you don’t get wet from just one drop, but from many drops you get soaked”.

Rabbi Tomal Rahamim is also pleased with the collaboration with the movement. “We decided to invite the IDSF three years ago because we resonated with the movement’s agenda, and we found it intriguing”, he says. “I am happy to say that the lectures outdid our expectations. The students loved it, and since then we have been coordinating many lectures and tours”. According to Rabby Tomal, the diverse activities of the IDSF have also made an impact on the field. “I’m not suggesting that the lectures caused an immediate transformation, where a student who previously had no interest in joining the IDF suddenly wants to enlist in the Special Forces after just one lecture. However, there’s no denying that they represent a significant step towards fostering enthusiasm for IDF enlistment”, he says. “In today’s reality, where there’s an abundance of opinions and perceptions that may undermine our nation, it’s beneficial to have a movement like the IDSF that presents a clear stance, reinforcing the Israeli public”.

Press here to book IDSF lectures

הפוסט Change Begins with Education: The IDSF Movement’s Activity in High Schools and Pre-Military Prep-Programs הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Since the War of Iron Swords broke out, Israel’s construction sector has suffered severely. And recovery is nowhere in sight. Eran Rolls, chair of the Israel Construction Center, explains the coming impact of the sector’s difficulties on everybody’s pocket, but he also sends an optimistic message: “There’s a historic opportunity here to stop depending on Palestinian laborers.”

One of the first steps the IDF took on October 8 was to close off Judea and Samaria, meaning that Palestinian construction workers were prevented from entering Israel. At the same time, the Home Front Command issued guidelines that imposed restrictions on work at construction sites around the country — because of wartime directives regarding safe areas, among other things. The municipalities and local authorities also responded to the war, many deciding to suspend all construction initiatives in their territory. As a result, most construction sites in Israel were paralyzed for anywhere between several days and several weeks. Some have not yet returned to operation.

That response was appropriate and correct, but it dealt a severe blow to the Israeli construction sector. “What’s happening here at this moment is a major drama,” stresses the chair of the Israel Construction Center, Eran Rolls. “Projects all over the country are held up, and there are significant delays in transferring apartments to the buyers. It affects everyone, and the first to suffer is the state.”

No transactions, no taxes: The effect of the real-estate crisis on the national budget

In Israel’s construction sector, difficulties began long before the War of Iron Swords. Over the years, prices rose significantly for many items important to the sector. According to Rolls, land that once cost 70–80 thousand shekels costs 400 thousand shekels today. And on top of that, as if it weren’t enough, come VAT, land improvement tax, and the tax on foreign workers. All those taxes have risen significantly. The latest financial decree was the leap in interest rates, which reduced buying power and, as a result, also reduced the demand for homes. Under those challenging conditions, the war broke out and the construction sector, already staggering, suffered another jolt.

Eran Rolls stresses that the difficulties in the construction sector radiate into other sectors as well. “There are enormous industries that depend entirely on the construction sector, such as manufacturers of building materials, concrete blocks, flooring, kitchens — and they’ll all suffer,” he warns. “Of course the smaller companies and the individuals who deal with the sector, such as architects, engineers, and interior designers, also have their share of the price to pay now and in the future.” That collateral damage also affects Israel’s economy. “The country’s cash flow is headed for an abyss. A quarter of the national budget comes from takes on real-estate transactions, and without transactions there are no taxes. We’re talking about revenues of around 120 billion shekels a year, and in the coming year, by my estimate, we’ll see a shortfall of 40 to 60 billion shekels in the national budget from that accumulated damage alone. However you look at it, if the contractors have it bad, the country has it worse. I don’t know whether the leaders haven’t understood that, or whether they’ve chosen to keep it from the public.”

Reliance on Palestinian laborers: The historic opportunity to stop the plague

Before the War of Iron Swords, roughly 80 thousand laborers from Judea and Samaria were officially working in Israel, plus roughly 20 thousand from Gaza and roughly 40 thousand illegals. Some of the illegals returned to work in Israel, despite all the difficulty involved, but the workers with permits haven’t returned to Israel since October 7.

At the same time, many workers in the sector — including foremen and engineers — were called to duty immediately upon the outbreak of war, as foot soldiers and officers in combat reserve units. A considerable portion of them are still on active duty, further deepening the shortage of workers.

Various voices are calling for the simple solution: allowing the Palestinians back into Israel to work. According to Eran Rolls, such a thing must by no means be allowed to happen — not now, and not later on. “The State of Israel has developed a reliance on Palestinian laborers, and there’s a historic opportunity here to get rid of that reliance and cancel all the Palestinian laborers’ permits for entering Israel.”

Rolls explains that the Palestinian laborers create many problems for the construction sector and endanger Israel’s security. “Everyone in construction knows that the Palestinian workers do intentional damage for nationalistic reasons. And that damage adds up int the billions per year,” he says. “They sabotage the plumbing, they clog drainpipes with tar, they stream water into the circuit breaker boxes — you name it. Because the vandalism is so common and so well known, the contractors already include it in advance among the expenses that they roll onward to the customer.”

Moreover, many painful instances have demonstrated that some of the laborers are also involved in terrorism against Jews. Only recently, an unauthorized Palestinian laborer mounted a stabbing attack in Gan Yavne and a 17-year-old boy was seriously hurt. “Since October 7, we’ve been seeing an uptick in the Palestinians’ motivation for terrorism, and it doesn’t matter whether they’ve come from Gaza or from Judea and Samaria,” Rolls states. “I’ve always argued that those laborers are dangerous, and now I’m not willing at all for them to stroll around the streets here. I believe that every mayor who lets Palestinian laborers work at construction sites under his jurisdiction is an accessory to any further terror attack that happens.”

The labor shortage: We asked for 100 thousand laborers, we received 1,000

The chair of the Israel Construction Center firmly opposes allowing Palestinian laborers to return to work in Israel, but he also knows that without laborers, the contractors will be simply unable to meet their obligations.

He suggests two solutions that could fill the ranks. The first, and faster, is to bring foreign workers, and the second is to train Israeli laborers. He says that neither solution is being pursued at the required speed or scale. “We asked the state to allow a hundred thousand foreign workers in, and since the start of the war we’ve received only one thousand. That’s absurd, and it’s frustrating because thousands of laborers are just waiting to be permitted to come to Israel.”

Rolls notes that even if the state does admit the necessary quota, bringing all the laborers will still be a problem because there are no lodgings for them. “The Palestinian workers go home to sleep, but foreign workers need to be given a place to stay,” he explains. “In many countries of the world , it’s common to set up villages for them with hostel-like accommodations and with all the necessary everyday services such as a supermarket, clinic, and gym. We must set up four or five villages like that in Israel, and we certainly can, but like everything else in the country — it’s not getting planned and it’s not getting done.”

The second solution to the labor shortage is, as mentioned, to train Israeli workers. Here, in contrast, the state is trying to take action and has even inaugurated a program for encouraging employment in the construction and agricultural sectors, offering monetary grants to Israelis who undertake such jobs. According to Rolls, the incentive may do some good; but before significant change can be generated, Israelis must be re-educated about the construction sector.

“Israelis don’t like to work in construction. Apparently it’s not engrained in the Jewish DNA,” he says. “In my opinion, that’s a great shame because people don’t understand that there are different kinds of jobs in this sector. Besides building and plastering, there are interesting jobs you can make your way to, like planning air conditioning and like installing smart electrical systems. It’s also possible to earn big money. A talented person can become a foreman or a contractor and can establish a meaningful, profitable career. I’m always saying that training Israeli workers is the most important thing for the construction sector, and I try to convince young people to enter the workforce but, to my regret, there’s not enough response.”

Apartments at half price? That may be the way to thank reservists

Eran Rolls doesn’t try to hide the depth of the Israeli construction sector’s troubles, but he’s also prepared to point out some glimmers of light. The first is a marked improvement in enforcing safety. “In recent years we’ve seen cases where company owners went to jail because of work accidents at their building sites. That was certainly a deterrent,” he recounts. “Today every contracting company pays great attention to safety and makes sure to enforce all the procedures. I’m happy to say that the improvement is significant.” Another point of light has to do with the building methods, which are constantly becoming more sophisticated. Rolls stresses that although processes are more efficient under the new methods, and employees are safer, still the improvements are no substitute for workers.

There is also cause for hope, Rolls believes, in the new wave of Jewish immigration from the Diaspora. Although that wave is driven by a regrettable rise in ant-Semitism, still it does bring new residents here and they are an important market for real estate. “We’ve opened a counselling center for new immigrants who are looking for a home in Israel,” he reveals. “Of course, if we have no workers we can’t provide homes. But there definitely is potential here for growth in the construction sector.”

As the interview nears its end, Rolls asks to propose an idea that could help both the fighting forces and the Israeli economy. “I think that the reservists and the draftees who have fought in the current war deserve the privilege of buying an apartment in the periphery at a 50 percent discount,” he says. “The state wouldn’t need to put up a single shekel, it would merely receive less revenue from those transactions. I see it as a way of thanking the fighters. The nicest bonus we could give them. And I’d like to see it happen.”

הפוסט “If the contractors have it bad – the country has it worse”: an interview with the chair of the Israel Construction Center הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.